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Tales of Philip II under the Roman Empire:

Aspects of Monarchy and Leadership in the Anecdotes, *Apophthegmata*, and *Exempla* of Philip II

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role anecdotes, *apophthegmata*, and *exempla* play in the historiography of the Macedonian king Philip II in the Roman world - from the first century BCE to the fourth century CE. Most of the material examined comes from moral treatises, collections of tales and sayings, and military works by Greek and Latin authors such as Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, Aelian, Polyaenus, Frontinus, and Stobaeus (supplemented with pertinent material from other authors). This approach will show that while many of the tales surely originate from the earlier Greek world and Hellenistic times, the use and manipulation of the majority of them and the presentation of Philip are the product of a world living under Roman political and cultural domination.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one defines and discusses anecdotal material in the ancient world. Chapter two examines two emblematic ancient authors (Plutarch and Valerius Maximus) as case studies to demonstrate in detail the type of analysis required by all the authors of this study. Following this, the thesis then divides the material of our authors into four main areas of interest, particularly concerning Philip as a king and statesman. Therefore, chapter three examines Philip and justice. Chapter four looks at Philip and tales of criticism and self-control. Chapter five studies Philip and tales of friendship and politics. The final chapter examines material mostly of a military nature (though not exclusively), and concerns Philip as a warrior and general. All these studies show in the end that the tales of Philip II speak to a wider perspective than their internal details would at first suggest. Instead they are an important part of the Roman world's evolving dialogue on politics, power, war and society.

This thesis argues that one notable role of this material was to present Philip didactically as a largely positive exemplar during the Roman Empire, particularly in terms of monarchy, statesmanship and generalship. Though negative tales also do exist, these seem to have their roots in the more hostile traditions that followed closely the works of authors such as Demosthenes and Theopompus and are less popular. All these tales allowed for an engagement with Philip's legacy on a broad social spectrum. However, this connection occurred particularly within elite circles. Here the dissemination of Philippic tales through rhetorical handbooks, education, speeches, collections of sayings and tales, panegyric, and military handbooks gave rise to a wealth of flexible and recognizable images of Philip as a model and paradigm for a class of Roman and Greek politicians and intellectuals who faced the realities of autocratic government. However, Philip's tales were also heavy in social and civic symbolism and values which could be applied to any and all individuals. Therefore, the themes, virtues and morals of Philip's diverse reception provided an image and exemplar which easily traversed age and social class. In conclusion, this thesis emphasises a practice by which Philip and his image were appropriated and manipulated to become important touchstones for social, civic, and governmental values during the constant political and cultural evolutions taking place in the Roman world as it moved from republic to entrenched empire.

Declaration by author

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

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Keywords

philip II, macedonian history, greek and roman history, anecdotes, reception studies.

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Tales of Philip II under the Roman Empire

Aspects of monarchy and Leadership in the Anecdotes, *Apophthegmata* and *Exempla* of Philip II

By Michael Thomas James Welch

...οὔ πω εἰδόθ' ὁμοιίου πολέμοιο,
οὐδ' ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσι.
τοὔνεκά με προέηκε διδασκέμεναι τάδε πάντα,
μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων (*Il.* 9.440-43).[1]

Τοῖς δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δημαγωγοῖς ἔφη χάριν ἔχειν, ὅτι λοιδοροῦντες αὐτὸν
βελτίονα ποιοῦσι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ ἤθει· "πειρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἅμα καὶ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ
τοῖς ἔργοις ψευδομένους ἐλέγχειν (Plut. *Mor.* 177E = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 7)."[2]

[1] '...knowing nothing as yet of evil war, nor of assemblies in which men become preeminent. For this reason he sent me to instruct you in all things, to be both a speaker of words and a doer of deeds.' All translations are from the *Loeb* editions, unless otherwise stated.

[2] 'He (Philip) said that he felt very grateful to the popular leaders of the Athenians, because by maligning him they made him better both in speech and in character, "For I try both by my words and by my deeds to prove that they are the liars."'

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τί τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου μέρεσι διαπρακτέον ἐστίν· (Isoc. *Ep.* 6.8).[3]

Thesis Rationale

There is an intriguing gap in our knowledge of Philip II of Macedon (382-336 BCE). What role do anecdotes, *apophthegmata*, and *exempla* play in the historiography of this extraordinary Macedonian king? This gap is significant, as this material was influential in the shaping and use of Philip's image and memory in antiquity.[4] This means it could also have an important potential role in modern evaluations of Philip's life, reign and legacy.[5] To date there has been no systematic attempt to examine this type of Philippic material as a whole in its own right. Individually, they feature occasionally in modern biographies of Philip and his period, but they are often inadequately discussed or understood beyond their immediate context.

This thesis argues that one notable role of this material was to present Philip didactically as a largely positive exemplar of words and deeds during the Roman Empire, particularly in terms of monarchy, statesmanship, generalship (often collectively referred to as monarchic ideology in this thesis), and leadership (which appealed more broadly to anyone who held authority or influence

[3] 'What is the object to be accomplished by the discourse as a whole and by its parts?'

[4] Three main works inspired the formation of this thesis - Diana Spencer's 2002 study of Philip's son Alexander in the Roman world; Brian Bosworth's 2009 Trendall lecture on Alexander, anecdotes and apophthegm; and Agnès Molinier's 1995 paper on Philip in sections of Cicero and Seneca.

[5] **On Philip II** - Hogarth 1897; Momigliano 1934; Wüst 1938; Cloché 1955; Kienast 1973; Ellis 1976; Cawkwell 1978; *HM* 2 – 1979; Wirth 1985; Tsimboukides 1985; Bosworth 1988: 5-18; Buckler 1989; Hammond 1994; Thomas 2006: 69-88; Worthington 2008b and 2014: 25-119; Gabriel 2010; and Müller 2010: 166-185 – with bibliographical essay. See also the collections in Perlman (ed.) 1973; Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos (eds) 1980; Adams and Borza (eds) 1982; and Carney and Ogden (eds) 2010. Cf. the useful **review articles** of Borza 1978a: 236-243; 1978b 97-101; and Errington 1981: 69-88. **On Macedonian history and culture** - Barr-Sharrar and Borza (eds) 1982; Sakellariou (ed.) 1983; *HM* 1, 2, and 3; Hammond 1989; Borza 1990; Errington 1990; Vokotopoulou (ed.) 1993; Ginouvès (ed.) 1994; Carney 2000; and Roisman and Worthington (eds.) 2010; cf. review essay on this material – Carney 1991: 179-89. **On fourth-century Greek history** – Hornblower 1983; and Buckler 2003.

over others).[6] This was unsurprising for a man, 'who had made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time' (Diod. 16.95.1). Though negative tales and visions of Philip also do exist – these seem to have their roots in the more hostile traditions that followed closely the classical works of authors such as Demosthenes and Theopompus and feature largely in rhetorical handbooks (e.g. the elder Seneca *Controv.* 3.8, 7.3.4, 10.5.4 and Cic. *Tusc.* 5.14.42).[7] It is clear that Philip was far from forgotten after his death. Instead, he remained a significant figure in popular, scholarly, and political circles right through into the Roman period and beyond.[8]

Tales, anecdotes, *exempla* and *apophthegmata* of Philip the king, statesman, and general saturated ancient consciousness. It was this cultural cognizance or collective memory which allowed for an engagement with Philip's legacy on a broad social spectrum. However, this connection occurred particularly within elite circles. Here the dissemination of Philippic tales through rhetorical handbooks, education, speeches, collections of sayings and tales, letters, panegyric, and military handbooks gave rise to a wealth of flexible and recognizable images of Philip as a model and paradigm for a class of Roman and Greek politicians and intellectuals who faced the realities of autocratic government. Indeed, under the principate the elites' political aspirations were curtailed. This disenfranchisement from power meant that tales of leadership provided by Philip and other notable exemplars were reconfigured to concentrate mainly on the imperial throne. However, Philip's tales were also heavy in social and civic symbolism and values which could be applied to any and all individuals. Therefore, the themes, virtues and morals of Philip's miscellaneous history provided an image and exemplar which easily traversed social boundaries.[9]

Therefore, this thesis emphasises a practice by which Philip and his image were appropriated and manipulated to become important touchstones during the constant political and cultural evolutions taking place in the Roman world from the late Republic to the high empire.[10]

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[6] Propertius for one thought that Philip (and most of his successors) enjoyed a generally more positive image in his time (3.11.39-40).

[7] Cf. Molinier 1995: 61; Leopold 1981: 227-246 and Opitz 1976.

[8] For Roman attitudes towards the Greeks in general – Petrochilos 1974.

[9] Cf. Spencer 2002: xiv, 35, 181-82, and 189. Eyben's 1974 work on the good example or model (termed the concrete ideal) in the life of a young Roman argues that they were an 'observable nature, the personification of the values one wishes to realize in life… a person one wishes to emulate' (200). Moreover, as the Roman pedagogic ideal was based on the influence of the good example, Seneca writes that a young Roman should act like their model (who could be chosen from among present and past notable individuals) is always watching them (Sen. *Ep.* 11.8, 52; cf. *Ep.* 25. 5-6 and Epict. *Ench.* 33). Both Plutarch (*Prof. Virt.* 15.85AB) and Seneca (*Ep.* 11.10; 25.6) advised their pupils to find their examples in the distant past. Though Alexander was surely more popular (cf. Eyben 1974: 202), Philip must also have had some interest among young Romans. On moral authorities under the early Roman Empire – Morgan 2007: 207-234, esp. 216-225.

[10] E.g. Ovid's implication that Sextus' owned land once controlled by Philip (*Ex Ponto* 4.15.15); Caesar's use of the threat Philip once posed towards Athens in speech to the senate as a point of comparison to the danger of Maroboduus to Rome (Tact. *Ann.* 2.63); Appian's comparative use of Philip's achievements (*Pref.* 10), as well as equating the punishment of Philip's murderers to those of Caesar (*Bell. Civ.* 2.21.154); and even Marcus Aurelius' use of Philip as a figure with which to meditate on the will of Nature (9.29).

While many of the tales are surely from the earlier Greek world and Hellenistic times, the use and manipulation of the majority of them and the presentation of Philip are the product of a world living under Roman political and cultural domination. Philip's anecdotes speak to a wider perspective than their internal details would at first suggest. Instead, they form part of this later period's evolving dialogue on politics, power, war and society. Therefore, the primary role for these anecdotes is not the discovery of objective historical accounts of Philip. Instead, it is their role as texts speaking to various contemporary literary and cultural milieus which should be appreciated.

It was a role Philip shared with many other famous individuals of Greek and Roman history, some of whom were more or less popular depending on the author and his work.[11] However, it was a role epitomized by his own son Alexander, whose fame and prominence surely aided Philip's own longevity and popularity in literature and culture.[12] Moreover, even though Philip's legacy and later role through these texts were not of the same order or magnitude as those of Alexander – they were still considerable.[13] Philip certainly eclipsed many other kings and statesmen of note in these texts (particularly many Classical heroes and Hellenistic kings), all of which goes some way to validating his status as an exemplar of a ruler, statesman and general of considerable value for the Roman world. Indeed, it is telling that Philip is the second most mentioned individual and king after Alexander in Aelian's *Varia Historia*[14] and Plutarch's *Regum et Imperatorum Apopthegmata*,[15] and has a healthy nine mentions in Valerius Maximus.[16] Moreover, when it comes to tales of generalship, Philip is one of the more popular figures to be found in both Polyaenus[17] and

[11] Popularity is a numbers game and does not equate to status or characterization.

[12] Philip was not the earliest Macedonian king to feature in collections of tales and sayings e.g. Archelaus – Ael. *V.H.* 2.21; 8.9; 12.43; 13.4; 14.17; and Amyntas III – Ael. *V.H.* 4.8; 12.43; 12.60. Cf. Archelaus - Plut. *Mor.* 177A-B. Though there is considerably less material.

[13] I disagree with Molinier's comment that '*les anecdotes sur lui sont relativement peu nombreuses et se recoupent plus ou moins*' (1995: 61). This thesis shows that there are more than is to be expected, but perhaps less than hoped for by Molinier.

[14] Philip is named twenty-six times in Aelian: anecdotes – 3.45; 4.19; 6.1; 7.12; 8.12; 8.15; 12.51; 12.60; 13.11; 14.48. Philip mentioned only - 1.25; 2.25; 3.17; 3.32; 4.29; 10.4; 12.14 (14.46c); 12.43; 12.53; 12.54; 12.57; 12.64; 13.7; 13.36; 14.47a; cf. 12.16 which is a double of 14.47a, but Philip has dropped out. *N.b.* the anecdote told at 9.36 stars Antigonus, but the same story is told by Plutarch (*Mor.* 67F) about Philip. Therefore, Philip is the fourth most mentioned individual in Aelian after his son (thirty-eight), and the two philosophers Socrates (thirty-five) and Plato (thirty-one).

[15] Philip has thirty-one entries under his name (*Mor.* 177C-179D), only three less than his son Alexander (thirty-four), and significantly more than many other famous individuals (including Romans) e.g. Epaminondas (twenty-four), Antigonus (eighteen), Themistocles (seventeen), Dionysius (thirteen), Alcibiades (seven), Cato the elder (twenty-nine), Scipio the younger (twenty-three), Pompey (fifteen), Caesar (fifteen), and Augustus (fifteen). However, Philip is also one of the main protagonist in five other entries of this work (*Mor.* 174E-F (x2), 179D (x2), 192B), and a further eight in the *Apophthegmata Laconica* (*Mor.* 215B, 216A-B (x2), 217F, 218E-F (x2), 221F, 233E). This gives a grand total of forty-four entries in Plutarch's collections of sayings which directly involve Philip. Only two other individuals have more – Alexander, with well over fifty, and king Agesliaus, who has over ninety-one (seventy-nine of which are in the *Apophthegmata Laconica*).

[16] There are altogether nine references to Philip in Valerius Maximus. There are five by name - 1.8.ext.9; 6.2.ext.1; 7.2.ext.10; 8.14.ext.4; 9.5.ext.1; three by unnamed reference - 1.8.ext.10; 1.8.ext.11; 6.4.ext.4; and one that is a reference to Philip's destruction of Stagira, but instead names Alexander as the perpetrator - 5.6.ext.5.

[17] Philip is the main protagonist of twenty-two *exempla* in book four of Polyaenus (4.2.1-22), second only to Alexander with thirty-two (cf. Hammond 1996: 23-53). These two kings, along with Antigonus (twenty-one *exempla*) account for

Frontinus[18] with thirty-four entries dedicated to his generalship. Indeed, with one of the functions of literature to provide role models (Quint. *Inst.* 1.8.5ff., 10.1.86ff.), Philip proved to be a popular figure in the Roman world with tales, sayings and mentions of him to be found in a vast range of authors across many different genres and periods of the Roman empire.[19]

This is a valuable study because Philip's anecdotal material should be embraced as an important branch of the historical tradition that surrounds Philip, his characterization, and the use of his image and memory – particularly in works of non-historical narrative.[20] Hence, anecdotes, *apophthegmata*, and *exempla* had a role in the formation and dissemination of Philip's character within antiquity. This reveals a strong focus on Philip's role as a king and subsequently as a monarchic exemplar through the proliferation and distribution of these tales – especially for Roman emperors and social elites who looked to examples from the past as they adapted to monarchy. Therefore, the primary motivation of this thesis is to explore the idea of Philip in these tales and anecdotes as an archetypal monarch, statesman, and general - good and bad (*agathos* and *kakos*, *bonus* and *malus*).[21] Moreover, as there is a tendency for modern historians to use or discount this material without suitable consideration of the many literary, rhetorical, didactic and educational, social, and political factors that lay behind it, and subsequently behind Philip's portrayal. This dissertation will allow at least this one function, Philip as exemplar of leadership, to be considered and better understood.

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over seventy-five of the one hundred and five *exempla* of the Macedonians of book four. In terms of the entire collection, Philip is tied for fourth with Dionysius I. Philip far outshines other prominent generals and statesmen of Greek history such as Themistocles (eighteen), Alcibiades (nine), Lysander (five), Epaminondas (fifteen), Pelopidas (three), Demetrius (twelve), and Agathocles (eight). Wheeler (2010: 37-38) makes the point that Polyaenus has undoubtedly been selective, though his criteria for exclusion and inclusion are unknown.

[18] Philip has twelve mentions in Frontinus – 1.3.4; 1.4.13; 1.4.13a; 2.1.9; 2.3.2; 2.8.14; 3.3.5; 3.9.8; 4.1.6; 4.2.4; 4.5.12; and 4.7.37. This makes Philip equal fourth with Epaminondas for foreigner *exempla* behind Hannibal (forty-five), Alexander (seventeen), and Mithradates (thirteen). This is noticeably more than other famous foreigners like Iphicrates (nine), Agesilaus (eight), Alcibiades (eight), Pericles (six) and Themistocles (four), Pelopidas (three), and Dionysius (three). It also equates well with the Roman *exempla* e.g. Julius Caesar (twenty eight), Pompey (sixteen), Sertorius (fourteen), Cato (twelve), Marius and Sulla (eleven each), and Antony (eight).

[19] For example, (in a list not exhaustive but representative) Philip can be found in Plutarch, Cicero, Aulus Gellius, Athenaeus, Cornelius Nepos, Dio Cassius, Quintilian, Propertius, Ovid, Livy, Polybius, Tacitus, Suetonius, Seneca, Seneca the elder, Pliny the younger, Pliny the elder, Strabo, Pausanias, Horace, Appian, Marcus Aurelius, Sextus Empiricus, Philostratus, Josephus, Diogenes Laertius, Julian, Vitruvius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Epictetus, Libanius, and Lucian.

[20] For overviews on the ancient evidence surrounding Philip's reign – Worthington 2008: 210-215; and Errington 1990: 299-301; on specific ancient authors - Connor 1967: 133-154; Shrimpton 1977: 123-44, 1991; and Flower 1994 (**Theopompus *FGrH* 115**); Barber 1935; Drews 1962: 383-92; 1963: 244-55; Rubincam 1976: 357-661; and Schepens 1977: 95-118 (**Ephorus *FGrH* 70**); Pearson 1960: 22-49; Pédech 1984: 15-69; Prandi 1985 (**Callisthenes *FGrH* 124**); Heckel 1980: 444-62 (**Marsyas *FGrH* 135**); Alonso-Núnez 1987: 56-72; Hammond 1991: 496-508; Heckel and Develin 1994; Yardley 2003 (**Pompeius Trogus and Justin**); Sacks 1990; 1994: 213-32; McQueen 1995; and Green 2006 (**Diodorus Siculus**); Cawkwell 1960: 416-38; Sealey 1993; Harris 1995; Worthington (ed.) 2000; Ryder 2000: 45-89; Buckler 2000: 114-58; Carey 2000 (**Demosthenes and Aeschines**). See chapter three for **Plutarch**. References for all other authors of importance are found throughout.

[21] Detailed discussion of the language of popular morality – Morgan 2007: 191-206.

Methodology and Approach

This thesis will not consider all references available for Philip. Having surveyed the extant material in relation to Philip this would be both unnecessary and counter-productive.[22] A thorough utilization of the material found in the anecdote, *apophthegmata*, and *exempla* collections by Greek and Latin authors such as Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, Aelian, Polyaenus, Frontinus, and Stobaeus (supplemented with pertinent material from other authors) serves equally well to make and illustrate all the necessary points and arguments bearing any relation to this dissertation's *raison d'être*. Therefore, that material which offers possible insights on aspects of monarchy and leadership has been given priority.

There are several reasons for this study. The most important is to ascertain the fundamental contribution that these tales and sayings make to our understanding of Philip and his role as an exemplar during the Roman period. This would allow this material to be an essential component of assessments of Philip and his reign. It will also show that by presenting Philip and articulating differing perspectives on his character and rule, successive generations of the ancients exploited much of this material to denigrate or eulogize Philip. At the very least, they exhibited details or opinions derivative of it. Moreover, the authors of these tales are products of the Roman world, and therefore they produced texts which tell us something of Philip as well as the contemporary concerns and agendas of a period which still held Philip up as a meaningful figure with which to think. Like his son Alexander, Philip offered 'an archetype for monarchy and charismatic autocracy' (Spencer 2002: xix) with which to meditate on existing political and social environments.

Most of the texts of this thesis are not historical narratives. However, they do draw upon history, philosophical traditions, popular traditions, and popular morality to conjure up Philip's image.[23] Moreover, from the regular appearance of Philip in texts of the Roman world, from the late republic to the height of the empire (peaking unsurprisingly in the literary *Zeitgeist* of the Second Sophistic),[24] it seems that there was something of an informed audience to appreciate his appearance. It was an audience prepared enough to receive and examine Philip as part of a wider

[22] This reflects Tigerstedt's thinking. He set limits to his study of the Laconian *apopthegmata* (1974: 16-30), noting on material not to be included that they 'would needlessly make the investigation more difficult without changing the results' (1974: 17).

[23] Popular traditions were traditions that had wider circulation away from more traditional historical texts (though they too could proliferate them). On popular morality, Morgan defines it as, 'ethical ideas which were in wide circulation around the Empire and widely shared up and down the social spectrum' (2007: 1), or even by geographically separate groups (2007: 2). Though not all values will have been 'equally applicable' or 'appealing' to every person (2007: 2). Cf. Morgan 1997: 3-4.

[24] Cf. Whitmarsh 2005: 4-5.

movement to define Roman political, cultural, social, and military activity and progress. Additionally, it seems assured that popular access to Philip's tales happened beyond the textual world of written histories that catered mostly to the literate elite.[25] Instead, performance and readings from alternative texts for mass audiences offered avenues for wider dissemination of Philip's image into public consciousness.[26] Though little direct evidence exists, it was surely from this wider dissemination that popular traditions and conversations (though instigated from within the elite) took place. Moreover, 'the degree to which groups up and down the social scale shared and exchanged aspects of their culture' (Morgan 2007: 5), must not be underestimated.

However, these empire wide conversations about Philip were for the most part divorced from recovering historical facts. Instead, the examination, presentation, and dissemination of Philip's tales and his image (like those of his counterparts in history) were often about cultural definition - that of the self and the other, in a complex and multi-valued Graeco-Roman world. Philip's tales help define wider social, political, and cultural norms and values at almost any strata of society in an ever evolving and transitioning world. Therefore, what is offered is an image of Philip and Philippic qualities which were useful for individual and collective self-definition (and improvement) in the Roman world.[27] As Morgan argues, 'texts are products of societies as well as individuals, and writers, readers and listeners contribute to society as well as to their immediate circle (2007: 11).' Therefore, instead of mining these tales for the 'historical Philip', as if one once existed in literary or anecdotal form – this thesis offers a different approach to these texts. Therefore, the Philip presented and discussed in this thesis is that which is constructed from his anecdotes.

This study is ultimately more about the search for the causes and reasons behind the recording and dissemination of this material, and its role in Philip's legacy as a monarch, than the material's historicity.[28] Indeed, with the material's strong biographical tendencies, the search is ultimately more about motives and methods than truth.[29] This is important in terms of assessing our ancient authors' attitudes to Philip, and by extension, the support for modern views of this

[25] The Roman world probably had around twenty per-cent male literacy (much lower female literacy). Cf. Morgan 2007: 3; 1998: 39-42, 50-89, 120-51 and Harris 1989 3-24. Morgan argues that, 'the written sources on which we depend so heavily can never be trusted to refer to the great majority of people (2007: 3).' On the difficulties of recognising popular Roman culture in literary sources – Horsfall 2003: 20-30.
[26] Cf. Spencer 2002: 31-32; Morgan 2007: 4.
[27] Cf. Spencer 2002: 51.
[28] Exhibiting one's wisdom was just one such motivation e.g. Isoc. *Pan.* 9.
[29] On the insoluble problem of truth in anecdotes – Beck 1998: 8. Useful also in this respect is Elizabeth Baynham's 1998 work on Quintus Curtius which argued that Curtius was 'not interested in a definitive history of Alexander as much as in the literary, rhetorical, and moral prospects his reign presented' (1998: 100); and with his focus on ideas like *fortuna* and *regnum* and the Roman ideals of *libertas*, *fides*, and *pietas*, Curtius' history of Alexander was also a contemplation of Roman Imperial power.

Macedonian king.[30] Certainly, the utilization or omission of this material can have profound ramifications. Moreover, by moving away from the persistent idea of seeking concrete facts in this type of material, this thesis will also make a contribution to other less studied areas and authors of Philippic studies.

We might sympathise with Bent that if our estimate of men is largely made up of little illustrative facts, it is important that these illustrations be correct, or the deductions from them will be wrong.[31] However, with no way of conclusively testing much of this material, it is probably more fruitful in the larger scheme of things to understand the contextual aspects of the material than whether or not the illustration is true or not. This allows for arguably larger and more interesting perspectives and arguments regarding the material and its generation and dissemination.

Thesis Outline

After defining and discussing anecdotal material in the ancient world, this study examines two emblematic ancient authors as case studies to demonstrate in detail the type of analysis required by the authors of this study. Following this, the thesis surveys four main areas of interest. The first three mostly concern Philip as a king and statesman, particularly around topics such as justice, criticism and self-control, and friendship and politics. The last is mostly martial (though not exclusively), and concerns Philip as a warrior and general.[32] To survey these four areas, this study often examines how the Philippic material itself was organized, developed, utilized, and presented by the various authors who employed it. This has meant scrutinizing their textual composition, including themes, language, historical content, as well as implicit and explicit commentary. It also means engaging with Philip's self-generated images, those fashioned in philosophical traditions, the counter images shaped by his enemies and detractors, and ultimately – how subsequent periods

[30] Attitudes to Philippic studies and Philip have reflected an inadequacy of balanced sources, as contemporary evidence for Philip is largely Greek, not Macedonian. Moreover, it is Athenian and mainly anti-Macedonian (Ellis 1976: 6). However, Philip did enjoy support from some Athenian intellectuals (Markle 1976: 80-99). Revisionist approaches have taken place in recent years with wider acceptance of more positive assessments of Philip (e.g. Diod. 16.95.1), as well as more Macedonian orientated approaches to writing the history of the mid-fourth century (Borza 1990: 189-91; cf. Worthington 2008 and Gabriel 2010). With much of the material of this study separate and running counter to the main currents of anti-Macedonian/anti-Philip source material, this material could find itself a revised or even rehabilitated pool of evidence more in line with recent trends towards a more positive assessment of Philip's goals and achievements.

[31] 1892: 354.

[32] Future studies could focus on other tales featuring Philip under other collective headings e.g. 'Philip and his Family' – Ael. *V.H.* 4.19, 12.43, 13.11, 13.36; Cic. *De Off.* 1.26, 2.14, 2.15, 2.53; *De Orat.* 3.35; Plut. *Mor.* 70B-C, 141B-C, 177C, 178B, 178C, 178E-F, 179C, 179D, 327E-F, 799E, 806B; *Al.* 2.2-3, 2.4, 3.1, 5.1, 5.2-3, 6, 9.4-5, 9.6; *Per.* 1.5; *Sert.* 1.4; *Marcus Antoninus* 27.11-12; Val. Max. 7.2.ext.10, IX.5.ext.1; Quint. 1.1.22-24; Athen. 10.435a; or 'Philip and Religion, the Metaphysical, and Death' – Ael. *V.H.* 3.45; Val. Max. 1.8.ext.9, 8.14.ext.4; Suet. *Cal.* 57; Plut. *Mor.* 105A-B, 177C; *Al.* 3.4-5, 10.4; *Phoc.* 16.6; *Dem.* 22.1-2; Paus. 9.29.8-9.

understood any of them.[33] Certainly, this analysis is a welcome move away from the study of more traditional material on Philip. However, the relationship between this anecdotal material and the traditional historical repositories of Diodorus and Justin could be of special interest – particularly the comparison between their accounts and this material's overt didactic moralizing in the form of short-hand rhetorically presented virtues, vice, and curiosities.

This thesis helps modern scholars to begin to understand how best to use, or not to use, this material in their studies of Philip and his reign. A thorough understanding of an author's motives, sources, literary skill, agenda, and audience certainly enables better comprehension of the passage. This will hopefully displace the tendency of some historians to selectively deploy this material, and allow greater comprehension of its contextual background.[34] Moreover, looking at the material through this particular lens also adds a layer of richness which can only further Philippic and anecdotal studies.

This investigation provides a valuable contribution to classical studies in five principal areas.

1. The presentation and application of Philippic anecdotes, *apophthegmata*, and *exempla* (Philip's legacy and image) in broader discussions surrounding monarchy and leadership under the Roman empire

2. Studies into monarchic ideology and its use and dissemination in anecdotal material

3. The collection and use of anecdotes, *apophthegmata*, and *exempla* of famous individuals in antiquity

4. Studies into the literary and historical value of specific authors and their genres of literature, particularly in terms of their aims, motives, methods, and their audience

5. The role played by these tales and sayings in Philippic history and historiography

Philip, Monarchic Ideology, and Macedonian Receptions

To examine anecdotal material, it is necessary to discuss the specific relationship between individual tales and their immediate contexts. It is likely that the great majority of our material must have existed in earlier periods – including Philip's own lifetime (though it is often impossible to prove). However, examining this material in the context in which it survives today means articulating its existence, function, and reception under the Roman Empire. To do this, overarching

[33] Cf. Carney and Ogden eds. 2010: xx.

[34] Wardle commented *prior* to undertaking his 1998 translation and commentary of Valerius Maximus book one – 'Valerius Maximus was to me one of those authors into whom historians dip for minor details, not one to be read continuously or to be evaluated in his own right' (1988: *Preface* v).

relationships for our material need to be established – unifying ideas that explain both content and form.

Kingship in the Greek World

Examining this anecdotal material, the content is a heterogeneous array of tales and sayings heavily imbued with moral and leadership qualities, and implicit and explicit judgements about a Macedonian king. The forms these tales take are for the most part necessary for the easy conveyance or exemplification of those qualities and judgements. These facts alone clearly relate our material to didactic literature, and in particular ancient 'monarchic ideology'. Indeed, an essential aspect of ancient conceptions of monarchy was that a monarch could be defined in large part by their character, particularly through the possession or absence of certain virtues or vices.[35] It was an idea that went at least as far back as the fourth century BCE, where justifications of legitimate monarchic rule rested on ascribed or proclaimed moral or character foundations.[36] This continued into the Roman Empire, where what distinguished between a 'good' and 'bad' emperor was personal character.[37] This unifying ideology may explain in part the survival of this material about Philip from his period right through into the Roman period (though most material survives from the Roman world through to late Antiquity). Therefore, as contemporary social and political structures continually evolved in the ancient world, successive generations of Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman leaders would have come into contact with Philip and his complex image and legacy through both historical narratives and this anecdotal material.[38]

By the time Philip was threatening the autonomy of the Greek city-states, the Greeks were already involved in conversations about the merits of one-man rule, and the belief that a ruler must possess certain virtues.[39] These conversations took the form of philosophical, biographical, and rhetorical texts from the period just before Philip's accession.[40] It was these texts, by writers sympathetic to monarchy, that gave rise to a monarchic ideology at whose heart lay a ruler's

[35] Noreña 2011: 38. On monarchy in Greek thought and politics – Luraghi 2013: 11-24. For the various areas of *moral exhortation* in antiquity – Malherbe 1986.
[36] Luraghi 2013: 12.
[37] Noreña 2011: 38. On regal image and bodily appearance as part of this reflection on the ideal monarch – Tatum 1996: 139-41.
[38] Cf. Spencer 2002: 29; and 2010: 175.
[39] On pre-Hellenistic reflections on monarchy – Bertelli 2002: 17-28; Frolov 1974: 401-434; Elder 1995: 153-173; and Cartledge 2009: 96-103. On a ruler's personal virtues in pre-classical thought – Noreña 2011 39 n. 3.
[40] Goodenough 1928: 55-57; Walbank 1984: esp. 75-81; and Noreña 2009: 2.

personal virtues.[41] However, the problem of defining the good ruler was only approachable in the beginning through the discourse of tyranny.[42] Thereby the image of the good *basileus* was created by turning the many vices of the *tyrannos* into their opposites.[43]

Influential in this movement were the sophists, who had helped to define the virtues, related them to the State as well as to personal life, and used exemplars from myth and poetry.[44] Also influential was the development of encomiastic biography, and the writings of Isocrates - particularly his *Evagoras*, *To Nicocles*, and *Nicocles*.[45] With these epideictic-toned works and others, Isocrates greatly aided the rhetorical development of monarchic ideology.[46] This Isocrates did through his use of a canon of virtues in encomium (e.g. *Evag.* 22-23),[47] and his focus on the ruler's excellence and role as a *paradeigma*.

> Μιμοῦ τὰ τῶν βασιλέων ἤθη καὶ δίωκε τὰ ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύματα· δόξεις γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ζηλοῦν....ἰσχυρότατον μέντοι νόμον ἡγοῦ τὸν ἐκείνων τρόπον (Isoc. *Ad Dem.* 1.36).[48]

Xenophon too was influential – especially his *Cyropaedia* and *Agesilaus*. Heavy with Socratic influence, the former presented an idealized king who displayed in addition to his great abilities as a general: clemency, generosity, benevolence, and justice.[49] The latter work became 'one of the

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[41] Noreña 2011: 39.

[42] On the ways in which *tyrannoi* legitimized their positions in the Greek world – Mann 2013: 25-48.

[43] Luraghi 2013: 19 and Haake 2013: 165-206 esp. 176. Greek political discourse had a standardized portrait of a *turannos* and his characteristic vices of cruelty, greediness, cunningness, sexual incontinence, annoyance at flattery and intolerance of free speech (Luraghi 2013: 17 and 2013B). It is no surprise that when leaders such as Philip were attacked as tyrants by orators and the like (e.g. Demosthenes, Hyperides and Theopompus), it was these vices – the opposites to the virtues of the good *basileus* - which are routinely referenced. Moreover, any image of a powerful sole ruler was always at odds with the ideology of the Greek *polis* (Haake 2013B: 179).

[44] North 1966: 85-120, 123. On sophists and the earliest literary discussions of monarchy – Stroheker 1954: 381-412.

[45] On Isocrates, Xenophon and the development of encomiastic biography – Hägg 2012: 10-66. This biographic focus on statesmen was paralleled and no doubt influenced by that which centred on philosophers and wise men. On Isocrates in general – Papillon 2010: 58-74; and monarchy – Bringmann 1965: 19-27 and Blois and Bons 1992: 169-173. Cf. Jaeger 1947: 84-105 on *To Nicocles*.

[46] On Isocrates popularity in later periods (including Rome's Imperial age), Blois and Bons argue that Isocrates 'featured prominently in the *koine* of popular ideas that was passed down in the rhetorical-literary education of the Greeks in Hellenistic and Roman times' (1992: 185; cf. 168, 172-73, 187). Certainly, quotations from *Ad Demonicum*, *Ad Nicoclem*, and *Nicocles* had an enduring popularity in gnomic anthologies (Morgan 2007: 94). On rhetoric in Graeco-Roman education – Clark 1957.

[47] Cf. North 1966: 143, 145-147; and Blois and Bons 1992: 169. The *Evagoras* is focused on the virtues of justice, wisdom, courage, and *sophrosune* (the so called cardinal virtues). However, Isocrates (like Xenophon in his *Agesilaus*) adds piety when he praises Theseus (*Helen* 31; cf. *On the Peace* 63; and *Panath.* 204, 216) (North 1966: 147). Isocrates also often used hierarchies among the virtues – *Ad Dem.* 6, 19, 38; *Phil.* 125 ff.; *Ad Nic.* 30, 31; and *Panath.* 72 (North 1966: 146 n. 68). On Isocrates and Xenophon – Gray 2000: 142-54.

[48] 'Pattern after the character of kings, and follow closely their ways. For you will thus be thought to approve them and emulate them…but consider their manner of life your highest law.' Cf. Isoc. *Ad. Dem.* 2, 11, 12; *Ad Nic.* 31, 38, 40; *Nic.* 57; *Ad Phil.* 113; *Evag.* 76-77 and Jaeger 1947: 101.

[49] Ambler 2001: 4. On Xenophon – Gray (ed.) 2010; Dillery 1995; and Anderson 1974. On the *Cyropaedia* – Gray (ed.) 2010: 327-453; 2011: 25-30; Ambler 2001; Gera 1993: esp. 26-131 (on Socratic influence); Nadon 1996: 361-74; 2001; Due 1989, 1999, 2002; and Tatum 1989. On the influence of the *Cyropaedia* on later ideas of leadership – Due 1993: 53-60. *N.b.* Alexander's career reflects considerable familiarity with the *Cyropaedia* – and later Scipio Africanus, Cicero and Julius Caesar certainly read and made use of it (Gray 2011: 9-12, 54-55 with refs).

fountainheads of eulogy in Graeco-Roman rhetoric and historiography' (North 1966: 129).[50] Drawing on the rhetorical tradition, Xenophon was at the forefront of developments in praise and blame literature in the fourth-century BCE - using techniques which led to authors like Theopompus.[51] Moreover, like Isocrates, Xenophon also thought that a king should be a *paradeigma* for his subjects (e.g. *Ages.*10.2; *Cyrop*. 8.1.30) and enjoy their *eunoia* and *charis* (e.g. *Mem.* 4.6.12; *Hiero* 11.7ff.; and *Oec.* 21).[52] Because of the special influence of these two authors on most aspects of leadership and monarchic ideology around Philip's period (including the way in which many of Philip's own tales would have been conceived, framed, and received), this thesis has noted comparative material and references from them throughout so as to contextualize Philip's tales better in the intellectual and elite (perhaps popular) ideologies of his world.

Also influential in monarchic ideology were the philosophical works of Plato with its philosopher kings,[53] and Aristotle who favourably defined monarchy (sharply distinguished from tyranny), not by institutions, but through emphasizing the character of the monarch (*Pol.* 5.1310b).[54] Aristotle even explicitly refers to the Macedonians as an example of kingship-monarchy, and of his five subclasses of kingship (*Pol.* 3.1284b35–1285b33), the heroic type matches well literary views of the Macedonians (e.g. Arr. 7.9.1-10-7).[55] Monarchy was quickly becoming conceived in almost purely ethical terms. Moreover, as 'writers do in fact help to mould the values of the age in which they write' (Ferguson 1989: 4), these authors and their values were, in all likelihood, also the dominant ethical currency of Philip's period. It was an influence that went right through to the Roman period.[56] As such, they are inherently important interlocutors in any Philippic anecdotal discussions.

These texts and ideas did not come from nowhere. They reflect an attempt by critics of democracy in the fourth century BCE to address perceptions of oligarchy and monarchy as only

[50] On the *Agesilaus* – Walbank 1984: 75-6; Luppino 1991: 89-107; Manes 1992; Forsdyke 2009: 9-10; Pontier 2010: 259-383; and Noreña 2011: 39-40; and Gray 2011: 30-32. Xenophon's *Memorabilia* was influential also in a more general and perhaps wider sense for its use of a cannon of virtues to eulogise the dead Socrates (cf. Gray 2011: *passim*). The judgement of Agesilaus (*Ages.* 10.1) reflects that of Socrates (*Mem.* 1.2.2). Nor can the influence of the *epitaphios logos* (funeral oration) in Athens be forgotten, with its praise for the heroic attributes of the dead (North 1966: 93-94, 106-7, 123).

[51] Gray 2011: 70.

[52] On Isocrates and *eunoia* – Blois and Bons 1992: 171-72; and De Romilly 1958: 92-101. For a comprehensive analysis of Xenophon and his ideas on leadership – Gray 2011; cf. Hutchinson 2000 and Wood 1964: 33-66.

[53] Some have theorized that the rule of Philip II was influenced by Plato's Academy (Hatzopoulos 1, 1996: 158–60). Luraghi (2013: 18) argues that the first formulation of the good *basileus* could go back to Socrates (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.12).

[54] Noreña 2011: 40. See esp. Plato's *Republic*, *Laws*, and *Statesman*, and Aristotle *Politics*. Even other genres, like historiography, saw the influence of this concentration on personal character e.g. Theopompos (Noreña 2009: 2-3).

[55] King 2010: 380. On Aristotle, kingship, and philosophy – Vander Waerdt 1985: 249-73 and Greenwalt 2010: 154-161. On Greek and Macedonian kingship in general – Adcock 1953: 163-80.

[56] E.g. Isocrates' influence on his students, contemporaries, and later orators and especially Hellenistic historians is evident in their use of rhetorical eulogy and censure (e.g. Theopompus). This tendency was seemingly so widespread that Polybius felt it necessary to denounced historians who substituted eulogy for history (12.25C; cf. 10.21). Moreover, by the Roman period, it was common to use the cannon of virtues as a framework on which to approach history biographically (North 1966: 148, 149).

being tyrannic in nature. It was an idea reinforced by the fact that the positive features of democracy were regularly articulated through the graphic illustration of the more negative aspects of autocracy.[57] By focusing on the moral education and attributes of rulers, these critics developed new models of monarchy and oligarchy which distanced themselves from the famous abuses of tyranny. Therefore, these new types of rulers were conceived of in purely ethical and moral terms – with a particular focus on the political virtues of wisdom and self-restraint,[58] which incidentally feature heavily in Philip's tales. This thinking and increasing interest in monarchy (mostly theoretical) took place before a 'backdrop of political and ideological change in the Greek world' (Noreña 2011: 41).[59] This change stemmed from reflections on different political constitutions since the events of the Peloponnesian war and the failure of democratic Athens.[60] It also coincided with the rise of powerful rulers on the periphery of the Greek world (Philip among them) who seemed to offer strong, stable, alternative possibilities and models of rule.[61]

Among other things, these individuals were evaluated against what would later be the cardinal virtues in the writings of the moral philosophers.[62] Socratic in origin, they were justice (δικαιοσύνη), courage (ἀνδρεία), wisdom (φρόνησις/σοφία) and temperance (σωφροσύνη).[63] Originally, Plato talked of ἀρετή having these four parts, plus piety (ὁσιότης - εὐσέβεια).[64] However, from the *Euthyphro* on Plato omits ὁσιότης, and restricts the canon to four (*Rep.* iv, 428A).[65] Aristotle dropped this constraint and extended the range of virtues, including giving prominence to πραότης (*Eth. Nic.* iii-vi; succinct list at *Rhet.* 1366B1.9.4-6).[66] Following Plato's lead, and Zeno's teachings, the Stoics re-established the idea of a cannon of four (listing other virtues only as derivatives).[67] Their example would prevail among most rhetoricians and philosophers in later periods.[68] Indeed, by Cicero's time (and under his influence too), they were ingrained in moral philosophy as *prudentia/sapientia*, *fortitudo* (sometimes *virtus*), *iustitia*, and

[57] Forsdyke 2009: 5-6.
[58] Forsdyke 2009: 9.
[59] Cf. Goodenough 1928: 55-56.
[60] Eckstein 2009: 6.
[61] Noreña 2011: 41; cf. Balot 2006: chap. 6. Even from the time of Herodotus there had been some sympathy for a virtuous monarchy as an ideal polity (Hdt. 3.82; Goodenough 1928: 55).
[62] On the cardinal virtues - Dover 1974: 66f.; Ferguson 1979: 24-52 and Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 300-301.
[63] *N.b.* As early as Pindar and Aeschylus there had been some tentative support for four or five primary virtues (North 1966: 151).
[64] Cf. Xenophon's *Agesilaus* e.g. *Ages.* 1.27, 1.34, 2.13, 3, 11.1, 11.8 (εὐσέβεια), 4 (δικαιοσύνη), 5 (σωφροσύνη); 6.1-3, 10.1, 11.9 (ἀνδρεία); 6.4-8 (σοφία). Xenophon also adds patriotism and several other minor qualities to these virtues (e.g. 1.36, 7, 9.7). In his *Cyropaedia* (8.1.23-33), Xenophon details the piety, self-control, and justice of Cyrus. At the end of his *Memorabilia* (4.8.11), Xenophon recalls the piety, justice, self-control, and wisdom of Socrates.
[65] On the history of the Platonic canon – North 1966: 165f.
[66] Though Fragments of the *Protrepticus* show that he did not immediately repudiate this tetrad (Frag. 52 Rose; North 1966: 198).
[67] Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 301.
[68] North 1966: 198, and 214.

temperantia/*continentia*. Moreover, they were consolidated under the rules of rhetoric which expected the praise of men and kings through the revelation of these virtues.[69]

Philip (along with Alexander) falls into a somewhat complex formative period in monarchic ideology. He lies between the more systematic articulation of kingly virtues found before his time, and the more formal attribution of virtues found in the Hellenistic period.[70] Even so, this anecdotal-Philippic material is not isolated or unrelated. It appears to come closest to the ideas behind the greater part of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (written late in the 360s just before Philip took the throne). In this work the focus is still on character as the 'key prerequisite for ideal rulership', but Cyrus' character is explored through tangible actions and not just individual virtues.[71] This is done throughout the narrative with a particular emphasis at times on narrative based tales reminiscent of anecdotes and *apophthegmata*. This equates well with much of our anecdotal-Philippic material. Therefore, there seems to be a continuity of sorts between the two. The later writings of Xenophon such as *Agesilaus*, but particularly his *Cyropaedia*, were either reflective of, or informative to a climate in the Greek world whereby the circulation of tales of more concrete actions and happenings were utilized to reflect (and reflect on) the character of the ruler. The veracity of these tales was from the very beginning probably of secondary concern – as is revealed by Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. It was primarily about ideal monarchy and ideal monarchs and leadership. It was inevitable that the 'spectre of Philip' would be drawn into these conversations at this time.[72]

Hence, it was this climate of monarchical deeds and their association with virtues or vices which probably gave birth to the circulation and recording of much of our anecdotal-Philippic material (cf. Xen. *Ages.* 1.6). Much of it may have come from Philip's own lifetime, where it surely started life as gossip, propaganda, or even eyewitness accounts (e.g. Satyrus, Theopompus, Ephorus etc.). It was a state of affairs which no doubt expanded exponentially after Philip's successes. Moreover, it would have continued well into the reign of his son whose even greater achievements refocused dramatically the prism through which Philip's character and achievements were accessed and judged. Therefore, speaking on the value of Diodorus' account of Philip's exploits, Lane Fox argues that oral repetition of Philip's exploits at the Macedonian court would have reached authors like Theopompus and Ephorus just as it did Alexander (2011: 348).[73] Philip's extraordinary story

[69] Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 301.
[70] Cf. Luraghi 2013: 20. On the justification of monarchic power in the Hellenistic world – Murray 1971 and Gehrke 2013: 73- 98 (who ascribes much of it to charisma, restless military activity and personal achievement). On Hellenistic monarchy – Préaux 1978: 181-294, Walbank 1984: 64-100, Mooren 1983: 205-40 and Ma 2003: 177-195.
[71] Noreña 2011: 40.
[72] Cf. Ellis and Milns 1970.
[73] It is interesting in terms of Philip's later image and legacy that both Ephorus and Theopompus were among the authors which Theon (65.29ff.) recommended as school text books for learning passages by heart (cf. Bonner 1977: 273).

along with his personality and success left his life a fertile resource of *apophthegmata*, anecdotes and *exempla* – each readily available for easy excerption and use.

Philip and Alexander

This was even truer for his son Alexander, who must also be considered when trying to understand or evaluate Philip in any period.[74] Certainly their contemporaries and successive generations of the ancients often thought of the accomplishments and qualities of one in comparison to the other.[75] For example, the tale told of the deathbed utterance of the emperor Marcus Aurelius in the *Historia Augusta* (27.11-12), and Cicero's comparative comments in *De Officiis* (1.26)[76] are perfect examples of this connecting reception of these father and son kings. Significant too is the first *apophthegma* of Plutarch's Phillipic collection in which Philip is described in relation to Alexander as 'μείζονα γενέσθαι καὶ μετριώτερον' (*Mor.* 177C), and evaluation of Alexander given by envoys visiting Philip's court that they 'regarded the much-talked-of ability of Philip as nothing compared with his son's eager disposition to do great things' (Plut. *Al.* 5.1). But perhaps the most extensive example is Justin's long comparative conclusion to his Philippic section of his epitome (9.8).

In recent times, Alexander's story or reception in Rome across various different texts has been examined, revealing a complex positive and negative dichotomy of traditions.[77] This thesis shows that Philip's story also comes with its own dichotomy or paradox of sorts in which Philip can play the drunken-debauch buffoon or classic tyrant; or the charismatic, intelligent, just, moderate and determined king and commander.[78] These were both fundamental features of his persistent relevance to the Graeco-Roman world as a paradigm.[79] However, when it comes to anecdotes, *exempla*, and *apophthegmata*, indications are that it was the latter image which dominates. It was

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[74] Molinier highlights this connection. She argues that Alexander's brightness has driven Philip's personality somewhat into the shadows, and that the Romans less naturally made recourse to Philip than Alexander, but when they did, it could have profound significance ('*cela pouvait avoir une signification d'autant plus profonde*' - 1995: 61).

[75] Cf. Carney and Ogden eds. 2010: xix.

[76] 'Philip, king of Macedon, I observe, however surpassed by his son in achievements and fame was superior to him in affability and refinement. Philip, accordingly, was always great; Alexander, often infamously bad. There seems to be sound advice, therefore, in this word of warning: 'The higher we are placed, the more humbly should we walk.'' *N.b.* Philip's *facilitas* and *humanitas* in opposition to Alexander's *rebus gestis et Gloria*, which make Philip *semper magnus* and Alexander *saepe turpissimus*. For discussion – Molinier 1995: 66-69 and Fears 1974: 117-21.

[77] Spencer 2002 has examined Philip's son Alexander and his reception in Rome. Cf. Spencer 2006: 79-104; Bayham 1998; and Carney and Ogden (eds.) 2010.

[78] On Philip's personality – Lévêque 1980: 176-187. Philip's charisma was reminiscent of Agesilaus' εὖχαρις (urbanity) (e.g. Xen. *Ages.* 8, 11.11; cf. *Cyrop.* 8.6.23). On charisma and leadership in Xenophon's leaders – Gray 2011: 374-76.

[79] Cf. Molinier 1995: 60. It was a paradox Roman historians were well aware of e.g. at the beginning of the fifth-century CE, Orosius (*Hist.* 3.8) bemoans all those who had made Philip a hero in spite of his appetite for savage conquest which devastated Greece for twenty-five years (cf. Molinier 1995: 79).

his son Alexander's career which far more epitomised the decent into tyranny that so worried the Roman elite. His was the more popular and spectacular tale of the dangers of unfettered autocratic power. Philip's tales were still popular, appealing to Roman appetites for vicarious and intimate access to elite circles of power, past and present.

Recently, it has been argued that the image and legend of Philip as an ideal Macedonian ruler in comparison to his son, emerged as a reaction or 'glorified counter-image' to Alexander's unpopular political style among Macedonian aristocratic opposition.[80] As Alexander moved beyond the traditional concept of a Macedonian king as a *primus inter pares*, many Macedonians began to judge him 'by their idealized memories of Philip' which in turn justified representation of Alexander as a degenerate king.[81] The image of Philip as an ideal Argead king, which was referenced to bolster oppositional claims, was derived from the memories of the greater influence wielded by Macedonian elite families during Philip's reign.[82] Therefore, the idealized image of Philip was a fiction, or a myth divorced from the realities of the historical king who curtailed the autonomy of the upper Macedonian nobles and laid the ground work for Alexander's more forthright autocratic style. Philip's memory became a myth, a *logos* of an ideal Macedonian king which was born from the loss of influence felt by some Macedonian nobles.[83]

There is merit to this argument.[84] Indeed, it helps to explain the survival of such a large amount of positive tales regarding Philip's reign. However, some care must be taken. Though some parts of Philip's memory might be aptly referred to as a 'fiction' or 'myth' created from idealized memories articulated during Alexander's period, we should be careful not to overstate the influence

[80] Müller 2010: 25-32. It is an image and tradition encapsulated in the second century CE satirist Lucian in his posthumous conversation between Alexander and Philip in his *Dialogues of the Dead* (Luc. *D.M.* 14; Baldwin 200). Cf. the speech of Hermolaus which outlines well the grievances of the Macedonian opposition at this time (Arr. 4.14.2; Curt. 8.7.1-8.23; Bosworth 1980: 95: ii, 98-99).

[81] Müller 2010: 27-29. At play was also the *topos* popular in the Greek literary tradition of the good ruler and the degenerate son (Müller 2010: 31; Metzler 1975: 449).

[82] Müller 2010: 30.

[83] Müller 2010: 31-32.

[84] It also reflects the earlier work of Molinier – '*les critiques formulées à l'encontre de Philippe furent sans doute éclipsées par la violente réaction idéologique provoquée par les conquêtes et les réformes d'Alexandre. Le penchant grec pour l'antithèse fit le reste: la réputation de Philippe gagna ce que perdit celle de son fils'* (1995: 62). Molinier's article (1995: 60-79) though develops this idea further by attempting to trace this positive portrayal of Philip from a (stoical) reaction to Alexander by Hellenistic thinkers to its emergence in Cicero and Seneca's Stoic inspired works (*De Officiis*, *De Ira*, and *De Beneficiis*) as an inspiring model in politics at the end of the Republic and early Empire (cf. Fears 1974: 113-30). She argues that it was present in the works of Diogenes of Babylon and his student Panetius of Rhodes, who, as member of the 'Circle of Scipio', used it as a model of more moderate imperialism for Rome's leaders in opposition to that of Alexander (cf. Polybius - who was also a member of this 'Circle' also had a more positive assessment of Philip relative to Alexander – *Hist*. 8.9-11). Later, drawing on this Stoical polemic against Alexander, Cicero produced his *De Officiis* which he addressed to his son (but perhaps aimed at Octavius). In this work, dedicated to refining the portrait of the ideal prince or protector of Rome there are several references to Philip. Molinier argues that they are used to undermine and counter the popularity of the image and exploits of Alexander, using an enlightened Philip resultant of the philosophy of the Middle Stoa. Finally, Molinier argues that that Seneca was inevitably drawn to this (Stoical) antithetical pairing of Philip and Alexander with his interest in differentiating the *tyrannus* from the *rex iustus* - though his portrayal of Philip is closer to its classical roots than that of Cicero. Seneca presents Philip as anxious for justice and able to resist anger in contrast to Alexander (implicitly equated to the emperor).

and perspective of a later period. This might bring about some neglect of this material, with Philip possibly seen as only the sum of Alexander's period when positive assessments are made. Moreover, despite the castigation Philip receives from authors like Demosthenes and Theopompus, their works leave little doubt regarding Philip's popularity among his so called debauched, corrupt, and well rewarded followers among the Macedonian nobles during his own lifetime. A possible disservice might be done to Philip's style of leadership by viewing our reception of it through the tempering effect offered by the political posturing of another period. Philip's style of leadership may have been somewhat idealized after his death to reproach an ever more autocratic Alexander (and later imitators), but there had to be some truth to these claims for them to have had any hope of traction at the time – perhaps where there is smoke…[85]

Philip and Kingship in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds

What then of the material's survival, relevance, and possible use during the Hellenistic period after the deaths of Philip and Alexander? It seems that the ideas of the period preceding Philip and Alexander had had little influence beyond intellectual circles. However, after these two Macedonian kings and the rise of the Hellenistic dynasties, debates were conditioned by the necessity of accommodating philosophically the legacies of these two great Argeads and the dominating presence of real monarchs.[86] To do this, and to combat an enduring political distrust of sole rule, theories of monarchy flourished by which autocratic power was curbed through the image of the ideal king or the admonition of the tyrannical despot.[87] It is the relationship between our Philippic material and these theories which is crucial. What better paradigms to use, or at least be informed by, than that of these two famous Argeads? These were kings who had forced a new political world onto the Greeks, and given monarchy a new prestige broadly based on effectiveness.[88] Even though there are many negative *exempla* also to be found, many Hellenistic dynast were eager to claim associations with these men and the Argead dynasty for legitimising purposes.[89] Moreover, among the educated classes, theories that based their material on distinct

[85] In support of this point – cf. Billows (1995: 63-64).
[86] On aspects of Hellenistic kingship and monarchy – Préaux 1978 181-294; Walbank 1984: 64-100; Bilde *et al.* (eds.) 1996; and Ma 2003: 177-195.
[87] Eckstein 2009: 5-6; Billows 1995: 56-61; and Noreña 2011: 41.
[88] Eckstein 2009: 2.
[89] Billows 1995: 33-41; Lianou 2010: 123-133; and Gattinoni 2010: 113-121 – which argues that in relation to Philip, Cassander tried to tap into 'persistent feelings of nostalgia, devotion, and respect for the man all Macedonians considered the founder of their powerful kingdom' (114). On nostalgia for Philip, and connections between Ptolemy and Philip – Plut. *Demetri.* 42.6-7; Curt. 9.8.22; and Paus. 1.6.2.

moralistic tales and sayings of monarchs and leaders such as these, would have more immediate relevance and persuasive power with monarchs and scholars alike.

We know that there were a number of treatises written 'On Kingship' (*Peri Basileias*), some by famous men, and addressed to the kings of this period.[90] These dealt with, among other things, the moral foundations of monarchy. It was a genre which sought in essence to domesticate monarchy 'in the framework of Greek political culture' (Luraghi 2013: 21). None survive, making it difficult to know for sure to what extent royal virtues were emphasized, or which ones in particular.[91] However, going on later summaries and references, it seems that a genuine king was a model of all virtues – being just, generous, wise, courageous, kind, benevolent and magnanimous (though the institutional aspects of monarchy are somewhat obscure).[92] Certainly, the virtues of *philanthropia*, *epieikeia*, *praotes*, *philanthropia* and *euergesia* were to the forefront of political thinking,[93] and it is no accident that all our Philippic-anecdotal material is very rich in all the above virtues.

The main functions of these treatises seems to have been to educate rulers in the use of their absolute power, and to teach people why monarchy was tolerable.[94] Moreover, by accepting the advice of the treatises the ruler proved himself not to be a *tyrannos* but a *basileus*.[95] It is difficult to argue that these texts contained similar tales and sayings to our anecdotes, at least explicitly.[96] However, monarchic themed anecdotes and sayings surely already formed a substantial body of influential material by this time from which elements and ideas were implicitly drawn.

It is true that Hellenistic monarchy rested primarily on militaristic platforms and ideals, as is reflected in the *Suda*.[97] However, this did not mean that ethical conceptions of monarchy were no longer important, as is shown by the above virtues, various extant texts, honorific decrees, royal letters, propaganda and titles.[98] Indeed, these things attest to an atmosphere in which the ideal king was still imagined to a large extent in moral terms. Therefore, autocratic power was still being articulated primarily in an ethical vocabulary (as it would be for the later Roman emperors, who were expected to enforce the *Pax Romana* whilst maintaining a range of civilian virtues). At the heart of this language were the virtues (particularly the cardinal ones – *dikaiosune*, *sophrosune*, *pronesis*, *andreia*), each primarily manifested in deeds. It was this ideological apparatus with its

[90] Eckstein 2009: 6 n. 39; and Billows 1995: 57-59; Sidebottom 2006: 116-157; Murray 2007B: 13-28; and Haake 2013B: 165-206.
[91] Noreña 2011: 41-42.
[92] Luraghi 2013: 21; and Bertelli 2002: 34-42.
[93] Murray 2007B: 21-26; Billows 1995: 57-58; and Walbank 1984: 82-83.
[94] Eckstein 2009: 6.
[95] Luraghi 2013: 21.
[96] Cf. Haake 2013B: 177.
[97] Gehrke 2013: 76-78. s.v. *basileia* 2; Eckstein 2009: 3; Billows 1995: 20-21, 28-29.
[98] Noreña 2011: 42-44. For some useful material on the Ptolemaic dynasty and the ideology of kingship – Samuel in Green (ed.) 1993: chap. 6.

portrait of the 'good' Hellenistic king, along with earlier classical Greek ideas,[99] that would have a profound impact on Roman imperial ideology for centuries.[100] Therefore, the survival of our Philippic material through the Hellenistic period would seem to be testament not only to any popular or historical value it had, but also to its enduring relevance to intellectual and political meditations occurring on the nature of ideal kingship and leadership. Moreover, it was a relevance that continued into the Roman period, becoming particularly prominent once more when autocracy returned at the end of the Republic and under the Principate. Philip's true legacy was intimately tied up with his leadership and the exercising of power. Indeed, Philip's aptitude for command and governance were the strong threads by which he and these stories were pulled through history.

There were various avenues by which the ideas and practices that promoted the association between monarchs, attributes and virtues reached Rome from the Greek East under the Republic.[101] One of these, which has not received much attention, was through various collections of anecdotes and sayings, especially those associated with former rulers and leaders like Philip. However, it was during the late Republic that personal virtues really come to great prominence in the public arena. The watershed moment was Caesar's cultic introductions which associated his person with traditional ideals, opening the way for virtues at Rome to be autocratically monopolized. The complete integration of the ideology of monarchy and virtue came with the rise of Augustus, and culminated with the senate's gift of the Golden Shield with its inscribed virtues of *virtus*, *clementia*, *iustitia* and *pietas*.[102]

As monarchy dawned on the Roman world, so too did the expectation that a 'good' emperor have certain attributes or virtues.[103] Indeed, the majority of political thought during the Empire was to be either direct appeals to or judgements of individual emperors,[104] often with reference to former leaders and rulers (indigenous and foreign). This ensued with the acceptance of the institution of the Principate after Tiberius' accession. Indeed, as an institution it moved beyond any real formal analysis much like Macedonian kingship before it. However, the emperors themselves were transient and a potentially appealing topic – particularly their characters, which in theory stood as the sole constraint on their behaviour.[105] For the majority of the population of the Empire, the emperor's constitutional position was irrelevant.[106] What mattered was that his virtues gave him the

[99] On the *Cyropaedia* and Hellenistic kingship – Farber 1979: 497-514.
[100] Noreña 2011: 45. It is of note that treatises *On Kingship* were also written during Roman Imperial and Late Antique times (Haake 2003: 100-102; Sidebottom 2006: 129-132, 135-154). On the ideal emperor in Greek thought of late-Antique – Stertz 1977: 433-39.
[101] Noreña 2011: 46-48.
[102] Noreña 2011: 48-50. These did not become a cannon of cardinal virtues for an emperor though (Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 298-323).
[103] Noreña 2011: 50.
[104] Noreña 2009: 1.
[105] Noreña 2009: 1-2; and 2011: 55-57.
[106] Charlseworth 1935: 105ff.

necessary qualifications, and a charismatic justification for his position.[107] However, Wallace-Hadrill argues that the elite could care less for any justification of autocracy. They accepted the emperor as a political fact and the only circumstance under which stability was possible. 'What mattered was the conduct of the individual ruler, the use to which he put his inevitable power' (1981: 318).[108] Moreover, with the constant necessity for adoption, the need to question the qualities on which one could be chosen emperor became ever more prominent.[109] Therefore, during the following centuries various texts dealing with imperial virtues and vices addressed to or about emperors were written (e.g. the corpus of *Panegyrici Latini*).[110] Among these texts, there were many that contained anecdotal-Philippic material which allowed the long dead Philip to act as a guide, comparative, and exemplar for the emperor down (e.g. Valerius Maximus, Seneca, and Plutarch).

There were other texts (in Greek) which also dealt with the nature of ruling in general – related by their ethical conception of one-man rule.[111] What is apparent is that up to the time of Constantine,[112] there was a relative stability in the vocabulary and *topoi* used to define autocracy and evaluate individual leaders. There was also a strong underlying belief that monarchy was best conceptualized through the emphasizing of royal character and individual ethical qualities.[113] However, while noting this tenacity of idiom and ideology, attention should still be given to the contexts surrounding a text's production, as well as to where the *exempla* are being sourced (such as from Classical notables, Hellenistic monarchs, Republican generals, and imperial predecessors) to fully comprehend its intended message.[114] Philip's status as a successful monarch of some repute gave him authority to be considered as a source, and collectors and authors a valid licence to include his tales and sayings.

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[107] Wickert 1954: 2222ff.; Kloft 1970: 181; Lichocka 1974: 14; and Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 299 and 317.

[108] In his work on the *civilis princeps* and the behaviour of emperors towards their subjects as a means of indicating their status (1982: 32-48), Wallace-Hadrill argued that through the use of differing levels of ceremonial pomp or condescension, the behaviour of emperors 'fluctuated between *civilitas*, the conduct of a citizen among citizens, and *superbia*, the disdainful bearing of a king and superhuman being' (1982: 33).

[109] Cf. Habine 2000: 283.

[110] Cf. McEvoy 2013: 24-28. There were also works like Seneca's *De Ira*; and Suetonius' *De vita Caesarum*; cf. Noreña 2011: 50-1 and Wickert 1954: 1998ff. – who lists around fifty qualities attributed to emperors over the centuries by various sources. De Blois (1998: 3391-3443) is excellent for the emperor and empire in Greek authors of the third century.

[111] E.g. Dio Chrysostom's *Kingship orations*, Aelius Aristides' *Eis basilea*, Menander Rhetor's *Basilikos logos*, Musonius Rufus' *That Kings Too Should Philosophize*, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*, Plutarch's *To an Uneducated Ruler*, the *Peri basileias* of Ecphantus, Sthenidas and Diotogenes, the speeches of Themistius, and Julian's first panegyric on Constantius II. Cf. Noreña 2009: 2 and 2011: 51-55.

[112] Despite a division between Christian praise-panegyrics (e.g. Eusebius) and 'classicising' works (e.g. Themistus and Pacatus) after this period, there was still some continuity in the qualities of the ideal emperor (McEvoy 2013: 23-47).

[113] On Greek intellectuals and ruler cult under the empire – Bowerstock 1973: 177-206.

[114] Noreña 2011: 55.

Writers under the Empire, despite the restraints of monarchy, used Philip's anecdotes to contribute to a 'shared project' which articulated the 'ethics for autocracy'.[115] However, it is impossible to determine what impact this really had on politics, or how effective it was in regulating monarchical behaviour. That said, it seems it may have been quite substantial.[116] A quick survey of the virtues found in Pliny's *Panegyricus* or Suetonius' *Caesars* (e.g. *moderatio*, *humanitas*, *comitas*, *civilitas*, *continentia*, *abstinentia*) shows the emphasis placed on social virtues, particularly self-restraint.[117] Hence, for Wallace-Hadrill, 'the focus is not on the possession of power, but on the control of it in deference to other members of society' (1981: 316), and, 'the justification for the emperor's possession of power becomes his willingness to abstain from using it to the detriment of those concerned' (1981: 318). Therefore, it is little surprise that Philip's tales also reflect this focus on social qualities, and his responsible and restrained use of power.

As for the virtues and vices themselves – it is apparent that in all periods, monarchs and individuals could be associated, praised and damned for a multitude of them.[118] However, not all virtues and vices were considered equal in value. Indeed, different virtues were valued to a greater or lesser extent during different periods by different authors, by different groups in society, and by different rulers.[119] This is an important idea which directly impacts on which anecdotes and sayings (with their associated qualities) were mobilised in whatever context they are found.

It is also essential to realize that this Philippic material features significantly (like his son's) in constructing the edifice that was normative Imperial behaviour.[120] Indeed, this Philippic material seems to have had a role in the formulation of classical monarchic ideology almost from its very inception. Philip emerges from these diverse anecdotes, *exempla*, and *apophthegmata* as a resilient image and exemplar of leadership. Despite his heritage, Philip persisted as a recognizable paradigm of enduring relevance to the Graeco-Roman world – powerful in his reflective and instructive qualities.[121]

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[115] Cf. Noreña 2009: 10.
[116] Cf. Noreña 2011: 10-11.
[117] On imperial ideology in Suetonius – Bradley 1991: 3715-3729.
[118] This expansion of virtues beyond the four cardinal ones probably stems in large part from Aristotle. Though the cardinal virtues were rooted in political and ethical tradition, Aristotle 'tended to bring philosophical theory into greater proximity to ordinary Greek thought…[and]…popular thinking always recognized many other forms of *aretê*' (North 1966: 199).
[119] Cf. Noreña 2011: 57-8.
[120] To the Romans the supreme expression of moral excellence was made with reference to what had come before, particularly to 'the customs of our forefathers' (Sørensen 1984: 32). However, despite Philip's heritage, when Philip was used as a moral paradigm, especially in combination with the heroes of the Republic during Imperial times, his tales were also imbued with the lustre of traditional moral custom. On the representation of the Republic in Imperial times - Gowing 2005. Useful also is Lobur's 2008 study of the formation of Roman imperial ideology which examines the role of oratory, historiography and *exempla* in this evolving cultural discussion (chaps. 4-6).
[121] Cf. Spencer 2002: 218.

PHILIP THE MACEDONIAN

Finally, this material of Philip's is another source of evidence in general receptions of the Macedonians and Philip under the Roman Empire (particularly during the Second Sophistic).[122] Other studies, which generally do not use this material, argue that the Macedonians were generally associated with warrior-hood, cultural and ethical ambiguity, and at times, barbarism.[123] During the Second Sophistic, views of the Macedonians were to some degree influenced by their image in fifth and fourth century BCE historians and orators.[124] However, there were still images that stemmed from the Macedonian warrior stereotype which was commonplace in Hellenistic times.[125] As for Philip more specifically in Roman times, the two surviving narratives of Diodorus (16) and Justin (7.6-9, epitomizing Pompeius Trogus) both praise and criticise Philip - Diodorus does much more of the former, and Justin much more of the latter.[126] However, their criticisms are more limited than writers contemporary with Philip such as Theopompus and Demosthenes (e.g. Diod. 16.93.3-4; Just. 8.6.5-8, 9.8.6-7).[127] Moreover, in relation to Alexander, both authors have a higher opinion of Philip. This is based on their interest in kingship and what makes a good ruler.[128]

During the Second Sophistic, leaders like Philip were a means by which many writers could express their existence 'between Greek culture and Roman power' (Asirvantham 2010A: 194). They even allowed Greek authors to claim some authority in the 'Roman province of power' (Asirvantham 2010A: 194 n.10). Overall, Philip sparked a diverse range of reactions in the Second Sophistic.[129] However, there is a tendency to downplay the achievements of Philip – no doubt related to the 'overwhelming shadow cast by the historical and romantic presence of Philip's son' (Borza 1990: 198),[130] his bad reputation in Classical Athens, and the enduring popularity of Demosthenes' oratory.[131] Reactions include that of Aelius Aristides, who echoes Demosthenic rhetoric and slurs in his anti-Philip *Theban Orations*, which uses the history of Macedonia as a 'foil

[122] On reception and Macedonians – Asirvatham 2000, 2008, 2009, 2010A: 193-204, 2010B: 99-124; Spencer 2002 (Alexander); and Carney and Ogden (eds.) 2010.
[123] Asirvatham 2000: 3.
[124] Asirvatham 2000: 14, 44.
[125] Asirvatham 2010B: 110.
[126] On Justin, Diodorus and Philip – Worthington 2010: 165-174.
[127] Worthington 2010: 170. On Theopompus and Philip – Flower 1994: chap. 4 and 5. As seen above (n. 64), the Hellenistic author Polybius criticises Theopompus for his stance on Philip (*Hist.* 8.8-11), perhaps reflecting a generally more positive assessment of Philip during this period (e.g. the Stoic philosopher Panaetius endowed Philip with *facilitas et humanitas*, and was more deserving of the title of *magnus* than Alexander – Cic. *De. Off.* 1.26.90). Cf. Asirvatham 2000: 11; 2010A: 193 n.7.
[128] Worthington 2010: 173-174 and 2014: 117-119, 308-309.
[129] Asirvantham 2010A: 194.
[130] Cf. Asirvantham 2000: 11.
[131] Asirvatham 2000: 10; 2009; and 2010A: 193; cf. Whitmarsh 2005: 66-68.

to the superior might of Rome' (Asirvatham 2010A: 194; 2000: 10).[132] In Plutarch's biographies Philip is a subsidiary character. His successes and role are understated in the *Alexander* to highlight his son's achievements, and he is viewed almost entirely from a Demosthenic point of view in the *Demosthenes*.[133] This influential and hostile perspective which viewed Philip as the liberty-ending-power-mad barbarian of the north originates mostly with Demosthenes (supplemented by others such as Theopompus and Hyperides).[134] Moreover, because of Demosthenes' enduring popularity in later antiquity, it surfaces throughout the ages in various authors such as in Cicero's use of the title *Philippics* for his own orations is telling.[135] Indeed, scholars cannot be sure that when an author like Diodorus (supposedly representative of a more historical tradition) states that Philip used his wealth to extend his kingdom (16.8.7, 53.3 and 54.3-4), that he represents 'a historical tradition even semi-independent of Demosthenes' (Ryder 1994: 230). However, Philip is never referred to as a barbarian in Plutarch, even though associated with gold and bribery (*Dem.* 14.2). Moreover, Philip's *philanthropia* is noted in Plutarch's criticism of Athenian reactions to his death (*Dem.* 22.3).[136] In general, Plutarch, like other authors such as Dio Chrysostom and Arrian, used Philip to support and promulgated an idealized image of Alexander.[137] However, Philip's role in anecdotal material, though related to these findings, seems to be slightly different. The nature of the material often allowing Philip to exist in a world separate from that which continued to be obsessed and haunted by his son's achievements.

Conclusion

Dialogues with Philip's legacy and image required Roman world auditors (be they ruler, of the elite class, or of a more humble background) to choose which aspects of Philip 'the model' they embraced or rejected. This decision allowed anecdotal-Philippic material to have a public and political function in the conception of cultural, social and monarchic identity.[138] The key to that

[132] The enduring popularity of Demosthenes meant that Philip's image was decidedly more negative in some of rhetoric of late antiquity e.g. drawing heavily upon Demosthenes' attacks on Philip (and as part of their *progymnasmata*), both Aphthonius and Libanius provided for burgeoning orators uncompromising sample invectives against Philip which condemned all aspects of Philip's person and behaviour (Aphth. *Prog.* 28.8-31.5; Lib. *Prog.* Invective 3; Flower 2013: 49-51; Long 1996: 78-80; Gibson 2008: 283-9; Cribiore 2013: 109-116; and Kennedy 2008: 54-72, 150-162. On *progymnasmata* – Kennedy 2003.

[133] Asirvatham 2000: 109, 153. On Plutarch's enthusiasm for Athens and her role in Greek history – Beck 1998: 52 (with refs).

[134] On Demosthenes and Philip – Ryder 2000: 45-89. On Demosthenes and his speeches – Ellis and Milns 1970; Sealey 1993; Tuplin 1998: 276-320; MacDowell 2000; and Worthington (ed.) 2000.

[135] On Cicero's *Philippics* and their Demosthenic model – Wooten 1983. Molinier (1995: 65) argues that Cicero saw Demosthenes harangues against Philip as a '*simple modèle littéraire*' and did not identify Philip completely with Anthony because of the coinciding publication of *De Officiis* with its positive image of Philip.

[136] Cf. Asirvatham 2000: 109, 154.

[137] Asirvatham 2010A: 193-195.

[138] Cf. Spencer 2002: 1.

function was in Philip's appeal and afterlife, his style of kingship, his incongruent reputation, his success, his son, and his personality. All of these aspects offered flexible potential imagery, the result of which were dynamic interpretive traditions referencing Philip's figure.

This conflicting evidence means that there is no strict universal definition or consensus possible regarding viewpoints on Philip and his image in the Roman world – even though the majority of evidence of this thesis suggests a generally positive attitude. However, it is incontestable that Philip had a broad appeal and value as an important figure with which to consider contemporary concerns and values. This is conspicuous at times in the political and cultural considerations of the Romans and Greeks of the Graeco-Roman world as they faced a pressing need to define and redefine (good and bad) imperial government, and more broadly, life under said rule.[139] In the end, to evoke Philip's name in anecdotal material was to call forth a formidable exemplar of kingship, statesmanship, and generalship for contemplation.

[139] Cf. Spencer 2002: 217.

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Anecdotes, *Apophthegmata* and *Exempla* - Methodological Considerations

ὅτι ἥκιστα μὲν οἱ ἐπιφανέστατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λανθάνουσιν ὅ τι ἂν ποιῶσιν - Xen. *Ages.* 5.6.[140]

This chapter is a short introduction to anecdotes, *apophthegmata* and *exempla* in antiquity. It provides definitions for our three main areas of interest, helping to establish parameters for the thesis in terms of material for study. It also presents some contextual background, and an outline of the more important scholarly ideas and debates – particularly those of authors such as Dover, Saller, Bosworth, and Goldhill. This enables better comprehension of the difficulties and opportunities that this kind of material presents to historians. It also demonstrates many important tenets and ways of approaching these tales which should be remembered when examining material from later chapters. Therefore, this chapter grounds the evidence used by this thesis in its ancient-cultural context, and details what that might mean for modern scholarship on this material.

Defining Anecdotes

> 'The oral tradition does not cleave to literal exactness, but becomes typical; that is to say that it does not cleave to a factually exact grounding of the events narrated, but brings out their inner significance, what is characteristic about them, what has a general human or popular content. Often an anecdote is all that remains of a long chain of events, circumstances, and personalities' (Burckhard 1919: 188-89).

Anecdotes are the hardest of our three areas to pin down in terms of definition.[141] It is certainly the broadest category and can incorporate the other two. In ancient times the great exemplar and master was Herodotus. Pledging to document the memorable, Herodotus recorded a

[140] 'But we all know this, that the greater a man's fame, the fiercer is the light that beats on all his actions.'
[141] Scholars do not even agree on if there is anything really definable in the term anecdote i.e. can the anecdote be considered a specific 'form or genre' in its own right (Grossman 2003: 147).

myriad of entertaining and informative anecdotes in his narrative of the Persian Wars.[142] Ever since Herodotus, historians have seen anecdotes as both 'indispensable and notoriously unreliable', although their 'use by posterity can be illuminating' (Africa 1995: 70). However, to date relatively little scholarly literature has been dedicated to the use of anecdotes in ancient literature.[143] Indeed, studies in general into anecdotes are uncommon.[144]

Among the earlier studies into anecdotes in antiquity was Haight (1940). One of her more intriguing findings was that –

> 'The Romans saw such aesthetic and moral possibilities in the small story that the composition of it was a serious part of their education. They used the anecdote not only to enliven their literature but to convey great truths (vii).'

However, this study was not comprehensive either in scope or depth. Moreover, there is nothing directly concerning Philip II. Therefore, a shorter and more enlightening examination of the topic is Saller (1980: 69-83). Like Haight though, Saller also has a Roman orientated focus. Therefore, until Bosworth's Trendall Lecture (2009) to the 'Australian Academy of the Humanities', little work had been done on anecdotes (and *apophthegmata*) originating from the earlier Hellenistic period on Macedonian kings. This reflects the fluctuating value given to anecdotes in trying to understand historical events and persons. They are either worthless rubbish based on the accretion of gossip, invention, reinvention, and literary embroidery, or fascinating factual accounts from eyewitnesses privy to extraordinary moments of history.[145]

Elements central to these tales are prone to creative exaggeration or modification by the narrator to suit his purposes and the tastes of his audience. Furthermore, behind a vast majority of anecdotes is an anonymous tradition of transformative transmission, which makes it difficult to satisfactorily take account of a narrator's interests and biases in the received text.[146] Some argue that anecdote is among the least dependable traditions for reconstructing history. But as Bloomer

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[142] Bosworth 2009: 10. On Herodotus and his methods, including the Greeks' early use of oral history and anecdotal material –Baragwanath 2008; Fehling 1990; Gray 2002: 291-321; Johnson 1994: 229-255; Murray 1987: 93-115; 2007: 314-325; Waters 1985; Thomas 1992; and Veyne 1988: 5-15.

[143] *Nb.* Bosworth 2009: 1 no.1 and Goldhill 2009: 100. Among the best to date – Gemoll 1924; Haight 1940; Wehrli 1973: 193-208; Saller 1980: 69-83; Mack 1987; Dover 1988: 45-52; Africa 1995: 70-75; Morgan 2007: 122-59; Goldhill 2009: 96-113; Bosworth 2009: 1-12. There has of late been a revival of interest in Plutarch and his anecdotes/*apophthegmata* – Tigerstedt 1974: esp. 16-30; Pettine 1988; Santaniello 1995; Beck 1998; 1999: 173-87; 2000: 15-32; Fuhrmann 1998; Pelling 2002b: 65-90; Stadter 1996: 291-303; 2008: 53-66. Although, these kinds of studies have a long history – Schmidt: 1879.

[144] Apart from some German scholars' interesting attempts to define the nature, form, and function of the anecdote. For a full listing of this material – Grossman 2003: 148 n.10. In terms of English – perhaps the oldest work is *Dissertation on Anecdotes* (1793) by I. D'Israeli.

[145] Grossman 2003: 145. Bent argued that, 'we are by anecdotes made more nearly contemporaneous with great men than were most of their contemporaries' (1892: 350). However, Dover concedes that anecdotal material is occasionally banished from historical studies 'as if it were in all circumstances second-class evidence' (Dover 1988: 46).

[146] Cf. Saller 1980: 79. Despite these drawbacks some continue to argue that 'the anecdote is the literary form that uniquely lets *history happen*... the anecdote produces the effect of the real... by establishing an event within and yet without the framing context of historical successivity' (Fineman 1989: 61).

states, historians may bristle at anecdotal and traditional history, 'but the readers have not' (1992: 9). Moreover, the 'peculiar and unseasonable charm' of an author like Valerius Maximus is tied up with anecdote which 'has an unmistakable, universal fascination' (1992: 9).[147]

In the past scholars cautioned against the use of anecdotes on account of their unfixed forms and changing content. This was largely owing to the use of creative invention by each successive narrator as they seek to develop and improve the narratives of the tales with every new telling.[148] Therefore, the original anecdote – where locatable, can have a 'stripped-down, almost abstract character' which leaves some scope for variant details (Grossman 2003: 144). Consequently, great damage could be done to any historical integrity the tale might have once contained.[149]

Many anecdotes in the ancient world found their way from oral form into literature. Often though, there is no named authority, and little clue as to when this transmission from oral to literary form occurred.[150] However, for famous individuals, the transmission of most material was surely either during or shortly after their own life-times, as the motivation of later periods to continue to circulate (in oral form) non-contemporary material often diminished. It could happen though, along with the fabrication of new tales, as well as the mistaken allocation of tales between individuals.

Whatever changes occurred during the anecdote's written transmission were probably minor compared to the modifications occurring during its oral circulation.[151] Transmission could also occur once again out of written form for repeated oral circulation. This scenario allows for the prospect of infinite-variant cycles of transmission and circulation of any given anecdote. Therefore, the anecdote 'crosses the boundaries between oral and literate in a way that shows the interdependence of both spheres' (Goldhill 2009: 111).

It is also true that literary form does not crystallize any material into fixed form or content. Hence, imagination and literary pretension can also modify the anecdote. However, literary form must establish some set of parameters, however flexible, within which certain details or themes cannot be altered too much before the integrity or meaning of the original tale is lost. If this occurs, the anecdote ceases to be useful to the author, who initially selected it for certain ideas or themes it originally contained and conveyed.

Currently, the fortunes of anecdotes as historical evidence for Philip II mirror the various interpretations of Philip himself. As one anecdote finds favour with one historian, another anecdote

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[147] Cf. Murphy 1991: 378.
[148] Saller 1980: 69.
[149] Vansina's 1965 work on oral traditions argues that there is a tendency for the historical component to become mere background so as not to detract from the unfolding tale. Moreover, where historical details are lacking, they are readily supplied, often with introduced characters and personalities. Minor characters have no real status, and better-known ones become ideal types. Traditions are often easily combined, or singular ones divided among several parts (Vansina 1965: 159; cf. Saller 1980: 73-4).
[150] On literacy and orality in ancient Greece – Thomas 1989 and 1992.
[151] Saller 1980: 74.

falls out with another. As a result, the historian's relationship to an anecdote can vary from dismissive to enthusiastic.[152] Moreover, certain anecdotes are regularly exhibited when arguments falter upon the leanness of other evidence – becoming *filler* to plug the gaps of historical narratives. Anecdotes are also often thought of as only the darlings of biography – interesting sources of amusement or shallow edification, which scholars often relegate to footnotes or emphasise in attention grabbing quotes (often without any real critique).

The word anecdote itself originates from antiquity from the Greek word *anékdotos* (ἀνέκδοτος).[153] Originally the word meant 'unpublished texts' when technically applied.[154] The extension of this meaning began with Procopius and his *Historia Arcana*. Much later, from the seventeenth century on, 'anecdote' developed into its more modern definition.[155] The English word 'anecdote' seems to come directly or via French from the modern Latin word *anecdota*.[156] The *Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd ed. 1989: 454) defines 'anecdote' as 'the narrative of a detached incident, or of a single event, told as being in itself interesting or striking (at first an item of gossip).' Gärtner (*Brill's New Pauly* 2002: 690-1) defines anecdote as, 'a short oral story, often with one punch line, also including humorous words, and which has a claim to be factually representative of some specific aspect of personalities or political-social circumstances.'

Certain words or phrases are regular features of modern definitions. Most serve to distinguish the anecdote from more complex narrative forms.[157] Therefore, anecdotes can be detached and/or form the basis for collections (e.g. Aelian's *Varia Historia*), or they can be embedded in larger narratives;[158] being particularly popular in biography for example. However, there is a complication in that features of anecdotes from the ancient world correspond often to other literary genres such as the *apomnemoneumata*, the *apophthegma*, the *gnome* (maxim), the *chreia*, the aphorism, and the *exemplum* (παράδειγμα).[159] Hence, it is accurate to argue that, 'of all genres of utterance, none eludes definition quite so persistently as 'anecdote'' (Dover 1988: 45).

[152] Grossman 2003: 143.
[153] For other working definitions in ancient history – Saller 1980: 69; Dover 1988: 45; Beck 1998: 6; Bosworth 2009: 1; and Goldhill 2009: 100. Cf. Grossman 2003: 147-50. In breaking the word *anékdotos* (unpublished) down we get; *an* + *ekdotos* – given out; *ekdidonai* – to give out, publish; *ek* – out, out of + *didonai* – to give out.
[154] Diod. 1.4.6; Cic. *Att*. 14.17.6; Clem. Al. *strom.* 1.1.14; Synesius *Ep.* 154a.
[155] Gärtner in *Brill's New Pauly* 2002: 691; and Grossman 2003: 151-2.
[156] On the history of the word in early modern Europe – Grossman 2003: 151-155.
[157] Cf. Grossman 2003: 148. On the tripartite structure of *occasio*, *provacatio*, and *dictum* in anecdotes – Beck 1998: 12-18.
[158] Grossman 2003: 148-9.
[159] *Brill's New Pauly* 2002: 691.

DEFINING *APOPHTHEGMA*

Many anecdotes from the ancient world build up to a memorable punch line, what the ancients termed the *apophthegma* (ἀπόφθεγμα - pl. ἀπόφθεγματα; Latin *facete dictum* or *sententia*).[160] However, these *apophthegmata* could often stand alone in antiquity. Either with or shorn of many of the narrative elements of an anecdote, they were assembled into collections know best to modern readers as 'Sayings'.[161] There are collections of *apophthegmata* from particular epochs and categories of individuals such as philosophers, kings and military commanders.[162] Philip II himself exemplifies the last two areas.

To the Romans, with their love for the individual, the particular, the curious detail, and character, *apophthegmata* were considered a 'delight' (Haight 1940: 4) which should form part of a good early education - particularly in terms of character building.

> ...I would urge that the lines, which he is set to copy, should not express thoughts of no significance, but convey some sound moral lesson. He will remember such aphorisms even when he is an old man, and the impression made upon his unformed mind will contribute to the formation of his character. He may also be entertained by learning the sayings of famous men and above all selections from the poets, poetry being more attractive to children (Quint. *Inst.* I.1.35-36).[163]

Their popularity is demonstrated by Cato the Elder's, Cicero's and Julius Caesar's collections of sayings from both Greek and Latin sources (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2, 4);[164] and that Melissus (librarian of the Porticus of Octavia), wrote one hundred and fifty books of maxims (*gnome*) called *Ineptiae*.[165]

One could simply define *apophthegma* as being the witty-spoken-punch-line to a short tale or anecdote. Often concise, its defining feature is its implicit claim to authenticity. These elements are clearly demonstrated by the oldest surviving *apophthegmata* from the likes of Anaxagoras (Aristot. *Metaph.* 1009b26), Theramenes (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.56), Stesichorus (Aristot. *Rh.* 1395a 1-2), and Pittacus (Aristot. *Rh.* 1389a 14-16).[166] In the end, the form was adopted by Christianity, so that

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[160] On *apophthegma*, *gnome/sententia, apomnemoneumata*, and *chreia/exemplum* – Stenger 2006: 203-221; Beck 1998: 30-40 and Morgan 2007: 5-8, 84-121; 122-59.
[161] Bonner 1977: 175-6. E.g. Plutarch has three extant collections of *apophthegmata*. They give some idea as to the structure of other lost collections – *Sayings of Kings and Military Commanders* (*Mor.* 172-208a), *Sayings of Spartans* (*Mor.* 208b-240b) and *Sayings of Spartan Women* (*Mor.* 240c-242d).
[162] Gärtner in *Brill's New Pauly* 2002: 886.
[163] On Quintilian and education – Dorey 1972b: 98-118.
[164] Still in circulation in Cicero's time (*De Off.* I.29, 104); cf. Bonner 1977: 176 and Laurence and Paterson 1999: 189-190.
[165] On the maxim (*gnome*) – Biscardi 1970: 219-232; Wehrli 1973: 193-208; Bonner 1977: 173-5, 248, 258; Karavites 1990: 9-34; Morgan 1998: 120-51 and 2007: 84-121; Too (ed.) 2001: 248-250, 294; Stenger 2006: 203-221; Mouraviev 1973: 69-78, and Tigerstedt 1974: 16 n.4. On *Ineptiae* and Melissus' use of this title, see Bower 1974: 523-528.
[166] Gärtner in *Brill's New Pauly* 2002: 886.

Clement of Alexandria's *Stromateis* has a lot in common with a work like the *Varia Historia* of his contemporary Aelian.

There is a close relationship between *apophthegmata* and anecdotes.[167] Bosworth recognized this close relationship, and as such, both formed part of his discussion.[168] Although not all anecdotes must end in an *apophthegma* (e.g. Philip and the oracle from Delphi concerning a four horse chariot – Val. Max. 1.8.ext.9), or all *apophthegmata* reported be done so in direct speech (e.g. Diogenes' rebuke of Philip at Chaeronea – Plut. *Mor.* 606c).

ANECDOTES AND *APOPHTHEGMATA* IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Saller has shown that *apophthegmata* need not always be part of studies into anecdotes from the ancient world.[169] Therefore, after defining anecdote Saller emphasizes two important points – anecdotes must have a narrative element which simple *apophthegmata* do not have (though Roman anecdotes may contain *apophthegmata*); and an anecdote must be of a detached incident, and thus lengthy historical narratives do not meet the definition.[170] This articulates what constitutes material for Saller's study and what does not. However, before detailing why this dissertation seeks to discuss both elements without strict limitation of this kind, it is worth quoting Saller further –

> It cannot be pretended that this definition produces clear-cut distinctions. Roman authors frequently provide some context for *bons mots*, and it is not always clear at what point the extra details transform a simple apophthegm into an anecdote (1980: 69).

By seeking a concrete distinction between *apophthegma* and anecdote, Saller imposes a difficult general constraint on his discussion. This could leave the evaluation of important evidence to one side for reasons of conjectural classification based on the use of the term *anecdote* – which is itself unstable. Therefore, this thesis examines *apophthegmata* and anecdotes together because both are important to any study in which the characterization of Philip's image is a strong focus. Many complex ideas of Greek and Roman literature bind them, but it is a connection most easily expressed, and more comprehensively contained in one Greek word (or concept) - ἦθος.[171]

It is what each may reveal about *ethos* or character that unites both anecdote and *apophthegma* (even *exempla*) together, no matter where one is said to end and the other begin.[172]

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[167] Cf. Beck 1998: 36.
[168] 2009: 1.
[169] 1980: 69-83.
[170] 1980: 69. The *apophthegmata* collections of Plutarch contain many anecdotes, indicating that the simple *apophthegma* could easily be expanded and still be collected under such a heading. This contradicts strict definitions that would have the term solely applied to the climatic conclusions of anecdotes.
[171] For a detailed listing of scholarship on *ethos* – Beck 1998: 42 n.122; and 2000: 17 n.10.
[172] Cf. Murphy 1991: 3781.

This connection is revealed by Plutarch's famous programmatic statement in his *Alexander* (1.2-3).[173] Here Plutarch explains his methods, which give preference to characterization rather than spectacular description or detailed narrative.[174] Though the terms anecdote or *apophthegma* are not explicitly stated, their use is implicitly foreshadowed and endorsed by Plutarch's opening remarks.

Plutarch's *Alexander*, like the rest of his writings, were inspired by Platonic idealism,[175] and Plutarch's belief (Peripatetic in origin) that character manifested itself in actions (πράξεις). Certainly, the application of strings of anecdotes concerning famous individuals to exemplify kinds of βίοι reflects Peripatetic biographical works.[176] Consequently, Plutarch's focus is primarily to be on a hero's character (ἦθος) which is best illustrated through their πράξεις, and in this particular case, chance remarks or even a joke (πρᾶγμα βραχὺ ... καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ παιδιά τις).[177] Plutarch cares little for his subject's place in history,[178] only in character itself, which manifests itself most visibly through examples of virtue or vice (ἀρετὴ ἢ κακία). It is unsurprising then that the *Life* of Alexander is replete with numerous anecdotes, many containing dramatic punch lines or famous sayings. For Plutarch, in his search for character, anecdotes and *apophthegmata* were valid markers, giving an impression (ἔμφασις) of character (cf. *Kim.* 2.2). This is important as a great deal of our anecdotes concerning Philip come from Plutarch.[179]

Bosworth agrees with Plutarch's position that an anecdote undoubtedly 'tells us a certain amount about the characters involved' (2009: 1). However, he noted two further problems with this type of evidence (like Saller). One - there are problems of verification - not unique to anecdotes, but particularly acute to this genre. Two - the anecdote is often transferred at a relatively early stage from one individual to another.[180] As Bosworth argues, 'the framework is agreed, but the actors are fluid' (2009:1). This presents difficulties for the historian. However, this thesis is focused on the material's use and purpose in a literary and cultural sense – on what it suggests regarding the authors and their characterization of Philip and his words and deeds, and the relationship this has with monarchic ideology and contemporary values? Whether true or scurrilous, anecdotes,

[173] Duff 1999: 14-22. On Plutarch's programmatic statements – Valgiglio 1992: 3992-98.
[174] The best work on Plutarch's *Alexander* remains Hamilton 1969 (2nd ed. with foreword and bibliography by Stadter 1999); cf. Steele 1916: 419-25; Powell 1939: 229-240; Tarn 1948: 296-309; Pearson 1954-5: 429-55; Wardman 1955: 96-107; Hamilton 1961b: 9-20; Mossman 1988: 83-93; Prandi 2000: 375-86; and Whitmarsh 2002: 174-192. On Plutarch - Barrow 1967; Gianakaris 1970; Russell 1973; Wardman 1974; Aalders 1982; Stadter (ed.) 1992 and 2015; Scardigli (ed.) 1995; Swain 1997: 165-187; Mossman (ed.) 1997; Duff 1999; Lamberton 2000; Pelling 2002; Hägg 2012: 239-281; and Beck (ed.) 2014.
[175] Cf. Grant 1992: 404.
[176] Gribble 1997: 382. Cf. Wehrli 1973: 193-4; and Momigliano 1993: 65-73.
[177] See also *Cato Min.* 24.1; 37.10; *Nic.* 1.5; and *Cat. Ma.* 7.3 – the idea goes back at least as far as Xen. *Symp.* 1.1. cf. Plato *Laws* 649d-652.
[178] Hamilton 1999: xliii-xliv.
[179] Goldhill (2009: 108-9) has noted the importance (and influence on writers like Plutarch) of the work of Xenophon in the history of anecdotes e.g. Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, four books of brief tales about Socrates (most around a paragraph), which are able to be told in any order, could have been written with the express purpose of fragmented sympotic use.
[180] Cf. Laurence and Paterson 1999: 191-194.

apophthegmata, and *exempla* are still evidence – depending on the questions asked of them.[181] This study defines how in relation to Philip by moving away from historicity towards their wider literary/social function.

To understand Philip's reception in anecdotes, the process of anecdote formation in the Greek world needs examination. Dover has made some attempt at this.[182] Firstly, noting the genre's elusive definition, he tried to define anecdote by instead noting some of its features.[183] One of which was that the anecdote, 'must be self-contained; a side-step, like a visual illustration, from a more general context..., or an item in a chain (e.g. a collection of apophthegms) of similar items' (1988: 45). This criterion is not always easily applied when identifying an anecdote. Sometimes the anecdote is skilfully woven into the fabric of the surrounding material, to call it self-contained could be difficult, and yet it may still be classed as an anecdote for a variety of other reasons. 'Self-contained' does not have to mean 'not connected' or 'not related', either in a temporal or narrative sense to the material surrounding it.[184] Having said this, 'self-contained tales' are a good marker of an anecdote. The majority of the material found in this thesis falls easily into this category.

Dover also discusses the historicity of anecdotes by making two problematic points. Firstly, his notion that 'there is no smoke without fire' is untenable when consideration is given to who generated the smoke, and to what purpose? Flawed too is the idea that, 'if there had been nothing in it, it could not have been said, because everyone would have known it was not true' (1988: 46). Considering Philip alone in relation to these two ideas supports this. For example, during Philip's life and after his demise, when the circulating material concerning him, particularly that of a gossip like nature, found its way into *literary anecdotal form* in histories, speeches and the like, the motivation to exaggerate, bend truths, suppress details, or simply invent material is obvious depending on the material's creator. Now add in the turbulent political climate of the Successors' period, and the intellectual and literary ferment of the Hellenistic period, and it is easy to see how significant the distortion could be long before the biases and agendas of the Roman period. In addition, Philip's career could serve as a philosophical and rhetorical *exemplum*, and it is highly probable that different philosophical schools exerted influence on both the rhetorical and historical traditions surrounding Philip, as they did with his son Alexander.[185]

Dover also argues that an anecdote's 'date of birth' must be ascertained, as a contemporary date to its subject demonstrates whether a story could be true or not – for the fact that it seemed to

[181] Cf. Dover 1988: 46. Grossman (2003: 159) argues that an anecdote may still be enlightening with regards to 'historical reality', if its meaning were sought more in what it conveyed about states of mind and general trends than actual factual veracity.
[182] 1988: 45-52.
[183] 1988: 46.
[184] A good example of this is one tale concerning Philip that is interwoven into the details surrounding the killing of Cleitos the Black in Curtius Rufus (8.1.23-25).
[185] Fears 1974: 129.

its author likely to be credible to his readers is noteworthy. Therefore, there is an important distinction between 'unrealistic' and 'untrue'.[186] Moreover, this so-called 'contemporary anecdote' says much in relation to 'contemporary perceptions' of the individuals involved. This principle seems applicable to Philip where attributed-contemporaneous material can be sourced. As always though, biases must be considered when studying a figure such as Philip, who was highly controversial in his life time, and whose image and legacy were of some interest to later generations.

Sadly, there is usually no acknowledgment of any individual authority for anecdotes, and material from an earlier account could be contaminated by material from other sources or by the excerpting author's re-working of the material.[187] It is difficult to discover to what extent this problem affects the authors of this dissertation. However, the search is not futile. Much of the extant historical writing which survives, including anecdotal material, is a 'reworking of material already familiar to its readers; and the primary objective of the authors was not the discovery [or invention] of new facts but the literary presentation of a known tradition' (Bosworth 1988b: *Preface* v).

Educated assumptions can be made about an author's motives, but more so their aims. Among these were surely to present an engaging, persuasive and clear miniature *narration* –for the anecdote must be told with one eye towards its auditors. Selection of material must leave nothing to subtract from its final form; its meaning must be clear; its style simple and its language of everyday life; it should ring probable despite any remarkable claims or details; and it should be intensely vivid in order that persons and objects shall seem present.[188] Finally, it should be easy to excerpt for effortless retelling.[189]

Dover also notes a clear difference in the 'function' between two categories of anecdote – those which have a named individual, and those which are 'detachable'.[190] The latter type is one which is able to detach from its original individual, location or time and join to different 'points of reference' or even remain detached.[191] This has happened to some material concerning Philip (see chap. 3).

The processes of transition between the above two categories appears to be straightforward.[192] For example, during any number of stages of transmission, anecdotes concerning named individuals can become 'detached' when people forget names – particularly if the anecdotes do not lose their purpose or deeper meaning by the loss. Conversely, anecdotes can attach

[186] 1988: 46-7.
[187] Cf. Baynham 2003: 3.
[188] Haight 1940: 8-9.
[189] Cf. Goldhill 2009: 106.
[190] 1988: 48.
[191] Dover 1988: 48; cf. Fairweather 1974: 265ff.
[192] Dover 1988: 49; cf. Wehrli 1973: 196ff, 204.

themselves to names (especially famous individuals like Philip) because it adds that extra bit of conviction and persuasion to the tale. Moreover, the narrator appears more erudite if the figure belongs to the past; or if the individual is a living contemporary, the narrator may appear to be privy to exclusive information.[193] However, it seems that many tales concerning Philip are distinctly more public than private (i.e. they take place at dinner parties, in law courts, and during military operations). This suggests a more assertive public or even parochial ownership of (or identification with) the exploits of one of Macedonia's most renowned and popular figures.[194]

Another way that a name can be attached to material is when details illustrate what the story teller considers, 'rightly or wrongly, to be the character of the subject' (Dover 1988: 49). This is important when looking at a man like Philip. For example, if Philip was popularly perceived as exemplifying a type of behaviour for whatever reasons, he could become the (common) subject of anecdotal material about individuals of that kind. This accumulation of material would then further confirm and increase any distortion of Philip's image – *if* the original tales or perceptions were erroneous.[195] Therefore, caution is needed, as material of this nature might surround a controversial figure like Philip.[196] Moreover, a significant proportion of this material would be semi-divorced from the more narrative based traditions of our extant Philip historians, making it almost impossible to attribute the data to individual authorities or even periods (if not from Philip's lifetime). Additionally, many anecdotes concerning someone prominent or especially famous, could be either political apparatuses employed to reconcile or estrange, or devices for utilization in either a literary or historical controversy.[197]

Philip has competing traditions – both in a historiographic and anecdotal sense. Some are hostile, some apologetic, and some hagiographic. Hence, for every alienating anecdote, apothegm, *exemplum* (most linked to various vices), there is a conciliating counterpart (most often associated with virtues). It is this constant divergence or disagreement, and its perpetuation (even in modern times), that has given birth in many respects to the different Philips of history. Any firm conclusions regarding character or characterization are undoubtedly undermined and destabilized by such a phenomenon. In the end, anecdotes have the power to elevate or depress our opinions of individuals.[198] This was no different in the Greco-Roman period for Philip II.

Dover also notes some factors which determined the role anecdotes and the like had in Greek historiography and biography.[199] Two are significant in relation to the birth of material

[193] Dover 1988: 49.
[194] It would also be difficult to feature conversations between two or three individuals that would have had few witnesses.
[195] Cf. Dover 1988: 49.
[196] Cf. Beck 1998: 9.
[197] Dover 1988: 49.
[198] Bent 1892: 350.
[199] 1998: 51.

concerning Philip. Firstly, educated and wealthy writers were often alienated from politics and a political life. Therefore, many regarded politics, and by association 'authority', as a grubby business whereby political events were influenced for the most part by base actions associated with various vices. Secondly, there is the porous nature of the boundary between 'historical enquiry and creative fiction' in the ancient world (Dover 1988: 51).[200] Certainly features praised by readers and critics alike (e.g. χάρις, πάθος, δεινότης) are produced just as well by fiction – perhaps even better.[201] This indifference at times to the line between historical truth and fiction was widespread and entrenched in the Greek world, and probably arose from a scarcity of documentation in a society and culture which mined the past for *exempla*, and saw remembrance of the dead as extremely important.[202] The latter two comments are equally true of the Roman world from which survives the anecdotal material concerning Philip of this thesis.

Anecdotes in the Roman World: Form and Function

As anecdotes could be generated and transmitted by a variety of means in the Roman world, there are problems with using them as historical evidence. Indeed, a study like Saller's is dedicated to this very problem (during the Principate). However, the primary concern of this dissertation is an author's willingness to record the material, the formulation it takes, the function it serves, and its relationship to conceptions and characterizations of Philip in association to monarchic ideology and contemporary mores. Its historicity is largely immaterial.[203]

Nevertheless, beyond the search for truth, there is much worth noting regarding how anecdotes were generated and transmitted in the Roman world, and what changes could (and frequently did) occur during transmission. For example, it is hard to ascertain if what appears to be the first author transmitting an anecdote witnessed it (not an issue with our Roman period authors regarding Philip), invented, altered it, or was merely passing it on. Moreover, since details of the anecdote's initial author seldom came with the anecdote, other ancient authors, often far removed in time from the incident, were as incapable as modern historians of determining its ultimate origin.[204] This is often true with the anecdotal material surrounding Philip – particularly in authors like

[200] Momigliano held rhetoric mainly responsible (1980: 306). Certainly, when it came to rhetorical exercises, 'historical figures are used rather for their mythical or ethical value than for the details of their historical existence' (Morgan 1998: 221). Cf. Bowerstock, who argues that the 'intrusion of fiction into history' was an 'increasingly conspicuous feature of the Graeco-Roman world' (1997: 9).
[201] Dover 1988: 51.
[202] Dover 1988: 51.
[203] It is the 'moral truth' that is important - not what actually happened (Morgan 2007: 128).
[204] Saller 1980: 70.

Aelian, Valerius Maximus and Plutarch.[205] However, some tales can come with a named authority (e.g. Athen. 13.605b-c = *FGrH* 115 F 248). In the end, Roman period authors do not seem (rhetorical manipulations aside)[206] to have invented their material on Philip, but transmitted in their works selections of what was available to them. That material was often supplemented with personal touches (most often contextual and stylistic) that subordinated it to their own literary agendas.

There were also various circumstances important to understanding transmission of anecdotes in the Roman world.[207] There was gossip – the narrators of which were not greatly concerned with its origin and trustworthiness. There was also story-telling, which was common to dinner-parties and other similar social gatherings. Here the entertainment value of an anecdote was more important than its historicity. Here, the survivial of many tales linked to the fact that they were just good stories. Moreover, similarities in details from various sources may indicate the existence of traditional core motifs around which a range of anecdotes were composed. There were also historical *exempla* used in oratory, which regularly took the form of anecdotes. These anecdotes were used both as 'illustrative material' and to lend authority to arguments.[208]

This common use of *exempla* in oratory is probably reflective of pervasive Roman views concerning moral authority.[209] Indeed, there are many other contexts in which words or deeds were either commended or dammed by reference to moral *exempla*. Hence, the use of anecdotes in moral treatises as illustrative information was quite common. For example, in authors such as Plutarch and Seneca, the authors draw on anecdotes as archetypes to illustrate virtues or vices, and for their didactic value – which remained foremost at all times (e.g. *Q. Nat.* 5.15.1-3). The accuracy of details also mattered little, as they would be adapted in each recounting to exemplify the moral principle under consideration.[210]

Philip's tales often fulfil this role – providing essential evidence for attitudes and ideologies.[211] Although, something of the Greek and Hellenistic context of the source material for these Roman period authors should also be remembered, as anecdotes after the reigns of Philip and Alexander were in all likelihood influenced to a large extent by Hellenistic traditions of kingship

[205] E.g. Ael. *V.H.* 12.60; Val. Max. 6.2.ext.1; and Plut. *Mor.* 845D.
[206] There is strong possibility that Philip's tales were part of many standard preliminary exercises (*progymnasmata*) with which the young were introduced to the study of rhetoric. Outlined in treatises (by e.g. Aelius Theon, Quintilian, Priscian, and Hermogenes etc.), these manipulations to tales included - comment, objection, expansion, refutation, and confirmation (Beck 1998: 38).
[207] Saller 1980: 70-3.
[208] Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.6 ff.
[209] Saller 1980: 72.
[210] Saller 1980: 72. In an interesting parallel, Philip's son Alexander is constantly invoked in either a negative or positive exemplary manner (Bosworth 1996: 2 no. 1 and 2). However, in this exemplary use of Alexander, the details are persistently removed from their context and 'geared to the author's own rhetorical or moralizing purposes' (Bosworth 1996: 2).
[211] Vansina 1965: 160.

and leadership. Therefore, working at an ideological level, these anecdotes also reflected contemporary opinion (informed or otherwise), as to what ideas people had regarding correct behaviour among monarchs, leaders, and commanders in the Hellenistic world (at least they had at some point to ensure survival through this period for later generations). Therefore, Philip's tales are complex paradigmatic material which probably underwent transformative change during transmission to accord with successive generational mores and ideas on how a good or virtuous king, leader or emperor should or should not behave. Moreover, far removed in time from Philip by this period, they might or might not be Philip's actual historical behaviour – as this could easily be fabricated at any point.[212]

Two other contexts for transmission are crucial to this dissertation. Firstly, having become part of the literary tradition, various tales concerning famous individuals were collected from an assortment of sources and retold by antiquarians for entertainment purposes because of their value as good stories, and as displays of learning or erudition.[213] They were also assembled into eclectic collections of memorable *acta et dicta*. Examples include – Cornelius Nepos' *Exempla*; Valerius Maximus' collection of *acta et dicta*; Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights*; Aelian's *Varia Historia*; Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistai*; and Macrobius' *Saturnalia.* Philip was a popular individual (along with Alexander) in such collections (see Introduction).

The final means of transmission was through biographies.[214] However, correct information and reliability of the sources were not the principal concerns of the biographer. Often there was little hope of tracing an anecdote's true basis or origin, so an overly analytical attitude achieved little.[215] Therefore, an author like Plutarch is not excessively sceptical towards much of his anecdotal material.[216]

Saller has also made some relevant conclusions regarding the stability of anecdotes during transmission through a comparative study of various elements in different versions of certain anecdotes. Firstly, the chronological setting in which the story takes place is one of the least stable aspects of anecdotes. The alteration could be small, or, as was common, the element of time was either added or removed.[217] There are numerous Philippic anecdotes, *apophthegmata*, and *exempla* which have no chronological markers whatsoever. However, there are others in which internal references to battles (e.g. Chaeronea) or other known events allow some dating.

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[212] Cf. Saller 1982: 82 – regarding Augustus.
[213] Saller 1980: 72.
[214] Momigliano 1971, 1971b, and Swain 1997: 1-37.
[215] Cf. Saller 1980: 73.
[216] Although Plutarch provides Philippic anecdotal material from his biographies and *Moralia*, he seems not to have written a *Life* of Philip (cf. even the *Lamprias Catalogue*). One can only speculate as to why. Perhaps the difficulty of pairing the Macedonian with a suitable Roman was the first great difficulty. Evans (1997: 232) notes that Plutarch chose not to write a *Life* of Philip, though he could have, because of some great antipathy towards him. On Plutarch's choice of individuals – Geiger 1981: 85-104. Cf. Chap. 2.
[217] 1980: 74.

An anecdote's physical backdrop or setting is only a slightly more stable component. Nevertheless, particulars about locality are often either in conflict or omitted entirely.[218] A good example of this in our Philippic anecdotes is the indefinite location of the supposedly impregnable fortress/city before which Philip made his famous remark concerning its vulnerability to an ass laden with gold.[219] Moreover, the unnamed Φρούριον... ὀχυρόν of Plutarch and the τινα πόλιν of Diodorus becomes the universal *omnia castella* of Cicero (*Letters to Atticus*, i.16.12).

When Saller considered the protagonists of anecdotes, it was apparent that the identity of minor characters could be altered, removed, or added without considerably changing the anecdote.[220] A good example of this is the anecdote which involves Philip giving an unjust judgement whilst either tired or drunk.[221] The other protagonist of the tale is entirely different (an old woman in one - Machaetas in the other).

Alterations in characters could also happen among the more important protagonists – even the main characters.[222] Though occurring less regularly, this change demonstrates that authors were willing to reassign anecdotal material between individuals if stereotypical qualities or personalities made it possible.[223] This happens on several occasions to tales involving Philip. For example, Plutarch holds Philip the man responsible for the memorable wise words of a tale regarding the treatment of slanderers.[224] Amazingly, Plutarch also assigns the words to a different individual – Pausanias, king of Sparta (*Mor.* 230D). This use of anecdotes suggests that they may not always be historical, but that their successful fabrication and transmission is still a type of evidence.[225] It demonstrates that the focus was often more on the sentiment or moral. Any names attached to incidents were sometimes more important for their ability to stand for a broader category of individual such as a king or philosopher. Paradoxically, the naming of renowned individuals also added to an incident's status and impact – as well as its popularity and longevity, and was therefore also important.

Changes in minor details are extremely common also in anecdotes.[226] This is to be expected. Anecdotes exist to expose the remarkable by their very nature, and mundane detail offers little beneficial material for either moral edification or amusement. A good example are the differences

[218] 1980: 75.
[219] Plut. *Mor.* 178A-B; and Diod. 16.54.
[220] 1980:75-6.
[221] Val. Max. 6.2.ext.1; Plut. *Mor.* 178F-179A; and Stob. 3.13.49.
[222] Saller 1980: 76.
[223] Saller 1980: 76. Cf. Burckhardt 1919: 188-89 and Grossman 2003: 160.
[224] *Mor.* 143F; *Mor.* 179A-B; and *Mor.* 457F.
[225] Cf. Grossman 2003: 161.
[226] Saller 1980: 77-81.

in minor details and language between the two accounts of Philip's letter to Alexander regarding his abortive attempt to woo the people with money.[227]

Additionally, the mutability of details does not seem to have decreased significantly once the anecdotes were written down.[228] The tale of Philip, the oracle and the chariot in Valerius Maximus (1.8.ext.9) and Aelian (*V.H.* 3.45; cf. Cic. *De facto* 5) is a good example. It suggests that either authors recounted anecdotes from memory, or strict adherence to their written sources was not their highest priority.[229] Ancient writers had little motivation to fabricate unimportant or minor details, but they also had no incentive to accurately replicate them either.[230] This thesis documents many instances in Philippic anecdotes where minor details play some role in Philip's characterization and image.

In stark contrast is the relative stability of the punch-line or *apophthegma* of the anecdote. However, even this could change depending on an author's intention for its use. Therefore, although elements of anecdotes like the apophthegm were less inclined to change, there was still 'no limit to the possible alterations' (Saller 1980: 79) that could take place. One example of a changing *apophthegma* in our Philippic corpus even comes from the same author – Plutarch. It is supposedly spoken by Agesipolis upon hearing of Philip's destruction of Olynthus.[231]

"ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναστῆσαί γε τοιαύτην" ἔφη "πόλιν ἐκεῖνος ἄν δυνηθείη'' – Plut. *Mor.* 40E.

"μὰ τοὺς θεούς," εἶπεν, "ἄλλην τοιαύτην ἐν πολλαπλασίονι χρόνῳ οὐκ οἰκοδομήσει - Plut. *Mor.* 215B.

"ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν ἀνοικίσαι γε πόλιν ἐκεῖνος δύναιτο τηλικαύτην," – Plut. *Mor.* 458C.

Overall anecdotes in the Roman world must be handled differently from other sources of evidence, as their generation and transmission remained primarily outside any critical discipline.[232] However, Saller argues that not all anecdotes are lies, there may be 'kernels of truth in them', but these 'kernels' are of little use unless some universal methodology can be devised to identify them (1980: 79). His study's opposition to anecdotes as evidence could be overcome for specific anecdotes, but only by demonstration on each occasion.[233]

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[227] Val. Max. 7.2.ext.10; and Cic. *De. Off.* 2.53. That letters from Philip circulated in ancient times is well attested e.g. Aul. Gell. *N.A.* 9.3.
[228] Saller 1980: 77.
[229] Cf. Saller 1980: 78.
[230] Saller 1980: 79.
[231] Only in one of these *apophthegmata* is the speaker actually named as Agesipolis – *Mor.* 215B (*Mor.* 40E = ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος; *Mor.* 458C = τις). This demonstrates the earlier point regarding the possible use of names as being indicative of roles (that role here is 'Spartan').
[232] Saller 1980: 81.
[233] Saller 1980: 81-2; cf. Laurence and Paterson 1999: 194-195.

Bosworth had rather different ideas on the value of anecdotes and *apophthegmata* as historical evidence –

> Our attitude to anecdotal evidence should be less sceptical than it has been in the past. Unless it is proven otherwise, we should accept its historicity, assuming that the tradition goes back to some memorable deed or apophthegm... The material that I have examined here... has little in the way of narrative context, but internal analysis reveals nothing self-contradictory or implausible. Instead, I have traced a line of consistent anecdotes... This is exactly the detail that is remembered and passed on by contemporaries, and the anecdotes that provide the evidence should be treasured and exploited, not casually ruled out of court (2009: 10).

This conclusion is a result of Bosworth's methodology which focussed upon the examination of 'anecdotal strings'. This involved the study of similar anecdotes by following their ideas and themes, and comparing them to material found elsewhere. This is essentially the individual demonstration demanded by Saller, but applied to thematically related anecdotes tied together for larger exposition. This thesis makes some use of this approach.

Anecdotes and the Second Sophistic

Speaking and oratory were one route to power and influence during the Second Sophistic. In fact, performing rhetoric (often containing anecdotes) was integral to understanding the Second Sophistic and the self-representation of the authors of this period. It was 'a fundamental aspect of the social and intellectual life of this period' (Goldhill 2009: 98). This is important to remember when it comes to considering work by authors such as Aelian, Athenaeus, and even Plutarch. Indeed, in a work dedicated to a discussion of anecdotes and the 'bookish culture' of the Second Sophistic, Goldhill argues that in the highly literate culture of the Empire, there existed parallel to its focus on the book another current in which knowledge was parcelled for oral circulation – anecdotes.[234]

Therefore, during this period, the *pepaideumenoi* exchanged in agonistic-discursive jousting brief paragraphs of paradoxes, curiosities, and moral paradigms (of which Philip is a good example). This increasing circulation of anecdotal material was fundamental to *paideia* – the education and culture which bound the elite of the Empire as a social collective.[235] In this way, by constant exposition of the weird, wonderful, and extraordinary, anecdotes help 'define and delimit the normal, *to eikos*' (Goldhill 2009: 111). This is the fundamental principal behind monarchy

[234] 2009: 111.
[235] Goldhill 2009: 111.

ideology and general behavioural paradigms of leadership in anecdotes. Therefore, anecdotes facilitate the performance of *paideia* at an everyday-oral level, allowing the elite (and lay auditors) 'to place themselves socially' (Goldhill 2009: 111). This suggests that in this time Philip and his tales offered elite Greco-Roman culture both positive and negative paradigms - moral *paideia* for the privileged and influential. Therefore, depending on the details, Philip as exemplar was either to be followed or rejected. This demonstrates that centuries after his death, Philip's tales continued to form a key informative element in the culture and education of the world's ruling elite.

Goldhill also argues that as an anecdote has a narrative and normally no author, it is to be distinguished from a quotation - therefore, Athenaeus' work consists of mostly quotations.[236] However, this distinction between quotation and anecdote might not be so clear. Taking the example of Athenaeus in relation to Philip, while Athenaeus 4.167a-c is very much a quotation like the following -

> Theopompus in Book LIV of his *Histories* says that in Philip's domain around Bisaltia, Amphipolis, and Macedonian Grastonia, the fig trees produced figs in mid-spring and the vines produced grape clusters, and the olive trees produced olives at a time of year when they should have been budding; he claims that Philip was lucky in everything (3.77d-e).
>
> Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander liked apples, according to Dorotheus in Book VI of his *History Involving Alexander* (7.276F).

Athenaeus 13.605b-c is a good example of a quotation containing some of the elements of an anecdote.

> And Onomarchus, he (Theopompus) claims, gave Physcidas the son of Lycolas of Trichonium, who was a good-looking boy, a laurel-garland made of gold that had been dedicated by the Ephesians. This boy's father took him to Philip's court, where he was treated like a whore and then sent home with no reward (13.605b-c).

Goldhill also discusses the *chreia* (χρεία) (sometimes equated with the *exemplum*). 'Closer' to the anecdote, it is normally a short exchange or single sentence which ends in a particularly clever or insightful comment or retort. Particularly good examples are found in the work of Machon (c. first half of the third century BCE).[237] It had a utilitarian object originally - hence its origin in the more practical Cynic and Stoic philosophical schools (e.g. Plut. *de Stoic. repugn.* 21), before gradually passing to those of the grammaticus and of the rhetor.[238] The *chreia* was something akin to an attitude, a genre minus rules or argument that represents a view of the world through

[236] 2009: 100.
[237] Gutzwiller 2007: 133-135.
[238] Haight 1940: 3; cf. Goldhill 2009: 101. On the *chreia* – Colson 1921: 150-54; Hock and O'Neil 1986; 2002; Mack 1987; and Robbins 1988: 1-23. Note the definition of *chreia* in Charisius' *Ars grammatica – Chria est dicti vel facti praecipua memoratio.*

'exemplary expression' (Goldhill 2009: 101; *cf.* 104).[239] It is memorable, brief, easily repeated, and powerful, having 'a signoff power', which is in many ways a demonstration of authoritative power (Goldhill 2009: 101).[240] Some argue that an anecdote is different from the *chreia*, as it is not so committed to a single witticism – nor is it such a 'vivid demonstration of the power or persona of the speaker' (Goldhill 2009: 102). This is highly subjective and demonstrates the closeness between anecdote and other literary genres. The best example of a *chreia* involving Philip comes from Plutarch.[241]

> ...τὸ τοῦ Διογένους "'Αριστοτέλης ἀριστᾷ ὅταν δοκῇ Φιλίππῳ, Διογένης, ὅταν Διογένει,"...and what Diogenes expressed when he said: 'Aristotle lunches at Philip's pleasure, Diogenes at his own,'... (*Mor.* 604D).

It is clear from this example alone that a *chreia* is a sharp or sententious aphorism of a kind. However, it differs from the maxim or *gnome* (γνώμη), in that it is related to a particular event or person. Moreover, it can be used in a narrative which explains it – as is the example above.[242]

Overall, the distinctions between an anecdote, the quotation, the *chreia*, and even the paradox are not so clear cut.[243] Even Goldhill acknowledges this difficulty, for although they are 'particularly useful frames for understanding the anecdote within Greek literary tradition...,' the forms themselves should not be thought of as 'absolutely discrete genres' (2009: 103; cf. 104). This is good advice when looking at material concerning Philip II.

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[239] *N.b.* Goldhill similar claim in relation to anecdotes (2009: 102).

[240] Lucian's work on Demonax (9.12-62) has around fifty examples of Demonax's putdowns. These pithy putdowns (recorded as *exempla*) show the Cynic philosopher taking on the world. Harping back to the assembling and circulating of material on Pythagoras to help facilitate group formation and identity, it shows how the *chreia* was an efficient form of disseminating exemplary models of behaviour (Goldhill 2009: 101). Compare this to the use of Diogenes in Epictetus when he speaks to Philip (2.13.24; 3.22.23-25).

[241] Plutarch's own account of Diogenes racing to meet with Philip at the battle of Chaeronea in order to rebuke him is interesting in this context (*Mor.* 70c-d and *Mor.* 606c; cf. Plut. *Dem.* xx.3; Diog. Laert. vi.43; Philostr. *Apollonius of Tyana* 7.2.3; 7.3.2; cf. Epict. 2.13.24; 3.22.23-25; see chap. six). It contains too many details to be a simple *chreia*, but contains all the base elements of a classic *chreia* – the cynic philosopher, and the harsh putdown.

[242] Cf. Haight 1940: 3.

[243] Goldhill acknowledges collections of *paradoxa*. However, he argues that paradox need not be part of an anecdote which normally has humans as its focus, and not the natural world or animals (Goldhill 2009: 103). *N.b.* Philip is mentioned in Aelian's *On the Nature of Animals*, but it is as part of an example of a paradox in relation to 'hangers-on' and 'flattery'. Κλείσοφος δὲ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸν ἕτερον δεσμῷ κατελάμβανε, Φιλίππῳ χαριζόμενος ἐν τῇ τῆς Μεθώνης πολιορκίᾳ τὸν ἕτερον ἐκκοπέντι - *N.A.* 9.7; cf. Ael. *Frr.* 107, 108).

EXEMPLA

> *Exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio* ([Cic.] *ad Herennium* 4.49.62).[244]

Like the genres above and anecdote, the line between an *exemplum* and an anecdote is at times illusory.[245] A good definition of *exemplum* is found in the *ad Herennium* (see above),[246] which also goes on to state that, 'it places its subject before the eyes since it describes everything so clearly that I would say it can almost be touched by the hand (4.49.62).'[247] Therefore, an *exemplum* renders a thought more brilliant, clearer, and more plausible.[248] Overall, *Exempla* are in essence the Roman equivalent of what might be understood to be an amalgamation of the modern terms example and anecdote. Goldhill sees the *exemplum* as being an 'institutionalized, packaged narrative form', which was repeatedly exploited as a component of Roman discourse, and something akin to the anecdote in the Greek tradition (2009: 105).

The Greek equivalent of the *exemplum* was *paradeigma*, or sometimes *chreia*. Collecting them began in Classical times, becoming more popular in the Hellenistic period, and endemic in Greek and Latin literature by the beginning of the Roman Empire.[249] Aristotle discussed *paradeigma* in breaking down the proofs of rhetoric into two areas – παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα (*Rhet.* 2.20ff.). The former he broke down further into two main areas – examples drawn from history and those which are invented (but drawn to some extent from real life).

> Παραδειγμάτων δ' εἴδη δύο· ἕν μὲν γάρ ἐστι παραδείγματος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα, ἕν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν - *Rhet.* 2.20.2.[250]

Much later, Quintilian also noted the fictitious as well as historical nature of the subject matter of *exempla*, further remarking on its usefulness in persuading the audience of the orator.

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[244] '*Exemplum* is the citing of something done or said in the past, along with the definite naming of the doer or author.'
[245] On the *exempla* tradition – Schoenberger 1911; Alewell 1913; Litchfield 1914: 1-71; Kornhardt 1936; Lumpe 1966: col. 1229-1257; Eyben 1972: 200-217; Price 1975; Maslakov 1978; 1984: 437-96; Fears 1981: 827-948; Klein 1996: 60-70; Skidmore 1996: 3-27; Dueck 2000: 176-196; Halten 2001; Bücher 2006; Morgan 2007: 10 n.33 and 122-159 and Urban 2011.
[246] On the use of *exemplum* in Cicero's works – Blincoe 1941, Brinton 1988, Blom 2010 and Urban 2011.
[247] Note the nature of exemplification at 4.44.57, and the motives for its use at 4.45.59. The *exemplum* was also distinguished from the *testimonium* by rhetoricians e.g. *Testimonium* was for Cicero, everything employed from an unrelated source to bring about belief. It could be a number of things e.g. a mere quotation of a statesmen, orator, philosopher, literary man, poet, or historian, a general truth, a proverb, an oracle, a text of law (*Topica* 73-78).
[248] Cf. Haight 1940: 4.
[249] Morgan 2007: 122-24.
[250] Cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.,* ch. 8 (1429 a-1430 a).

> *Potentissimum autem est inter ea quae sunt huius generis, quod proprie vocamus exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio - Institutio Oratoria* 5. 6. 6.

Roman teachers and parents were greatly concerned about conduct and character,[251] and as such *bona* and *mala exempla* (like *chreia*) also had an important role in the education of Roman young.[252] They taught morals, as well as being used as ornaments of style which could persuade the hearts and minds of listeners.[253] Seneca advocated that boys should memorize in school *chreia* (as a form of *exemplum*) because their young minds can comprehend them, and through them discover wisdom –

> *Ideo pueris et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias vocant, quia conplecti illas puerilis animus potest, qui plus adhuc non capit – Ep.* 33.7.

This thesis documents how Seneca makes use of Philippic *exempla* in his works.[254] However, they are too long and detailed to be considered the *chreia* variety mentioned above. Instead, they are relatively traditional *exempla*, with their details speaking to more mature edification.

Quintilian tells us more than Seneca on anecdote writing in the schools of the Grammaticus (*Institutio Oratoria* 1.9.2-6). He gives express directions as to their teaching, stating that each student should learn to paraphrase in simple and restrained language the fables of Aesop, and also practice writing aphorisms, moral essays (*chriae*) and *ethologiae* (*Sententiae quoque et chriae et ethologiae*) (basically maxims and *exempla*). Moreover, he thinks deeds no less than sayings should be presented for treatment (*et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est*). Quintilian argues that above all, an orator should have a plentiful store of *exempla*, as many as possible (*sciat ergo quam plurima*), both old and new, those recorded in history, those transmitted by oral tradition, those that occur from day to day, and even those fictitious *exempla* invented by the great poets. The former have the authority of evidence or even legal decisions, the latter, either have the warrant of antiquity or are regarded as having been invented by great men to serve as lessons to the world (*Institutio Oratoria* 12.4. 1-2; cf. 12.2.29).[255]

Quintilian followed his own advice when it came to Philip II on at least one occasion, using him as an excellent *exemplum* from history for the proving of his point (*Institutio Oratoria* 1.1.22-24). Therefore, Philip, like others (e.g. Alexander)[256] was a figure of Roman rhetorical education,

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[251] Bonner 1977: xi.
[252] On Roman and Greek education – Wilkin 1905; Freeman 1907; Marrou 1956; Eyre 1963: 47-59; Beck 1964; Gwynn 1964; Clarke 1971; Bowen 1972; Bonner 1977; Bloomer 1997; Morgan 1998, 2007; Too 2001: and Joyal 2009.
[253] Haight 1940: 7.
[254] On Seneca and his use of *exempla* – Mayer 1991: 141-76; and 2008.
[255] On the moral authority and importance of *exempla* or *chreiai* – Plin. *Pan*. 45.6; cf. Fronto *Ad Ant. Imp.* 2-3 (Naber p. 217); and Cic. *Orat.* 1.46, 201.
[256] Spencer 2010: 180.

his image an important touchstone in the preparation of successive generations of Roman politicians and leaders for public life. Philip serves Rome in the creation and exploration of cultural values from an early educative phase, but also enduring as an exemplar in more mature accomplishments.[257]

Returning to Cicero, who used many *exempla*, he referred to *exempla* as the most useful embellishments of the style of an oration (*de Orat.* 3.52.201),[258] mentioning the use of them among the *ornamenta* of an oration in his description of the art of the ideal orator (*Orator*. 40.138; cf. *de Orat.* 3.53.205).[259] Cicero reflects these thoughts in the several mentions of Philip he makes in his works.[260] Cicero often introduces Philip's exempla/anecdotes quite naturally into his work (almost conversationally) to illustrate some point. Moreover, most references to Philip, like most of Cicero's anecdotes in general, are often succinct and to the point.

Conclusion

There are numerous difficulties regarding the formulation of any methodology for working with anecdotes, *apophthegma* and *exempla* from the ancient world. Indeed, these terms can be difficult even to define, and their associated material often challenging to categorise with any real certainty – let alone approach with any sure method of examination. Moreover, their formation and dissemination in different periods was a complex evolving process which spanned centuries, cultures, languages, genres and applications. These difficulties have been shown to be particularly acute in terms of gathering true historical information from them. However, this thesis is not focused on their historicity. Instead, its primary attention is on how they function in their respective texts and in society at large. What larger role/s animate the recording and distribution of this material? As a result, many of the problems cited above are manageable. By concentrating on a selection of these tales and their themes, ideas and qualities; it is possible to obtain meaningful information regarding the reception of Philip's persona and legacy in the Roman world. However, to realize this possibility, critical assessments must still be undertaken towards the authors and the works in which these tales are located (as shown next in chap. two).

[257] E.g. *suasoria* (Cic. *De. Inv.* 1.12.17), *controversiae* (elder Seneca *Controv*. 10.5), a dramatic dialogue with his son in an oration on kingship (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 2), and the *Dial. mort. Alex. and Phil.* of Lucian.
[258] I take Cicero's use of *luminibus* as an implicit reference to *exempla* (cf. *de Orat.* 3.53.205).
[259] Cicero of course does not confine them only to his speeches (Morgan 2007: 123 and Urban 2011 *passim*).
[260] e.g. *Disp.* 5.14.42; *Ep.* 16.12; *De Off.* 1.26, 2.14, and 2.15.

2

Ancient Sources – Two Case Studies

> Excerptors are responsible for choosing their material, both the individual quotations and the overall topics....In this, at least, they must exercise judgement and taste...They are also responsible for the organization of the work…The double process of selection and ordering leaves ample scope for originality. The excerptor's choices will to some degree reflect contemporary values and concerns, and in this regard may serve as a window on the age; but they may also be the product of individual preference and decisions... and so help to shape the interests and views of future readers... The anthologizer may thus play a crucial role in the transmission of a cultural heritage (Konstan 2011: 10).

The sources of this thesis demonstrate Philip's popularity as a figure with which to negotiate and engage with the concerns and interests of the Roman world from the late republic to the height of empire. These same sources also suggest the existence of an extensive audience primed for Philippic tales, as there is a large amount of ancient sources to consider in a dissertation of this kind. Some are *simple* excerptors such as Stobaeus – but many are more complex than this with their reworking of the material to fit either context or agenda. Therefore, because of this large volume of reference material, this chapter is intended as a detailed example of some of the analysis required of any approach towards these authors. Hence, two authors have been chosen to stand in many respects for the countless authors mentioned during this thesis (though relevant discussion of particular authors is appended where necessary to the main text of the thesis). Indeed, the critical approach demonstrated here is applied throughout the thesis to all authors cited. However, space limitations demand its omission from the text.

The two authors selected are Valerius Maximus and Plutarch. These two authors are in many ways emblematic of the majority of our authors or various aspects of them. They will enable consideration of such areas as monarchic ideology, collections of *exempla*, collections of *apophthegmata*, Roman/Latin authors, Greek authors, the role of rhetoric, the use of anecdotes in treatises, the second sophistic, intended audiences, ethics and morals, the selection and reworking of material, agendas, contextual issues, dedicated works, and many other themes. Moreover, Plutarch in particular accounts for a good proportion of the material of this thesis, and seems to have had access to earlier Greek material on Philip that surely helped to shape many later traditions.

Each section is not exhaustive. More details concerning these authors and their Philippic material is found throughout this thesis where appropriate. Moreover, many of the points made

below should be understood to have larger more universal relevance to other referenced authors of this thesis. Therefore, what follows is an analysis of each author and their work so as to better contextualise their material on Philip into their philosophies and aims.

Valerius Maximus

The Roman author Valerius Maximus[261] has nine mentions of Philip amongst the 967 stories of his *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* (see introduction).[262] Some argue that the work is of little use to the historian of events and individuals.[263] However, Valerius was not writing history.[264] Hence, others argue that Valerius' work gives us insight into what aspects and individuals of the past were deemed worthy of remembrance, and what was said about them in the social and cultural milieu of early first century CE Rome under Tiberius.[265] Indeed, reworked-excerpted *exempla* could displace the original source material as new paradigms of historical memory – providing the basis for education and acculturation into imperial Roman elite circles,[266] as their leading protagonists were referenced as models for the culture of a new age.[267] Philip was one of these past individuals deemed worthy enough of remembrance in Rome under this new imperial reality.[268] Consequently, Philip's *exempla* offer insights to aspects of the culture of the first century CE.

Valerius' work is a mass of rhetorically shaped stories and details of varying lengths arranged into nine books. Each book has a variety of different chapter headings of mostly abstract

[261] There is a substantial body of literature concerning Valerius Maximus - Heraeus 1900; Lundberg 1906; Helm 1940; 1955; Thormeyer 1902; Comes 1950; Helm, 1955: cols. 90-116; Carney 1962; Duff 1964: 54-66; André 1965: 294-315; Kempf 1966; Carter 1968; Carter 1975: 26-56; Faranda 1976; Maslakov 1978; 1984: 437-96; Sinclair 1980; Bloomer 1987; 1992; Skidmore 1988; 1996; Römer 1990: 99-107; Bloomer 1992; Von Albrecht 1994; Mueller 1994; 2002; Combès 1995; Skidmore 1996; Coudry 1998; David (ed.) 1998; Wardle 1998; 2005: 141-161; Weileder 1998; Bailey 2000; Thurn 2001: 79-94; Truschnegg 2002: 360-397; Walker 2004; Haegemans and Stoppie 2004; Lucarelli 2007; Morgan 2007: 125-159; Lobur 2008: chap. 6; Spencer 2010: 175-191, and Langlands 2008: 160-187; 2011: 1-23. On the sources of Valerius Maximus – Maire 1899; Bosch 1929; Ramelli 1936: 117-152; Helm 1939: Klotz 1942: 1-113; Bliss 1951: 130-154; Palladini 1957: 232-51; and Fleck 1974.

[262] There are various tallies for the material of Valerius e.g. Wardle 1998: 11 n. 46; Combès 1995: 22 n. 2; Skidmore 1996: 24 n. 3; and Bloomer (1992: 1 – for 967).

[263] Carter 1975: 38; cf. Maslakov 1984: 439.

[264] Bloomer 1992: 146.

[265] Bloomer 1992: 3, 8; cf. Wardle 2005. Maslakov (1984: 439) argues that the work adds to our understanding of Roman responses to an age in transition. Skidmore also argues that Valerius presents evidence for first century CE Roman attitudes to history and 'the manner and quality of that understanding and the uses to which it was put' (1996: 40). Cf. Lobur 2008: chap. six. On dating Valerius Maximus and his work, which general consensus places during the reign of Tiberius (with publication between 27-31 CE) – Wardle 1998: 1-6; 2005: 149; and Carter 1975: 30-4). Bellmore (1989: 67-80) advocates an Augustan date.

[266] Bloomer 1992: 9, cf. 4.

[267] Bloomer 1992: 12; cf. 146.

[268] From Valerius we see the development of Alexander's characterization under the early emperors - for he was placed along-side those individuals that the Roman élite were expected to learn about and to reflect on when regarding their own behaviour (Wardle 2005: 142). Philip was in a similar position, though his presentation cannot be expected to match in substance or quantity that of his more famous son.

categories of morality or immorality.[269] In most cases they offer both Roman *exempla* (*domestica*) followed by foreign *externa* (mostly Hellenic) *exempla*.[270] This methodology consciously involved the juxtaposition of Roman and foreign *exempla*.[271] Scholars are divided as to whether there is any real (successful) organization of the material.[272] There are also deep divisions as to the overall purpose of the work.[273] Nonetheless, scholars fall into basically two not wholly irreconcilable camps. Some argue that the work was meant as a pedagogic aid for practitioners and students of rhetoric and declamation.[274] That declamatory composition directs and informs the work's structure and organization.[275] Thus, it was a hand-book or reference-scrapbook of *exempla* and stylistic paradigms meant for adding 'colour, variety and persuasiveness to both conversation and formal oratory' (Carter 1975: 34).

Others see the work as having a powerful moral purpose, whereby *exempla* of a didactic tone were employed to bring about ethical persuasion.[276] Skidmore is adamant that Valerius is a source of moral exhortation. He argues that any glory attained by individual exemplars would serve to encourage their audience to imitate their impressive deeds and words (e.g. *...ut eorum quoque respectus aliquid praesentibus moribus prosit* – Val. Max. *Praef.* Book 2). Whereas individuals whose deeds and words brought infamy would serve as deterrents. Therefore, Valerius seeks to deter vice and encourage virtue. The preface to the work (including its dedication to Tiberius) seems to support this.[277]

> I have determined to select from famous authors and arrange the deeds and sayings worthy of memorial of the Roman City and external nations, too widely scattered in other sources to be briefly discovered, to the end that those wishing to take examples may be spared the labour of lengthy search... Therefore I invoke you to this understanding, Caesar…by whose celestial providence the virtues of which I shall tell are most kindly fostered and the vices most sternly punished (Val. Max. *Praef.*).[278]

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[269] Bloomer 1992: 17.

[270] On the organization and content of the work – Combès 1995: 24-46; Bloomer 1992: 17-58; and Carter 1975: 26-9. There are two epitomes of Valerius (often drawn on to fill the lacuna between 1.1.ext.4-1.4.ext.1), that of Julius Paris (c. third century CE), and that of Januarius Nepotianus - variously dated to the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries CE (Wessner 1916: 697-8; Skidmore 1996: xv; Duff 1964: 58; and Shackleton Bailey 2000: 5-6).

[271] On Roman verses foreign *exempla* – Faranda 1971: 15.

[272] Wardle 1998: 7-8; Helm *RE* viiiA: 95; Duff 1964: 57; Carter 1975: 27; and Maslakov 1984: 468 – who argues that what appears as imposed design or sequence, might be excised from previous collectors or collections of *exempla* (1984: 455 n. 31).

[273] Haegemans and Stoppie (2004: 147-48) have recently outlined the different purposes attributed to Valerius' work.

[274] Bloomer 1992: 1, 8-9. Declamation was a type of oral performance which may have been the dominant public art form of the early empire. It formed the last stage of Roman education, and those trained in declamation could aspire to a career in the courts or serving the emperor himself (Bloomer 1992: 1 n. 2; cf. Bonner 1949: 1-50). For similar views to Bloomer regarding the works purpose – Duff 1964: 56; Carter 1975: 34-6; Vessey 1982: 501-2; and Howatson 1989: 588. For scepticism on Bloomer's argument – Wardle 1998: 13; Skidmore 1996: *Preface*.

[275] Bloomer 1992: 17.

[276] Skidmore 1996: 53-82; and Mueller 2002: 175-82. This moral aspect is not completely ignored by Bloomer (e.g. 1992: 3). On Skidmore (1996), see the review by Wardle 1998b: 158-60.

[277] Skidmore 1996: xv-xvi; and Wardle 1998: 12-13.

[278] On Valerius' preface – Janson 1964: 100-106.

However, it also supports the arguments Bloomer makes regarding the work being defined in terms of practical utility.[279] Bloomer argues that the purpose, method and audience of Valerius are all declared in the preface. Indeed, he feels that the needs of Valerius' audience, that is public speakers, lawyers and declaimers for a collection of *exempla* of 'authoritative literary pedigree', are the main inspiration for his work.[280]

The latest scholarship is working towards an uneasy reconciliation between the two camps, though with more emphasis on the moral aspects of the work. Spencer recently commented that any distinction between rhetorical and ethical is not 'practicable or desirable' (2010: 176 n.5).[281] Wardle makes a similar argument noting that the fundamental or serious moral purpose of the work should not be separated from its practical use to its primary audience (those involved in declamation).[282]

Owing to disagreement on the work's purpose, different audiences have been proposed for the work. They include declaimers, school boys (apprentice declaimers), the Roman elite (or Italians and provincials) active in Rome's imperial bureaucracy and military – that is imperial supporters and beneficiaries, and those in public life whose business was law and politics.[283] Whatever the truth, Valerius' work probably reached a wider audience than even the author had envisaged after publication – particularly if it was known to be on the emperor's reading list. Therefore, Philip's *exempla* were available to various audiences drawing upon the work for various purposes – including leisure.[284]

There was once great focus on and disagreement about Valerius' sources. Now, there seems to be consensus, at least on a larger compositional level.[285] Though Valerius mentions a few different authors, he deviates little from mainstream and orthodox authors like Livy, Cicero, Varro, and Pompeius Trogus (*externa exempla*).[286] Possible sources for material relating to Philip II include Cicero, C. Julius Hyginus, Pompeius Trogus, a collection of *exempla externa*, and

[279] Bloomer 1992: 14-17; cf. Shackleton Bailey – 'nothing said here about edification' 2000: 3.
[280] Cf. Alewell 1913: 38.
[281] Cf. Morgan 2007: 126.
[282] 1998: 12; cf. 14.
[283] Bloomer 1992: 11-13; Skidmore 1996: 103-112; and Carter 1975: 34. Cf. Wardle 1998: 12.
[284] Those who used Valerius probably had wider audiences than he did (Morgan 2007: 129).
[285] Duff 1964: 58; Carter 1975: 36-40; Maslakov 1984:457-84; Bloomer 1992: 59-146; Wardle 1998: 15-18; 2005: 147-8; and Shackleton Bailey 2000: 4. For references to German *Quellenforshern* on Valerius – Wardle 1998: 15 n. 68.
[286] Bloomer 1992: 63.

Theopompus (cited at 8.13.ext.5, and 8.4.ext.5),[287] though it was once denied that Valerius could be using Greek sources.[288]

It is impossible to give detailed analysis of Valerius' source use and influences with so much literature from antiquity lost or corrupt.[289] Moreover, there is the 'elusive influence' of the more oral and fluid versions of *exempla* found in the schools of rhetoric, and the fact that not all *exemplum* must have one source (Wardle 1998: 16). Maslakov argues that the search for Valerius' sources for some more common *exempla* is pointless, as they were often dealt with in rhetorical compositions and handbooks, 'accumulating with time standardized imagery and vocabulary that particular authors (without necessarily borrowing from one another) varied at will' (1984: 460). Famous *dicta* and *facta* could also preserve their form throughout numerous presentations, but not necessarily reflect dependence on any given source, as both oral and written traditions would keep the essential component of the story unaltered – while scene and characters were fluid.[290] Indeed, in popular imagination, Philip's wit and use of bribery were commonplaces – and formed themes around which tales, real or invented, clustered in the schools of rhetoric and declamatory halls.[291] Additionally, if Valerius had himself been a practitioner of declamation, he would have memorized countless famous *exempla* and *dicta* of just this kind.[292]

Philip's own fame, as well as his paternity to one of Rome's greatest foreign obsessions, Alexander, no doubt hastened the accumulation of material.[293] Therefore, Philip's fame, image and memory were the playthings of *exempla* literature, increasingly vulnerable to the ornamentation and fabrications of recurring *topoi*.[294] Philip's memory outside of historiography reduced and purified into some kind of fusion of rhetorical tradition and popular memory – which informed it, and was informed by it.[295] Therefore, Philip's *exempla* in Valerius might rightly be considered artificial and stylised representations of his career and image that have been subjected to a fluid process of elaboration and refinement divorced of any discernible historical tradition.[296] However, even if this were substantial true, it in no way decreases their contribution to discussions regarding monarchic ideology or contemporary values.

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[287] On Valerius' use of Pompeius Trogus – Bloomer 1992: 99-108; and Wardle 2005: 148, who argues that no 'extended close verbal parallels' are evident. Bloomer also argues against the use by Valerius of one of our main extant sources on Philip, Diodorus Siculus (1992: 79-99, 107; cf. 146, 197; and 254, *contra* Maire 1899). Valerius sources of foreign material were often works of the late republic and Augustan Rome, and not that of Greek or Hellenistic writers. On Valerius, Pompeius Trogus, and Philip's son Alexander – Bloomer 1992: 104-7; and Haegemans and Stoppie 2004: 145-72.
[288] Kreger 1888: 79-80; and Comes 1950: 37.
[289] Carter 1975: 37-8; cf. Bloomer 1992: 32.
[290] Bloomer 1992: 100.
[291] Cf. Bloomer 1992: 116; and 190-1.
[292] Cf. Bloomer 1992: 99.
[293] On Rome's enthusiastic adoption of Alexander into a 'persuasive anecdotal tradition' – Spencer 2010: 177.
[294] Cf. Bloomer 1992: 197.
[295] Cf. Bloomer 1992: 174.
[296] Cf. Maslakov 1984: 443.

Scholars have undertaken analysis into Valerius' use and adaptation of source material where possible. Hence, when phrases are not copied verbatim, modification takes place usually in the form of paraphrasing, abbreviation or compression, alteration of word order, use of synonyms, change of emphasis, and the switching of nouns and adjectives.[297] There is also rhetorical embellishment and amplification of source material, which is possibly just the stylistic reworking of the material for easy insertion into declamation.[298] Moreover, there are historical mistakes in Valerius (usually on account of simplification and confusions of memory).[299] However, by comparison to possible source material Valerius does reveal his understanding of issues and institutions.[300] This brings us to Valerius' style and method, which is important when competing versions of Philippic material exist elsewhere.

Exempla were an important aspect of moral education for Romans, and it was from history that *exempla* were mined for deeds and words that were worthy of praise (*laus*) and reproach (*reprehensio*).[301] Valerius offers his audience a catalogue of mined *exempla* animated by a strong sense of Roman patriotism, conservatism and traditionalism (e.g. the panegyric on Rome at 2.7.6).[302] However, Valerius is still open to the use of foreign material (*externa*), though somewhat less (c. three to one ratio), and despite some occasionally explicit anti Greek invective (e.g. Val. Max. 4.7.4). Moreover, the *externa* are separated and subordinated to what he considered superior Roman material, and sometimes included for reasons mainly relating to variety or entertainment (e.g. Val. Max. 1.6. ext.1).[303] This variety provides interest for the reader, and enables Valerius to be more persuasive by providing *exempla* from all periods, races, and classes.[304] Therefore, entertainment meets instruction, and compliments Valerius' moralistic aims.[305] There are also more subtle methods used to prioritise Roman material. For example, in the final chapters of book 1 there is the contrast between national (Roman) and individual (foreign) greatness. The numerous foreign examples, in which Philip first appears in the work, are not ordered by chronology or national origin, but appear as a catalogue of disconnected abnormal events. This contrasts significantly to the careful ordering and praise of the Roman *exempla*.[306] Bloomer would have us play down this general disparagement of Greece and Greeks, citing one of Valerius' methodological predecessors

[297] Wardle 1998: 15-18; 2005: 147-48; Maslakov 1984: 457-484; and Bloomer 1992: 233-54.
[298] Bloomer 1992: 17.
[299] Shackleton Bailey 2000: 4; cf. Bloomer 1992: 135-6; and Helm 1955: cols. 101-2.
[300] Maslakov 1984: 458.
[301] Wardle 1998: 13; Skidmore 1996: 54. Cf. Wiseman 1979: 37-40.
[302] Duff 1964: 57; Bloomer 1992: 21; Shackleton 2000: 3 and Maslakov 1984: 461.
[303] Cf. Val. Max. 6.9. ext.1; 2.10.ext.1; Quint. 10.1.33; and Cic. *Orat.* 19.65-66; Wardle 2005: 142-3.
[304] Skidmore 1996: 89-90. Valerius makes this point explicitly at 5.6.ext.5. Relevant also is the deep respect for Greek culture and literature of Tiberius – the work's dedicatee (Suet. *Tib.* 70.2-3).
[305] Skidmore 1996: 92.
[306] Bloomer 1992: 21.

Cicero and his 'stated, prescriptive preference' for *exempla* of Roman origin (Bloomer 1992: 78-79; cf. Cic. *Orat.* 132).[307]

The *exempla* themselves are ordered under chapter headings, with key introductions which serve either as links/transitions between chapters, or as vehicles in which Valerius justifies material selected.[308] Each *exemplum* is presented in a regular format that includes an introduction, substance or body, and conclusion.[309] The introduction to each *exemplum* can be ornate and rhetorical or simple and clear, even predictable. In regard to the material on Philip, it either stands alone or coalesces into the body of the *exemplum*.[310] It is also in the introductions/transitions that Valerius often enters the text. Along with other first person comments elsewhere, this provides important moral guidance. It helps to condition the audience's attitude, and communicates ways in which to begin to appreciate the subsequent material.[311]

In addition, Valerius' transitions are a sophisticated signalling of a change of topic. This was an essential skill for the declaimer who must hold his audience (often deeply familiar with the proffered material) by novelty of transition and treatment.[312] Introductions were also important as they helped to assert the relevance of the *exemplum* to the rubric under consideration. They often establish a hierarchy to the sequence of *exempla*.[313] In many ways these prefaces/introductions/transitions substitute for the argument found in a theoretical thesis.[314]

Some would argue that while Valerius is capable of clear, lively, well-organized, and informative narrative, his overall style of writing is filled with verbal flourishes, 'epigrams and other ornaments of variable quality' couched in language, 'ponderous, stilted, and strained' (Shackleton 2000: 3-4). Carter argues that Valerius has a 'pompously didactic tone' (1975: 27), and that his approach is 'uniformly dull, monotonously turgid and oppressively forced' (1975: 29). However, in considering Valerius' Philippic *exempla* almost in isolation from the rest of the text, we tend to lose the more negative cumulative effects of many of these elements.

It is in the conclusions to Valerius' *exempla* that we find his most elaborate 'flowers of rhetoric' (Shackleton Bailey 2000: 3) and moralistic comment.[315] Valerius' gaze is mostly focused upon virtues, but he does include vices for moral comment (91 chapters worth).[316] However, Valerius is cautious of their possible adverse moral impact on his audience (*n.b.* 9.1.*Praef*). Though

[307] Bloomer has made several arguments for the influence of Cicero on the subjects and structural presentation of *exempla* in Valerius (1992: 5-7).
[308] Wardle 1998: 8-9.
[309] Guerrini 1981: 13-28; cf. Wardle 1998: 11-12.
[310] Wardle 1998: 11-12 esp. n. 50 and 54.
[311] Skidmore 1996: 57-58.
[312] Bloomer 1992: 25-6, and 54-8.
[313] Bloomer 1992: 26, 28.
[314] Skidmore 1996: 58.
[315] Cf. Wardle 1998: 12.
[316] Skidmore 1996: 79 n.18.

he also realizes they are necessary to his work (e.g. 9.13 and 5.2.*Praef*), and includes them owing to their excellent ability to make a point through contrast.[317]

Finally, does Valerius provide a consistent characterization or picture of an individual? This is important when considering a figure like Philip as an exemplar and the possibility of finding historical material free of rhetorical deposits and fictions. Others have touched on such questions in relation to other individuals with interesting results.[318] Overall though, scholars argue that as Valerius is not committed to a systematic account of events, and is using a vast amount of heterogeneous sources, it is unlikely that he would present a unified perspective of an individual.[319] Instead, he amasses a collection of morally and politically contradictory and conflicting material, the result of which is various shades of unfavourable and favourable references.[320] It is 'a dichotomy of patterns' which relates not only different facets of personalities, but also reflects natural debates and controversy, or a 'tradition of dispute' from the wider community permeating the schools of rhetoric (Maslakov 1984: 488-89). Valerius offers in each *exemplum* a picture of these personalities which 'obliterates ambiguities, removes specifics and imposes narrow, negative [or positive] verdicts' (Maslakov 1984: 482). Philip too is not immune to this accumulation of incongruous and paradoxically unambiguous material.

However, the kind of book Valerius wrote did not call for a consistent historical outlook on events or individuals. Instead, Valerius wrote to present valuable paradigms from history. He did have favoured villains and heroes though,[321] for although Valerius was no systematic compiler, 'eclectic or indiscriminate compilation would undermine the consistency of his moral types' (Bloomer 1992: 163). Therefore, different view-points are discernible when the focus is not to suppress dissonant material, but only to praise the good and denounce the bad.[322] The Philip of Valerius' work offers both these aspects for consideration – reflecting the contentions of competing historical traditions. Valerius allows Philip's behaviour and values in any given tale to be judged on their own, free of any consistent agenda regarding presentation of a good or bad Philip. For Valerius, Philip is a multi-functional exemplar from the past – his tales individual elements in a connected whole that has purpose. Therefore, each Philippic tale should be interpreted on its own merits, whilst remembering the larger purpose for which it is being used.

[317] Skidmore 1996: 79-80.
[318] Carney 1962: 289-337 – on Marius.
[319] Maslakov 1984: 448-9, 454.
[320] Maslakov 1984: 454.
[321] Bloomer 1992: 150.
[322] Bloomer 1992: 163-4.

PLUTARCH

There are many Philippic anecdotes, *apophthegmata* and *exempla* in the works of Plutarch (c. 46-120 CE). Some are to be found in his *Parallel Lives*,[323] but a great deal of come from the slightly less read *Moralia* – particularly the *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*.[324] The *Moralia* itself is a large collection of works in which Plutarch deals with a multiplicity of themes (e.g. education, ethics, antiquities, religion, philosophy, literature etc.), in various forms (e.g. letters, diatribes, lectures, dialogues, sayings). It paints a picture of Plutarch as an earnest mentor intent on helpful lessons.[325] Many of those lessons are centred on personal conduct, as Plutarch was above all else a moral philosopher, with a moral message.[326] Indeed, the teaching of his fellow man in how to lead a better life was perhaps the greatest virtue for Plutarch.[327]

Written in Greece under Roman rule, all Plutarch's works bear the hallmarks of an author working in the early phases of the second sophistic, a classicising movement obsessed with the Greek past and Greek *paideia*.[328] Ideally placed at Delphi in Apollo's service to advertise his values and the cultural memory of Greece,[329] Plutarch's hope was to 'convey the essence of Hellenic *paideia* to his pupils, to his powerful contemporaries, and to posterity' (Russell 1973: 17).[330] Plutarch wrote for readers, many of whom were very influential men, 'whose ambitions, virtues, and weaknesses he recognized and whom he wished to help achieve a more philosophical based life' (Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002: 1). Therefore, in his *Lives* and other non-biographical works, some featuring Philip, Plutarch uses historical deeds and sayings as *exempla* or

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[323] Plut. *Alex.* 2.2-3; 2.4; 3.1; 3.4-5; 5.1; 5.2-3; 6; 9.4-5; 9.6; 10.4; *Tim.* 15.4; *Eum.* 1.1-2; Per. 1.5; *Pel.* 18.5; *Phoc.* 9.5; 16.1-2; 16.2-3; 16.5; 16.6; 17.4-5; *Dem.* 9.1-2; 16.2; 20.3; 22.1-2. *N.b.* this is a subjective list due to problems in defining anecdotes (chap. one). Moreover, Philip is not always a major protagonist in these anecdotes. In some he is merely a reference point (e.g. many of the anecdotes in *Phocion*). On anecdotes in Plutarch's *Lives* – Beck 1998. 1999: 173-87; and 2000: 15-32. On Plutarch's biographies – Beck (ed.) 2014: 249-528.

[324] *Moralia* references = *On listening to lectures* (*Mor.* 40E); *Sayings of Spartans* (*Mor.* 215B; 216A; 216B; 217F; 218E-F; 218F; 221F; 230D; 235A-B; 235B); *On the control of anger* (*Mor.* 457E-F; 457F; 458C); *How to tell a flatterer from a friend* (*Mor.* 67F; 70B-C; 70C-D); *Sayings of kings and commanders* (*Mor.* 177C-179D); *On the fortune or the virtue of Alexander* (*Mor.* 331B; 334C-D; 339C); *Table-Talk II* (*Mor.* 632B; 634C-D); *Table-Talk VII* (*Mor.* 707B; 715C); *On exile* (*Mor.* 602D; 606C); *On Chance* (*Mor.* 97D); *A letter of condolence to Apollonius* (*Mor.* 105A-B); *Advice about keeping well* (*Mor.* 123E-124A); *Advice to bride and groom* (*Mor.* 141B-C; 143F); *Whether an old man should engage in public affairs* (*Mor.* 790B); *Precepts of statecraft* (*Mor.* 799E; 806B); *Concerning talkativeness* (*Mor.* 511A; 513A); *Greek and Roman parallel stories* (*Mor.* 307D); *Lives of the ten orators* (*Mor.* 845C; 845D; 848F-849A). On the range of *exempla* used by Plutarch in the *Moralia* – Grilli 1991: 41-46.

[325] Russell 1968: 131; cf. Van Hoof 2014: 135-148.

[326] Nikolaidis 2014: 350-372.

[327] Gianakaris 1970: 81.

[328] On the second sophistic – Van Groningen 1965: 41-56; Bowersock 1969; Bowie 1974; and Whitmarsh 2005, 2013. On Plutarch and his Roman world (including the Second Sophistic) – Barrow 1967; Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002; Stadter 2014: 13-31 and 2015; and Schmitz 2014: 32-42. On other literary activity in Achaea during Plutarch's life – Bowie 2002: 41-56, who argues that during his time, Plutarch was 'a man whose influence as a philosopher is very considerable' (2002: 51).

[329] Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002: 1, 11.

[330] Cf. Preston 2001: 100. A sound Greek *paideia* was for Plutarch a man's most valuable asset – one which could guard against φιλοτιμια (Swain 1990A: 129-33; 1990B: 192ff.). Cf. Blois and Bons 1992: 162.

παραδείγματα for instruction.[331] Indeed, in Plutarch's non-biographical material, often he deliberately neglects historical setting for these *exempla*. What really matters to Plutarch is their use as proofs and as models of behaviour.[332] Therefore, seemingly cut adrift from historical context, Plutarch's world of moral *apophthegmata* often 'leaves an impression of timelessness' (Schmidt 2002: 58).

It is Philip's role within this whole process of *paideia* that is of most interest. With Plutarch's principal concerns being man, his character, and his ethical nature,[333] the moral tone of his Philippic material is no surprise. Plutarch's fascination with history (and her protagonists) was always driven by moral considerations, by his concern for humanity and compassion, as well as overall civilized values.[334] Plutarch was fixated on the idea that serious moral education could come from the observing and interacting with past and present personalities.[335] This is highly visible in his Philippic material.

For Plutarch the importance of history was very much utilitarian in nature. Moreover, this utility (ὠφέλεια - as opposed to pleasure - τέρψις) was not political or militaristic, but wholly moral.[336] Plutarch believed as part of his general moral framework that to improve character the words and deeds of notable individuals formed examples which served either as models for imitation or for avoidance.[337] This moralism though is for the most part implicit in Plutarch's texts, the onus of praise and blame left to the reader's judgment. However, frequently the moral categories invoked are not contentious, so that the reader's response to the moral message is foreseeable.[338] Therefore, rarely are there imperatives or prescriptions, merely material for moral reflection.[339] Philip's general role in Plutarch particularly exemplifies this approach.

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[331] Valgiglio 1992: 3963-4051; and Duff 1999: 50. On this aspect in the *Lives* – Stadter 2000: 493-510; also Jiménez 2002: 105-114 on *exempla* in the *Lives* and the education of rulers. A key-*Vita* for this aspect was the *Numa*. Here Plutarch offers an image of the ideal ruler which owes much to Greek philosophy and literature – particularly Isocrates and Plato (Blois and Bons 1992: 159-188.

[332] Cf. Duff 1999: 50.

[333] Gianakaris 1970: 39, 80 and Nikolaidis 2014: 350-72.

[334] Russell 1968: 135.

[335] Jiménez 2002: 105; Valgiglio 1992: 4012-13; Frazier 1996: 59-65; Duff 1999: 37-41; 49-51; Stadter 2000: 493-510.

[336] Duff 1999: 51-53. Cf. *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 79c-e and 84b.

[337] Duff 1999: 50-51, 72; Beck 1998: 2; and Stadter 2015: 215-30. Cf. *Aem.*1.1-4; here the model reader uses 'the mirror of history to adorn life and make it like the virtues of those men'.... taking what is most effective 'for the improvement of character' (πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἠθῶν); cf. *De liberis educandis* 14a; and *Per.* 1.4-2.4. On these two programmatic statements - Duff 1999: 30-45. Cf. *De Lat.Viv.* 1129b-c - on great men being examples. This thinking was certainly nothing new – being present before Philip in both Isocrates and Xenophon (e.g. Isoc. *Evag.* 46, 75-76; *To Dem.* 8, 12; *Ep.* 7.7; *Nic.* 55; Xen. *Ages.* 10.2; *Mem.* 1.2.1-8, 3.5.14; *Oec.* 4.4-25; and *Cyrop.* 1.1.3, 2.2.30, 7.5.85, 8.1.12, 21-39). Cf. Gray 2011: 51-53. On Plutarch as an Antiquarian – Payen 2014: 235-49.

[338] Duff 1999: 53-55. Pelling (1988: 10-18) details two different types of moralizing. 'Protrepic', which contains implicit or explicit counsel, and 'descriptive', which broaches moral concerns but does not try to direct conduct (cf. Duff 1999: 68-9).

[339] Duff 1999: 69-70.

Conservatively inclined, Plutarch's work reflects his strongly held civilised morals.[340] Plutarch's values and ethics come from contemporary-classicizing-philosophic currents and his declared Platonic devotion.[341] He is especially interested in the subordination of emotions or the irrational (πάθος) to reason (λόγος) (especially in adverse circumstances), and in the gaining of the right mean (*mesotēs*) between excesses, which was necessary to display virtue.[342] This is a key theme in Plutarch's biographies and permeates his other works, particularly as Plutarch thought that genuine virtue came only through action – mostly political or public (the majority of Plutarch's Philippic material would agree with this).[343] Great virtue also came from education or culture (παιδεία) for Plutarch, which was an important feature of Greek self-definition in his time.[344] This education, which allows for the control of emotions, produces certain virtues in the individual.[345]

Most common are πραότης – which is a calmness or self-restraint that shuns every kind of excess (physical or emotional) both within the individual and in relations with others; it is an internal moral state which is discernible in the decorum of a person's guise, emotional continence, and patience in dealings with others.[346] The other is φιλανθρωπία (humanity), which has an expansive usage in Plutarch.[347] Indivisible from (Hellenic) civilization, it is the 'virtue par excellence of the civilized, educated man; and it manifests itself in any manner that is proper for such a man, be it affability, courtesy, liberality, kindness, clemency, etc.' (Martin 1961: 174). Unsurprisingly, or perhaps surprisingly (for Philip's detractors), it is these virtues which pervade Plutarch's Philippic-anecdotal material. It is a fact which connects them to a letter written to Philip from Isocrates in which special emphasis was placed on these two qualities in Philip's dealings with the Greeks (5.113, 116).[348]

With Plutarch's view that active political participation was the indispensable human activity in the pursuit of ἀρετή,[349] it is important to outline Plutarch's political thought, particularly as regards monarchy and leaders like Philip.[350] Plutarch's views on politics were profoundly

[340] Russell 1973: 64, 81.
[341] On Plutarch's philosophy and morals – Russell 1973: 63-99; Dillon 1977: 184-230 and 2014: 61-72; Froidefond 1987: 184-233; Opsomer 1998; 2005: 161-200 and 2014: 88-103; and Becchi 2014: 73-87. On ethics and morals in the ancient world (particularly Greek) - Huby 1967; Rowe 1976; and Ferguson 1979: 1989.
[342] Duff 1999: 70-76, 78-82; Beck 1998: 108; and Russell 1973: 85, 88. On the rhetoric of virtue in Plutarch – Stadter 2015: 231-45.
[343] Duff 1999: 66.
[344] See Duff 1999: 76-77 on the link between virtue and education in Plutarch's *Lives*.
[345] de Romilly 1979: 275-307; and Duff 1999: 77-8.
[346] Martin 1960: 73.
[347] For list of references dealing with *philanthropia* – Martin 1961: 164 n.1, including the important Hirzel 1912: Chap. 4. 'Philanthropie'. Cf. Roskam 2014: 516-28. Bell 1949: 31-37 and Ferguson 1979: 102-117 are still useful.
[348] On Plutarch's familiarity with Isocrates – Blois and Bons 1992: 167.
[349] *An seni* 791C; cf. *Cato Mai.* 30.3; *Adv. Colot.* 1126ff. At *Aristid.* 6 Plutarch focuses upon ἀπετή, which as the only divine good attainable by man, must be nurtured and pursued by rulers. Thus, glory from virtue rather than power was an ideal ruler's aim. Cf. Schettino 2002: 203.
[350] On Plutarch's most important political works – Zecchini 2002: 191-200. Plutarch does still have much in his non-political works on statesmanship e.g. *De tuenda sanitate* 137C, where he states that he is writing for φιλόλογοι and

influenced by his attachment to *polis* structures and his acknowledgment of his place in Rome's empire.[351] Thus, Plutarch is influenced by the panhellenistic ideology of authors of the fourth-century BCE, and is sensitive to the freedom and unity of the Greeks.[352] This may explain, along with his dislike of tyrants and Hellenistic kings, his negative view of the Macedonians in general, and perhaps Philip, who ended Greek freedom.[353] However, Plutarch seems to have admired Alexander. This reveals that in spite of his affection for Greek traditions, he had sympathies for a world ruled by an able, wise and humane monarch.[354] This feeling was surely influenced by his acceptance of the principate, by the Platonic ideal of kingship, and by peripatetic ideas of moderation and pragmatism.[355]

Plutarch believed that kingship was the supreme constitution (cf. *Ad princ. Inderud.* 780E-F; *An seni* 790A), a great and divine gift (μέγα καὶ θεῖον δῶρον - *Num.* 6.1; cf. Isoc. *Evag.* 40), and differed from tyranny, not in institutions, but in its just treatment of the governed.[356] Therefore, his highest concern was for the personality or moral virtues of those ruling, virtues such as sobriety and wisdom, but particularly δίκη (justice) through πραότης and humanity. The ideal king was a just ruler, a *basileus dikaios*. Indeed, Plutarch concurs with Agesilaus when he questions the greatness of the Great King, 'rightly and nobly thinking that justice must be the royal measure wherewith relative greatness is measured' (*Ages.* 23.5-6).[357] It is a position he backs up in his biography of *Demetrius* (who embodied everything contrary to a *basileus dikaios*) where he highlights the role of

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πολιτικοί. Cf. Aalders 1982: 8. On Plutarch's political views (apart from Alders 1982) – Carriere 1977; Blois 1992: 4600-4611; Duff 1999: 90-94 and Pelling 2014: 149-62.

[351] Aalders 1982: 11.

[352] Aalders 1982: 18-19.

[353] Aalders 1982: 16-17, 21-22. *N.b.* Plutarch's view of Philip in the *Pelopidas* – 'This was the Philip who afterwards waged war to enslave the Greeks (τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὕστερον πολεμήσας ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας), but at this time he was a boy and lived in Thebes with Pammenes. Hence he was believed to have become a zealous follower of Epaminondas, perhaps because he comprehended his efficiency in wars and campaigns, which was only a small part of the man's high excellence; but in restraint (ἐγκρατείας), justice (δικαιοσύνης), magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχίας), and gentleness (πραότητος), wherein Epaminondas was truly great, Philip had no share, either naturally (φύσει) or as a result of imitation (μιμήσει)' (26.5). Aalders (1982: 23-25) noted Plutarch's positive appreciation of Alexander, making some reference to the *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* (179ff.) – yet ignored this collection in relation to Philip, where the characterization of Philip is far more positive. However, any argument that this collection is Plutarch's needs to be reconciled with Plutarch's opinion of Philip above. Though, Epaminondas was Plutarch's *über* hero (cf. Barrow 1967: 51), and any comparison made between him and Philip was bound to highlight Philip's failings. This attitude may have softened if Plutarch had written a *Philip* using the Philippic *apophthegmata* of (his?) *Sayings of Kings and Commanders*. Perhaps the task of reconciling Philip - the good ruler of the *apophthegmata*, and Philip - the conqueror of Greek freedom (arch-nemesis of Demosthenes), appealed little to Plutarch. His *Alcibiades* had perhaps shown him the difficulties of extraordinarily ambiguous heroes. Lane Fox recently argued that Plutarch wrote no life of Philip because of the hostile source tradition in Demosthenes and Theopompus – especially the latter's, 'dark, personal presentation' (2011: 350).

[354] Aalders 1982: 25, 28-30.

[355] Aalders 1982: 33, 65; and Blois and Bons 1992: 164 n. 19.

[356] Aalders 1982: 28, 32.

[357] See Schettino 2002: 203-4, noting Plutarch's familiarity with the *basileus dikaios* from Hellenistic political thought, and the stress placed on law and justice by his contemporaries.

law and administration of justice through Demetrius' unjust and vicious behaviour (*Demtri.* 42).[358] For example –

> For nothing so befits a king as the work of justice. For 'Ares is tyrant,' in the words of Timotheus, but 'Law is king of all things,' according to Pindar (*Demetr.* 42.5).

Demetrius' behaviour (in anecdotes) is contrasted with that of Philip, whose approachability and reasonableness in such matters is recalled by the Macedonians (Φιλίππου μνημονεύοντας... ὡς μέτριος ἦν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ κοινός - *Demetr.* 42.3). It is these aspects in relation to justice and law which are curiously enough also emphasised in Plutarch's Philippic *apophthegmata* (chap. three). Moreover, in correlation with other contemporary authors (e.g. Pliny and Dio), it suggests a widespread diffusion of common ideals and values (particularly in relation to monarchic ideology) in the age of Trajan.[359]

Certainly, these connections between Plutarch, Philip and Trajanic ideology will be one area of special interest, particularly as Plutarch thought the governed were also formed by their leaders (e.g. *Lyc.* 30.4). Indeed, the moral standard of a leader was a guideline for the ruled (e.g. *Num.* 6.2; 8.1).[360] Therefore, Plutarch thought that kingship was a difficult and serious duty filled with the most 'concerns and toils' (*An seni* 790A), and one which demanded great ability. However, Plutarch believed ultimately that power or even success were of less value than a ruler's moral values.[361] Therefore, Plutarch believed that a good king had high moral standards, was just in his dealings, sober, dignified, attentive, peace-loving, liberal, and dedicated in full to his subjects.[362] Kings should not be too harsh or severe, but also not too indulgent, governing instead with persuasion and mildness.[363] Using practical reason (cf. *Praec.* 798C) and following a moderate path, the statesman should not be swayed by either praise or criticism, or even personal gain. He must also avoid ambition (φιλοτιμία), greed, anger (ὀργή), and arrogance.[364] Moreover, he must take account of the unique nature of his people (*Praec.* 800A-B), winning them to himself without buying them through acts of demagogy (*Praec.* 823A). Confidence in a ruler by the people was his

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[358] On Demetrius and Antony as negative paradigms – Duff 1999: 45-49.
[359] Schettino 2002: 204.
[360] Aalders 1982: 33, 44-45; and Blois and Bons 1992: 175-76. Pliny makes much of Trajan's character as a model for the people (e.g. *Pan.* 41.4, 45.6, 46.5, 47.6, 70.3-4, 83.2, 84.4).
[361] Aalders 1982: 19.
[362] Cf. *Numa* 6.2-4; *Ad. Princ. Inerud.* 781C and E; *Apophth. Lac.* 221D; *Reg. Et. Imp. Apophth.* 179C-D; *Demetr.* 42.7.
[363] Aalders 1982: 31, 34, 36. Plutarch had a strong aversion to tyrants and demagogues, describing them using many of the *topoi* of classical Greek literature (e.g. *Septem Sapientum Convivium* – which distinguishes between a king and a tyrant, and condemns the latter). Plutarch even considered tyrannicide laudable (e.g. *De fato* 570D; Aalders 1982: 34-35). However, while relating the assassination of Philip in his *Alexander*, there is no praise of Pausanias as a tyrannicide, only mention of possible conspirators and his motive – which was his failure to get 'justice' from Philip (μὴ τυχὼν δίκης ἀνεῖλε Φίλιππον) (*Al.* 10.4). With Plutarch's focus on justice in leaders, this could serve as a valid reason for killing Philip in Plutarch's eyes.
[364] *Cato. Mai.* 32.4; *Agis* 2.3; *Coriol.* 15.4; *Philop.* 1.3; Aalder 1982: 46, 51. On ambition and anger – Duff 1999: 83-89; Frazier 1988: 109-27; Wardman 1955: 105-7; 1974: 115-24; and Bucher-Isler 1972: 12-13, 31, 41, 58-9.

greatest protection.[365] All these ideas are strongly present in Plutarch's Philippic material, and reflects a less negative approach by Plutarch towards Philip's image and legacy than other material might suggest.[366]

Plutarch is more interested in praising than censuring (which influences his selection of Philippic anecdotes). He believed that the moral historiographer's duty was to document virtuous and inspiring deeds.[367] If criticism was needed, in accordance with the generosity, tolerance and compassion of an educated man, it was to be reasonable and warranted.[368] Plutarch also saw tendentiousness commentary as a more emotional, subjective and rhetorical approach to giving examples. When he was faced with variant examples, he always went with the more generous interpretation.[369] This has interesting implications when comparing variant traditions with his Philippic material.

Plutarch believed a ruler should be wise, or at least counselled by one who was i.e. a philosopher (cf. *Praec.* 798C).[370] This contact between the politically powerful and philosophers was to the advantage of the many people dependent upon these leaders (*Max. c. princ.* 776B ff.; 778D. ff.).[371] It also highlighted a virtue which was particularly attributed to the philosopher (e.g. Diogenes – chap. six), and thought a fundamental right of the free citizen, *parrhesia* (free-speech).[372] This edification of the powerful was something Plutarch put into practice at the highest levels of Roman government (the *Lives* aside) – if the disputed dedicatory letter to Trajan of the *Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum* is authentic (*Mor.* 172B-E).[373] According to the latest

[365] *Arat.* 25.7; cf. Plin. *Pan.* 85.5-6 and Tact. *Hist*. 4.7.

[366] Beck argues that, 'hovering in the intellectual circles composed of the Greaco-Roman elite,' Plutarch was aware of the 'historical tradition' and 'current climate of educated opinions' about his biographical subjects (1998: 116). This was surely valid to some extent for the individuals of his collection (many of whom, like Philip, were intimately linked to the subjects of his biographies).

[367] Duff 1999: 56, 58.

[368] Duff 1999: 56, 58-59. Duff argues that Plutarch did not write about men such as the Spartan regent Pausanias and Philip II because immoral individuals might be misconstrued as sympathizing with their misdeeds, or creating a downbeat condemnatory narrative (1999: 59).

[369] Russell 1973: 60-61.

[370] Aalders 1982: 45. Plutarch believed strongly that it was a philosopher's duty to communicate with influential men (*Max. c. princ.* – *Mor.* 776B-779C). Plato had attempted to educate in philosophy a young ruler (Dionysius II), and perhaps in part out of sense of emulation it became a central doctrine in Plutarch's thinking. On Plutarch's ideal of collaboration between ruler and philosopher – Roskam 2002: 175-189. On Roman rulers and philosophic advisers – Rawson 1989: 233-57. For the social role of philosophers in the second century CE – Dillon 2002: 29-40; and Trapp 2014: 43-58 (Imperial period generally).

[371] This philosophic council would induce leaders to do what was useful and good, thus conforming to moral law or reason (λόγος). This bestows on the leader wisdom, greatness, mildness and simplicity (φρόνημα καὶ μέγεθος μετὰ πραότητος καὶ ἀφελείας), and evokes the virtues of prudence (εὐβουλία), justice/righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), honesty/goodness (χρηστότης), and greatness of mind/magnanimity (μεγαλοφροσύνη) (*Max. c. princ.* 776E). In the *Ad principem ineruditum* the virtues are good-order (εὐνομία), justice (δίκη), mildness (πραότης), and uprightness (ἀλήθεια). Cf. Zecchini 2002: 192-3.

[372] Haake 2013B: 182-83.

[373] For a concise discussion on the three main pieces of evidence, including the dedicatory letter of the *apophthegmata* collection, linking Trajan and Plutarch – Barrow 1967: 45-49. On Plutarch and Trajan, particularly reception of his collection – Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002: 7-8, 11-13. On the collection itself – Morgan (2007: 154-55) who notes

scholarship it appears genuine.[374] If correct, it would have profound implications for the collection as a whole – making it a contemporary document of moralistic and behavioural edification for an emperor akin to that of Valerius Maximus or some of Seneca's works under Nero.[375] It would be a document of primary importance for monarchic ideology during this period.

Plutarch's *Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum* is the most important source of Philippic *apophthegmata* surviving. Available at least by the time of Stobaeus (who quotes frequently from it) as an independent volume, it was long thought to be a forgery of material taken from earlier collections and the *Lives*.[376] However, work done by Beck, Pelling, and Stadter, would seem to confirm Plutarchian authorship.[377] The latter two scholars argue that it was an independent work, but differ on some fundamental points. For example, Pelling argues that it was taken from preliminary narrative *hypomnemata* made for individual lives. While Stadter argues that the collection is a selection of *apophthegmata* edited by Plutarch from a larger, earlier, ongoing, unpolished, quasi-annotated, and flexible collection in which he had arranged anecdotes planned for use in some of his lives (in the order that they might occur).[378]

The collection itself of over 500 anecdotes is arranged by peoples (barbarians, followed by Greeks then Romans), subdivided by nations/cities, then by individuals (roughly chronological – with a couple of retrogressions). The *apophthegmata* are separated from each other (few exceptions), and show statesmen navigating the turbulent waters of private and public life. Many of these statesmen feature in Plutarch's *Lives* with their anecdotes normally running parallel to those of the collection. However, there is a tendency for the collection to omit anecdotes which are negative or unsuitable for imitation.[379] This suggests that the collection was edited and lightly polished selection from a larger collection - meaning that more negative Philippic *apophthegmata* which were available to Plutarch were excised as being unsuitable for his purposes and the needs of the collections' intended recipient. This 'selection' has an impact on the overall presentation of Philip in our surviving material.

If the dedicatory letter to this collection is genuine (as I think it is), it is the best means of assessing the aims of Plutarch for the collection – and Philip's role in it. It begins with two apophthegms which emphasize that wise leaders understand the value of humble but

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the most popular themes are 'friendship and justice, followed by courage, fortune, self-control, generosity, frugality and the treatment of one's enemies (155).' Most are present in Philip's tales.

[374] Beck 2002: 163-173.

[375] Cf. Beck 2002: 169-70.

[376] Babbitt 1949: 3-5; Jones 1971: 30-31 and Hahn 1989: 185-186. Many of the *apophthegmata* are found in earlier writers e.g. Cicero and Valerius Maximus (Stadter 2008: 55). With the Philippic material though, some tales are found in later authors like Aelian, but Plutarch is often the oldest author to mention them.

[377] Beck 1998: 19-28 and 2002: 163-173, Pelling 2002b: 65-90, and Stadter 2008: 53-66; cf. Fuhrmann 1998: 3-15; Tigerstedt 1974: n. 814, and Babbitt 1949: 3-4.

[378] Stadter 2008: 53-7; cf. 2015: 119-29.

[379] Stadter 2008: 55, 58 n.17; cf. Pelling 2002b: 82.

enthusiastically (τῇ προθυμίᾳ) given gifts, and the value of *apophthegmata* as illustrations of admirable behaviour. Plutarch then offers Trajan his own humble gifts and tokens of friendship, and what he calls the common offerings of the first-fruits from philosophy (κοινὰς ἀπαρχὰς προσφέροντος ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας). Trajan is urged to accept the utility of these sayings and to understand and learn from them if they have anything of value for the understanding of the characters and values of leaders (ἠθῶν καὶ προαιρέσεων ἡγεμονικῶν), which are to be found in their words rather than in their actions (ἐμφαινομένων τοῖς λόγοις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτῶν) (cf. Isoc. *To Dem.* 18).[380] Finally, Plutarch notes that in his *Lives* the statements (ἀποφάσεις) of his characters lay alongside (παρακειμένας) their actions awaiting the leisurely consideration of the reader (σχολάζουσαν φιληκοΐαν περιμένουσιν); but here in this collection, their very words have been collected to serve as samples and seeds of their lives which will not be a burden on Trajan's time to peruse (ὥσπερ δείγματα τῶν βίων καὶ σπέρματα συνειλεγμένους οὐδὲν οἴομαί σοι τὸν καιρὸν ἐνοχλήσειν). Therefore, allowing Trajan to review in abridged form many men who have been deemed worthy of being remembered (ἐν βραχέσι πολλῶν ἀναθεώρησιν ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων μνήμης γενομένων λαμβάνοντι).[381]

Plutarch, like Valerius Maximus, offers to an active and busy emperor an alternative means of pleasurable, practical and engaging moral instruction other than that of longer more time consuming historiographic, biographic or philosophic compositions. Plutarch's gift is inspired by the usefulness of such pre-digested collections for politicians, especially busy Roman statesmen who possessed a fervent fascination for *apophthegmata* and *exempla*.[382] Also like Philip's role in Valerius Maximus, Philip is invoked as an easily assimilated paradigm of behaviour for Roman leadership at its highest levels. Each Philippic tale meant to form a didactic dialogue with the past. It is one in which discussion leads ultimately to self-appraisal, and in true Plutarchian style – gentle and correct ethical council and edification. As a result, the 'student' hopefully acquires through acquaintance with several *exempla* of pre-selected behaviour a certain orientation in public life[383]. The highest and most profound application of this education is obviously to be seen in terms of monarchic ideology where Philip's example was for direct appraisal by those who ruled and those who were ruled.

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[380] *N.b.* αἱ δὲ γιγνόμεναι παρὰ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς τύχας ἀποφάσεις καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις, ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις καθαρῶς παρέχουσι τὴν ἑκάστου διάνοιαν ἀποθεωρεῖν - *Mor.* 172D; cf. *Al.* 1.1-3 for the superiority of words over deeds in revealing character, and *Aem.* 1.1-3 for another use of the mirror simile (Beck 2002: 167). For ancient views on personality – Gill 1990: 1ff. and Halliwell 1990: 32ff.

[381] Laurence and Paterson 1999: 191.

[382] Beck 2002: 168; and Stadter 2002: 55. Cf. *Conjugalia Praecepta* 138C – on the benefits of concision for the retention of information.

[383] Cf. Jiménez 2002: 106.

This connection between Plutarch, Trajan, contemporary ideology, and Philip raises some interesting considerations.[384] For example, having noted Plutarch's firm belief in πραότης as an indispensable virtue of the ideal leader (evident in his Philip material), it is of note that it comes at the expense of ἐπιείκεια or *clementia* (prominent in earlier intellectuals like Seneca).[385] Some argue that this is because *clementia*, which is associated with the autocracy of absolute power, is somewhat abandoned in the second century in favour of πραότης.[386] It is this 'mildness' that would appeal to Trajan, as it recalls Caesar (an approved model of rule for Trajan's principate) and his *mansuetudo* and *misericordia*.[387] Therefore, after the despotism of previous emperors, and in an atmosphere of mutual agreement between ruler and ruled, it was essential for the *bonus princeps* not only to behave more flexibly in matters of justice, but to respect the law and to pardon where appropriate.[388]

This intense focus on πραότης in matters of justice under Trajan, and its reflection in many of Plutarch's Philippic anecdotes, suggests an agreed ideological agenda of sorts whereby *clementia* was less and less associated with justice.[389] Where it is found, it has a new distinctive meaning, whereby the unilateral act of a *dominus* is replaced by a more moderate and temperate programmatic interpretation of the law by a *bonus princeps*.[390] Therefore, Plutarch demonstrates, particularly with those judicial Philippic tales he gifted to the emperor, his close connections with contemporary political ideology. Moreover, by echoing Trajanic propaganda and themes Plutarch is able to act as a mediator between 'ideological aspects of the principate and the milieu of Greek culture' (Schettino 2002: 206). Indeed, it is as an intermediary and an advisor that Plutarch has utilized Philip's *anecdotal persona* in his work (particularly in the *Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum*) to reflect not only his values, but also to contribute and influence Trajanic and elite ideals and values.[391]

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[384] Stadter and Van der Stockt (eds.) 2002 and Stadter 2015: 165-178.
[385] Zecchini 2002: 193.
[386] *Clementia* was distrusted by many as an imperial prerogative. Even Pliny refers to Trajan's *moderatio* rather than *clementia* in his *Panegyric* (Schettino 2002: 205).
[387] Zecchini 2002: 194.
[388] Zecchini 2002: 194.
[389] Scholars have shown that when it came to Trajan's legal activity *clementia* was still apparent, but in a somewhat modified guise i.e. Trajan's *clementia* does not indicate his forgiveness but his moderation, which was an indication of his *innocentia*, and a contrast with the *avaritia* of past emperors (Schettino 2002: 204).
[390] Schettino 2002: 205; cf. Noreña 2011: 293-297.
[391] Coming from a member of the ruling elite, Pliny's *Panegyric* is of interest here. It not only praises the virtues of Trajan, but provides a prescription of what a good leader should be like. Pliny stresses the social virtues, those which involve the decent treatment of fellow citizens. Therefore, the general theme is the emperor's *humanitas* (cf. Plutarch's φιλανθρωπία). Hence, Pliny highlights qualities associated with this *humanitas*, such as *mansuetudo* (gentleness/mildness), *facilitas* (easiness/kindness/good-humour), *temperantia* (moderation), *simplicitas* (simplicity), *hilaritas* (joyfulness), *iucunditas* (pleasantness), *suavitas* (politeness/agreeableness), but particularly - *moderatio* (moderation) and *modestia* (modesty/moderation) (Stadter 2002: 229). It is no coincidence that it is these qualities and similar (with their own Greek hue) which feature in Plutarch, and particularly in his Philippic material. Stadter (2002: 231-234), for example, has shown well the relationship between Plutarch and Pliny in areas like restraining ambition and respect for citizens. As part of the latter, Pliny makes much of Trajan's accessibility to both populace and senators.

It was literature and rhetoric which educated and wrought Rome's powerful.[392] Indeed, real decisions of state were often decided, not by practical or economic interests, but by a statesman's conceptualization of themselves as it was reflected in the mirror of the literature they had studied. Therefore, it was an influential position held by those who controlled interpretations of the past and decoded her great figures for contemporary-power elite to measure themselves against.[393] Plutarch was such a figure. His Philip was just one of his many implements of persuasion and influence. Therefore, Philip's enduring image and legacy were still present as Rome ascended the heights of its empire, their role in Plutarch's tales predominantly scholastic in nature.

All of Plutarch's original collected material was also available for use elsewhere, such as in lectures and philosophical treatises. Here the material is not arranged in simple list form, but integrated into the arguments of connected discourse. This process involved amalgamation with credible detail, as well as other elements of discourse – particularly rhetorical devices and interpretative comments.[394] Moreover, where there are multiple treatments of particular anecdotes, Plutarch rarely narrates them in the same words. Instead, in trying to adapt a story more effectively to its context and enhance its meaning, there are slight variations in language, as well as expansion and condensation.[395] Indeed, Plutarch's variant Philippic anecdotes often show just how crucial context is in terms of the presentation or even interpretation of this material. For example, more complex settings, other than that of the *apophthegmata* collection (where context is almost wholly neglected in deference to their value as uncomplicated positive *exempla*), can cause more ambivalent and intricate interpretations.[396] In addition, attempts to compare different versions of these anecdotes (even as far back as the 19th century)[397] in the hopes of discovering which is derived from which, are unconvincing. All versions may not reflect all the details Plutarch had access to. It is better to look at each version and their presentation in relation to the work's aims, audience, and Plutarch's personal beliefs,[398] and how these relate to monarchic ideology and other contemporary values.

This provides direct correlation to Philippic material concerning approachability in Plutarch (see chap. three). For more on Pliny's *Panegyricus* as a 'key document in the evolution of imperial leadership ideals' – Roche (ed.) 2011 (quote from ix).

[392] Mattern 1999.

[393] Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002: 6-7.

[394] Stadter 2008: 58, 64; cf. Pelling 2002a: 143-70.

[395] Babbitt 1949: 6. Cf. Stadter 2008: 61, 63; Beck 1998, 1999: 173-87; 2000: 15-32.

[396] Stadter 2008: 61-64.

[397] e.g. Schmidt 1879.

[398] Stadter 2008: 54, 63-64.

Conclusion

Any analysis of an author and any Philippic material they possess is best done individually. However, it must be performed with full contextual knowledge of the larger work's aims, methods and audience – as well as the authors own beliefs in regard to monarchic ideology and other contemporary political, cultural, and literary mores. This is the approach that has been adopted here whilst examining the Philippic material of Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, and all the sources of this thesis.

3

Judge Philip

The Judicial Tales of Philip II and the Role of Justice under the Roman Empire

> 'The reason we hear and remember the golden sayings and great deeds of people of the past is also so that we can conform ourselves to their wisdom. It is to prevent the rise of the self-centred mind' (Yamamoto Tsunetomo's *Hagakure* 1.6).
>
> 'Now, if I am giving you sufficient instruction as to what manner of men you ought to be….well and good; if not, then you must learn it form history of the past, for this is the best source of instruction' (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.7.24).

This chapter considers those tales and sayings surviving in the Graeco-Roman world relating to Philip's involvement in judicial matters. It explores the role played by the cardinal virtue 'justice' (*dikaiosune*/*iustitia*) in these tales, and what this material reveals about Philip, his responsibilities as a Macedonian king, and *isegoria* and *parrhesia* and the Macedonian legal system.[399] Moreover, aside from demonstrating Philip's role as a monarchic paradigm of some worth, this chapter shows that these judicial tales also contain elements of *paideia*, declamation, entertainment, and popular moral edification. In the end though, they are united by more unifying and serious traditions concerned with not only the morality or ethics of monarchy (or more specifically of the monarch himself e.g. wisdom, generosity, humour, and forgiveness), but with general ideas of contemporary Graeco-Roman culture, politics and society. Deeply integrated with the various motives and methods of those who propagated these tales and sayings, these traditions have forged a complex and substantial relationship for the majority of this material. It is a connection woven around the image and personal character of Philip II as understood under the Roman Empire.

[399] On the king's duties and relationship with the people – Hammond 1989: 21-4, 60-70; and Hammond and Griffith 1979: 383-404. Cf. Billows 1995: 60f.

Macedonian Judicial System

Little is known of Macedonia's judicial system except that anecdotes indicate that the reigning monarch was the supreme judge or final judge of appeal.[400] Other evidence also suggests that in capital trials involving threats to the king, an assembly of the troops under arms had some kind of function. However, nothing is known of any code of laws – nor do Philip's activities imply that there was one. Even so, other evidence suggests that those who dealt with the Macedonians had reasonable expectations of justice under some unknown system.[401]

Anecdotes provide evidence for a court presided over by the king himself. Many of these tales are found in Plutarch, where their inclusion and number in his *apophthegmata* collection (5 of the 31 Philippic anecdotes) highlight the importance of this activity for a Macedonian king – particularly for Philip personally.[402] It is difficult to argue on the evidence of Plutarch only that such a percentage of Philip's time (one-sixth) was taken up with judicial matters. However, it was one of the king's most essential functions as regards legitimacy, and all Macedonia kings were supposed to find the time to carry it out.[403] This was exactly the point made by the *parrhesia* or *isegoria* (free speech) of the woman who shouts at Philip not to be king when he complained of his lack of time to hear her case (example 3.2). This high occurrence of judicial anecdotes for Philip reflects not only the necessity to carry out some kind of royal-judicial function, but also strongly indicates the longevity of Philip's good reputation among the Macedonians regarding justice and its associated cardinal virtue *dikaiosune* – particularly in light of the activities of later rulers of Macedonia.

The anecdote in which the friend of Antipater was made a judge, then removed because of his hair (example 3.3), suggests that there were royally appointed judges operating in Macedonia. Macedonia was certainly a big kingdom and Philip would have found it difficult to be everywhere.[404] However, these men may have just been *epistatai* (personal servants or administrators of the king) among whose responsibilities were judicial matters. Indeed, our only evidence for any kind of 'urban judicial system' comes from a board of judges (*dikastai*) later known only from Thessalonike – but they too could have been royal judges.[405] Therefore, the exact

[400] Errington 1990: 222; and Hammond 1992: 65. It is possible that tales showing Philip acting as judge are appeal cases after hearings by local judges (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 395).
[401] Hammond and Griffith 1979: 392-393.
[402] *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 12, 23, 24, 25, and 31.
[403] Hammond and Griffith 1979: 393-4. Cf. Plut. *Al.* 23.2 - where 'judging' was one of the four ways Alexander might pass a normal day It has also been postulated that the Macedonian king may have been supported by a group of Companions who advised him during cases, but had no part in the final decision (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 393 n. 7).
[404] Hammond and Griffith 1979: 394.
[405] *IG* 10.2, 1028; ISE 111; Errington 1992: 222. Cf. Hammond and Griffith 1979: 395 n. 1.

nature of the king's delegation of power for judicial activity is not fully understood.[406] Nevertheless, deputized by the king, these men were probably based in the principal population centres of Lower Macedonia and the administrative centres of Upper Macedonia.[407] Moreover, there was little doubt that they came from the most influential sections of society, and that the 'quality of these appointments was as vital to the well-being of the kingdom as the qualities of the generals' (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 394). This fact is clearly reflected by Philip's strong regard for the appointment in the example 3.3.

Isegoria and *Parrhesia*

Some of these tales raise interesting ideas regarding free speech and petitioning the king (*parrhesia* and *isegoria*), which are important to understanding any Macedonian constitution.[408] Therefore, expanding on Granier's (1931) idea of a basically constitutional Macedonian state with specific duties and rights for its people and limitations on royal power, Aymard (1950: 129f.) added the argument that Macedonians also had the right to *isegoria* before the king using evidence from an incident under Philip V (Polyb. *Hist.* 5.15; 5.27.5-7) e.g. εἶχον γὰρ ἀεὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς (5.27.6).[409]

Some proponents of a more autocratic Macedonia in which 'the king was dominant in a highly personal relationship with his people' (Adams 1986: 43) argue that there was no constitution (building on Piero de Francisci).[410] There was only the personal authority or royal will of the king, who granted or denied whatever rights he wanted.[411] Errington even rejected *isegoria* in any constitutional sense,[412] noting that any real power beyond the king was in the hands of the *Hetairoi*. More recently, Adams looked at the question of *isegoria* – including evidence from anecdotes (though not all their variants).[413] He states that the basic problem was one of law versus personality, and that the question of *isegoria* obviously involves a judicial context as well as the idea of freedom

[406] Cf. Hammond and Griffith 1979: 395.
[407] Hammond and Griffith 1979: 394.
[408] On *parrhesia* – Baltussen and Davis 2015: 1-17; Konstan 2012: 1-11; and Sluiter and Rosen (eds.) 2004.
[409] '...with such freedom did the Macedonians always address their kings...'; cf. Walbank 1957: Vol. 1. 550-1. Briant later added an 'Assembly of the People' to the argument (1973: 237-250).
[410] 1948: 345-495.
[411] Lock 1977: 91-107; Errington 1978: 77-91; cf. Adams 1986: 45.
[412] 1978: 80-86.
[413] 1986: 43-52.

of speech.[414] He concluded that hearing petitions was part of being king and that subjects had the right to say so.[415]

Such conclusions (though reasoned) can be questioned on the grounds that Adams only examined certain versions of the anecdotes. Moreover, little space is dedicated in his study to the contexts of the anecdotes and authorial agenda – particularly as they may relate to more contemporary cultural ideas around the virtues or vices of ideal or tyrannical rulers. Hence, the manifestations of monarchic ideology of later periods may have shaped and distorted possible contemporary tales about Philip. Therefore, any possible interpretations or inferences these tales make or have in relation to the Macedonian legal system and *isegoria* are problematic.

Dikaiosune

It is unquestionable that one of the most important roles of the Macedonian king concerned his responsibilities as chief judge. This responsibility entailed being the arbiter of justice (*dike*), and afforded the opportunity for the king to show himself to be *dikaios* (just). It was also a duty that may have had deeper religious connotations (like the virtue *dikaiosune* itself). The king of the gods Zeus was commonly conceived of as the ultimate arbiter or judge of the universe.[416] Therefore, in light of the deep significance of the relationship between Zeus and the Argead dynasty – it is unsurprising to see Macedonian kings emulating this role within the confines of their somewhat more humble terrestrial kingdom.[417]

The *dikaios* man conformed to social customs, refusing to break conventions for any reason, even self-interest. He respected the justified claims of others, and was under obligations towards others, which he acknowledged and fulfilled.[418] It was an important (perhaps the most important) virtue, which under the guise of *dikaiosune* (justice) became one of the four cardinal virtues (Theognis 147; Aristot. *E.N.* 1129^{b}29). Moreover, by emphasising respect for the proper claims of others, it conceived of morality in terms of personal relationships.[419] It is the product of a society moving away from the purely shame-culture of the Homeric epics (whereby public opinion or guilt was the main sanction), and towards one whereby sanction lies with personal conscience.[420]

[414] 1986: 45-47.
[415] 1986: 48, 52.
[416] On divine justice – Dover 1974: 255, 257-68.
[417] On Macedonian religion – Christesen and Murray 2010: 428-445 (with bibliography).
[418] Ferguson 1979: 17-18.
[419] Ferguson 1979: 42; and 1989: 29. On justice and *dikaiosune* in general – Dover 1974: 180-87, 190f. 252, 306f.
[420] Ferguson 1989: 16-17.

As a cardinal virtue justice was extremely important in monarchic ideology from early on in the Greek classical period.[421] Aeschylus (*Sep.* 610) named it as a virtue early on (though it had been an important royal virtue in the ancient Near East).[422] Nearer to Philip's period, Xenophon argued that Agesilaus possessed it (Xen. *Ages.* 4), so too his Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia*. He had been a model of *arete* for among other things - his commitment to justice (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.26).[423] Isocrates also held justice in the highest regard,[424] and argued that δικαιοσύνη along with αἰσχύνη (self-control) and σωφροσύνη (moderation) were the highest of adornments (*Ad Dem.*15). It was better than riches, provided glory after death, and the wicked had no part in it (*Ad Dem*. 38).[425] Isocrates also advised the Cypriot king Nicocles to show himself in the highest degree a good and just man (βέλτιστον καὶ δικαιότατον - *Ad Nic.* 20; cf. 10, 18).[426] He later put justice (often paired with σωφροσύνη) into the mouth of Nicocles as being one of the most important kingly virtues (e.g. Isoc. *Nic.* 2, 29-30, 31-5, 43-5, 48).[427] It was part of the canon of virtues used in Isocrates' encomium to king Evagoras (*Evag.* 22-23),[428] who apparently gained his rule in accordance with piety and justice – both of which qualities characterised his every act (*Evag.* 26, 38). Isocrates also believed that virtues needed testing under different conditions, and believed *dikaiosune* should be tested in times of want (δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις - *Nic.* 44). It was also an important virtue for Plato around this time.[429] He defined the 'most kingly man' (*basilikōtatos*) as being among other things – *dikaiotatos* (most just) (*Resp.* 580c), and the ideal statesman (*politikos*), as one who guided the state with virtue and knowledge, distributing justice (*ta dikaia*) to all (*Plt*. 301d).

In Hellenistic times, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* has 'moral worth' as an important concern of the king, and strongly hints at justice being vital to kingship.[430] In the *Letter to Aristeas* Ptolemy II is instructed in *dikaion* (justice) among other things. These examples of course reflect the expectation among subjects of Hellenistic monarchs that their kings show benevolent concern for

[421] *N.b.* Hesiod's focus on the dispensation of justice by *basileis* (*Theog*. 83-6; *Op.* 219ff.), where the focus is not on any personal virtue *per se*, but on the service to the community (cf. Noreña 2011: 39 n. 3).
[422] Raaflaub 2000: 52-7.
[423] Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 7.7.41; *Hell.* 5.4.25-34; and *Cyrop.* 1.2.6-7, 15; 1.3.16-18.
[424] In the *Archidamus*, Isocrates has the Spartan king state that nothing was of greater consequence than justice (*Archid.* 35); cf. *Peace* 31-35.
[425] Elsewhere, Isocrates also claims that the bad have no part in both δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη like they could have in ἀνδρία (courage), δεινότητος (cleverness), and other qualities (*Nic.* 43). He also warned Philip II in a letter that, 'nor should you be enamoured of such virtues as even ignoble share, but only of those of which no base person may partake (μηδ' ἀγαπᾶν λίαν τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρετὰς ὧνκαὶ τοῖς φαύλοις μέτεστιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνας ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν πονηρὸς κοινωνήσειεν - *Ad Phi.* I.10; cf. *Ad Nic.* 30). Indeed, Isocrates often promotes justice, *sophrosune*, and wisdom, but is inclined to leave out *andreia* (e.g. *On the Peace* 63). The sophists of the fifth century BCE had favoured *sophia* and *andreia* over *dikaiosune* and *sophrosune* (North 1966: 146 n. 68).
[426] Such men had a greater hope of enjoying the gods' blessings (*Ad Nic.* 20; cf. *Helen* 37).
[427] Writing to the Spartan king Archidamus, Isocrates praised king Agesilaus for showing himself to be in the highest degree just (δικαιότατος), self-controlled (ἐγκρατέστατος - used sometimes instead of σοφροσύνη), and statesmanlike (πολιτικώτατος) (Isoc. *Ad Arch.* 13).
[428] A slightly different set of virtues feature when Isocrates recommends one of his pupils (Diodotus) to Philip's regent Antipater in a letter (*parrhesia* among them). However, both *dikaiosune* and *sophrosune* still feature (*Ad Antip.* 4).
[429] E.g. *Phd*. 69C; *Leg*. I 631C; and *Smp.* 195BC.
[430] Cf. Noreña 2011: 42.

them through various means, one method of which was the provision of justice.[431] This idea found its highest expression in the epithet *Dikaios* ('The Just') taken by many of the Hellenised dynasts of Pontus, Parthia and Cappadocia.[432]

During the Roman period justice (*iustitia*) was still the royal virtue *par excellence*, and fundamental to imperial ideology.[433] In order to be *iustus* an emperor could not rule despotically, but instead had to submit himself to the rule of law. Indeed, despite Augustus never referring to himself as *iustus* in inscriptions, the epithet 'most just' (*iustissimus*) later became a stock imperial designation, even used of those wielding authority in their name such as provincial governors.[434] Certainly, *iustitia* became quite prominent once more in official discourse during the reigns of Nerva and Trajan after the unrestrained autocracy of Domitian (Plin. *Ep.* 10.55 and 97) (coincidently the period of Plutarch in particular).[435] This is particularly evident in the 'kingship orations' of Dio Chrysostom,[436] and later in the work of Aelius Aristides. The latter's encomium to an unnamed emperor (*Eis Basilea*), holds justice as a characteristic virtue of royalty (*Or.* 35.8, 15, 17).[437] Moreover, *dikaiosune*/*iustitia* was also significant among the stoic writers under the principate – particularly for Marcus Aurelius, who knew what it truly meant to rule.[438] This royal virtue was highly prominent in the 'pseudo-Pythagorean' kingship texts (*Peri Basileas*) of Diotogenes, Sthenidas, and Ecphantus of the second or third centuries CE, and also important in the imperial panegyrics and literature of the late third and fourth centuries CE (*Pan. Lat.* 3.21.4, 4.1.5, 6.6.1, 7.3.4 etc.).[439] It was one of the virtues which Menander Rhetor thought crucial to distinguishing between a despot and a king in his manual on how to praise a king (374-5).[440]

Justice could also be represented by the imperial virtue *aequitas*. Its principal meaning associated with fairness or justice in decision making, particularly in judicial settings.[441] Paired on occasion with *iustitia* or other virtues of a good judge (e.g. *integritas*, *fides*, *mansuetudo*, *humanitas*, *temperantia*, *prudentia*, and *misericordia*), it could also be equated with the Greek *dikaiosune*. There are also a number of literary references to *aequitas* as an imperial (judicial) virtue, including from the reigns of Tiberius, Claudius, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, and Julian.[442] All these emperors coincidently have literary connections to the authors of the anecdotes of this chapter.

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[431] Noreña 2011: 44 esp. n. 21.
[432] Fears 1981: 868.
[433] Aug. *R.G.* 34; Cic. *Off.* 3.28; and Noreña 2011: 57.
[434] Ferguson 1979: 183.
[435] Stadter 2015: 179-87 on Plutarch, justice and Pliny's tenth epistle.
[436] On the *Kingship Orations* of Dio Chrysostom – Moles 1990: 297-375.
[437] Noreña 2009: 7. On attribution to Aelius Aristides – Jones 1972: 134-52.
[438] E.g. 3.61, 5.12.2, 6.47.6, 7.54, 7.63, 8.39, 10.11.2, esp. 11.10.4. Noreña 2009: 7 and Hadot 1998.
[439] Cf. Nixon and Rodgers 1994: and Noreña 2009: 7.
[440] Cf. Noreña 2009: 7; and Russel and Wilson 1981: 279-280.
[441] Noreña 2011: 63.
[442] Noreña 2011: 64-65.

Overall, this focus on justice as a royal virtue and a fundamental feature of monarchic ideology reflects an anxiety or a concern (among politicians and philosophers) to regulate the appropriate relationship between monarchs, the law, and the rights of citizens. It is unsurprising then that the enduring and popular theory by which the good ruler not only dispensed justice fairly, but himself freely submitted to the same laws that governed his subjects was developed, expanded, and reiterated.[443] It spoke to the immense power of autocrats in all periods, and provided one of the few genuine moral checks to their almost unaccountable dominance. Philip's judicial tales are part of this tradition.

Finally, aside from those virtues directly associated with the judicial role of the Macedonian king, these tales show that this role allowed for the display of other important qualities associated with good or bad monarchic rule. Indeed, this layering of multiple secondary qualities underneath the tale's primary focal virtue or vice is also important in understanding the use and survival of these tales about Philip.

Judicial Philippic Anecdotes

Philip and Variant Versions – A paradigmatic Analysis

The first judicial tale is found in three authors (**example 3.1**). Each has utilized the tale differently to accord better with their individual motives and contexts. The version of Valerius Maximus offers a more negative Philip – almost the stock character of the foreign tyrant. The purpose of this unflattering role was to reflect contemporary concerns about monarchic behaviour under the fledgling principate. However, this function is deftly filtered through the safe distance of a foreign example of somewhat ambiguous importance. In Plutarch, Philip is a far more positive paradigm of monarchy and justice. Therefore, so as to align with shifting contemporary values – Philip and his actions patently articulate and disseminate the virtues of Trajanic Rome.[444] It is the burgeoning contextual mores of the Second Sophistic which allow this foreign king to be posited both as a benchmark and exemplar for a mature and entrenched autocratic system once more seeking validation, rehabilitation, and stability after the notorious failings and abuses of previous emperors. The concise version of Stobaeus has obvious pedagogical motivations which dictate both form and content. Stobaeus exploits the universal applications inherent in the virtues or vices that make up monarchic ideology for rather more humble purposes.

[443] Noreña 2009: 7.
[444] On Trajan's admiration for Alexander – Cassius Dio 68.29f.; *Hist. Aug. Hadrian* 4.9; and Julian *Caes.* 335d.

3.1.A

Inserit se tantis viris mulier alienigeni sanguinis, quae a Philippo rege temulento immerens damnata, <provocare se iudicium vociferata est, eoque interrogante ad quem> provocaret, 'ad Philippum' inquit, 'sed sobrium.' Excussit crapulam oscitanti, ac praesentia animi ebrium resipiscere causaque diligentius inspecta iustiorem sententiam ferre coegit. Igitur aequitatem, quam impetrare non potuerat, extorsit, potius praesidium a libertate quam ab innocentia mutuata (Val. Max. 6.2. ext.1).[445]

3.1.B

Μαχαίτᾳ δέ τινα κρίνων δίκην καὶ ὑπονυστάζων οὐ πάνυ προσεῖχε τοῖς δικαίοις ἀλλὰ κατέκρινεν· ἐκείνου δὲ ἀναβοήσαντος ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν, διοργισθείς "ἐπὶ τίνα;" εἶπε· καὶ ὁ Μαχαίτας, "ἐπὶ σέ, βασιλεῦ, αὐτόν, ἂν ἐγρηγορὼς καὶ προσέχων ἀκούῃς." τότε μὲν οὖν ἀνέστη· γενόμενος δὲ μᾶλλον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ γνοὺς ἀδικούμενον τὸν Μαχαίταν τὴν μὲν κρίσιν οὐκ ἔλυσε, τὸ δὲ τίμημα τῆς δίκης αὐτὸς ἐξέτεισεν (Plut. *Mor.* 178F-179A = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 24).[446]

3.1.C

Ἐν ταὐτῷ. Πρεσβῦτις δικαζομένη ἐπὶ Φιλίππου, ὡς ἑώρα νυστάζοντα ἔπειτα μέλλοντα ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἐδεῖτο συγχωρῆσαι αὐτῇ ἐφεῖναι. ὃ δὲ 'ἐπὶ τίνα;' εἶπεν. 'ἐπὶ Φίλιππον' ἀπεκρίνατο 'ἐγρηγορότα' (Stob. 3.13.49).[447]

Taken together this is the perfect anecdote. It is a brief, self-contained story, with a mere six lines in its longest version. It has a mix of indirect and direct speech – the latter being extremely witty and scathing.[448] It is clear and easily understood, and has an entertaining point. Furthermore, despite their obvious differences, there is enough common internal threads and themes to suggest a strong relationship between all three.[449] Indeed, all three are different versions of the same anecdote. They also have analogous messages or morals underpinning their diverse presentations

[445] 'A woman of alien race inserts herself among these great men. Wrongfully condemned by king Philip when he was in liquor, she cried out that she appealed, 'to Philip,' she said, 'but to Philip sober.' She dissipated the fumes of wine as he yawned, and by her ready courage forced the drunkard to come to his senses and, after a more careful examination of the case, to render a more just verdict. Thus she extorted the equity which she could not get by asking, borrowing recourse from freedom rather than from innocence.'

[446] 'While he (Philip) was hearing the case of Machaetas, he was near falling asleep, and did not give full attention to the rights of the case, but decided against Machaetas. And when Machaetas exclaimed that he appealed from the decision, Philip, thoroughly enraged, said, 'To whom?' And Machaetas replied, 'To you yourself, Your Majesty, if you will listen awake and attentive.' At the time Philip merely ended the sitting, but when he had gained more control of himself and realised that Machaetas was treated unfairly, he did not reverse his decision, but satisfied the judgement with his own money.'

[447] 'An old woman who was being heard before Philip, as she saw that he was nodding off, then about to give his judgement, begged him to allow her to appeal. And he said, 'To whom?' 'To Philip,' she replied, 'when he has woken up.''

[448] The tone of the direct speech recalls the language of a Diogenes in his *chriea* involving famous and powerful individuals.

[449] There is also a version in the late collection *Philogelos* – a collection of 265 amusing stories ascribed to the unidentifiable Hierocles and Philagrius. With the work's purpose and audience equally obscure, it is difficult to come to any real conclusions about the material. The stories are not about named individuals, though some can be linked back to other known tales where individuals are named. No. 264 is one such example – Εὐτράπελος ἐπὶ ἡγεμόνος ἐδικάζετο. τοῦ δὲ νυστάζοντος ἐβόησεν· Ἐκκαλοῦμαι, ὁ δὲ ἔφη· Ἐπὶ τίνα; κἀκεῖνος· Ἐπὶ σὲ γρηγοροῦντα - A witty man is pleading a case before a leader/judge. When the judge nods off, the man shouts, 'I appeal!' 'To whom?' asks the judge – 'To you awake!' Despite being severely abridged, it is clearly related to Philip's tale. On the *Philogelos* – Thierfelder 1968 and Ritter 1955.

and structures. These revolve around the abstract ideal of justice – but particularly as concerns the responsibilities of those sitting in judgement (i.e. being *dikaios* or displaying *dikaiosune*). However, within that basic moral message (clearly part of Philip's role as a conduit of monarchic ideology), there are nuances involved in each of the three tales worth investigating.

The first arrangement comes from the second chapter (entitled *Things Freely Spoken or Done*) of book six of Valerius Maximus. It has its own *Preface* and contains twelve *domestica* (Roman examples) and three *externa* (foreign examples). The *Preface* or transition to this section is significant (Val. Max. 6.2. *Praef.*). Here Valerius makes his usual authorial intervention and signals his change in topic. He also gives his familiar moral guidance -priming his audience for his preferred reception of the *exempla* to follow. In this instance, that guidance relates to the ambiguous nature of his current topic.[450] It is prone to be either a virtue or vice (*inter virtutem vitiumque posita*), and is more attractive to the vulgar than the wise (*ac vilgi sic auribus gratior quam sapientissimi cuiusque animo probabilior est*). Even so – Valerius defends its inclusion because of his overall purpose (*sed quia humanae vitae partes persequi propositum est*).[451]

Philip's *exemplum* is the first of the foreign *exempla*. However, its introduction reveals that Philip is not the primary subject.[452] Therefore, forming a transition from the list of Roman *exempla*, the first sentence reports that it is a foreign woman who inserts herself amongst these great men. The contrast is deliberately stark between the great Romans of the Republic and this obscure unnamed woman. With her appearance Valerius boldly reasserts the ambivalent temperament of freedom of speech, and its propensity for problematical paradigms. Even so, it is a problem that the chapter's *Preface* has in part provided for with its paradigm for judging – *si salubri modo se temperavit, laudem, si quo non debuit profudit, reprehensionem meretur.*[453] Moreover, if the reader is unable to discern which is which, Valerius himself will offer his guidance – *propria aestimatione referatur.*

Comparing the first part of the *exemplum* with that of the other authors shows that Valerius was most likely not Plutarch's source. Plutarch's version of the anecdote is very different – and not just cosmetically. His anecdote, part of his *apophthegmata* of Philip, begins at an earlier phase of the tale than Valerius' report. Philip (who is the focus) is still listening to the rights of the case before proceeding to making his decision. The case concerns a man named Machaetas.[454] As in

[450] Bloomer 1992: 54.
[451] Cf. Bloomer 1992: 55.
[452] It is debatable whether either protagonist are the subject of the *exemplum* as it is the tale's theme of free speech that is Valerius' main concern.
[453] Cf. Bloomer 1992: 55.
[454] Machaetas was a noble Macedonian whose sister Phila was married to Philip (Athen. 13.557C – from Satyrus *FGH* iii, frg. 5; on Phila – Carney 2000: 59-60). This was Philip's brother-in-law in other words, and the father of Alexander's friend and treasurer Harpalus (Heckel 1992: 213), and therefore I agree with Fuhrmann – '*il est surprenant qu'il soit mentionné ici à la manière d'un inconnu*' (1998: 261).

Valerius, Philip makes his decision against the defendant on account of lack of attention, but unlike in Valerius, it seems to have been on account of tiredness (for unknown reasons). When Machaetas appeals the decision, an angry (διοργισθείς) Philip asks to whom, only to receive the reply (appreciably longer than that in Valerius), 'to you yourself, Your Majesty, if you will listen awake and attentive.' Here Philip does not appear to be drunk, and despite its focal witticism, Machaetas' reply is somewhat more diplomatic and respectful with its deliberate use of βασιλεῦ.[455] The focus is deliberately kept on the relationship between monarch and subject, judge and plaintiff, Philip and Machaetas.

Valerius, after introducing the woman and the anecdote, presents the woman crying out in appeal against the judgement of an intoxicated (*temulento*) Philip, who has apparently wrongfully condemned her (*immerens damnata*). When asked to whom she appealed, the woman replies sharply – 'to Philip... but sober' (*ad Philippum...sed sobrium*).[456] Philip is all but humiliated by the woman's witty retort. The famous wit of Philip (chap. five) is upstaged. Moreover, the use of a woman suggests that Valerius is attempting to utilize the rhetorical technique of 'argument from unlike' (*argumenta imparia*).[457] This technique uses individuals of lower social status to persuade audiences. Valerius uses it elsewhere (e.g. 1.1.9; 1.1.10; 3.3.ext 7; and 3.8.7), as part of his moral scheme whereby the appeal to pursue virtue is open to all classes and races (e.g. 3.3.ext.7; 8.14.5; cf. 5.6.ext.5). Its utilization adds greater believability or *fides*.

These unequal examples are an important reason Valerius has *externa*, as the more 'barbarous and unexpected' the example – the more successful its potential.[458] What is also important to this theory is Philip, but not Philip *per se*, only his status and role as monarch and judge. Therefore, Valerius or his antecedents have compressed a figure out of the anecdote in transmission (possibly Machaetas with his attendant status), replacing them with a lowly, generic and anonymous figure to serve as rhetorical device. These nameless figures are predominantly the stuff of rhetorical exercises and not historical record.[459] Valerius exploited this device to play the more expansive and identifiable everyman he needs to best articulate and transmit his particular values and views regarding monarchic ideology.[460]

Argumenta imparia also add to the contrast inherent in the tale's uneven power dynamics. A powerless, convicted, criminal woman seeks justice from a drunken autocrat flouting due process.

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[455] Plutarch's use of βασιλικός was nearly always complimentary (Aalders 1982: 33), and with the overall tone of Plutarch's *apophthegmata* being consciously positive, any deliberate use of the title βασιλεῦ should be seen as approving.
[456] As usual in Valerius, the direct speech is broken up by the use of *inquit*. It is one of Carter's many criticisms (1975: 46), but here it adds delay and dramatic effect into the woman's reply.
[457] Skidmore 1996: 87-89. On 'argument from unlike' – Quint. 5.11.10 - giving the example of the bravery of a woman.
[458] Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.10-12; Skidmore 1996: 89.
[459] Bloomer 1992: 72.
[460] On representative figures in anecdotes – Beck 1998: 10-11.

Philip's actions are those of a classic (foreign) tyrant, not an ideal or just (*dikaios*) monarch. They are not the actions of a just (*iustus*) Roman emperor. This type of contrast is almost entirely lost with the use of Machaetas in Plutarch. The loss is not complete though – the juxtaposition of defendant and judge, man and king, and the ultimate reversal of those roles when one teaches the other implicitly of justice remains. Plutarch's monarch is able to transcend Valerius' negative tone and the tyrant's mould through his positive reception of that lesson. This service to 'justice' is all the more appealing through the definite naming of the king's fortunate subject.

Another difference is that Valerius has the woman condemned by Philip. Whereas Plutarch merely has the decision go against Machaetas. It is reported later that the decision involved only the levelling of a pecuniary fine of an unknown amount. Valerius' version is more abbreviated – more dramatic. The woman's situation is more precarious than that the wronged Machaetas. Her very life is at stake.[461] Aside from 'selling the drama', this particular difference may reflect popular unease with the introduction of *cognitio* (see below), which would have reshaped debate and evolving perceptions of Tiberius' autocratic power and responsibility.

Stobaeus was the author of an *Anthology* of the fifth century CE.[462] The focus for him is squarely on the *apophthegma* of the old woman. It is the witticism, not the outcome that matters. His version of the anecdote, written in the early fifth century CE as part of a work of instruction for his son, is the shortest and the latest. It contains elements found both in Valerius and Plutarch. For example, Stobaeus' defendant is an *old* anonymous woman (Πρεσβῦτις), again perhaps of rhetorical linage like that of Valerius. However, like Plutarch, Philip's inattention is caused by unexplained sleepiness (has drinking been condensed out?). The retort is sharp and pointed as in Valerius, but is focused on Philip being awake, not sober (ἐγρηγορότα).

Stobaeus has one feature that is all his own though. His defendant calls for the right to appeal the decision before Philip even hands it down (μέλλοντα ἀποφαίνεσθαι). This is perhaps done because the reader of Stobaeus is left completely uninformed as to the outcome of the old woman's plea. Indeed, he offers little other material to the reader. The retention of Philip himself is really the only historically significant or distinguishing fact Stobaeus imparts. That Philip's name and fame could instil the anecdote with credibility, lustre and poignancy - and promote its longevity

[461] Of the other *exempla* from Valerius' chapter – three involved trials (6.2.1, 4, 5), two of which definitely involved life and death situations (the third is unclear – 6.2.5). This clustering suggests either heavy reliance on the arrangement of an older collection, or Valerius' strong interest in this contextual setting for his chapter's theme.

[462] Stobaeus dedicated the work to his son Septimius to improve his reading memory (i.e. as a didactic-pedagogical text). The work is a diverse assortment of texts of various lengths (*chreía*, *apophthegmata*, *gnome* etc.) arranged by thematic chapters. They are linked by *lemmata* which usually give titles and authors' names. Moreover, with more than 500 Greek authors represented, it covers all of Greek literature from Homer to Themistius. The complex layering of the work makes it difficult to distinguish Stobaeus from his sources. However, some kind of anthology of various authors is likely to have been one such source, as it is unlikely he had direct access to all 500 odd authors. His work is preserved in four books, books three and four (our concern here) are referred to as the *Florilegium* or *Sermones*. Their dissemination no doubt helped by their ethical character (Piccione in *Brill's New Pauly* 2002: 846-50 and Reydams-Schils (ed.) 2011).

(through repeated inclusion in, and citation from rhetorical handbooks etc.), are probably factors here.[463] Even so, the austere arrangement of Stobaeus completely de-emphasises Philip's personality, reducing Philip and his role to that of simple authority/judicial figure. Therefore, the overall sense of the tale is still somewhat about justice. However, for Stobaeus, the simple lesson and memorable nature of the witticism were all that were really needed for his son's education. Monarchic ideology fades easily into the background behind the rhetoric and universal moralism of justice. This allows the tale's foreground to deliver its simple pedagogical lessons unfettered by more complex debates.

The apophthegm is also the focus for Valerius, but he offers more than just the neat rhetoric of its witticism. For him, the result of the woman's outspokenness or free-speech (her Greek *parrhesia*) was highly relevant to his stated rubric. Certainly, Valerius felt that he must also point the way rhetorically to any moral possibilities of the tale. Therefore, the woman's pointed reply causes Philip to re-examine the case more carefully and render a 'more just verdict' (*iustiorem sententiam*). This raises four important points. Firstly, the idea of 'just reward' is a central theme in Valerius and is evident here.[464] Secondly, there is the blatant contrast between the *praesentia animi* of the woman and the *ebrium* of Philip.[465] Thirdly, was it moral argument that has forced Philip to re-examine the case, or has the woman's *parrhesia* (or exercising of *libertas*) taken place in more insidious circumstances, such as a public hearing whereby community opinion could influence matters? However, Valerius' omission of this would be understandable. Any perceivable external reasons for Philip's reversal would detract from the more personable moral point of the *exemplum*. It is this more relatable moral which can be secured with greater relevance to autocratic responsibilities, autocratic tolerance of free-speech, and a monarch's just treatment of their subjects. Therefore, it must be the forceful call of due process and justice which remits the drunken Philip's decision (his direct internalisation of the external plea of the woman). This gives the *exemplum* more impact – making it arguably more persuasive, entertaining and memorable.

The last point is that Valerius replicates somewhat the lack of interest of all our authors in the actual mechanics of rule or practical consequences by not elaborating on the reconsidered 'more just' verdict. Instead, the woman's plight is to be made completely unambiguous by Valerius' last line. Valerius reveals here that he does not just record anecdotes, but supplies his audience with apposite interpretation.[466] This is the final reiteration of Valerius' views by which the lesson or moral of the tale is presented and received as he would have it. It is this simple rhetorical

[463] Cf. Beck 1998: 8-9.
[464] Skidmore 1996: 54-7.
[465] The introduction/transition to the next *externa* (6.2.ext.2) subtly directs the reader backwards to reconsider the previous example of the *libertas* of the woman as brave (*fortis*). Her actions are undoubtedly meant to be viewed as positive.
[466] Cf. Bloomer 1992: 11.

reinforcement which structures his work and drives his dual agendas of moral instruction and monarchic ideology. Philip's tale is a well-oiled cog in big machine driving all the agendas of Valerius.

Valerius returns to his characteristic affected style in order to insert his moralizing comment, and ends the *exemplum* with fashionable rhetorical antithesis.[467] As rhetoric describes reality and seeks to manipulate how it is perceived, Valerius seems to want to 'guide' the perceptions of his audience more than the other authors with the overt use of it. This agrees with what is known of Valerius' aims and agendas. Rhetoric was certainly his favoured device for the conveyance of his particular 'brands' of moralism and monarchic ideology.

In the final line, the woman claims justice through her free speech rather than through any claims to innocence (*quam ab innocentia mutuata*). There is a paradox at the heart of this moralizing comment, which also stands at the heart of the entire *exemplum*. Valerius was deeply attracted to commemorating the incongruous and paradoxical tale, stories which reveal exceptional reversals of fortune.[468] The clever Philip, who taught so many lessons to the whole of Greece, is sharply schooled in one himself in justice or fairness (*aequitatem*) by a humble woman. However, this justice seems to be of the imperial *aequitas* variety, the use of which implied 'judicial fairness'. Its specific use in this sense (which invokes *iustitia*) can be traced back to the time of Tiberius under whom Valerius wrote.[469] Indeed, *aequitas* became greatly important to imperial subjects after the introduction and extension of *cognitio* – a judicial procedure by which emperors and provincial governors were not constrained by any traditional external rules or law (unlike *iudices*), and thus open to arbitrary judgements.[470] Therefore, the paramount virtue of this Philippic tale is old and traditional, new and innovative, but more importantly – it is contemporary and praiseworthy. There is no ambiguity for Valerius in the outcome of this tale as far as the actions of the woman are concerned and its moral didactic implications… even if her ultimate fate is a mystery.

Valerius makes remarkable circumstances like those of Philip's tale more pertinent to the everyday lives of his audience.[471] Hence, contemporary Roman issues surely lie beneath the presentation of both Philip and the woman, especially regarding the roles of individuals under the principate in matters of justice and free-speech. As seen above *dikaiosune* had its Roman equivalent somewhat in *iustitia* and *aequitas*. It is known that the work's dedicatee Tiberius received not only the appellations '*iustus*' and '*iustissimus princeps*' (*I.L.S.* 159; 3783),[472] but was also thanked

[467] Bloomer 1992: 53, 97, 125.
[468] Bloomer 1992: 17, 21, 23.
[469] Noreña 2011: 65. On Tiberius and judging – Suet. *Tib.* 33.1. There are of course older judicial themed uses of the word *aequitas* e.g. Cic. *QFr.*1.1.45.
[470] Kaser 1966: 339-409; Millar 1977: 236-40, 516-37; and Noreña 2011: 64-65.
[471] Skidmore 1996: 74.
[472] Cf. Ferguson 1979: 183.

officially in the *senatus consultum de Gnaeo Pisone Patre* for his *aequitas* and *patientia* (patience or forbearance – cf. example 4.11).[473] Moreover, Velleius Paterculus held Tiberius responsible for the renewal of *aequitas* and *iustitia* (2.126.2). These facts strongly link the anecdote to publically known Tiberian attributes, and also suggest acknowledgement of authorised imperial propaganda. Such associations in Valerius reflect well the author's pursuit of relevance to his audience. They also show him operating within the established, but evolving parameters of monarchic ideology, which often looked backwards to validate and reinforce contemporary values in the hope of promulgating them yet further and transmitting them to future generations.

With the tale's focus on acceptable free-speech and *iustitia*, the anecdote strongly hints at *clementia* (ἐπιείκεια) playing some role in the woman's fate beyond the scope of the immediate tale.[474] It is true that praise could be gained in Republican times by leading figures through clemency, and that it was 'later integrated into the image-factory of the Principate' (Spencer 2002: 171). *Clementia* was certainly a very conspicuous virtue of Tiberius' reign, and was publically recognized at least twice during his life.[475] The most significant being the erection of an altar to *clementia* by the Senate after the sparing of Agrippina and Nero (Tact. *Ann.* 4.74.1-3). Moreover, if *clementia* was to take place, the anger of Philip would have to give way to *moderatio* (*sophrosune* or *enkrateia*), another heavily stressed virtue of Tiberius' reign.[476] Velleius Paterculus certainly lauded Tiberius' '*singularis moderatio*' (2.122.1).[477] As such, Valerius allows the lessons present in Philip's anecdote, and those of the subtext, to speak to a range of contemporary issues relevant to emperor, elites, and anyone else who could read or listen.

Plutarch's version appears to be less 'handled' by the schools of rhetoric and their practitioners.[478] The finale to Plutarch's anecdote brings the focus back to Philip and his (good) actions, and away from the apophthegm of Machaetas. Philip is said to end the sitting, gain control of his anger later, and realise that the defendant has been treated unjustly (λόγος finally overcoming πάθος).[479] This is the *enkrateia* or *sophrosune* (the *moderatio*) explicitly missing in Valerius. For Plutarch, it becomes the first step towards displaying *dikaiosune*.

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[473] *SCPP* (*CIL* 2^2/5.900), 11.17-20. Cf. Noreña 2011: 65.
[474] On *clementia* – Adam 1970; and Dowling 2006; as an imperial virtue – Fears 1981. It was also a significant factor in Alexander's Roman story (Spencer 2002: 97-112, 170-175).
[475] Ferguson 1979: 187-188.
[476] Ferguson 1979: 188. North (1966 301ff.) argues that the coalescence of *sophrosune* and *praotes* might have formed the imperial virtue of *clementia*.
[477] Under the guise of *temperantia*, *clementia* was linked by Cicero with *aequitas* as part of his unofficial cannon of virtues (*Cat.* 2.25).
[478] As do most of his Philippic *apophthegmata* – suggesting the use of older, less contaminated or reworked source traditions.
[479] Philip's initial anger was understandable to Plutarch who believed that human nature was not perfect – for him complete control of the irrational by *logos* was unattainable. On anger as dangerous and destructive (to individual and society) – *Mor.* 581b-c.

Philip does not though reverse his decision. Instead he pays the fine of Machaetas out of his own money (suggestive of the *liberalitas* that would later come to define a good emperor in Plutarch's period – chap. five). Philip's actions admit to some kind of procedural unfairness during the case – but the original decision is still upheld. It seems that Philip was unable to explicitly admit that a wrong decision was made. Upholding the decision and paying the fine himself allow Philip to appear just (*dikaios*), but this action does not call into doubt his original judgment. Instead, it shifts the focus subtly onto the procedures or factors upon which that judgement was originally made. The difference in emphasis is delicate but distinct. The king has not made a mistake – only a decision that could have been better informed. Even so, when mistakes happen, Philip shows himself ready to right the wrongs. But it is done in his way, and on his terms. Plutarch's Philip seems a far more positive, if wilier figure than that found in Valerius. Philip has the monarchic virtues of *dikaiosune* and *sophrosune/enkrateia*, but he also shows himself to have among other things political *phronesis* (wisdom). It is a wisdom (or *prudentia*) completely missing from Valerius more abrupt ending.

Philip's tale provided Plutarch a powerful example of wise, moderate, just and accountable autocracy.[480] His main interest though was to present a positive tale and praise implicitly an inspirational deed for moral edification (*n.b.* the implicit presence of the popular Plutarchian themes of πραότης and φιλανθρωπία to go along with δίκαιος). This was in accordance with his belief in moral historiography. Plutarch offers few details beyond those immediately relevant to the tale's moral. The focus is on a monarch upholding justice (δίκη), no matter the source of the chastisement, and no matter the cost to him personally. As always for Plutarch the ideal king was a just ruler – a *basileus dikaios*. Nevertheless, as Plutarch retains the Atheno-centric idolizing mores of the Second Sophistic, Philip remains a slightly ambiguous figure to him here. Philip makes a mistake, but understanding true justice, he remedied what he could. But also understanding power, Philip did it on his terms – seeking advantages from error. There were layers to Plutarch's simple paradigms.[481]

This fairly positive Philippic tale also appears appropriate to Plutarch's general aims regarding his *apophthegmata* collection. Its moral is clear and the lesson obvious to any audience – even those wearing purple. As such, this anecdote is steeped in the ideology of what made a good monarch or statesman. Here Philip shows himself to be a clear example of Plutarch's supreme constitution – kingship, and no tyrant (it is his just treatment of the governed that marked the difference).[482] Moreover, by highlighting Plutarch's favoured theme of πραότης at the expense of

[480] Was the decision to stand against Machaetas to his liking though (public reproach was possible after adverse judgements – e.g. *Mor.* 179A)? Silence or positive comments were probably the most likely outcome - on account of the pecuniary settlement of the fine, the notoriety gained personally for such an event, and the wish not to push Philip too far. Machaetas had what he wanted (to a degree), quitting while ahead made good (safe) sense.

[481] Cf. Duff 1999: 71.

[482] Isocrates (*Ad Phil.*154) advised Philip explicitly that the Macedonians would be grateful to him (σοι χάριν ἕξουσιν) if he reigned over the Macedonians, not like a tyrant, but like a king (Μακεδόνες δ' ἢν βασιλικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ τυραννικῶς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατῃς).

the more traditional ἐπιείκεια or *clementia*, it harmonizes well with known Trajanic ideals, and what it meant at this time to be a *bonus princeps*.[483] Indeed, Pliny noted that Trajan 'administers justice with fairness (*aequitas* - *Pan.* 77.3; cf. 38.7),' and that he was expected in judicial matters by his subjects, 'to prevent unfairness on the part of magistrates, to reverse anything done amiss...' (*Pan.* 80). All this was part of Trajan's 'reverence for the laws' (*legum reverential* - *Pan.* 77.3; cf. 34.2),'[484] which left him with a great reputation for justice (Cass. Dio. 68.6), and shows the contemporary relevance of Philip's tale in constructing and supporting early first century CE imperial monarchic ideology.[485]

Valerius' version also functions within the realm of monarchic ideology, but its use within this ideological framework is different. Philip is a wholly negative figure – the convenient foreign autocrat, drunk on wine and power, and liable to the humiliation and lessons of even women when abusing justice. He is contemptible with his openly (classical) tyrannic traits and candidly contrasted with the heroes of the Republic. Therefore, Philip becomes an illustrative paradigm for the first Roman emperor to inherit *imperium*, particularly in the exercising of it in relation to free-speech and the virtue of justice (*iustitia* – or more accurately in this case – *aequitas*).

Philip's heritage also renders this a safe *exemplum* for Valerius. The action and implicit censure of the paradigm pass through the distancing and distorting effect created by its foreign origin. This removes any direct and immediate relevance to the author's addressee, whilst retaining the subtle instructive tones of the *exemplum*. In addition, any positive judgments concerning Philip's 'just' decision in the end are merely circumstantial, for this second decision must be given for the anecdote to be of use as an *exemplum*. Philip is only the foil by which the woman's actions are to be highlighted. He is a foreign autocratic power against which justice from free speech must prevail.

This point is strongly reinforced contextually by the interesting company Philip keeps in the *externa* of this chapter. These *externa* also involve individuals, one named, the other another anonymous woman, who speak up against other autocratic leaders. Philip's companions include the tyrant of Syracuse Dionysus – described as excessively harsh, responsible for excessive burdens, and crueller than his predecessors (*superioribus importuniorem*); and king Lysmachus, who loses his temper and orders a man crucified. It is not flattering company for Philip, who is one of a set of foreign despots. It is taint through association – Valerius deliberately grouping this triumvirate of

[483] In Hellenistic kingship treatises *philanthropia* and *epieikeia* occur in combination with *dikaiosune* (Adam 1970: 36-8; Billows 1995: 58).
[484] Cf. Pliny's praise of Trajan's *iustitia* in a letter and *Panegyricus* (*Ep.* 6.31.2; *Pan.* 33.2, 56.6-7, 59.3, 76.4-5, 78.2, 80.1-5). For more references to Trajan's *iustitia* – Wickert 1954: 2,250-1. Dio Chrysostom's 'kingship orations' (probably addressed to Trajan) invoke justice constantly as an essential quality of a king e.g. 1.45, 2.26, 2.54, 3.7, 3.32, 4.24 (cf. Noreña 2009: 7). Finally, any φιλανθρωπία shown here by Philip correlated well with the known *humanitas* of Trajan e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 2.6-7, 3.4, 4.6, 71.5 etc.
[485] For Trajan's *mansuetudo, clementia* and *abstinentia* – Plin. *Pan.* 2.6, 3.4 and 38.5.

autocrats and anecdotes for blackening effect. These foreign leaders represent the abuse or misuse of power by which free-speech can have a positive evaluation. This is in direct contrast with the Roman examples given, especially those featuring Pompeius Magnus who is prominent among them (6.2.4-9, six of the twelve *exempla*). As a Roman who at times wielded power akin to that of a foreign autocrat (explicitly noted in the anecdotes), Pompey offers a useful comparison. The theme of his six *exempla* is spelled out clearly in the introduction/transition to the first –

> Therefore we ought the less to wonder that Cn. Pompeius' enormous authority so often struggled with such freedom, and not without great credit, since with unruffled countenance he let himself be a mockery to the license of all sorts of men (6.2.4).

Six tales follow showing this to be the case.

Pompey reflects how proper Romans (with *imperium*) should correctly behave in the face of free-speech and actions (which come in for some strong censure in these six *exempla*). As a result, Valerius' chapter as a whole presents two sides of the same coin. In the *domestica*, free speech and action is mostly abused or unjustly used with correct indulgence and self-control (or *moderatio*) being giving to it by those with power. In the *externa*, are more acceptable uses of free speech – but only because examples are given of arbitrary or abusive use of autocratic power by leaders who have transgressed constructs of ideal monarchy. The contrast for Valerius is between good moral behaviour (*virtus*) and bad moral behaviour (*vitia*) – between the ideal monarch and the tyrant.[486] The message is clear. Free speech was a good thing against abuses of power. However, good Romans leaders as a rule do not abuse power. Therefore, being out-spoken, particularly against an emperor or his representative, should be frowned upon or censured (*reprehensio*). Nevertheless, power and justice must be exercised with caution and due diligence, as the slope from ideal ruler to tyrant was slippery. The deliberate contrast Valerius makes between the heroes of the Republic and Philip and his motley co-companions tries to encapsulate that fall.

It is a pointed message in the context of Tiberian Rome. It could be addressed to the emperor himself, his representatives, or even to those whom he ruled.[487] Indeed, it was a message for a collective Roman world in transition, and one in which Philip's *exemplum* had a role to play. But that role was expressly defined by Valerius by both his selection and tinkering. As such, Valerius seeks to impose the conduct of those individuals of the past on those of the present.[488] It is the conceptualization and transmission of a new moral culture for the principate, a moral culture

[486] Cf. Skidmore 1996: 54.
[487] Val. Max. 2.1.10 – demonstrates the moral aspect of Valerius' work and the use that his material might have in respect of imitation (Skidmore 1996: 60).
[488] Skidmore 1996: 58. Valerius often explicitly and implicitly contrasts between the morally high standards during most of the Republic and the moral degeneration of the current age (Skidmore 1996: 58-63).

upon which the Empire itself may be dependent.[489] This is Philip's role in Valerius, as it is in our two other authors – to instruct by example (and entertainment), and disseminate virtues or vices of monarchic ideology for didactic edification. In Valerius, Philip performs this role as a negative paradigm. In Plutarch, Philip is a far more positive exemplar. The abridgement of Stobaeus unfortunately has left little of Philip to evaluate either way.

This study shows three versions of the same anecdote animated in three entirely differently ways. Each account speaks to a different world through various authorial agendas, and underlines the importance of examining all versions of a tale where possible. Even so, collectively they highlight the use of Philip's image to address not dissimilar moral and didactic ends across a wide expanse of time.

Philip: Paradigm of Justice

In the next judicial anecdote (**example 3.2**), the role assigned to Philip in the *apophthegma* is also attached to other famous rulers. That the individual could change like this suggests that the ideal was more important than the individual. This indicates the primacy of monarchic ideology and the reduction of the role of individual monarchs to almost stock element. This also implies that accuracy in transmission was subordinated to contemporary interests around the character of the ideal ruler or tyrant. It is the tale's function in the exemplar tradition which appears its most important feature when questions of attribution are unsolvable.

3.2.A

Πρεσβύτιδος δὲ πενιχρᾶς ἀξιούσης ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κριθῆναι καὶ πολλάκις ἐνοχλούσης,ἔφη μὴ σχολάζειν· ἡ δὲ πρεσβῦτις ἐκκραγοῦσα, "καὶ μὴ βασίλευε," εἶπεν. ὁ δὲ θαυμάσας τὸ ῥηθὲν οὐ μόνον ἐκείνης ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὐθὺς διήκουσεν (*Mor.* 179C-D = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 31).[490]

3.2.B

καί ποτε πρεσβυτέρου γυναίου κόπτοντος αὐτὸν ἐν παρόδῳ τινὶ καὶ δεομένου πολλάκις ἀκουσθῆναι, φήσας μὴ σχολάζειν, ἐγκραγόντος ἐκείνου καὶ "Μὴ βασίλευε" εἰπόντος, δηχθεὶς σφόδρα καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ γενόμενος ἀνέστρεψεν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, καὶ πάντα ποιησάμενος ὕστερα, τοῖς ἐντυχεῖν βουλομένοις, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς πρεσβύτιδος ἐκεί νης, ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἐσχόλασεν (Plut. *Demetr.* 42.3-4).[491]

[489] Bloomer 1992: 12 and Skidmore 1996: 63.

[490] 'When a poor old woman insisted that her case should be heard before him, and often caused him annoyance, he said he had no time to spare, where-upon she burst out, 'Then give up being king.' Philip amazed at her words, proceeded at once to hear not only her case but those of the others.'

[491] 'An old woman once assailed him as he was passing by, and demanded many times that he give her a hearing. 'I have no time,' he said. 'Then don't be king,' screamed the old woman. He was stung to the quick, and after thinking

3.2.C

Ἐκ τῶν Σερήνου. Ἀντιπάτρῳ ἀγροῖκος ἄνθρωπος ἐπεδίδου βιβλίον ἐντυχίαν ἔχον, ὃ δὲ οὐ σχολάζειν ἔφη. "καὶ μὴ βασίλευε" εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος "εἰ μὴ σχολὴν ἄγεις" (Stob. 3.13.48).[492]

3.2.D

ἀμέλει γυναικὸς παριόντος αὐτοῦ ὁδῷ τινι δεομένης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶπεν αὐτῇ ὅτι "οὐ σχολάζω," ἔπειτα ὡς ἐκείνη ἀνακραγοῦσα ἔφη "καὶ μὴ βασίλευε," ἐπεστράφη τε καὶ λόγον αὐτῇ ἔδωκεν (Cass. Dio 69.6.3).[493]

These are four versions of essentially the same anecdote. With the tale's attribution to two kings (possibly), a regent, and an emperor - all of them are clearly centred on the ideology of monarchy as appreciated through its responsibilities.[494] Its core elements and messages certainly concern the responsibilities of power and the accountability and approachability of rulers to their subjects,[495] factors which are manifest in the tale's implicit concern for the virtue *dikaiosune*.

As such, Cassius Dio's (c. 164 – after 229 CE) account of the episode is not really about its significance as a piece of history about an emperor *per se*. Instead, it is given as an example of character, but that characterization is not made exclusive by external ties to more concrete historical circumstances. Indeed, there is no unique or discriminating material within the tale itself which would exclude other attributions.

The structure and central themes of Cassius Dio's tale suggest that they reflect contemporary expectations regarding imperial character, accessibility, duty, and justice. As always, this kind of reflection orientates an anecdote towards the ideology of autocratic power. Plutarch's two versions also reflect this orientation, offering insight into fourth-century BCE Macedonian monarchic values, and (like Cassius Dio) glimpses into more contemporary imperial ideology and expectations. They also illustrate Plutarch's diverse methodologies regarding anecdotes used in his collection and those found in his biographies. The brief version of Stobaeus is again dictated by the agenda of the material's more humble pedagogical aims, but its core element remains the ideology of power.

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upon the matter, went back to his house, and postponing everything else, for several days devoted himself entirely to those who wished an audience of him, beginning with the old woman who had rebuked him.'

[492] 'A rustic man gave to Antipater a petition book he had, and Antipater said he did not have time. 'Then don't be king', said that man, 'If you don't have the time.''

[493] 'At any rate, once, when a woman made a request of him (Hadrian) as he passed by on a journey, he at first said to her, 'I haven't time,' but afterwards, when she cried out, 'Cease, then, being emperor,' he turned about and granted her a hearing.'

[494] Laurence and Paterson have written that - 'if the issue of ascribing a particular dictum to a specific emperor is set on one side, then it soon becomes clear that many dicta cluster round a number of themes, which can illustrate perceptions of the imperial role (1999: 195).'

[495] E.g. 'The Macedonians act as a moderating force against Demetrius (Asirvantham 2000: 160).'

Cassius Dio's version concerns Hadrian who came to the throne in 117 CE, only a couple years or so before the death of Plutarch.[496] Even if one disputes the attribution of the *apophthegmata* collection to Plutarch (with its Philippic version and Trajanic dating), the version from the *Demetrius* was surely already written before Hadrian's accession.[497] Even if one wanted to date Plutarch's *Demetrius* nearer to his own death (under Hadrian), it seems unlikely that Plutarch would reassigned a known contemporary tale about an emperor to a long dead king (a cautionary paradigm no less!).[498] Therefore, it is reasonable to dismiss Hadrian's attribution, though it is still important, as it speaks to the role of the tale in reflecting on contemporary expectations of imperial responsibilities in the second-century CE.

Despite this discrepancy between Plutarch and Cassius Dio, Dio's language is more akin to that found in Stobaeus. This suggests that Dio has drawn upon the same tradition as Stobaeus, who sourced his version from a certain Serenos.[499] However, this would mean accounting for the change in attribution. Even so, ancient audiences understood and accepted to some extent the fluidity of persons and detail in these more character focused tales. Dio certainly uses the anecdote this way, giving it solely as an example of Hadrian's 'biographical character' and his personality as a ruler. It is a facet of contemporary Roman-imperial-monarchic ideology that hovers somewhere between Dio's period and that of Hadrian's, and has little real historical weight.[500] However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Dio genuinely heard it told of Hadrian. This suggests that the story itself, whatever its origins or final designation, had long since made the transition to a stock moralizing tale of monarchic ideology. Its value resting in the exemplar tradition – not the search for history.

Serenos' attribution to Antipater in Stobaeus is more difficult to dismiss. Despite the fact that Antipater never took the title 'king' (rendering "καὶ μὴ βασίλευε" problematic), it may reflect

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[496] Fergus Millar (1967: 9-19) first used this anecdote about Hadrian as evidence that 'the ideology–and practice–of the Empire was that the Emperor was *personally* accessible to his subjects in a way which now seems incredible...' (1967: 9). Later, once aware of parallel versions – Millar stated that 'there persisted long-established conceptions of what a 'king' should be which... help to transform a Roman *princeps* into a descendant of the Hellenistic kings' (1977: 3). One of these conceptions was reflected in this anecdote, which was 'easy and not wholly misleading, to quote' (1977: 3) as evidence for the required and accepted role of the emperors. Millar also argues that we should not reject as 'irrelevant literary affectation' Plutarch's 'display of classical quotations' from which he derives his expectations of a king's conduct (1977: 4). Birley (1997: 172) notes the parallel versions in passing, but concludes on no real evidence that Dio's version 'is likely to be genuine for all that.'

[497] On the sequence of the *Lives* – Nikolaidis 2005: 283-324.

[498] According to the *Historia Augusta*, when Hadrian arrived in Greece during his world tour, he followed the example of Hercules and Philip and had himself initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries (*Eleusinia sacra exemplo Herculis Philippique suscepit - Hadrian* 13.1). This action (and the above anecdote) suggests some kind of link or relationship between the two rulers. What it could have been cannot be easily guessed.

[499] He might be identified as the Athenian grammarian Aelios Serenos (Fuhrmann 1998: 44 n.4). There is also the outside chance (as Stobaeus seems to use wholly Greek sources), that the reference may be to Serenus Sammonicus (? - 212 CE; *RE* 6). This man addressed his antiquarian work *Res reconditae* (which could have contained Greek tales – possibly in Greek) to Septimius Severus (and possibly Caracalla), making his work contemporaneous with Dio himself – who could have taken his version from this work for reworking in his own history.

[500] On Dio's 'Biographical History' and the early Principate – Pelling 1997: 117-144. He notes that Dio is fairly anecdotal, but to some effect, 'grouping his stories to illustrate important themes' (1997: 124). Here, it is Hadrian's character that is being illustrated. However, Pelling also argues that Dio's 'biographical analysis' does not penetrate very deep psychologically (1997: 135).

a tradition that seems to acknowledge Antipater's desire to be a king (Plut. *Mor.* 180E; Curt. 10.10.14).[501] Antipater, like Demetrius (another possible attribution), was involved in the upheavals that followed Alexander's death. As such, it is easy to understand why stories showing Philip upholding Macedonian kingly qualities (if chronology is right to imply Philip's original attribution), could easily have become valuable weapons in the propaganda wars that followed Alexander's death. Connections to Philip and Alexander were certainly invaluable in this period of turmoil. Why stop there when association is easily superseded by appropriation. Therefore, the version of Serenos and that of the *Demetrius* could reflect competing traditions of adoption and misinformation. Even so, if there was such a dispute, at its centre is the embracing of Philip's tale and its associated qualities. The paradigm of Philip functioning in a judicial role as king was so powerful its wholesale appropriation was an attractive possibility for those trying to claim Macedonia's throne or legitimize themselves before Macedon's citizens.

Plutarch's version in the *Demetrius* is problematic if Plutarch is also supposed to have been the author of the version in the *apophthegmata* collection. However, some have argued that Philip is clearly the antecedent for the anecdote and not Demetrius.[502] This seems the best reading of the text of the *Demetrius*. As a result, there are two versions of the anecdote concerning Philip – both (possibly) from the same author. There are certainly close similarities in language and sequence (especially up until the apophthegm itself), despite Plutarch's obvious working up of the *Demetrius* version for insertion into a biography.[503] This 'biography' version comes in a chapter dedicated to Demetrius' defective behaviour as king of Macedonia. This behaviour is directly contrasted with that of the more just Philip before him by the Macedonians themselves through the use of this anecdote which adds weight to the preceding comments. The anecdote then gives way to an excursus on justice, which ends with a very Plutarchian remark on injustice (*Demetr.* 42.6). This foreshadows events to come, and completes the contrast with Philip. It is typical Plutarch – structured, meaningful, and entertaining.

This entire section of Plutarch is heavy with monarchic ideology – particularly in relation to being *dikaios* (showing *dikaiosune*) and self-controlled (showing *enkrateia*) in the face of abuse. Plutarch uses these virtues to distinguish between the two monarchs in the hope that this will guide his audience's ultimate reaction to the behaviour of Demetrius as a king – aligning their response with his principles. However, this 'coercive structure' with its alignment of ethics is not just about making correct judgements on the past, but building values and ideologies for the present and future. Plutarch speaks to a contemporary audience regarding expectations placed on current leaders and their deputies – by themselves and others. To educate the present, Plutarch embeds in his

[501] On Antipater – Heckel 2006: 35-38.
[502] Adams 1986: 48; cf. *HM* 2: 394 n. 2.
[503] Cf. Stadter 2008: 58-64; and Beck 1999: 175-186 on Plutarch's methods.

curriculum the tales and values of great individuals and statesmen from the past like Philip as models.[504] This education was a broader appealing example of monarchic ideology – itself constantly evolving and always unique in a sense to a time, to a place, to a culture, and to an author.

These two versions of the anecdote also offer insight into Plutarch's methodology in terms of preparing *apophthegmata* for his biographies. The unembellished *apophthegma* of the *apophthegmata* collection certainly gives the impression of having been worked up for the *Demetrius*. As a result, there are discernible differences aside from the more complex contextual setting of the *Life* version. For example, the details about the woman and the language used to describe her actions are different. Hence, Πρεσβύτιδος δὲ πενιχρᾶς has become the milder description πρεσβυτέρου γυναίου; and πολλάκις ἐνοχλούσης has become the more reasonable δεομένου πολλάκις ἀκουσθῆναι. However, most of the modification occurs after the woman's pointed *apophthegma* (καὶ μὴ βασίλευε - unsurprisingly stable in all versions). Moreover, the unadorned details of the *apophthegmata* collection give way to the more complex sequence of events and details of the *Demetrius*.

The differences are not great, but they are there – and they do have their effect. The main differences are the softening of the woman's actions and the introduction of a more reflective Philip whose actions are further fleshed out (cf. Isoc. *Ad Dem.* 34). This could also suggest Philip's possession of that other cardinal virtue *phronesis* – practical wisdom. But it is more likely done for greater effect in contrasting the spectre of Philip, and the disturbing figure of Demetrius. Additionally, the more austere version dedicated to Trajan in the *apophthegmata* collection conforms well to the aims of that work. The ultimate focus there was on the conveyance of the moral(s) or lessons ingrained in the tale, not on any sophisticated acts of contrasting or characterization. Monarchic ideology worked best when operating on a simple level – even when addressed to the highest of individuals. Therefore, the messages of individual tales like Philip's were left concise and clear for the emperor Trajan - and any others who cared to utilize such a large collection.

Despite any differences, there are common 'Plutarchian' ideas or ideals behind both Philippic versions (many discussed in chap. four). There are ideas around the approachability of rulers to petitioners (cf. Plut. *Polit. Parang.* 31 = *Mor.* 823A-D). There is the lack of anger (ὀργή) by Philip at the woman's rebuke, instead Philip is tolerant and controls what would have been a natural reaction to the criticism or free speech (*parrhesia*). Thus, his λόγος overcomes πάθος. Moreover, this emotional restraint and calmness (his πραότης) allows Philip to use his practical reason to accept the woman's comment, and dedicate himself fully to the needs of his subjects – especially as regards δίκη (justice). These actions are highly suggestive of the virtues

[504] Stadter 2015: 215-30.

enkrateia/*sophronsune* and *phronesis*. Even so, it was above all the active concern with justice for his subjects (*dikaiosune*) which separated kingship from tyranny – not only for Plutarch, but for most political intellectuals.[505] When united with φιλανθρωπία, this concern for justice also gave people the most confidence in their ruler, and was a leader's greatest protection in Plutarch's eyes. The presence of all these themes almost guaranteed Plutarch's interest in selecting this tale of Philip's for his purposes. It was rich in the values Plutarch wished contemplated and practiced in his own time, as well as associated with his own persona by his auditors.[506]

Despite the broad parameters of monarchic ideology, if the tale is truly linked to Philip (whether historical or not), there could be some subtle disparity between how Plutarch uses and wishes this anecdote to be received and interpreted, and any original ideas it was meant to reflect and disseminate in its original Macedonian context.[507] Therefore, the themes of the *Demetrius* version seem initially focused on the king's royal duties, accessibility, and free speech or petition (*isegoria*/*parrhesia*) before the king by his subjects. All of these would have been of particular concern for a Macedonian audience. However, by following the tale in the *Demetrius* with an excursus on justice, Plutarch shifts the focus away from these contextually relevant Macedonian themes towards justice in a more practical and wider cultural sense. Plutarch's reasons for doing so accord well with his values and philosophical beliefs, as well as the agenda of his work. Plutarch's monarchic ideology is formulated to appeal to a broader audience which was far removed culturally from fourth-century BCE Macedonia. Philip's tale, which accorded with ancient values of his period,[508] is manipulated by Plutarch to align more with contemporary values regarding its ideas and themes so as to be most effective. Macedonia's *isegoria* is still prominent – but it is subsumed by Plutarch's 'Justice'.

The minimal version of the *apophthegmata* collection, which is devoid of any real context or Plutarchian commentary, is more open to interpretation. This was deliberate too. Greater scope for interpretation had the potential for facilitating greater assimilation of the tale's core elements by almost anyone. Therefore, with Roman emperors also expected to be accessible to their subjects (e.g. Suet. *Aug.* 53.2; cf. *Vesp.* 23.2), and praised for it (Plin. *Pan.* 23.3, 24.3, 48.1), the anecdote was well placed to cross the temporal and cultural divide between Macedonian and Roman concerns regarding the duties of rulers, their approachability, and their services to justice.[509] The structure in which these primary elements were set certainly needed to maximise any coalescence with

[505] Cf. Erington 1990: 220.
[506] Beck 1998: 61.
[507] As two of our other possible candidates are also Macedonian, it seems safe to accept an original Macedonian context.
[508] E.g. Xen. *Ages.* 9.1-2; *Cyrop.* 7.5.55; and *Anab.* 4.3.10-13.
[509] Cf. Beck 1998: 15. This approachability to petitioners continued to be emphasised by other Greek authors of the imperial period – e.g. Aristides *Eis Bas.* 9.23-4 and Themistius *Or.* 15.190C (Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 35).

contemporary mores. Nevertheless, the principal values and morals of the tale were perfect in themselves for influencing monarchic ideology in any period. In the end, Plutarch believed Philip's willingness to listen to the woman provided a positive model of leadership that was in itself well worth the attention of his readers.

The next judicial anecdote (again from Plutarch) concerns Philip's appointment of a judge and his subsequent removal for amusing pseudo-rational reasons (**example 3.3**). The virtues in such a tale would seem to revolve around *dikaiosune* and *phronesis*. The anecdote seems to come in only one version, though there might be some affiliation with a similar anecdote in Aelian. Nevertheless, the tale's underlying function is again the blending of past and contemporary interests in the relationship between appearance, character, and a leader's role in true justice. Certainly, the tale offers a slightly different approach to *dikaiosune* with its top down focus on where ultimate responsibility for its expression lies.

3.3.A

Τῶν δὲ Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων τινὰ κατατάξας εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς, εἶτα τὸν πώγωνα βαπτόμενον αἰσθανόμενος καὶ τὴν κεφαλήν, ἀνέστησεν εἰπὼν τὸν ἄπιστον ἐν θριξὶ μὴ νομίζειν ἀξιόπιστον ἐν πράγμασιν (Plut. *Mor.* 178F = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 23).[510]

3.3.B

Ἀνὴρ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἀφίκετο Χῖος, γέρων ἤδη ὤν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἀλαζών, ἠδεῖτοδὲ ἐπὶ τῷ γήρᾳ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὴν τρίχα πολιὰν οὖσαν ἐπειρᾶτο βαφῇ ἀφανίζειν.παρελθὼν οὖν εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοιαύτην ὑποφαίνων τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐκεῖνα εἶπεν ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ ἀφίκετο. ἀναστὰς οὖν ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίωνβασιλεὺς "τί δ' ἄν" ἔφη "οὗτος ὑγιὲς εἴποι, ὃς οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ περιφέρει;" καὶ ἐξέωσε τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεχθέντα, διαβάλλων τοῦ Χίου τὸν τρόπον ἐξ ὧν ἑωρᾶτο (Ael. *V.H.* 7.20).[511]

The moral sentiments in both anecdotes appear to be similar, that the dying of one's hair implied a deceptive or untrustworthy personality.[512] Even so, it is impossible to reconcile the two as they stand (if they are indeed related beyond the idea of appearance reflecting character), or to assign priority. Each is explicitly focused on a different individual (though both are kings – which marks them both as being related to monarchic ideology). One concerns the appointment of a judge,

[510] 'He (Philip) appointed one of Antipater's friends to the position of judge, but later, on learning that the man dyed his beard and hair, he removed him, at the same time remarking that he did not believe that a man who was untrustworthy in the matter of hair was fit to be trusted in actions.'

[511] 'A man from Chios arrived in Sparta. He was elderly, vain in many ways, and ashamed of his age, and for this reason he tried to dye his white hair. He appeared before the Spartans, revealing his head as described, and explained the business for which he had come. Archidamus the Spartan king rose and said: 'How could this man have anything sensible to say when he carries around falsehood not only in his soul but also on his head?' He rejected the proposals with a denunciation of the Chiot's character based on his appearance.' Cf. Stob. 3.12.19 (abridged).

[512] In Plutarch the deceit or denunciation is in relation to the man's actions or deeds (πράγμασιν). In Aelian, it relates to the man's soul (τῇ ψυχη) and his character as a whole (τὸν τρόπον). However, both anecdotes assign the exposition of the condemnation to the king, which is given publically (Plutarch – indirect speech; Aelian – direct speech).

whilst the other relates the hearing of some embassy (both concern unnamed individuals – one is a man of Chios, the other a friend of Antipater). There are also minor differences. For example, Aelian gives the reasons for the Chian's wish to dye his hair (detail wholly lacking in Plutarch). Whereas Plutarch tells us that it was the man's beard (πώγωνα) as well as his hair that was dyed.[513] To avoid too much speculation as to their relationship, it is more profitable to focus on Plutarch's version and what it reveals concerning both Philip, its author, and its message.

The moral is straightforward and reflects a common belief in Plutarch's era that appearance could reflect character (ἦθος).[514] In Plutarch's other works they are often implicitly or explicitly connected.[515] It was Plutarch after all who believed that his concern to reveal character (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα) was similar to that of a portrait painter.[516] Moreover, Plutarch thought appearance could reflect both positive as well as negative attributes such as anger and cruelty.[517] Here the deception inherent in the man's hair is linked explicitly to a deceptive character, particularly as would be manifested in his actions. For Plutarch, using Philip as wise mouthpiece, 'deception'[518] had no part in justice, which was itself of fundamental importance to his conception of the harmonious state. In addition, it also reflects Plutarch's belief that ostentatious, pompous, or pretentious exhibition (often involving over the top clothing or appearance), was something akin to dramatic performance, and suggestive of arrogance or 'a gap between appearance and reality' (Duff 1999: 125-6). Moreover, from just following Plutarch's account it is clear that there was no one 'correct' reading of body parts/quirks etc. These could vary considerably depending on individual interpretations, though it is known that hairstyles certainly could 'reflect the self-image of individuals against the background of prevailing cultural and political views' (Haas, Toppe, and Henz 2005: 298). For the Romans, too much care for the hair could indicate effeminacy – thus external characteristics represented internal moral character (e.g. Cic. *P. red. in sen* 16).[519]

Plutarch presents Philip as prudent ruler (showing *phronesis*) whose direct intervention vividly demonstrates his concern with justice (his *dikaiosune*). Philip is anxious that proper justice is done in his name. The king's representatives are just as accountable as the king himself in matters of justice; they too must be *dikaios*.[520] Justice was a chain at the head of which was the king. It was

[513] For another instance of the linking of hair to moral character in Plutarch – *Lys.* 1.3 (with Stadter 1992b: 42). On physiognomics in the ancient world – Evans 1969; Boys-Stones 2007: 19-124; Rohrbacher 2010: 92-116; and Gladhill 2012: 315-348.
[514] It is particularly prevalent in Suetonius (Rohrbacher 2010: 92-116), who records one instance whereby Vespasian removes one man's commission because he smelt of perfume (*Vesp.* 8.3).
[515] Duff 1999: 164, 166-67; cf. 92-3; Georgiadou 1992: 4617-18.
[516] *Al.* 1.3; cf. *Cat. Min.* 24.1; Duff 1999: 16-17. On a good portrait conveying a subject's character – Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.1-8; Arist. *Poet.* 1450a27-9; Ael. *V.H.* 4.3; and Plin. *N.H.* 35.100.
[517] Duff 1999: 78.
[518] Plutarch calls the man τὸν ἄπιστον.
[519] Cf. Corbeill 1996: 163-5, 169.
[520] The tale could in fact represent a more mundane tradition of political power wrangling at the highest levels of Macedonian political/judicial structures. As such, the man's hair may have merely formed a publicly palatable pretext

he that was responsible for their positions, and ultimately for their *dikaiosune* or their injustices (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.1.8). It is a slight shift in the traditional styling of *dikaiosune*, even within the fluid edifice of monarchic ideology. Nevertheless, it is about accountability at all levels, a concept that had already been well articulated in Isocrates' advice to Nicocles. He advised the young king to manage the state like his ancestral estate, and in its appointments – to act 'splendidly and royally' (λαμπρῶς καὶ βασιλικῶς - Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 19), because;

> 'When you put men in charge of affairs which are not under your personal direction, be governed by the knowledge that you yourself will be held responsible for whatever they do (Isoc. *Ad. Nic.* 27).'

Isocrates also advised Demonicus that –

> 'When you are placed in authority, do not employ any unworthy person in your administration; for people will blame you for any mistakes which he may make (Isoc. *Dem.* 37).'

This advice would seem to secure Philip's actions to the standards of his period. But its inclusion in Plutarch's *apophthegmata* collection also suggests something of Plutarch's own values – and a more contemporary and pointed message for Trajan and those servants of his administration. Pliny certainly made much of Trajan's wise choices in this regard.[521] The moral soon becomes the dominate feature when the tale is regarded this way. Philip's role as 'himself' is superseded – his importance as Philip II of Macedon diminished in importance to the messages of the anecdote. Plutarch utilizes the tale to contribute actively to an aspect of contemporary monarchic ideology which focused its discourse around responsible justice. As such the tale illustrates the divide between merely the appearance of justice (symbolically embodied by the man's hair) and true justice. It allows leaders no escape from their duties by hiding behind the failings of subordinates. Ultimate responsibility for justice lay with those in charge – they were the accountable captains of the ship of state. The recording and dissemination of this tale underscores a complex blending between past tales and existing preoccupations, ideologies and agendas. Philip's positive representation as a king taking on the full weight of justice in the past is again proffered as a model with which to vie in the present.

Example 3.4 (again from Plutarch's collection) highlights the strong connection between actions, which were the manifestations of certain qualities or virtues (wit and humour among them), and monarchic ideology.

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for action that was otherwise problematic. Therefore, contemporary Philippic propaganda may lay behind this tale, as indeed it might be behind any one of a number of extant tales i.e. it could all be the subversion of Philippic political necessity by more agreeable moral paradigmatic symbolism.

[521] E.g. 'There is even greater merit in your choice of procurators, the sort of men whom most of your subjects choose to try their cases in preference to anyone else….' (Plin. *Pan.* 36.5).

3.4.

Γενόμενος δὲ κριτὴς δυοῖν πονηρῶν ἐκέλευσε τὸν μὲν φεύγειν ἐκ Μακεδονίας τὸν δὲ ἕτερον διώκειν (*Mor.* 178A = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 12).[522]

This tale shows that Philip as king had some kind of judicial role (κριτὴς) in what seems to have been a private dispute between two individuals. However, the anecdote's brevity allows for a multiplicity of interpretations and speculations, so it is best to focus on the fact that it highlights one of Plutarch's fundamental themes – true virtue came only through action, which could be political or public. In this tale that action is publicly judicial. Moreover, despite so few details, with the rest of Plutarch's *apophthegmata* of Philip positive in nature, it suggest that this tale is likewise meant to be read as such. Therefore, Philip's decision (seemingly the exile of both fellows) is probably best thought of as being moderate as well as clever.[523] Like Plutarch's earlier judicial anecdotes, any judicial moderation shown by Philip may have had direct contemporary associations with the noted *abstinentia* (restraint), *mansuetudo* (forgiveness), *temperantia* (moderation) and *indulgentia* (mildness) of the emperor Trajan (e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 2.6-7; 21.4). In addition, Philip's actions could be equated with some minor act of clemency which would accord philosophically with Plutarch's own idea of the *basileus dikaios*. A just leader whose actions (and words) always implied some kind of use of the Plutarchian favourites - φιλανθρωπία and πραότης. These virtues were the staples of Plutarch's own monarchic ideology, Plutarch's own principles, and the principles of the principate (in Greek terms) as Trajan and others would have wished it understood. They reveal the ideal monarch or individual – especially as associated with *dikaiosune*.

There are other elements also at work here. With so few details given, the slight rhetorical cleverness of Philip's decision unsurprisingly becomes the focal point of the *apophthegma*. Certainly, the received form of the *apophthegma* only allows it to be read that way (as Plutarch surely intended). Therefore, by sacrificing a more complex structure and context, and focusing almost completely on the *apophthegma* itself, this anecdote has lost much of its paradigmatic value in regards to *dikaiosune*. In its place the tale elevates the wit and humour of Philip almost into an exemplary virtue (see chap. five). As such, this tale offers a less conventional aspect of the ideal monarchic model. Indeed, with this configuration of the tale as some kind of vehicle of light amusement, the entire thing has become more entertaining. Its didactic element is also made less bombastic. However, as will be seen below, this focus on humour does not always diminish the value of tale to the initiated in terms of its contribution or value to monarchic ideology.

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[522] 'Being called upon to decide a suit between two knaves, he (Philip) ordered the one to flee from Macedonia, and the other to pursue him.' Cf. Just. 8.3.

[523] Plutarch had no problem with statesmen who were nobly serving their states using rhetoric as a kind of co-worker (συνεργὸν.... πειθοῦς) (*Praec. Ger.* 801C ff.).

The amusing tone of 3.4 links it to another of Philip's *apophthegma* recorded by Plutarch. This tale (**example 3.5**) again involves Philip forming some kind of judgment between two fellows (brothers in this case). The context of the incident is difficult to establish, though a judicial setting is certainly not out of the question. If it were judicial, like the tale above, it is Philip's wit which upstages the more traditional virtue *dikaiosune*. Either way, the entertainment of the king's rhetoric and witticism usurp the role of more 'serious' virtues. Even so, this tale can still to be regarded as important to Plutarch's ideology in terms of a model leader.

3.5.

Δυοῖν δὲ ἀδελφῶν Ἀμφοτεροῦ καὶ Ἑκατεροῦ, τὸν μὲν Ἑκατερὸν ἔμφρονα καὶ πρακτικὸν ὁρῶν, τὸν δὲ Ἀμφοτερὸν εὐήθη καὶ ἀβέλτερον ἔφη "τὸν μὲν Ἑκατερὸν ἀμφότερον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ Ἀμφοτερὸν οὐδέτερον (Plut. *Mor.* 177F = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 10)."[524]

The two individuals mentioned may be the two historically attested brothers Amphoterus and Craterus – both of whom rose to prominence under Alexander.[525] This may affect views on the tale's historicity for some. However, with so few details and no context, the real focus should be on the sophistic language and amusing tone of the entire tale (mostly playing on the words Ἀμφοτερὸν and Ἑκατερὸν), and Plutarch's reasons for including it. The tale again projects Philip's image as a quick witted man who was not above lowbrow puns or rhetorical word play.[526] It is for this amusing quality that Plutarch uses it in his collection.[527] Moreover, (like 3.4) its inclusion provided the reader with a measured and somewhat droll break from the more serious reflective nature of other material (cf. Valerius' use of such material in his collection).

This amusement though still retains a significant aspect of monarchic ideology. Jokes were still a valid indicator of character for Plutarch and others (*Al.* 1.2; cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 22), and the collecting of such things by him was to be expected. Here, its purpose suggests an underlying message concerning the usefulness of retaining a sense of humour despite all the cares and toils of state. It was something Philip evidently was able to do, as the numerous tales of his wit and humour clearly reveal. A good sense of humour was also seen as an important virtue of the ideal leader, and was a sign of *civilitas* or being *demotikos*. This suggests a definite reason for including such tales as

[524] 'Of two brothers, Both and Each, he (Philip) observed that Each was sensible and practical, and Both was silly and foolish, and he remarked that Each was both and Both was neither!'

[525] Heckel 2006: 23, 95-99. Cf. Ars. 382; and Apost. 12, 72. Fuhrmann seems sceptical of the attribution noting, '*bien le caractère fantaisiste de l' –apophtegme – paraît-il évident* (1998: 260 n. 5).' Amphoterus held several important commands under Alexander – and also handled some delicate missions for him (Arr. 1.25.9-10; 3.6.3; Curt. 4.8.15). Whilst Craterus rose to highest levels becoming one of Alexander's most trusted and powerful marshals.

[526] See also Plut. *Mor.* 177F = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 9. (cf. Dem. *De Cor.* 67; Aul. Gell. *N.A.* 2.27). Their close proximity in the collection suggests a common source in which they were thematically linked by their rhetorical play on words (this could of course be Plutarch's own doing).

[527] This type of humour using puns on names was called *interpretatio nominis* (Cic. *De or.* 2.257; cf. Quin. *Inst. or.* 6.3.55-56). For other examples from Plutarch and Suetonius – Reekmans 1992: 201-203.

this in a work Plutarch would dedicate to the emperor Trajan. They were certainly not liable to be overlooked by an emperor who was noted for his *facilitas* and *hilaritas* (e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 2.6-7; 4.6). Therefore, with this type of amusing tale Plutarch moved away from the more conventional cardinal virtues of monarchic ideology (probably *dikaiosune* here). This approach reflects a more comprehensive, but less overbearing effort to entertain and educate those in power in the moral *paideia* of leadership and autocracy.

The final judicial *apophthegma* of Plutarch's (**example 3.6**) brings us back in a sense to our first example (3.1). It also brings us back to the cardinal virtues of *dikaiosune* and *phronesis*, which seamlessly make the transition from their fourth-century BCE Macedonian context to imperial Rome of the second-century CE.

3.6

> Ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἅρπαλος ὑπὲρ συγγενοῦς καὶ οἰκείου Κράτητος ἀδικημάτων δίκην ἔχοντος ἠξίου τὴν ζημίαν εἰσενεγκεῖν ἀφεθῆναι δὲ τῆς κρίσεως, ἵνα μὴ λοιδορηθῇ, "βέλτιόν ἐστιν," εἶπε, "τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἢ ἡμᾶς διὰ τοῦτον κακῶς ἀκούειν (*Mor.* 179A = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 25)."[528]

The focus of the anecdote concerns Philip's interest in true justice and public image, the latter of course the whole point of Harpalus' shifty proposal. This Harpalus was probably either a brother or cousin of Machaetas.[529] Moreover, his lobbying for Crates to be absolved of the adverse decision by the paying of the fine recalls somewhat the fine/decision dichotomy of Machaetas' case (which precedes it in the text).

It is a well-constructed anecdote, which builds quickly to its concluding apophthegm. This time the apophthegm is Philip's – and its meaning is clear. Crates should suffer the stigma attached to his crime.[530] Any reduction of that shame through Philip's intercession would amount in essence to a reversal of the decision. This would reflect badly upon Harpalus, for lobbying such a proposal on behalf of the man – but more importantly on Philip, for allowing what was essentially a miscarriage of justice. True justice was not only in the punishment of the crime, but also in its recognition. Crates was trying to circumvent his true acceptance of the crime (if this was originally his idea and not Harpalus'). Paying the fine amounted to no *mea culpa*, nor any act of contrition by Crates. These could only come after truly taking responsibility for the crime. Justice and the fine are separate issues, and Philip's apophthegm speaks directly to this distinction. Any monarch who truly

[528] 'When Harpalus, acting in behalf of his kinsman and intimate friend Crates, who was under condemnation for wrongdoing, proposed as a fair solution that Crates should pay the fine, but be absolved from the adverse judgement so that he should not be subject to reproach, Philip said, 'It is better that the man himself, rather than that we because of him, should be ill spoken of.''

[529] Heckel 1992: 213. Fuhrmann (1998: 261 n.5) thinks this Harpalus was the son of Machaetas.

[530] *N.b.* the long tale in Seneca in which Philip goes so far as have a man's crime carved upon the man's brow (*stigma*) (*Ben.* 4.37-38). The tale itself contains some interesting material in relation to Philip's powers regarding gift giving, guest/host relationships, justice and punishment – but falls outside the parameters of this thesis due to its unusual length. Discussion in Molinier 1995: 74-75. Cf. Isoc. *Evag.* 19-20 and Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.7.

possessed the virtue of *dikaiosune* would act as Philip had done. Real justice has no price. Crates' rank, friends, and money have no effect on Philip's judgment. Instead, Philip dispenses justice in a manner that is seen to be fair, transparent, and unsupportive of sly acts of injustice.[531] Here Philip is Plutarch's *dikaios* monarch.

It is not explicitly stated that Philip was the original judge in the case, but either way, any intercession would reflect badly on him.[532] Plutarch was always adamant that the greatest defence a leader had was the confidence of his people, especially in terms of justice. If that relationship or trust were undermined by actions such as were proposed here by Harpalus, then a leader's actions were probably base and possibly dangerous (cf. Isoc. *Ad Dem.* 43). Certainly, it was Philip's failure to attend properly to justice for Pausanias that was thought to have led to his death (Diod. 16.91.2-94.4; Just. 9.7). Isocrates was certainly aware early on of this crucial relationship between justice, which was the key component of virtuous rule, and the interests of the monarch - particularly as related to the longevity of his regime (*Ad Nic.* 8, 15, 21). Plutarch's tale is both a lesson and a warning regarding justice.

The entire matter is also tinged with other monarchic virtues. For example, Philip displays his wisdom with his decision not to allow Crates to do as proposed. But it is not the theoretical *sophia* of a philosopher, instead it is the more practical *phronesis* (*prudentia* or *sapientia*) of the statesman. It is a functional good sense that sees wrong and does right. This wisdom allows Philip to exhibit a strong sense of decency and show great integrity. He is also not afraid to use candour. Interestingly enough, like *iustitia* and *aequitas*, all these virtues are known to have been explicitly praised virtues of Trajan (e.g. *pudor* - Plin. *Pan.* 2.8; *simplicitas* – *Pan.* 4.6; and *integritas* - *Pan.* 92.2).[533] Plutarch is not shooting in the dark. This symmetry of morality and values again reflects the universal nature of the virtues (and vices) associated with monarchic ideology. It also shows that despite the vast expanse of centuries, Plutarch was still able to exploit Philip's tales in such a way as to have Philip play a meaningful and ongoing-dynamic function in the evolving paradigm of the ideal leader – from education to validation. Overall, Philip's positive portrayal in these judicial tales speak to his status as a positive role model in terms of 'justice' for later leaders of antiquity.

[531] Cf. Isoc. *Ad Dem.* 16-17, 29, 37, 39; and *Nic.* 52.
[532] Where did any fine paid by Crates go? If it went to the state, and then ultimately to Philip, the implications of such an arrangement were not good. Philip was to receive payment for what amounted to no conviction being recorded.
[533] Pliny is exceptional though in his wide and unprecedented set of virtues (Roche 2011: Introduction).

Conclusion

These judicial anecdotes reveal much of Philip's role as a monarchic paradigm in the Roman world. They also show something of the characterization of Philip personally performing his judicial responsibilities. Often Philip's character is tied to the moral of the tale or reflects the author's wish to highlight other features present. Hence, Philip's character is an interpretive key to the anecdote, and the author's aims and agenda. For example, Valerius portrayed Philip in negative terms to underscore aspects of free speech. Plutarch presents a different Philip, whose wise concern for justice and exhibition of other various virtues underline much of Plutarch's own ethics. Moreover, most of the judicial anecdotes are found in Plutarch. This suggests that Philip's regular concern with justice contains an implicit barbed and ironical lesson of Plutarch. Almost every reader who read them also knew of Philip's murder. But more importantly, they would have known of Pausanias' reported motivation – Philip's failure to punish Attalus and afford proper justice to Pausanias (Arist. *Pol.* 5.8.10, 1311b2). Philip suffered (fatally) the consequences of this neglect of justice. Plutarch's judicial anecdotes as a whole serve the dual function of explicitly educating and implicitly warning.

The simplicity of all the above tales belie in many cases the complex functions they serve. For example, they reveal something of the role of the Macedonian king, *isegoria* or *parrhesia* within the Macedonian justice system, though they allow for few definitive statements about Macedonia's justice system. They do suggest though that Philip's powers regarding fines and judgments were unregulated by anything other than his own personality. Certainly, Philip's character was a defining quality of just about every judicial anecdote studied here. Even when that character was only as important as the kingly role it fulfilled. Moreover, despite the loss of historical context and other important details, these tales still function well to convey that character. It is this role which brings us back to monarchic ideology.

These anecdotes are entertaining tales of morally charged edification, which are meant to play a purpose in promoting Philip, or at least the virtues inherent in his actions as exemplars of leadership and monarchy. However, these paradigms could move beyond any exclusivity to rulers, and appeal to other broader segments of the population beyond the ruling class using the universality inherent in most virtues. The virtuous ruler is after all only a virtuous man with power.

Philip's judicial anecdotes are good mediums for the characterization of Philip and sources of contemporary views on the virtues and vices of leadership. However, historians must use them in full knowledge of their limitations. Therefore, this investigation has provided no definitive answers in terms of historicity, or even history itself (as foreseen). What it has shown is that there were

various ways to manipulate and interpret Philip's image to suit contextual aims, and contemporary motives and issues – particularly those associated with monarchic ideology in the Roman world. What is most surprising in regards to that image, is the largely positive perception of Philip in matters of justice (apart from one rhetorically minded version of a tale in Valerius Maximus). Therefore, Philip's judicial tales generally advance positive examples of a monarch performing 'justice'.

4
Slandering Philip

Philip II, Criticism and Self-Control in the Roman World

ὧν τὰς δόξας ζηλοῖς, μιμοῦ τὰς πράξεις (Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 38).[534]

ἅπαντας μὲν οὖν χρὴ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας τὸν κράτιστον ὑποστησαμένους πειρᾶσθαι γίγνεσθαι τοιούτους, μάλιστα δὲ σοὶ προσήκει. τὸ γὰρ μὴ δεῖν ἀλλοτρίοις χρῆσθαι παραδείγμασιν, ἀλλ' οἰκεῖον ὑπάρχειν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκὸς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σε παροξύνεσθαι, καὶ φιλονικεῖν ὅπως τῷ προγόνῳ σαυτὸν ὅμοιον παρασκευάσεις; λέγω δ' οὐκ ὡς δυνησόμενον ἁπάσας σε μιμήσασθαι τὰς Ἡρακλέους πράξεις... ἀλλὰ κατά γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος καὶ τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν, ἣν εἶχεν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας... (Isoc. *Ad Phil.* 113).[535]

Part of Philip's continuing popularity and status was his accessibility as a means by which to enlighten or critique imperial behaviour and policy, provide a historic (moral) exemplar, or to underscore Roman culture and achievements.[536] To highlight these roles, this chapter examines those anecdotes, *apophthegmata*, and *exempla* which illustrate how Philip responded to slander, criticism, and free speech (*parrhesia*). Other important themes raised are the roles of reputation, *paideia*, declamation, entertainment, and popular moral edification. However, in the context of the Graeco-Roman world's unending dialogue on how to hold and wield power, this chapter is governed by the more unifying tradition of monarchic ideology, particularly as manifested in the cardinal virtue *sophrosune* (self-control – sometimes expressed as *enkrateia*). Indeed, Philip's attendance at these negotiations is bought on by discussions that surrounded the relationship and interaction between supreme monarch and citizen that occupied so much political discourse under the Roman Empire. The anecdotes are united and made more accessible and comprehensible by their use of Philip as a paradigm of leadership with which to ponder more contemporary concerns. It is this approach which influences the range and presentation of themes.

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[534] 'If there are men whose reputations you envy, imitate their deeds.' Cf. Isoc. *Nic.* 62.

[535] 'Now, while all who are blessed with understanding ought to set before themselves the greatest of men as their models, and strive to become like him, it behoves you (Philip) above all to do so. For since you have no need to follow alien examples but have before you one from your own house, have we not then the right to expect that you will be spurred on by this and inspired by the ambition to make yourself like the ancestor of your race? I do not mean that you will be able to imitate Heracles in all his exploits….but in the qualities of the spirit, in devotion to humanity, and in the good will which he cherished towards the Hellenes.'

[536] Cf. Alexander's role in Spencer (2002: 3).

Sophrosune and Philip's Period

One of the most important virtues of this chapter, and one which is particularly important to monarchic ideology, is another of the cardinal virtues – *sophrosune* (sometimes *enkrateia*).[537] Philip's judicial tales have already shown that this virtue can carry the meanings self-control, restraint, caution, temperance, moderation or continence (hence the use of *temperantia*, *moderatio* and even *continentia* by the Romans to render the idea). Whatever the exact wording, *sophrosune* always carried the idea of 'a tempering of dominant emotions by gentler thought' (Ferguson 1979: 32-33), or 'the harmonious product of intense passion under perfect control' (North 1966: x). Found early in Greek thought,[538] it was early and securely one of the four cardinal virtues.[539]

This moderation or self-control was never thought of as a gift from the gods, but instead recognized as coming from the practitioner themselves to their credit. Moreover, such displays were thought to also benefit the community, which grew ever more harmonious.[540] It had a variety of associated applications. For example, it could stop the mind from being carried away by emotion, passion, lust, and greed (which could denote connotations of modesty or *modestia*); it could enable individuals to stand steadfast in the face of failure or even great success; it could bring individuals, who were once enemies, into friendship.[541] However, it was a virtue that is particularly remarked upon when being breached by men and women, rather than being observed.[542]

Xenophon shows the broad intellectual and moral scope of *sophrosune* just before Philip's period in the fourth century BCE in his frequent and diverse use of the word.[543] Interested in several aspects of the word (including its value to the ruler and the State), Xenophon links the quality to the notion of the ideal ruler in his *Agesilaus* and *Cyropaedia*.[544] In the Agesilaus, *sophrosune* is filtered through the necessities of a military career. It is made up of *enkrateia* (self-control – cf. *Mem.* 4.8.1) and *karteria* (endurance), and is part of a cannon of distinction along with justice, piety, courage, patriotism, wisdom and cordiality.[545] There is also Agesilaus' simplicity, affability, and friendliness

[537] It was related to intellectual and moral qualities such as *aidos, eunomia, metriotes, kosmiotes, hagneia*, and *katharotes*. The antitheses were *aphrosune, hubris, andreia, akolasia, anaisthesia*, and *truphe* (North 1966: x; break-down of the word *sophrosune* itself at 3 n.10). It is the comparative of *metriotes* which Plutarch uses when quoting from Theophrastus on the moderation of Philip in his first Philippic *apophthegma* (*Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 1 = *Mor.* 177C).
[538] E.g. Hom. *Od.* 22.411; 23.30; cf. 4.158-60; 18.125; and *Il.* 21. 462-64.
[539] Aesch. *Sept.* 610; and Pl. *Phd.* 69C; *Leg.* I 631C. Helen North's 1966 study of *sophrosune* remains the definitive treatment to date of this quality from the Heroic period until the period of patristic literature.
[540] Morgan 2007: 146.
[541] Morgan 2007: 145-7.
[542] Noreña 2009: 7.
[543] North 1966: 123-132. On *sophrosune* in the *Hellenica*, *Anabasis*, *Memorabilia,* and *Oikonomikos* – North 1966: 123-129.
[544] North 1966: 129-132.
[545] North 1966: 130.

(contrasted with the pride and aloofness of the Persian king – *Ages.* 8.1-6, 9), which Xenophon summarises as *praotes* (*Ages.* 10.1). Already in this thesis, Philip has had some association with this quality, which is constantly found in association with *sophrosune* and *enkrateia*,[546] and this chapter shows yet more instances.

In the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon devotes some time to the instilling of virtue through the education of the ruling class in his idealised Persian state. One of the virtues to be gained is *sophrosune* (1.2.8-9; cf. *Const Lac.* 2-4). However, later in the treatise, Cyrus and Tigranes discuss whether it was possible to acquire *sophrosune* (3.1), and make some interesting points along the way, such as that all other qualities like courage, power, wealth, and strength are useless without *sophrosune* (3.1.16). Throughout the *Cyropaedia* there are many recognisable connotations of *sophrosune* such as moderation, prudence, restraint, control of appetite, and even chastity.[547] However, like the *Agesilaus*, it is the military aspects of *sophrosune* which are conspicuous like orderliness, knowledge of strategy, obedience, and discipline.[548]

In that other important author for monarchic ideology in the fourth century BCE, Isocrates, *sophrosune* not only referred to individual morality, but expanded as a political virtue (e.g. signifying a restraint in international relations).[549] In his *Nicocles, Nicocles or the Cyprians*, and *Evagoras*, the portrayal of the ideal ruler includes the virtue *sophrosune* as a moral quality which encompasses self-control and being able to resist the temptations of power and pleasure (e.g. Isoc. *Nic.* 36ff.).[550] Isocrates also paired it with *dikaiosune* as the most important of the virtues for their benefits to mankind (*Nic.* 29-30, 43). Moreover, the base could have no part in either virtue, for 'justice and temperance are the possessions of the good and noble alone', and are the virtues, 'which are the truest and the most abiding and deserve the greatest praise' (Isoc. *Nic.* 43). Indeed, Isocrates praises king Theseus for his other virtues and his prudence (ἄλλην ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην), but particularly in the way he governed Athens (μάλιστ' ἐν οἷς τὴν πόλιν διῴκησεν) (*Helen* 31). Certainly, Isocrates believed that the king is meant to be an exemplar of this quality for his people.[551]

> ...ἀλλὰ τὴν σαυτοῦ σωφροσύνην παράδειγμα τοῖς ἄλλοις καθίστη, γιγνώσκων ὅτι τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἦθος ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν - Isoc. *Nic.* 31.[552]

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[546] Cf. North 1966: 130
[547] E.g. 1.2.8-9; 1.5.9; 3.1.16-17; 6.1.46-47; 7.3.12; 7.5.75-76; 8.1.30, 36-37.
[548] E.g. 3.3.58; 5.3.43; 5.4.44; 11.10. North 1966: 132.
[549] North 1966: 143. On *sophrosune* in Isocrates – North 1966: 142-149.
[550] North 1966: 145. It is interesting that it was Theopompus (Isocrates' student) who castigated Philip most for his lack of *sophrosune* (Frags. 27, 224, 225, 236).
[551] Cf. Nic. 37; and Cic. *Ep. ad Fam.* 1.9.12 – '*quales in republica principes essent, tales reliquos solere esse cives.*'
[552] '…let your own self-control stand as an example to the rest, realizing that the manners of the whole state are copied from its rulers.' Elsewhere, Evagoras was meant to have instilled in his people the virtues of gentleness and moderation (πραότητα καὶ μετριότητα- *Evag.* 49; cf. 75, 76), which are both related to *sophrosune* (North 1966: 147).

Furthermore, like *dikaiosune*, *sophrosune* was also to be tested, but only when in power (τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις - *Nic.* 43).[553] Therefore, as a king and statesmen, Philip was apparently in the best position to have his *sophrosune* or self-control tested.

Plato had a more philosophical contribution to the virtue *sophrosune*. His ideas influencing the development of *sophrosune* not only in the fourth century BCE, but for centuries to come.[554] However, it is the thirty-first *Socratic Letter* (apparently written by Plato to Philip II during the reign of his brother Perdiccas) which is of most relevance.[555] Primarily about the harmony between the two brothers, Plato offers Philip advice on how to keep things from becoming discordant between the two men. Therefore, towards the end of the letter, Plato directs Philip to outdo the actions which his brother has performed on behalf of the State, but also the benefactions (εὐεργεσίας) that he has rendered him personally (16-20). But most of all, Plato advises Philip that he 'must esteem above all the attainment of temperance in yourself and heed your brother who acts towards you as he now does' – Περὶ πλείστου δὲ δεῖ σε ποιεῖσθαι σώφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ κατήκοον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, ὄντος περὶ σὲ οἵός περ νῦν ἐστιν (20-23). Here is a direct appeal to Philip by Plato in regard to attaining *sophrosune*. With the letter's authenticity disputed, the influence of such an appeal is unknowable. Even so, Philip's actions in many tales and sayings accord well with this appeal from the great philosopher.

Sophrosune was therefore an important virtue in Philip's period – particularly for leaders. This did not change as the centuries passed and Rome rose to power. As already stated, the virtue s*ophrosune* was understood in Rome under many guises (e.g. *temperantia*, *moderatio* and *continentia*).[556] Its enduring presence and relevance in monarchic ideology meant that it remained a powerful apparatus with which to not only understand many of the tales and sayings of Philip, but with which to reflect on contemporary values and leaders. It is no accident that it is a dominant feature in many of the tales and sayings of Philip which Plutarch dedicated to the emperor Trajan (see below), and also features heavily in Pliny's *Panegyricus* to the same man.[557]

[553] Cf. Plato *Laws* 649-50.
[554] Space permits only that the reader to be directed to the work of North (1966: 150-196) on this particular aspect. However, references to other more recent work on Plato have been noted where relevant.
[555] For the text and a discussion of this letter – Natoli 2004: 161-174.
[556] On these values in Rome – North 1966: 258ff.
[557] E.g. 2.7, 3.2, 3.4, 4.3, 9.1, 10.3, 16.3, 17.4, 38.4, 51.1, 54.5, 55.5, 56.3, 60.5, 63.8, and 83.7-8 on the moderation of Trajan's wife.

Criticism and Self-Control

The first anecdote (**example 4.1**) demonstrates the role of certain virtues in these thematically similar tales and the impressive versatility of Philippic *apophthegmata*. This tale appears in two (possibly three) very different contexts. Plutarch achieves this accomplishment by engineering each version to better suit his immediate purposes and needs through the use of surrounding contextual material and/or the slight manipulation of details. This allows the anecdote to speak to a variety of meanings, and 'to diverse and seemingly incompatible audiences' (Patterson 1992: 4710) centuries after the events it claims to recall.

4.1.A

᾽Αγανακτούντων δὲ τῶν φίλων, ὅτι συρίττουσιν αὐτὸν ἐν ᾽Ολυμπίοις εὖ πεπονθότες οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, "τί οὖν," εἶπεν, "ἐὰν κακῶς πάθωσι (*Mor.* 179A-B = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 26);"[558]

In the last judicial anecdote (3.6) Philip expressed his concern as to how he and Harpalus would be viewed if he granted Harpalus' dubious request. This sentiment is attached specifically to justice in an internal Macedonian context. The example above (which immediately follows that of Harpalus' request in Plutarch's text) again takes up the issue of reputation - but this time it is attached to a more external context. The concern here is Philip's ability to endure insults. It is a test of Philip's pride, self-restraint, and moderation. In many ways it is an examination of the king's *sophrosune* and *enkrateia* on a pan-Hellenic stage. Its pronouncement, in keeping with its setting, is also far more universally appealing. Even so, there is some ambiguity in the wording of the witticism. It highlights Philip's self-control, wit and the ungrateful behaviour of the Greeks – but it also implies the possibility of a threat. It suggests that self-control just might have its limits for a king who faced an increasingly belligerent Greece under Athenian guidance.

This particular *apophthegma* also comes with two other Philippic variants and another version which concerns Pausanias.[559]

4.1.B

ἐν ᾽Ολυμπίοις δὲ βλασφημίας περὶ αὐτοῦ γενομένης καί τινων λεγόντων ὡς οἰμῶξαι προσήκει τοὺς ῞Ελληνας ὅτι εὖ πάσχοντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου κακῶς αὐτὸν λέγουσι, "τί οὖν," ἔφη, "ποιήσουσιν, ἄν κακῶς πάσχωσιν (*Mor.* 457F = *De Cohib.* 9);"[560]

[558] 'When his (Philip's) friends were indignant because the people of the Peloponnesus hissed him at the Olympic games, although they had been treated well, he said, 'Well, what if they should be treated ill!''

[559] Cf. Stob. 4.23.52 (abridged). There are similarities to one of Alexander's aphorisms in Plutarch's collection – Πυθόμενος δὲ ὑπό τινος λοιδορεῖσθαι, "βασιλικόν," ἔφη, "ἐστὶν εὖ ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν" (Plut. *Mor.* 181F). Cf. Plut. *Al.* 41; Diog. Laert. vi.3; Epict. *Disc*. iv.6; M. Aur. *Med.* vii. 36; and Dio Chrys. *Or.* xlvii.

4.1.C

τότ' οὖν δεῖ μάλιστα τὴν νοῦν ἔχουσαν ἀποκλείειν τὰ ὦτα καὶ φυλάττεσθαι τὸν ψιθυρισμόν, ἵνα μὴ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ γένηται, καὶ πρόχειρον ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ **Φ**ιλίππου. λέγεται γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων παροξυνόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὡς εὖ πάσχοντας καὶ κακῶς αὐτὸν λέγοντας εἰπεῖν "τί οὖν, ἄν καὶ κακῶς ποιῶμεν αὐτούς;" ὅταν οὖν αἱ διαβάλλουσαι λέγωσιν ὅτι "λυπεῖ σε φιλοῦσαν ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ σωφρονοῦσαν," "τί οὖν, ἄν καὶ μισεῖν αὐτὸν ἄρξωμαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν; (*Mor.* 143F = *Conjug*. 40)."[561]

4.1.D

Τῶν δὲ φυγάδων αὐτὸν προτρεπομένων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἄγειν τὴν στρατιὰν λεγόντων τε ὅτι τοῖς Ὀλυμπίοις ἀνακηρυττομένου αὐτοῦ ἐσύριττον αὐτὸν μόνοι,"τί οὖν οἴεσθε," ἔφη, "τοὺς ὅτε εὖ ἔπασχον συρίττοντας παθόντας κακῶς ποιήσειν (*Mor.* 230D = *Apoph. Lac. Paus.* 2);"[562]

This disputed attribution makes it impossible to assign ownership. Chronologically speaking, Pausanias comes first, but Philip has more versions attributed to him. Both could have genuine historical claims to the *apophthegma* as it stands, so there is the possibility of two historically similar events or mistaken attribution.[563] Therefore, whilst noting any differences between these tales, it is best to focus on Philip's versions and what they reveal.

Certainly there are enough differences between the Philippic version of the *Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum* and its Pausanian counterpart, to understand *Plutarch's* use of these similar tales in the same collection.[564] However, one of the more important differences is that in Philip's

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[560] 'So in Olympia when Philip was being defamed, and some persons said that the Greeks should smart for it since they spoke evil of Philip though they were being well treated by him, Philip said, 'What will they do, then, if they are badly treated?''

[561] 'So, at such a time especially, a woman who has sense ought to stop her ears, and be on her guard against whispered insinuations, so that fire may not be added to fire, and she ought to have ready in mind the saying of Philip. For it is told that when he was being incited by his friends against the Greeks on the ground that they were being well treated, but were speaking ill of him, he said, 'What would happen then, if we were to treat them ill?' So when these back-biters say, 'Your husband treats grievously his loving and virtuous wife.' 'Yes, what would happen, then, if I were to begin to hate him and wrong him?''

[562] 'When the exiles were inciting him (Pausanias) to lead his army against the Athenians, and saying that, when his name was proclaimed at Olympia, they were the only people who hissed him, he said, 'What do you think that those who hissed when they were being well treated will do if they are treated ill?''

[563] Philip's version is datable to the Olympics of mid 336BCE, which puts Philip in Macedonia just before his assassination sometime after early July (on this date – Ellis 1976: 222 n. 53). However, there is the intriguing possibility that ἐν Ὀλυμπίοις is actually meant to refer to the Macedonian Olympia which was possibly celebrated at Aegae in October (Hatzopoulos 1982:38-42). If so, the anecdote could date to around the time of Philip's death. The use of Peloponnesians in the version of the *apophthegmata* collection would be a logical mistake from an incorrect assumption as to the setting of the hissing.

[564] There are the obvious differences in protagonists and antagonists (Philip's version = οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι; Pausanias' version = τοὺς Ἀθηναίους). It was exiles whom tried to incite Pausanias to action (Τῶν δὲ φυγάδων αὐτὸν προτρεπομένων), whereas in Philip's version it is his friends (τῶν φίλων), and they were only indignant (Ἀγανακτούντων) – not actively seeking to provoke. Moreover, the insults that provoke these actions appear a little different. In Philip's version it is the hissing of him at the Olympics, whereas it is reported to Pausanias that his name was hissed at by the Athenians when it was proclaimed at the Olympics. The latter implies that Pausanias was not present to hear the hissing himself, though his presence cannot be ruled out. The exiles might be restating for their own purposes what Pausanias had already heard for himself. There is also no other evidence to suggest that Philip was ever in attendance at an Olympic games in person (cf. Romano 1990: 67), and can only speculate like Fuhrmann (1998: 45

version he is being hissed at by those who have been treated well (εὖ πεπονθότες). This particular information is in the tale's narration. It is not left to the direct speech of Philip's apothegm, which gives it an air of truth. Whereas Pausanias makes this contention himself in his apothegm (τοὺς ὅτε εὖ ἔπασχον συρίττοντας). This raises the possibility that their sound treatment was only *his* opinion. It also elongates what is the far simpler apothegm of Philip's version. This reduces its wit and diminishes the effectiveness of the double edged humour.

Plutarch's interest in either version of the anecdote was undoubtedly related to the idea of a statesman's immunity to criticism – his self-control. It is this invulnerability to public scorn that is unmistakable in both versions, despite the darker undercurrents. It reflects thinking which held the statesman or monarch who showed himself impervious to (public) insults to be an imposing model of *sophrosune* or *enkrateia*. Philip's humour is a defence mechanism which clearly reminds people of where power truly lies, but it is the pointed joke of a powerful man who seeks due respect. The tale is a lesson in two aspects of self-control – that lost by the crowed, and that shown by Philip while still managing to voice its possible limits.

One of our variant Philippic versions is embedded in Plutarch's Γαμικὰ Παραγγέλματα (*Marital Advice*), a work that 'consists of a collection of similes or comparisons, each with a lesson, with only modest amount of connected argument' (Russell 1973: 90).[565] It is one of three references to Philip in the work (141B; 143F; 144E) which was dedicated to a Pollianus and Eurydice (the latter a known Macedonian regal name and possibly the name of Philip's last wife).[566] Borrowing from the stoics and others, this work of Plutarch's has an intimate focus on the marital relationship,[567] its advice reflecting 'traditional, popular and pragmatic marital concerns' (Patterson 1992: 4714).[568] Despite its modest scope, it covers the three areas of marital interaction essential to marriage as defined by the Stoics – property, body and soul. The most important of these for Plutarch being 'harmony and *homonoia* (likemindedness) of soul, the third and highest form of marital *koinonia*' (Patterson 1992: 4715, 4719-21).

Plutarch's concern is to emphasize the importance of practical marital harmony. This is the context of Plutarch's use of Philip's *apophthegma*. It is squarely aimed at the promotion of personal and practical harmony between wife and husband, but particularly as comes from *sophrosune* or

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n.1) that the hissing was '*soit aux attelages qu'il y faisait courir sous ses couleurs, soit à des hérauts se livrant à certaines proclamations de sa part'*. It is also possible that it was a direct reaction to the construction of the Philippeion, which was either completed or nearing completion at this time (mid 336 BCE) (Schultz 2007: 209-210). On this building commissioned after Chaeronea (Paus. 5.17.4; 5.20.9-10) – Schultz 2007: 205-33; Miller 1973: 189-218; Townsend 2003: 93-101; *HM* 2: 691-695; and Worthington 2008: 164-166. On Philip and the Olympics – Romano 1990: 61-79.

[565] On this work – Ziegler 1951: 791-2; Aguilar 1990-1: 307-25; Montano 1991: 331-38; Patterson 1992: 4709-23; Pomeroy 1999; and Tsouvala 2014: 191-206.

[566] Carney 2000: 74. On the two dedicatees – Puech 1992: 4849 and 4873.

[567] Patterson 1992: 4710.

[568] On Plutarch and the Stoics – Opsomer 2014: 88-103.

enkrateia. Therefore, combined with a proverb,[569] and presented somewhat as an analogy, Plutarch distils the larger context of Philip's *apophthegma* (i.e. gone is the Olympic setting to the insults) to its universal elements and sentiment for use by the new wife in her more personal situation. This would have her disregarding the whispered insinuations (τὸν ψιθυρισμόν) of slanderers (αἱ διαβάλλουσαι),[570] with her own *apophthegma* which reiterates the sentiment (and the language) of Philip's famous dismissal of the slanders of the Greeks.[571] It is powerful advice aimed at promoting essential harmonies and reducing marital disagreements and jealousies (αἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας διαφοραὶ καὶ ζηλοτυπίαι). Plutarch has taken a traditional idea surrounding marriage, and through illustrative analogy given it 'a sharper and somehow more compelling expression' (Patterson 1992: 4723). He has distilled the *sophrosune*, *enkrateia*, and humour of Philip so as to appeal to the interests of a more immediate audience. Therefore, despite the focus of monarchic ideology, concerned as it was with promoting the ideal ruler or castigating the despotic tyrant, the (evolving) constituent virtues that were its essential feature had wider properties and application which Plutarch exploited here. The sentiment and values were transferable from context to context. It is about the virtues of kings, not virtues for kings.

The second variant is embedded in Plutarch's dialogue περὶ ἀοργησίας (*On lack of Anger*).[572] In this dialogue the main speaker Fundanus treats the theme in both a particular and general fashion, finishing with an account of his own cure. The *apophthegma* is found amongst a grouping of like anecdotes collected by Fundanus (Plutarch) which demonstrate the conquest of anger.[573] Apparently Fundanus (Plutarch) always strove (ἀεὶ πειρῶμαι) to collect and peruse (συνάγειν... ἀναγινώσκειν), not only the sayings of philosophers, but even more those of kings and tyrants (βασιλέων καὶ τυράννων) which demonstrate this conquest (*Mor.* 457D-E), for;

> to erect in the soul a trophy of victory over anger.... is proof of a great and victorious strength (μεγάλης...καὶ νικητικῆς ἰσχύος) which possesses against the passions (τὰ πάθη) the weapons of its judgements...(*Mor.* 457D).

Plutarch was always directly interested in the control of emotions through *logos*. Here that emotion is anger, which Plutarch thought to be particularly dangerous and destructive (e.g. *Mor.* 481B-C) – and especially in leaders. Plutarch has selected this *apophthegma* of Philip's as an

[569] Well reduced with Plutarch's use of - ἵνα μὴ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ γένηται(so that fire may not be added to fire), a proverb found in Plato (*Laws* 666A), and used elsewhere by Plutarch to introduce another Philippic anecdote (*Mor.* 123F).
[570] Philip's friends (φίλων) and the Greeks (τοῦς Ἕλληνας) are both cast somewhat in the role of διαβάλλουσαι. This reflects the idea that Philip's friends are just as culpable as the Greeks, their reporting of slander could in turn be slander (fire on fire, two wrongs etc.).
[571] The use of 'Greeks' agrees also with *Mor.* 457F, whereas *Mor.* 179A-B only mentions Peloponnesians.
[572] On the *De. Cohib. Ira* – Ingenkamp 1971: 14-26; Becchi 1990; Van der Stockt 1999: 517-26; van Hoof 2007: 59-86. On anger in the ancient world – Harris 2002, Braund and Most (eds.) 2003, and Konstan 2008: 243-254.
[573] On thematic clustering of anecdotes in Plutarch (often around ethical concepts) – Beck 1998: 175ff.

example of emotional control (or more specifically an example of the absence of the emotion). Though not mentioned specifically, it is again a sign of that ideal monarchic virtue of self-control (*sophrosune* or *enkrateia*) which had widespread appeal and application. It follows another Philippic tale (*Mor.* 457E-F; example 4.10), and is one among many similar themed tales.

Compared to our other Plutarchian versions, the story and details have remained relatively stable. The setting is once more Olympia (ἐν Ολυμπίοις). This wider more publically orientated context for the defamations (βλασφημίας) of the Greeks (τοὺς Ἕλληνας), unlike that of the more intimate contextual impression of the Γαμικὰ Παραγγέλματα, gives Philip's comment greater standing on an argumentative level. Concern for reputation and self-pride, or the anger they could rouse when insulted, are humbled by Philip's *logos* despite the more embarrassing public setting of the abuse. This *logos* manifests itself in Philip's self-control (his *sophrosune*), which is implicit in his actions.[574] Philip's kingly restraint or moderation in the face of provocation is given as a virtue from which to learn. It is one of a number of powerful examples in Plutarch's philosophical treatise which demonstrated that if the pride and anger of powerful kings could be overcome by self-control, then more humble persons surely faced an even easier task. Nevertheless, the overall message of the treatise with its elite and famous examples worked at any level of the social and political scale.

This version also has unspecified persons (τινων λεγότων) actively seeking to incite Philip to punish the Greeks (ὡς οἰμῶξαι προσήκει), as his friends do in the Γαμικὰ Παραγγέλματα (i.e. παροξυνόμενος). This is a little different from the merely indignant friends (Ἀγανακτούντων... φίλων) of the Philippic version of the *apophthegmata* collection. However, the dedicatee of this collection (Trajan) could be a factor here. Any assimilation of the tale's message (devoid of the contextual argument of a philosophical treatise), demanded the greater universality that comes with less specific detail. Certainly on occasions an emperor was expected to act in accordance with the good advice of friends – thus displaying his approach to ruling with *civilitas*. The more generalized the detail, the greater the chance of analogy or correlation between Philip's actions and any Trajanic associations, aspirations or expectations (e.g. Cass. Dio. 68.6). The transference and assimilation of (good) monarchic ideology worked when rulers saw and judged themselves through the prism created by the displayed and lauded virtues of other rulers, and the prevailing traditions and expectations of contemporary standards. This was an ideal in the mind of philosophers such as Plutarch. One of the keys to this was the simplicity of the form and content of the message. Complicated or unnecessary details posed a danger to this process. This suggests that

[574] *N.b. aidos* also caused one to avoid what was disgraceful in public, whereas *sophrosune* and *enkrateia* could also do this in private (Prodicus, Frag. 10; North 1966: 92-93, 131 n. 23).

Plutarch has prudently mitigated this possibility with a subtle simplification of detail allowing greater chance of identification and assimilation.

This anecdote demonstrates the versatility of Philippic *apophthegmata* and their inherent virtues. Moreover, these nuanced treatments of the tale all show Philip caring little for the provocation of public criticisms and slanders to his reputation. Philip avoids vengeful outbursts of anger despite the personal agitation of those around him – though his wit cleverly warns of a more considered reckoning. This *apophthegma* of Philip (true or not) speaks to an astute, practical, moderate, and reasonable leader who was far from a soft-touch – Plutarch's favourite kind. Such leaders and tales were easily utilized for his moralistic purposes, and made flexible examples capable of functioning as models of monarchic ideology, or as moralistic parables of popular edification in the Roman world.

Self-Control in an Anecdote Cycle

There are other Philippic *apophthegma* which concern Philip's public reputation and various aspects of self-control. They too offer insight into ideal kingly qualities, monarchic ideology, and the public and political functions these tales have in the conception of cultural, social and monarchic identity. One such instance introduces a grouping of five anecdotes in Plutarch's *apophthegmata* collection with similar themes (*Mor.* 177C-F = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 4-8). This speaks to deliberate authorial arrangement, as the first and final anecdotes of the sequence act as bookends to the sequence (the concluding anecdote's post Chaeronea setting echoes the setting of the first).

The first anecdote (**example 4.2**), has a vague historical setting of 'after his victory over the Greeks'. This probably refers to just after the battle of Chaeronea, a time which has left a mass of tales concerning Philip (see chap. six). It shows Philip being advised, no doubt by his closest and most influential companions, as to what to do in terms of the Greek cities.[575]

4.2.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ νικήσαντι τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτῷ συνεβούλευον ἔνιοι φρουραῖς τὰς πόλεις κατέχειν, ἔφη μᾶλλον πολὺν χρόνον ἐθέλειν χρηστὸς ἢ δεσπότης ὀλίγον καλεῖσθαι (*Mor.* 177C-D = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 4).[576]

[575] The S. P. *Gnom. Vatic.*, 105, Sternbach has Alexander give this response in almost identical terms (Fuhrmann 1998: 259 n.6). There was a strong expectation in Greek thinking that a king should conspicuously seek the advice of his closest advisors on most matters, but by virtue of his position he was free to go against such advice at his own risk (cf. Luraghi 2013: 14). On the portrayal of the *philoi* of kings as advisors – Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 334-354 (though focused on the Hellenistic period, there is a lot of material relevant to earlier periods).

[576] 'After his (Philip's) victory over the Greeks, when some were advising him to hold the Greek cities in subjection by means of garrisons, he said that he preferred to be called a good man for a long time rather than a master for a short time.'

Their advice, though seemingly prudent or even wise (though not really true political *phronesis*), would have been incredibly unpopular in Greece. Philip knew this well. There was certainly a general reluctance to garrison the main southern Greek cities until long after his death.[577] Philip's apophthegm to this effect, couched in the familiar rhetorical juxtaposition of χρηστὸς and δεσπότης, speaks more to Philip's political shrewdness and even caution or restraint in this instance (his *sophrosune*), than to any superficial ideas about ego and public perception. Philip shows the true *phronesis* of this tale. Philip is to be viewed as a benevolent and moderate victor. Couched in Philip's familiar wit – the tale offers up a powerful model of moderation in victory and success for Plutarch's auditors be they emperor, governor, or general.

Plutarch's interest in this *apophthegma* is to be expected in light of his strong aversion to tyrants (chap. two). Philip deliberately chooses to be called a good man (χρηστός), and notes the longevity of such a reputation. It is this concern for a long term positive reputation which is indicative of the argument used to convince rulers of the necessity of ruling well, namely that it was fundamentally in their own interests.[578] Virtuous rule was seen to guarantee affection, eternal glory, fame, and a respectable posthumous reputation.[579] Vicious or dissolute rule meant eternal-historical damnation, or worse – obscurity. This was particularly important to rulers, especially those raised on the paradigmatic tales of past monarch's like Philip. It facilitated an introspective questioning by which rulers were obliged to confront the very real volatility of what was to be their legacy when they too joined the pantheon of rulers about whom such tales were told.[580] Pliny well highlights this aspect on several occasions.[581] It was an aspect of monarchic ideology which must have had a powerful influence on later rulers.

Unsurprisingly for a Plutarchan tale, the response of Philip to his advisors is also a wonderful display of both πρᾳότης and φιλανθρωπία. Indeed, the apophthegm's moderation and pragmatism appear to be textbook peripatetic, and Plutarch would have appreciated both features. Coincidently, it was also these two qualities of πρᾳότης and φιλανθρωπία which Isocrates highlighted in his address to Philip in opposition to harshness. Philip was to strive for a reputation based on these qualities rather than cruelty.

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[577] For strategic reasons Philip did of course garrison Thebes, Corinth and parts of Ambracia after Chaeronea (Thebes = Diod. 16.87.3; Paus. 4.27.9-10, 9.1.8, 9.6.5, 9.37.8; Just. 9.4.6-10, 11.3.8; Arr. An. 1.7.1; Ambracia = Diod.17.3.3' Corinth = Plut. *Arat.* 23). On Philip's settlement after Chaeronea – Roebuck 1948: 73-92; *HM* 2: 606-613; and Worthington 2008: 154-157.
[578] Noreña 2009: 10.
[579] Cf. Isoc. *Evag.* 70, 71, 73-4; *Ad. Nic.* 32, 36, 37; *Ad. Phil.* 134; Xen. *Cyrop.* 11.7; *Ages.* 9.7.
[580] Noreña 2009: 10.
[581] E.g. *Pan.* 53.5, 53.6, 55.9-10, and 63.1.

Καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς, εἰ διὰ παντός σε τοῦ λόγου πειρῶμαι προτρέπειν ἐπί τε τὰς εὐεργεσίας τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πραότητα καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν· ὁρῶ γὰρ τὰς μὲν χαλεπότητας λυπηρὰς οὔσας καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι, τὰς δὲ πραότητας οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἁπάντων εὐδοκιμούσας... ὧν ἐνθυμούμενον ἐθίζειν σαυτὸν χρή, καὶ μελετᾶν ὅπως ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν τοιαύτην ἅπαντες περὶ σοῦ τὴν γνώμην ἕξουσιν (5.116).[582]

Philip's actions in Plutarch's tale represents the fulfilment of ideal kingly behaviour as understood in the fourth-century BCE. They were also in line with future values and aspirations when it came to later even more powerful autocratic leaders under the Roman Empire – allowing Philip's words to take on an exemplary role far beyond that ever imagined at their utterance.

Philip's tale is part of Plutarch's philosophic counsel. It sought to induce leaders and individuals to do what was right – to inspire greater wisdom and mildness, and evoke prudence and goodness (χρηστότης). Philip's advisors, who were probably not philosophers, would have had him almost certainly doing the opposite. Only Philip's political nous and care for his reputation prevent such a mistaken policy. Plutarch could not openly praise Philip's concern for his public image though, as leaders were not supposed to be swayed by criticism, praise, or even personal gain. These were supposed to be of little consequence to those who did the right thing. However, there is no overt statement that it was ego outright that motivated Philip's decision, only an honest desire to avoid despotic behaviour and enjoy the reputation of having done so.[583] For Plutarch, kings and emperors (even the everyday person) needed good advisors and good friends - preferably philosophers like himself.[584] But on occasion a leader needed to be guided by their own sense of right and wrong. It was essentially the *phronesis*, *sophrosune* and *enkrateia* of the ideal ruler which should guide such decisions. Philip's tale was of relevance to any good leader. However, Plutarch's collection aimed at the emperor himself, where it could do the most good.

Focusing on the last anecdote of this thematic sequence in Plutarch for a moment (**Example 4.3**), it too shows Philip's forgiveness, moderation, and wit.

4.3

Τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων, ὅσοι περὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἑάλωσαν, ἀφεθέντων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δίχα λύτρων, τὰ δὲ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα προσαπαιτούντων καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἐγκαλούντων,

[582] 'And do not be surprised if throughout my speech I am trying to incline you to a policy of kindness to the Hellenes and of gentleness and humanity. For harshness is, I observe, grievous both to those who exercise it and to those upon whom it falls, while gentleness, whether in man or in the other animals, bears a good name… Bearing ever in mind these truths, you should habitually act and strive to the end that all men shall cherish even more than they do now such an opinion of your character.'

[583] Cf. the other tale in Plutarch's collection which again highlights Philip's concern for reputation in regard to the Athenians – 'Those who counselled him to treat the Athenians harshly he said were silly in urging a man who did everything and underwent everything for the sake of repute to throw away his chance to exhibit it (Plut. *Mor.* 178A = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 11).'

[584] Roskam 2002: 175-189.

> γελάσας ὁ **Φ**ίλιππος εἶπεν, "οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑμῖν Ἀθηναῖοι νομίζειν ἐν ἀστραγάλοις ὑφ' ἡμῶν νενικῆσθαι''(Plut. *Mor.* 177E-F = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 8).[585]

Philip's benevolence after Chaeronea has here a more specific target. It is the Athenians who have been introduced in the preceding tale (linked strongly to this one).[586] The anecdote begins with Philip setting free the Athenians after the battle without ransom.[587] However, this act of respect and forgiveness, overflowing with πρᾳότης and φιλανθρωπία (even *sophrosune*),[588] meets with further requests. Philip's reply is given as a witty *apophthegma* to his men and not to the Athenians themselves (though probably within their earshot). It makes it clear that Philip's virtues, his πρᾳότης and φιλανθρωπία, introduced at the beginning of this sequence, might again just have their limits (the same undercurrent of threat was met earlier in the abusive Olympic anecdote). Indeed, Philip's quip underscores just how generous and forgiving his actions currently were. Greek warfare had long accustomed itself to severe or harsh treatments for the defeated. Nevertheless, Philip was willing to be restrained and moderate under the circumstances – he was now master of Greece after all. But loyal Macedonians and friends had paid for that privilege, and Philip was in no mood to quibble with the vanquished. Philip's humour was black and sharp. His joke was a stark reminder and a warning to the Athenians.

Ultimately it was the lack of grateful acknowledgement by the Athenians of Philip's relatively benevolent actions which called forth his cutting wit. This suggest that leaders and rulers may have had something of a fixed obligation to display the virtues of ideal monarchs, but equally important was the obligation of those who benefited from these displays to graciously acknowledge them. This was a key factor in monarchic ideology later in the Hellenistic period and under the Principate, where it could be taken to sycophantic extremes. Even so, it was incumbent upon those who expected and profited by such virtuous displays to recognize and salute the modest and deferential use of power that came with such actions. It was a complex system that provided incentive and positive reinforcement to monarchs – while defining the limits of virtuous power. Philip's example here was a potent exemplar for an emperor like Trajan (a *civilis princeps*), praised for his *abstinentia* (restraint), *mansuetudo* (forgiveness), *temperantia* (moderation) and *indulgentia* (mildness or kindness) (e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 2.6-7; 21.4).

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[585] 'When all the Athenians who had been taken captive at Chaeronea were set free by him without ransom, but asked for the return of their clothing and bedding besides, and complained against the Macedonians, Philip laughed and said to his men, 'Does it not seem to you that the Athenians think they have been beaten by us in a game of knuckle-bones?''

[586] On Philip and Athens – Cawkwell 1980: 100-110; and Perlman 1973.

[587] Cf. Polyb. 5.10; Diod. 16.87 and chap. six.

[588] Under the stress of constant warfare in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, the scope of the meaning of *sophrosune* was extended (by authors like Isocrates) to include restraint and moderation in international relations (North 1966: 122).

The next anecdote (**example 4.4**) precedes the anecdote above in the collection. It introduces the Athenians to this series and makes a perfect preamble to example 4.3.

4.4

> Τοῖς δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δημαγωγοῖς ἔφη χάριν ἔχειν, ὅτι λοιδοροῦντες αὐτὸν βελτίονα ποιοῦσι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ ἤθει· "πειρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἅμα καὶ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ψευδομένους ἐλέγχειν (Plut. *Mor.* 177E = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 7)."[589]

Philip's actions after Chaeronea somewhat confirm this righteous declaration. Certainly, the anecdote concerns Philip's reputation and character (τῷ ἤθει), and what he considers to be counterproductive disparagement. There are three important points here. Firstly, Philip was probably referring to his most bitter and vocal opponents like Demosthenes when he speaks of τοῖς δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δημαγωγοῖς.[590] Secondly, the full force of Philip's wit and personality are once more vehicles of display. In fact, the entire *apophthegma* is a wonder stroke of verbal jousting. Philip essentially thanks his enemies for maligning him. This was surely more frustrating to them than any overt hostile invective could ever have been. Philip claimed that it was they who were in fact making him better in speech and character (τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ ἤθει) as he set about proving them to be liars (ψευδομένους).[591] It is mischievous, antagonistic – and typical of the anecdotal Philip. It could also be inspirational depending on your point of view (a reoccurring theme throughout Philip's *apophthegmata* for obvious reasons). Philip's remark insults, and it challenges. It also defends Philip powerfully with its idealistic moral high road. Moreover, it undermines any further efforts to denigrate Philip by reducing criticism to fuel for still greater actions. Ironically, the anecdote is a sophisticated dig at Philip's detractors, and a witty comment worthy of the Pynx from an 'autocratic barbarian'. Thirdly, Philip's final comment regarding his words and his deeds has Homeric tones. Indeed, these two things are often found together in Homer to represent the two most important functions or measures of an individual (e.g. *Il.* 9.440-43).[592]

They were common measures in Greek thought and historiography, and often rulers could be criticized for doing one and neglecting the other. However, the real barb in this *apophthegma* is no doubt the τοῖς ἔργοις. Philip is specifically calling his detractors out on their deeds – or lack thereof; calling attention to their inability to back their utterances with real action. Philip deftly

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[589] 'He (Philip) said that he felt very grateful to the popular leaders of the Athenians, because by maligning him they made him better both in speech and in character, 'For I try both by my words and by my deeds to prove that they are the liars.'' Cf. Antonios *Mel.*, II.69, p. 1165; Ars. 469.

[590] There were many others about whom Isocrates (*Ad Phil.* 73, 78-80) tells Philip not to worry, as they were jealous of him and worried only about their own interests (which included conflict with Philip). In a letter to Philip, Isocrates goes further and pleads with Philip to ignore those who reported back to him the slanders circulating in Athens about him and to be nice to Athens (*Ep.* 2.14-15, 20-21).

[591] The connecting of τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ ἤθειwould have appealed to Plutarch who strongly believed that one was a good measure of the other.

[592] On Philip and Odysseus – example 4.11 and chap. six.

shows that while their verbalizing of him has called forth his own *matching* verbal banter (in one sense his τοῖς λόγοις), his mention of deeds is a direct challenge to his opponents for theirs. When Philip states that deeds are one of the means by which he will prove them to be liars, he is implicitly admitting that deeds could be in fact used against him, if his detractors had the courage to act. Philip believes they do not have the nerve, and seems to taunt them so. This is Philip's implicit criticism here. It is an incisive sneer at men of words from one who believes himself to be something more – a hero of old, a man of *words and deeds*. Plutarch's interest in this anecdote was to be expected. He no doubt also saw true ἀρετη in the statesman as the product of both virtuous words and deeds, and settled on this anecdote as a fairly simple medium to convey that obvious message. Philip emerges once more as a positive paradigm of kingly behaviour with which any ruler could meditate his own leadership.

The last two anecdotes of this series (**examples 4.5 and 4.6**) might be different accounts of the same story. However, there are some significant differences which would seem to argue against this identification. The first tale is simple and very similar to another story given elsewhere by Plutarch about Pyrrhus (**example 4.7**).[593]

4.5

Τὸν δὲ λοίδορον ἐξελάσαι τῶν φίλων κελευόντων, οὐκ ἔφη ποιήσειν, ἵνα μὴ περιιὼν ἐν πλείοσι κακῶς λέγῃ (Plut. *Mor.* 177D = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.*5).[594]

4.7

ἐν δὲ Ἀμβρακίᾳ κακολόγον τινὰ καὶ βλάσφημον ἄνθρωπον οἰομένων δεῖν μεταστῆσαι τὸν Πύρρον "Αὐτοῦ μένων," ἔφη, "μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἐν ὀλίγοις ἢ περιϊὼν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους κακῶς λεγέτω (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8.5)."[595]

The similarities between these two stories are obvious. However, the version concerning Philip has fewer details (e.g. ἐν δὲ Ἀμβρακίᾳ) and less verbal/literary embellishment. Moreover, it has the universal anonymous figure, which allowed for greater identification with the figure and the anecdote's moral. This is to be expected given the respective contexts of each tale.[596] There are also a range of possibilities that could account for the apparent relationship between the two tales, such

[593] Cf. Antonios *Mel.* 11. 69, p.1165.

[594] 'When his (Philip's) friends advised him to banish from his court a man who maligned him, he said he would not, so that the man should not go about speaking ill of him among more people.'

[595] 'And in Ambracia there was a fellow who denounced and reviled him, and people thought that Pyrrhus ought to banish him. 'Let him remain here,' he said, 'and speak ill of us among a few, rather than carry his slanders round to all mankind.'

[596] The version found in the *Pyrrhus* is part of a sequence of anecdotes which serve to show Pyrrhus' kindness and mild temper (ἐπιεικὴς καὶ πρᾷος ὀργήν), which would play no small role in his eventual claim on the Macedonian throne (cf. πράως...φιλανθρώπως - Plut. *Pyrrh.* 11.4). However, this sequence divorces the anecdote from any datable historical circumstances except possibly during time spent in Ambracia.

as imitation or mistaken identity in transmission. However, it is more profitable here to look closer at Philip's version and the tale found along-side it in Plutarch.

This example shows Philip's friends (τῶν φίλων) exhorting him to banish an unnamed individual who had maligned him (Τὸν... λοίδορον).[597] Philip's clever quip then follows, highlighting both the simple overall structure of the *apophthegma*, and Philip's concern regarding evils spoken about him among more people (πλείοσι κακῶς λέγη). But this comment is a superficial reference to Philip's egotistical self-interest and reputation. The tale is really about the fact that Philip ignores those closest to him and makes a more practical, moderate, and forgiving gesture towards the man which undermines his slanders. Philip displays both *phronesis*, *sophrosune/enkrateia* – though probably thought of better in terms of the more Plutarchian favoured virtues of *praotes* and *philanthropia*. Moreover, Philip's actions accord well with the common notion that a leader or monarch should consult and take advice from friends and intellectuals, even if he chooses to go his own course (cf. Isoc. *Evag.* 41, 44; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31). It was the tyrant's role to be suspicious of everybody (particularly friends), and to see advice as a dangerous form of free-speech (*parrhesia*).[598] Philip listens – but goes one better.

This *apophthegma* once more makes known Plutarch's strong desire that leaders be moved to emotion (*pathos*) neither by criticism nor praise. The core of this tale demonstrates this well with its implicit focus on the moderation, self-restraint, calmness and forgiveness of Philip. Philip is again a model leader, ruler and man. His witty reply is the simple illustration of the ideal virtues of a temperate king. This tale of moderation, and the many others like it (especially in Plutarch), show that after Philip's death, his image as a restrained king was a somewhat legitimate tradition. Furthermore, it was one which travelled down through the centuries as an iconic element and measure in monarchic ideology for later men of power and influence – finding some voice in Plutarch's period under an emperor noted for these same virtues.

Attaching some cynicism to the tale, Philip exemplifies the old adage of keeping one's enemies close – especially as the ultimate fate of the individual mentioned is unknown (it could have been bleak).[599] This was not really the point though, as there was rarely any follow up to the anecdote's lesson. However, given its undeniable positive impression, this brief *apophthegma* could be the first part or phase of a much longer more complete anecdote, whereby Philip reaches some kind of reconciliation with his detractor. There are certainly two or three possible candidates. The first is set alongside it in the *apophthegmata* collection of Plutarch (**example 4.6**).

[597] The use of κελευόντων would seem to imply stronger language than merely *advised*.
[598] Haake 2013B: 184.
[599] Irony may also be present if Philip's ultimate fate was recalled. In fact, there is nothing here to preclude the unnamed individual actually being Pausanias (though accounting for this shift into anonymity would be challenging).

4.6

Σμικύθου δὲ Νικάνορα διαβάλλοντος ὡς ἀεὶ κακῶς λέγοντα τὸν Φίλιππον καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων οἰομένων δεῖν μεταπέμπεσθαι καὶ κολάζειν, "ἀλλὰ μήν," ἔφη, "Νικάνωρ οὐ φαυλότατος ἐστι Μακεδόνων· ἐπισκεπτέον οὖν, μή τι γίνεται παρ' ἡμᾶς." ὡς οὖν ἔγνω τὸν Νικάνορα θλιβόμενον ἰσχυρῶς ὑπὸ πενίας ἠμεληµένον δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, προσέταξε δωρεάν τινα αὐτῷ δοθῆναι. πάλιν οὖν τοῦ Σμικύθου λέγοντος ὅτι θαυμαστὰ περὶ αὐτοῦπρὸς ἅπαντας ἐγκώμια λέγων ὁ Νικάνωρ διατελεῖ, "ὁρᾶτε οὖν," εἶπεν, "ὅτι παρ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς ἐστι καὶ τὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν (*Mor.* 177D-E = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 6)."[600]

With a more complex (and dramatic)[601] structure of alternating phases of indirect and direct speech, Philip is again informed by a certain Smicythus (apparently maliciously – διαβάλλοντος), of the constant slurs (ἀεὶ κακῶς λέγοντα) of another man named Nicanor.[602] What was implicit in earlier anecdotes regarding the informant activities of Philip's companions is made explicit in the censure here of Smicythus. Philip's companions (referred to this time as ἑταίρων) again have very definite opinions on what should be done. However, again Philip disregards their collective counsel, and replies with his calculated jibe (Νικάνωρ οὐ φαυλότατος ἐστι Μακεδόνων). This comment was most likely intended as a direct jab at, or censure of the bearer of the news itself – Smicythus (cf. Xen. *Ages.* 11.4, 5). Moreover, the clear moderation, kindness and generosity with which Philip treats Nicanor in the end (again reflecting those Plutarchian favourites of πραότης and φιλανθρωπία), was perhaps further subtle chastisement for what amounted to slander and intrigue by Smicythus. The audience rightly expects some kind of *pathos* and punishment from Philip, but with Plutarch's collection dominated by positive examples, instead they read of *logos* manifested in inquire, moderation, kindness and wit. Therefore, Philip discovers for himself what is wrong (cf. Isoc. *Evag.* 42), and accepts his responsibility for Nicanor's slanders. These were apparently due to his neglect or ignorance of the man's financial plight (θλιβόμενον ἰσχυρῶς ὑπὸ πενίας). It is a problem Philip remedies with a gift (προσέταξε δωρεάν τινα αὐτῷ δοθῆναι), though the more cynical might say bribe (cf. Isoc. *To Dem.* 25 and 28).[603] This overt and quantifiable generosity (signs of εὐεργεσία or ἐλευθεριότης - see chap. five), which the Romans would have easily

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[600] 'When Smicythus remarked maliciously of Nicanor that he was always speaking ill of Philip, and Philip's companions thought that he ought to send for Nicanor and punish him, Philip said, 'But really Nicanor is not the worst of the Macedonians. We must investigate therefore whether something is not happening for which we are responsible.' When he learned therefore that Nicanor was hard pressed by poverty, and had been neglected by him, he directed that a present be given to the man. So when again Smicythus said that Nicanor was continually sounding the praises of Philip to everybody in a surprising way, Philip said, 'You all see that we ourselves are responsible for the good and the ill that is said of us.''

[601] Cf. Beck 1998: 57.

[602] Fuhrmann (1998: 41 n.1) notes that both men are unknown under Philip, though many bore the name Nicanor in the entourage of Alexander. He also thinks that he could be the slanderer of the preceding anecdote. Cf. Sugars 1997: 365 n.1.

[603] *N.b.* Cleobulus of Lindus' statement that 'we should do a favour to a friend to bind him closer to us and to an enemy in order to make a friend of him' (Diog. Laert. 1.91).

understood as *liberalitas* or *indulgentia*, causes the man to sing Philip's praises to everyone (ἅπαντας).[604] The reversal is miraculous (θαυμαστὰ). The slanderer has now become the panegyrist. This is the acknowledgement of Philip's (monarchic) virtues which was conspicuously lacking above by the Athenians after Chaeronea.

Philip's apophthegm concludes the anecdote by summarising and underscoring the meaning of the tale regarding restraint and the responsibility of rulers or people for what is ultimately said of them. This ties in suitably with earlier anecdotes whereby Philip linked his actions to the opinions held of him. Philip holds the position in multiple *apophthegmata* that it is ones' actions for which one is to be ultimately judged, not the slanders or words of others. This abuse or vilification should be risen above using moderation, generosity and even humour where possible. This was at least a vital part of Philip's personality and image as it was perceived in antiquity through these types of tales, and of some use to philosophers like Plutarch and statesmen like Trajan – who 'paid little attention to slanders and was no slave to anger' (Cass. Dio. 68.6; cf. Plin. *Pan.* 46.8).

Ultimately, this tale has a variety of aspects worth consideration. There is the role of the *hetairoi* or advisors of Philip, particularly Philip's relationship with them and their opinions (counsel). This highlights the disparity between friends and flatterers (on which Plutarch also wrote). It also emphasises the role and censure of Smicythus – surely coloured by Rome's experience of the dreaded *delatores* in Plutarch's presentation.[605] There was also Philip's actions or display of Plutarch's two cardinal virtues (both born of Philip's *sophrosune*), πραότης and φιλανθρωπία, which manifested themselves his restraint, kindness and practical wisdom in his approach to both the slanders and the news of the Nicanor's plight. Therefore, this anecdote reflects Plutarch's philosophy and his favourite virtues (and others like *sophrosune*, *phronesis*, and *euergesia*), and was a moralistic-monarchic tale which was easily understood by a Roman (Imperial) audience. Indeed, this particular tale exemplifies how virtues and values relevant to all individuals could easily cross cultural, temporal, and terminological divides, and be reflected upon through the examples of famous monarchs and leaders. That deliberation was also possible at the highest and lowest levels of society, as the messages of these tales were unrestricted in their application. Plutarch speaks to an emperor using a king's example – but he could be heard by anyone.

Looking past the moral agenda/s of Plutarch's anecdote, perhaps the actions of Smicythus and the *hetairoi* cannot be judged too harshly. The danger that slurs could lead swiftly to intrigues and violence in the Macedonian court was very real according to other anecdotal evidence. This is underscored by another possible version or extension to example 4.5. It is found in two versions

[604] On euergetism and Plutarch – Roskam 2014: 516-28. There is also the contrast here between the private grumblings of an individual in the beginning, and the very public praises of the convert in the end.
[605] *N.b.* Trajan and the *delatores* – Plin. *Pan.* 34.3-35.3.

(**examples 4.8 and 4.9**), in two entirely different contexts and languages. Even so, the moral messages are again similar.[606]

4.8.A

Philippus, cum audisset Pythian quendam bonum pugnatorem alienatum sibi, quod tres filias inops vix aleret nec a rege adiuvaretur, monentibus quibusdam, uti eum caveret,'quid? si,' inquit, 'partem aegram corporis haberem, absciderem potius quam curarem?' deinde familiariter secreto elicitum Pythian, accepta difficultate necessitatium domesticarum, pecunia instruxit ac meliorem fidelioremque habuit, quam habuerat antequam offenderet (Frontin. *Strat.* 4.7.37).[607]

4.8.B

Εἰ δὲ τὴν πραότητα ταύτην τριβωνίῳ μέν φησί τις προσήκειν ἁλουργίδι δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι καταριθμήσω καὶ τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους τῶν βασιλέων παραπλησίους Σωκράτει γεγενημένους. Φιλίππῳ τῷ Ἀμύντου κατεῖπέ τις ὀτουδὴ τῶν ταξιαρχῶν ὡς ἀπεχθῶς διακειμένου καὶ ῥαδίως κακόν τι βουλεύσαντος, εἰ μὴ τάχιστα ἐκποδὼν γένοιτο. τί οὖν ὁ Φίλιππος; οὐκ εὐθὺς ἦξεν ἐπὶ τὸν σίδηρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' ἡμᾶς, φησί, τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ἀπεχθείας· ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὁ φαυλότατος τῶν Μακεδόνων. καὶ τά τε ἄλλα ἐπιμελεῖται εὐθὺς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ προῖκα ἐπιδίδωσι δεομένῳ θυγατρὸς ὡραίας. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἦν πιστότερος τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν πάλαι κεκριμένων ἐπιτηδείων. Ὡς εὐεργεσίη κακοεργίης μέγ' ἀμείνων. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον οὕτω τινὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀπάνθρωπον φῦναι ὥστε παρ' οὗ τὰ ἔσχατα πείσεσθαι προσεδόκησε, τούτῳ χρηστῷ καὶ προσνείμαντί τι τιμῆς οὐκ εὐθὺς εὔνουν γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁ τὴν τιμωρίαν διαφυγὼν ὅσῳ δικαιότερον ὤφλε, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὑπόχρεως γίνεται τῷ συγχωρήσαντι (Them. *Or.* vii. 95 B-C).[608]

The first version is found in the *Strategemata* written under Domitian by the Roman author Frontinus (c. 30 – 103/4 CE).[609] It is the second mention of Philip in Book four (cf. 4.5.12), and is a little unusual for its tenuous relationship to the surrounding martial material.[610] It only has

[606] The tale of course could be its own entirely separate anecdote. Nevertheless, the warning to Philip to be on his guard is explicit in both, though the source of such a warning is a little vague (*monentibus quibusdam* and κατεῖπέ τις).

[607] 'Philip, having heard that a certain Pythias, an excellent warrior, had become estranged from him because he was too poor to support his three daughters, and was not assisted by the king, and having been warned by certain persons to be on his guard against the man, replied: 'What! If part of my body was diseased, should I cut it off, rather than give it treatment?' Then, quietly drawing Pythias aside for a confidential talk, and learning the seriousness of his domestic embarrassments, he supplied him with funds, and found in him a better and more devoted adherent than before the estrangement.'

[608] 'But if someone says that this compassion is becoming for a [philosopher's] cloak, but not for a purple robe, yet I shall give you a list of the most glorious of kings who were very similar to Socrates. Somebody informed Philip, son of Amyntas, that one of his taxiarchs bore him a grudge and might be ready to hatch a plot against him if he were not gotten out of the way at once. So what did Philip do? He did not immediately reach for his sword but said, 'The cause of his enmity lies with us, too, for the man is not the least of the Macedonians.' And he is right away solicitous of the fellow in other matters, and provides his lovely daughter's dowry, without his asking for it. Afterwards, none of those who were considered his oldest and closest friends were more loyal to the king. 'That fair dealing is better by far than evil dealing.' There could not easily be a member of the human race so inhuman that, when he had expected to receive the ultimate punishment from someone, but that person was kind and accorded him some respect, he would not immediately be well-disposed to him; in fact, the more justly the one who escapes justice was convicted, the more indebted he becomes to the one who forgave him' (trans. Sugars).

[609] On Frontinus and his work – chap. six.

[610] The authenticity of this book has not been above question on stylistic grounds, content, and the repetition of anecdotes from earlier books. However, modern opinion leans towards accepting it as genuine since Bendz 1938 (cf. Duff 1960: 339-41; Campbell 1987: 15 n. 10; and Turner 2007: 427-9, 431 n. 27, 432).

incidental relevance to military matters because of Pythias' skill as a warrior (*bonum pugnatorem*), a description which serves to heighten the possible danger Philip faced from the man, and the importance of keeping such a man onside. Nonetheless, Frontinus has made use of the tale – and it is important to know why.

The programmatic statements of the work's introduction are important here. They detail the aims of Frontinus (himself an experienced commander)[611] to produce a work full of convenient and inspirational sketches of the clever operations of generals which would be of practical value to others (*Str.* 1. *Pr.*). These can be supplemented by the introductory comments to the maxims of book four.

> *...hoc exhibebo ea, quae parum apte discriptioni priorum ad speciem alligate subici videbantur et erant exempla potius strategicon quam strategemata* (Frontin. *Str.* 4. *Pr.*).[612]

Frontinus then gives seven categories for this material, which concern mostly moral qualities and strength of character. All of these were considered important attributes of a commander by the Romans. Therefore, in contrast to the previous books' fairly even ratio of foreigners to Romans, many of the examples in book four are about Romans.[613] Philip's tale (recorded under the seventh heading – *De variis consiliis*) is one of the exceptions, and more so for its relatively non-military context.

The tale is closely linked thematically to the preceding Roman example,[614] which details how Quintus Maximus generously treats a potential deserter, thereby making him extremely loyal (*Str.* 4.7.36). The parallels with Philip's tale are evident. So much so, this tale almost provides the opening that Philip's anecdote needs to make it into the collection. This suggests their having been already collected together in a source of Frontinus.

There are some important differences between this version and that already discussed. Here the man is named Pythias, a man too poor to support his three daughters. He was estranged from Philip because of Philip's lack of assistance to him (*nec a rege adiuvaretur*). This is reminiscent of Philip's neglect in the earlier version, and probably speaks on some level to the customary reciprocal relationship between king and *hetairoi*. This often saw financial assistance given in exchange for ongoing political support and loyalty (any ideas around patronage certainly spoke also to a core value of Roman society). Here also, the mere poverty of one version is given a more personable human aspect. Moreover, Philip's initial reply is quite different with its rhetorical question in regards to diseased body parts. Different too are Philip's actions in discovering the

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[611] Tac. *Agr.* 17.2; Gambash 2016: 264-65; cf. Dahm 1997.
[612] '....in the present book I shall set forth those instances which seemed to fall less naturally under the former classification (which was limited to special types), and which are illustrations rather of military science in general than of stratagems.'
[613] Campbell 1987: 15.
[614] Cf. other tales of moderation and kind treatment of enemies in book four (4.7.3, 4, 5, 7, and 25).

man's problem – which he does personally and discreetly. Macedonian pride and machismo could lie at the heart of this particular discretion of Philip's.[615] But the most important difference is the lack of any final comment (witty or otherwise) by Philip after he has addressed the man's financial needs. The anecdote instead finishes with an observation regarding the man's devotion, apparently much improved on even pre-estrangement levels. This is an important omission (if it is that), as it gives Philip's rhetorical response to the initial warnings he receives added weight and interest. It has reorientated the focus of the anecdote to this phase of the tale.

So what is it about these warnings, Philip's response, and Philip's overall actions which appealed to Frontinus? Firstly, the anecdote conforms well to the needs of the work as outlined in his programmatic statements. Secondly, Frontinus (like most Romans) believed that aside from the more obvious virtues like *virtus*, the qualities and skills required of a successful military commander were quite numerous.[616] Philip's tale is indicative of this stance. Despite not really being martial in context, it easily functions in a purely military context as a practical and moral guide to the character of a commander in regards to forgiveness, moderation and generosity within his own ranks. This simple message was applicable to any and all Roman generals and leaders. It even applied to the emperor himself – the highest of Roman commanders. Therefore, with the reader's focus orientated to the central phases of the tale, reflection is concentrated on Philip's actions as a king faced with discontent and possible danger, and done so in terms of more familiar Roman virtues such as *clementia*, *moderatio*, *prudentia*, and particularly *liberalitas*. One could even appreciate Philip's actions in terms of *patienta*, *indulgentia*, *abstinentia*, and *comitas*. The interpretations were numerous. But the overall message was clear enough, and able to be grasped by anyone from legionary to general, and on upward to *princeps*. It was about the responsible and moderate use of power.

It is difficult though to establish direct contemporary references. Instead, it is better to acknowledge that among other near contemporaries of Frontinus, conspiracies (real and imagined) and executions were one of the notable aspects of Domitian's reign.[617] As such, there is the real possibility that this tale (along with others), is an *exemplum* of indirect advice to the emperor and his supporters – embedded counsel which promoted the use of a more moderate and generous approach to reports of discontent and suspicion – but through the relative safety of a foreign paradigm. As Turner has argued – 'the incontrovertible praise of Domitian's specific actions in the *Strategemata* does not mean that Frontinus did not intend criticism of that *princeps* to be understood at some level, or that contemporaries may not have read such criticism into his text'

[615] Cf. Sugars 1997: 367-8.
[616] Cf. Campbell 1987: 23.
[617] On Domitian and the Senate, *delatores*, executions, banishments, and the sources etc. – Viscusi: 1973: 117-156; Jones1979;1992:180-192; and Southern 1997: 110-125.

(2007: 445). In summary, Philip's anecdote in Frontinus is at odds with its surroundings, as its moral message (though fit for generals) is divorced from any real meaningful martial context. Therefore, its inclusion is best thought of in terms of its thematic connection to the preceding Roman anecdote. It is a relationship which draws attention (but not too forcefully) to possible contemporary concerns around the role of the *delatores*, the number of accusations, and the amount of executions and banishments among the empire's elite under Domitian. It is subtle monarchic criticism and edification for an anxious period through the display of Philip's more positive example.

The other version (**example 4.9**) is found in the Seventh Oration of the pagan orator, statesman, and philosopher Themistius (c. 318-388 CE) which was delivered before the emperor Valens and the senate of Constantinople.[618] Compared to the previous version, the context and the content of this oration make the identification with monarchic ideology more certain. In this oration Themistius thanks the emperor for his clemency regarding those individuals obliquely associated with Procopius and his attempted seizure of the throne of the eastern Roman Empire in 365 CE.[619] The themes of the speech are Procopius' treachery, and Valens' courage during, and clemency after the attempted revolt.[620] However, the speech is really a long discourse on how Valens can only fulfil his real potential as a Roman leader if he showed mercy to those who were indirectly involved in the unsuccessful rebellion against him (specifically the Neoplatonist Maximus of Ephesus).[621] Themistius claims that while the troops of Valens shared his victory – the emperor alone was responsible for saving the lives of the conquered. This display of *philanthropia* meant that Valens' reputation for mercy and justice was akin to the example set by celebrated kings, commanders, and philosophers of the past. Moreover, Themistius notes that this *philanthropia* was the most significant feature of a king's character, and was held in common with God.[622] It is praise and edification through correlation and identification with famous positive paradigms – one of whom is Philip.

Philip's anecdote is skilfully imbedded in the text and themes of the oration. It flows naturally on from preceding sections. These include a comparison between Pericles and Valens, and a discussion on correct Roman policies towards barbarians and Romans during strife. The latter ends by equating the damage done to the Empire (if Roman opponents are overly punished or destroyed) to the amputation of a diseased limb that could have been treated (*Or.* 7.94B-D) (this

[618] On Themistius and selected orations - Penella 2000; Heather and Moncur 2001; and Kennedy 2008: 32-35. On the Seventh Oration – Sugars 1997: esp. pp. 361-371 for commentary on section 95B-C.
[619] Sugars 1997: vi.
[620] On *philanthropia* in fourth century CE religion and politics – Downey 1955: 199-208.
[621] 'Blunting the edge of Valens' wrath against the citizens of Constantinople was the generic purpose of the speech. Saving Maximus was a specific purpose' (Sugars 1997: 69).
[622] Sugars 1997: vi-vii.

analogy has echoes of Philip's reply to the accusations reported to him in Frontinus). Indeed, Themistius goes on to make a clear contrast, in that – 'a man who receives a moderate sentence may then come to be of greater service to the one who dealt with him compassionately' (*Or.* 7.94D). This leads on to the Romans' treatment of the Libyan Massinissa, and finally onto Socrates' correction of an ancient proverb that one must help one's friends, but not harm one's enemies, but instead, make them friends (*Or.* 7.95A-B).[623]

This Socratic correction immediately precedes Philip's tale and is the perfect introduction. The theory or proverb of the philosopher is followed by the successful practical application/example of the statesman. The transition between the two is a rhetorical reply to sceptical views on the appropriateness of a philosopher's compassion (πρᾳότητα....τριβωνίῳ) in an emperor (ἀλουργίδι).[624] It is now that Philip (τῷ Ἀμύντου) is put forth as a suitable example of a statesman using his compassion (πρᾶότης) for the emperor to imitate. The speech's audience (including Valens himself) is meant to conflate Socrates (the philosopher), Philip (the king), and Valens (the emperor) into one apposite and compassionate whole. The core of this section (of which Philip's tale is a key part) is imbued with the simple lesson of the universality of the virtue πρᾶότης. The advocacy of Themistius clearly follows in the footsteps of the earlier philosopher Plutarch in this regard.

Themistius' version of Philip's compassion also has some interesting particulars. For example, the man who is reported (again 'someone' = τις) to have a grudge against Philip, and was possibly ready to plot against him (explicitly reported like Frontinus), is referred to as one of Philip's taxiarchs (τῶν ταξιαρχῶν). If true, the man was one of Philip's senior military commanders, and as such, the threat may have been very real. Moreover, it would explain Frontinus' comment regarding the man's martial skill – he or his source substituting an easily understood comment of the man's military skill for a specialized Macedonian military title.

There is the added rhetoric embodied in Themistius' question about (and explanation of) what Philip's actions were not upon receiving the report (τί οὖν ὁ Φίλιππος; οὐκ εὐθὺς ᾔξεν ἐπὶ τὸν σίδηρον).[625] Themistius then gives Philip's two part reply - similar to that found in Plutarch's account. What is different to Plutarch's version is the report of Themistius that apart from being immediately considerate to the fellow in other matters, Philip provided for his daughter's dowry unasked (προῖκα ἐπιδίδωσι δεομένῳ θυγατρὸς ὡραίας). This particular detail accords with Frontinus' version (though plural has become singular) and is

[623] Cf. Sugars 1997: 358-361.

[624] On the use of τριβωνίῳ and ἀλουργίδι - Sugars 1997: 361-2, where he notes the Greek technical term for Themistius' refutation of a theoretical objection is ὑποφορά or προκατάληψις.

[625] This could be an allusion to Philip's contrasting actions during one of his marriage feasts (Plut. *Al.* 9.6-11), the results of which almost split the kingdom (the subtext of which could be the parallel outcome that could have resulted from Procopius' actions).

not, as Sugars believes (1997: 367), a deliberate conflation by Themistius of Plutarch's version and a tale concerning Alexander (*Mor.* 179F).[626] It could have come from either Themistius' knowledge of Frontinus' version, or a version common to both Frontinus and Themistius. Either way, the idea of *euergetism* (or *liberalitas*) born of *praotes* is central to both versions.

The tale's ending is also similar to Frontinus' version in that both note the new-found loyalty of the fellow.[627] However, Frontinus ends here, whereas Themistius continues. He does so, not with a comment by Philip (as in Plutarch), but with an altered quote from Homer's *Odyssey* (22.374) which introduces a final rhetorical section.[628] It is a short section (with some literary allusions)[629] in which Themistius sums up his ideas in relation to the themes introduced by Socrates, exemplified by Philip, and now, as he moves on, to be apparent in Alexander. The whole moves seamlessly – each tale a convincing layer of argument. Moreover, these Greek *exempla* (chronologically arranged, even looking back to Pericles) are the only ones which Themistius uses in this section before going onto Roman *exempla*. He thereby establishes a pantheon of sorts of Greek *exempla* for his current theme, which would be appealing to an emperor, but more importantly – worthy of his imitation. Certainly, there was an inclination in late Roman rhetoric to reference either classical, Hellenistic or republican models, rather than imperial forerunners. Indeed, the more 'classical' the reference the better its idealized value.

Philip is not here the figure found in Demosthenes or Theopompus (like he is in other authors or rhetorical exercises from the period e.g. Aphthonius and Libanius – see Introduction). He is included by Themistius as a notable and praiseworthy statesman whose compassion, forgiveness and generosity were exemplary. Six hundred years after his passing, Philip's actions have crossed the centuries (many of them now Roman) as a weighty paradigmatic lessons on autocratic statesmanship. They have become important avenues for the articulation of the wishes or voices of the governed – functioning in part as positive aspirational cultural mores of empire and government. Moreover, 'Philip II' *per se* does matter somewhat beyond merely his role as an ancient Greek monarch. If Philip's name were replaced with an anonymous reference, the anecdotes would still function as detailed above. However, that role would be diminished significantly through the loss of a historical reference point (and any associated feelings of veracity), and any emotive sentiments of personal identification or empathy which named individuals evoke. The anecdote required any king,

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[626] Sugars makes reference to Frontinus' version (1997: 368), but does not note this detail.

[627] The ideas behind this had deep roots in Roman thinking e.g. during the early empire Seneca wrote of 'how many have been made useful friends through forgiveness' (*De Ira* 2.34.2), and equated this attitude to the success and security of the Roman Empire in general (e.g. *De Ira* 2.34.4). Cf. Sørensen 1984: 108.

[628] Ὥς εὐεργεσίη κακοεργίης μέγ' ἀμείνων instead of ὡς κακοεργίης εὐεργεσίη μέγ' ἀμείνων (cf. Sugars 1997: 368-369). Is this reference perhaps acknowledgment of a tradition linking Philip and Odysseus (chap. six.)?

[629] Sugars 1997: 369-371

but it had to be a known king (preferably special) to have the necessary impact. It was an interesting paradox which also had to account for Philip's historical and rhetorical baggage.[630]

What all these tales of this cycle illustrate is the very real possibility of some kind of complex relationship between all the extant tales of Philip's restraint, moderation and generosity in the face of public insults and slanders. It is a relationship which might extend back to either one or two tales, which have had various details and themes either selected, omitted or emphasised during transmission, so as to agree with authorial interests and context. Nevertheless, the utility of these tales as a tradition of moral conduits is clearly established by all the variants so far encountered. Philip's behaviour as king and leader was on display, and the messages or lessons that went with this served many masters. In a Roman world which never ceased to negotiate the moral limitations of power, and the cultural, political, and social principles it valued – authors and auditors alike found Philip's example of moderation, self-control and generosity in these texts important touchstones of considerable value.

Philip's Restraint and Seneca

Seneca was one such master whom Philip's tales served. The final anecdote of this section is found in *De Ira ad Novatum* (**example 4.10**).[631]

4.10

Non habuit hoc avitum ille vitium, ne paternum quidem; nam si qua alia in Philippo virtus, fuit et contumeliarum patientia, ingens instrumentum ad tutelam regni. Democharesad illum Parrhesiastes ob nimiam et procacem linguam appellatus inter alios Atheniensium legatos venerat. Audita benigne legatione Philippus: 'Dicite,' inquit, 'mihi, facere quid possim, quod sit Atheniensibus gratum.' Excepit Demochareset: 'Te,' inquit, 'suspendere.'

[630] There is another version or very similar tale which Plutarch records in his *On Lack of Anger* (*Mor.* 457E-F = *De Cohib.* 9), and Athenaeus in his *Deipnosophistae* (6.249C-D = Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 280; Duris of Samos *FGrH* 76 F 3; and Phylarchus *FGrH* 81 F 37). It is paired with example 4.1 in Plutarch in a sequence of examples which all relate to the absence of anger as per the treatise's topic. The focus for Plutarch is Philip's actions. These show affability, courtesy, moderation, liberality, and kindness (his overall φιλανθρωπία). They also demonstrate an autocrat showing forgiveness in the face of provocation (i.e. his ability to bear free speech - *parrhesia*). The variant of Athenaeus comes in a section dedicated to the theme of *kolakes* (flatterers). Therefore after mentioning noted flatterers of Philip such as Cleisophus (6.248c-249a; cf. Ael. *N.A.* 9.7 and Plut. *Mor.* 632B) and Thrasydaeus (Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 209), the tale is introduced by the contrasting description of Arcadion. He is a clever man who hated Philip so much that he voluntarily went into exile (ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος φυγὴν ἔφυγεν). This account shows that the tale was popular in Hellenistic historians, and probably circulated during Philip's own lifetime. On Athenaeus and his work – Braund and Wilkins (eds.) 2000; Paulas 2012: 403-39; and Jacob 2013.

[631] For discussion – Molinier 1995: 76-79. On Seneca in general – Griffin 1976; Sørensen 1984; Abel 1985; Veyne 2003; and Inwood 2005. On the sources for Seneca's life – Rudich 1997: 17-18 and 263. On *De Ira* – Sørensen 1984: 99-108; Abel 1985: 713-15; Mattern-Parkes 2001: 177-88 (as a source of social history); Harris 2001: 377-81; Vogt 2006: 57-74; and van Hoof 2007: 59-86. On the virtue *clementia* and *De Ira* – Dowling 2006: 203-205.

> *Indignatio circumstantium ad tam inhumanum responsum exorta erat; quos Philippus conticiscere iussit et Thersitam illum salvum incolumemque dimittere. 'At vos,' inquit, 'ceteri legati, nuntiate Atheniensibus multo superbiores esse, qui ista dicunt, quam qui impune dicta audiunt* (3.23.2-3).'[632]

Dedicated to the practical moral concept/problem of 'Anger', *De Ira* is the first century CE prose dialogue of the philosopher Seneca.[633] The principal theme of *De Ira* is the foolishness of being incited to anger, 'the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions' (*De Ira*. 1.1.1), particularly in public life,[634] and particularly for a leader.[635] Though dating the work is problematic, it was probably brought on by the impact of the excesses of Caligula's reign and completed sometime under Claudius.[636]

Seneca's philosophy had an interest that was fundamentally ethical and therefore Philip's example is again a moral tale. Seneca also had a background in rhetoric, which, combined with his personal inclinations, produced the characteristic style found in *De Ira*.[637] It was a new style, not uncriticised, which combined pretentious affectations with 'the short sentence, rhetoric, and declamation' (Basore 1963: ix).[638] All of these are present in Seneca's Philippic *exemplum*. Despite this rhetoric (and its faulty arrangement e.g. 2.18.1; 3.5.2), *De Ira* is rich in illustrative material like all of Seneca's works.[639] This material includes many tales and portraits of historical individuals which suit the context (preference for Roman *exempla*).[640] They are essentially 'moral sketches' used to warn, and on rare occasion (like Philip's tale) – to serve as ideal models.[641] Indeed, Seneca

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[632] 'He (Alexander) did not get this weakness from his grandfather, nor from his father either; for if Philip possessed any virtues at all, among them was the ability to endure insults – a great help in the maintenance of a throne. Democharas, surnamed Parrhesiastes on account of his bold and impudent tongue, came to him once in the company with other envoys from the Athenians. Having granted the delegation a friendly hearing, Philip said, 'Tell me what I can do that will please the Athenians.' Democharas took him at his words and replied, 'Hang yourself.' All the bystanders flared up in indignation at such brutal words, but Philip bade them keep quiet and let that Thersites withdraw safe and unharmed. 'But you,' he said, 'you other envoys, go tell the Athenians that those who speak such words show far more arrogance than those who listen to them without retaliation.''

[633] Dialogue in the sense that it is addressed to someone whom Seneca permits to make objections, which he then repudiates (Sørensen 1984: 106). On Seneca's fame and influence – Trillitzsch 1971 and Habine 2000: 264-303.

[634] Cf. van Hoof 2007: 74, 79.

[635] For a dated but still useful discussion on the art of ruling as gathered from Seneca's *De Clementia*, *De Ira* and tragedies – Brooks 1921.

[636] Sørensen 1984: 98 and Molinier 1995: 76. Nothing is known about when the works of Seneca were published or their reception (Griffin 1976: 1; Sørensen 1984: 98). Recent scholarship favours the early reign of Claudius, probably before his exile in 41 CE (Kuen 1994: 344; and Nussbaum 1994: 405); though some prefer a later date of around 49-50 CE (Harris 2002: 3). The work though was surely finished by 52 CE (Dingal 2001: 414; and Griffin 1976: 62, 304-305, 396-398). Cf. van Hoof 2007: 60. On the chronology of Seneca's works in general – Giancotti 1957; and Abel 1985: 703-11.

[637] Setaioli 2007: 335.

[638] On Seneca's style – Suet. *Calig.* 53; Gellius xii.2; Fronto *De fer. Als.* 3, VdH^2 pp. 227-33 = Haines II, pp. 4-18; *De Orationibus*, VdH^2 pp.153-60 = Haines II: pp. 100-115; cf. Davenport and Manley 2014: 135-140; and esp. Quintillian who criticises his tastes, particularly for excessive rhetoric (10.1.25-31).

[639] Basore 1963: xiii. On the influences and sources of *De Ira* – Pohlenz 1959: I, 311; Basore 1963 xiii; Griffin 1976: 168; Cupaiuolo 1975; Fillion-Lahille 1984; Inwood 2005: 27-30; van Hoof 2007: 60. There is general consensus on Posidonius, Sotion, and the possibility use of a host of earlier authors.

[640] Griffin 1976: 9, 210.

[641] Sørensen 1984: 100. On *exempla* as a feature of Roman discourse – Habinek 1987, esp. 194-98. On Seneca's *exempla* and efforts to be one himself – Mayer 1991.

noted how important *exempla* were in teaching for him, stating that, 'it will be helpful not only to state what is the usual quality of good men, and to outline their figures and features, but also to relate and set forth what men there have been of this kind' (*Ep.* 95.72ff.).[642] Therefore, Philip is set forth (*exponere*) as just such an *exemplum* of this kind.

Philip's tale comes late in Book Three, after Seneca has made the point that though it is expedient for subjects to control their passions, 'it is even more expedient for kings' (*utilior est regibus*), for whom it could be dangerous (3.16.2-3). Seneca then follows this with examples to be avoided (3.14.1-21.5), before coming to Philip's tale. It is part of a selection of *exempla* 'which are to be imitated, being instances of restrained and gentle men, who lacked neither the provocation to anger nor the power of requital' (3.22.1). Therefore, it may surprise some that Philip is here presented by Seneca as part of a collection of men who exemplify *moderatio* and *lenitas* (or *lenitudo*).[643]

The first positive *exempla* of this section are tales about Antigonus (3.22.2-5), which are followed by some details of his 'grandson' Alexander the Great's anger (a reiteration of tales told at 3.17.1-4).[644] These unflattering points about Alexander's anger and cruelty are then used to introduce the *exemplum* of his father as a contrast.[645] Seneca's selection of these three Macedonian kings also highlights some kind of hereditary or familial connection to his *exempla*. Even if not all strictly related, they were all men who wielded autocratic power theoretically over the same people. This was much like the Roman emperors Seneca was familiar with, men like Tiberius, Caligula, and Claudius.[646] Indeed, in these tales one could almost equate the Macedonian kings with these leaders. The military contexts of the tales of Antigonus (the old soldier/general turned king), which end with his slightly morally ambiguous actions and wit (3.22.5), recall the early behaviour and dry wit of Tiberius (the old soldier/general turned *princeps*), in the face of abuse and slander.

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[642] *N.b. Ep.* 6.5; 83.13 and Griffin 1976: 176. Cf. 'All philosophical study and reading should be directed to the object of attaining a happy life… looking for valuable precepts and lofty and inspiring utterances, which may in due course be translated into action (Sen. *Ep.*108.33-35).'

[643] Cf. Molinier in Intro. n.74.

[644] This is a mistake. Antigonus (the one-eyed) was one of Alexander's generals. Amyntas III was the grandfather of Alexander (cf. Molinier 1995: 61 n. 6). However, it cannot be entirely discounted that these tales are about Antigonus Gonatus, who was a noted Stoic (Ael. *V.H.* 12.25), and had once called kingship a 'glorious servitude' (*endoxos douleia* – Ael. *V.H.* 2.20). Contrast with Tiberius becoming emperor complaining that a wretched and burdensome slavery was being forced upon him – *miseram et onerosam iniungi sibi servitutem* (Suet. *Tib.* 24.2).

[645] Cf. Molinier 1995: 77.

[646] The Stoics sympathized on philosophical grounds with monarchy (though considered it inferior to a mixed constitution because of its degenerative tendency – Cic. *Rep.* 1.69; Sen. *Ep.* 90.6). However, there does not seem to have been a distinctive Stoic theory of kingship. Instead, the Stoics, like other philosophical schools, will have emphasised the need for the king to be of supreme virtue (Griffin 1976: 202-206). Indeed, Seneca's interest was in the moral quality of the monarch (cf. *De Clem.*), it was the individuals that interested him, not so much the system. Therefore, Seneca is ambiguous towards the term *rex* outside *De Clementia* (which justifies monarchy philosophically – Griffin 1976: 194), and accepts the Principate as a necessary evil – though does not comment on it as a constitutional system, instead choosing to underline the moral characters of the emperors (Griffin 1976: 207, 389-90). Moreover, Seneca inherited many of his general maxims, precepts and examples of moral behaviour of monarchs from Greek philosophy (e.g. *De Ira* 2.23.3; 2.33.2; 3.14.6; 3.30.5; *Brev. Vit.* 17.1; *De Ben.* 4.37.2; *Ep.* 94.14), and naturally applied them to the emperor – the link being the restraint and responsible use of autocratic power (Griffin 1976: 207-208).

> ….he [Tiberius] was self-contained and patient (*patiens*) in the face of abuse and slander, and of lampoons on himself and his family, often asserting that in a free country there should be free speech and free thought….A most unassuming remark of his in the senate is also a matter of record: 'If so and so criticizes me I shall take care to render an account of my acts and words… (Suet. *Tib.* 28.1).'

Seneca praised the early years of Tiberius' reign, but like others was not impressed with his later years when once good qualities transformed and became tainted.[647] The terrible behaviour of Alexander killing men at banquets and having others thrown to wild animals brings to mind the horrific acts of Caligula (some of which Seneca detailed at 3.173-19.5), who apparently wore Alexander's breastplate at times (Suet. *Calig.* 52).[648] Both men had been young rulers who were easily roused to anger after perceived insults and slanders.[649]

Finally, Philip had become king either following or instead of his young nephew.[650] Whereas Claudius came to throne after the death of his nephew. Claudius had also had to endure with some restraint much abuse during his life e.g. contrast Philip's treatment of Democharesand Claudius' treatment of German envoys (Suet. *Claud.* 25.4), with Caligula's treatment of Claudius when he came as an envoy (Suet. *Claud.* 9.1.). Moreover, like Philip, Claudius as emperor had much dealings with Greek envoys (Suet. *Claud.* 42.1).[651]

So why these tales about three foreign kings who virtually recall to mind past and present Roman emperors? By using these Macedonian kings, Seneca offers both contrast and continuity to his preferred Augustan model which climaxes this section (3.23.4-8).[652] We know Seneca equated in many ways the *princeps* with a *rex*.[653] These Macedonian *reges*, unlike many other monarchs (but like Roman emperors), had ruled far flung heterogeneous empires, not just homogeneous kingdoms. Moreover, they were foreign *reges* of a different kind to the corrupt Persian or middle to late Hellenistic variety;[654] even Alexander had only become corrupt in his later years (like Tiberius). These *exempla* foreshadow and highlight the Roman tales of the *divus* Augustus. He is

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[647] On Seneca's opinions of the reign of Tiberius – *De tr. an*. 11.11; *De ben.* 3.26.1; *De Clem.* 1.1.6 (cf. Sørensen 1984: 81-82).

[648] On Caligula's terrible behaviour towards people, friends and family, and particularly at banquets – Suet. *Calig.* 24-27; 32; 36; 39. Caligula even had Seneca condemned, only to let him off because of illness (Suet. *Calig*. 53 and Cassius Dio 59.19). Cf. Alexander's stories in *De Clem.* 1.25.1.

[649] Sen. *De Con. Sap.*18.4; cf. Suet. *Calig.* 56; and Søresen 1984: 93.

[650] Worthington 2008: 20-22.

[651] The similarities between the two could be extended to include – their limps, their wit, falling asleep at inappropriate times, multiple marriages, and perhaps even being murdered by their wives. On Claudius – Levick 2015 and Osgood 2011.

[652] This entire section of positive *exempla* is brought to its final climax with a large section of rhetorical questions, one of which restates Philip's role as a positive exemplar (*Dicat itaque sibi quisque, quotiens lacessitur: 'Numquid potentior sum Philippo? Illi tamen impune male dictum est - De Ira* 3.24.1). This association between Philip and Augustus is curious as it is known that Amyntianus (who dedicated a *History of Alexander* to Marcus Aurelius) wrote imitation 'Parallel Lives' of Plutarch, and paired Augustus with Philip (Photius *Bibl.* Cod. No. 131 cf. *FGrH* 150). Cf. Molinier 1995: 78-79.

[653] E.g. *De Clem.* 1.3.3-4; 1.4.3; 1.8.6; 1.11.4; 1.13.1; 1.19.3-6; cf. Griffin 1976: 194.

[654] *N.b.* the use earlier of Persian kings as negative *exempla* at 3.15.1-2; 3.16.3-4.

for Seneca a sanctioned and more culturally appropriate paradigm for emperors and Roman elites to follow and aim for (though not faultless – *De Clem.* 1.11.1-2 and *De ben.* 6.32).[655]

This particular work though was not addressed directly to an emperor. However, that did not limit its distribution and consumption at that level of society.[656] Instead, it is dedicated to Seneca's brother Novatus, apparently at his request (a well-known *topos* in ancient literature).[657] This man was a significant public figure and politician, a senator and a provincial governor who had 'virtually unlimited power over non-citizens' in his province.[658] Moreover, though addressed to an individual, it was surely intended for a wider audience.[659] Seneca proffered ethical philosophy for statesmen and men engaged in public affairs, a form of moral education for the elite of Imperial Rome.[660] Philip as a model leader in moderation under provocation was to serve this philosophic enlightenment.

Seneca's approach in the majority of his writings was highly pedagogical and grounded deeply in Stoic philosophical principles (in *De Ira*).[661] Through his council Seneca sought the moral improvement of his readers and himself, particularly in their behaviour and interactions with others.[662] He saw himself as a teacher and healer of minds,[663] a philosophical authority on what anger was and why it needed eliminating.[664] This improvement was also a form of 'self-shaping', and *De Ira* is the most extensive reflection on this in Seneca's corpus with its focus on self-control.[665] This self-shaping came from the 'protrepic' moralism of Seneca in which actions were prescribed for the reader, who must move beyond contemplation (*contemplatio*) to practical action (*actio*).[666] Therefore, central to Seneca's Stoicism was the promise that this practical *actio* would help adherents to lead better lives.[667] Therefore, Seneca's Philippic *exemplum* (like others) was to be read, contemplated – and then acted upon.[668]

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[655] *De Clem.* 1.9.1-11.4; 1.16; *Cons. Polyb.* 12.5; cf. 15.3; *Cons. Marc.* 2.3; 15.2; *De Ira* 3.40; *De Ben.* 1.15.5; 2.27.2; 2.25.1; 3.27; 3.32; *NQ* 1.16.1; *Ep.* 83.14; *Ep.* 94.46. On Augustus as a model for Claudius and Nero – Griffin 1976: 65, 104, 130, 211-13, 217, 403, 442.

[656] Seneca would later write directly for the emperor Nero and demonstrate that Stoicism was a good source of counsel for *principes* and kings (Tact. *Ann.*13.42.4; and *De Clem*. 2.5.2 – *Scio male audire apud imperitos sectam Stoicorum tamquam duram nimis et minime principibus regibusque bonum daturam consilium*). Cf. Griffin 1976: 9.

[657] Griffin 1976: 319; Lausberg 1990: 157-9; and van Hoof 2007: 61.

[658] Inwood 2005: 153.

[659] Habinek 2000: 279.

[660] Griffin 1976: 9. On this idea in Cicero and Seneca – Griffin 1988: 133-150.

[661] van Hoof 2007: 70. On moral improvement in Seneca – Cooper 2004: 309-34; and Wagoner 2014: 241-62. On Seneca as a Stoic – Veyne 2003: 31-155. On Seneca's philosophical milieu - Inwood 1995: 63-76; and 2005: 7-22. On ethics and Stoicism in general – Annas 2007: 58-87.

[662] Cf. Plutarch's story on the value of Seneca's moral instruction for Nero (*Mor.* 461Eff.).

[663] Griffin 1976: 3, 8.

[664] van Hoof 2007: 82.

[665] Inwood 2005: 144-5. Cf. Edwards 1997: 23-38.

[666] van Hoof 2007: 71. Cf. Pelling 1988: 15; Duff 1999: 68-70 and Setaioli 2007: 334.

[667] Wagoner 2014: 261.

[668] Cf. Isoc. 3.62 – 'Be not satisfied with praising good men, but imitate them as well.'

The text of Philip's *exemplum* follows the transitional reiteration of Alexander's bad behaviour, which apparently did not come from his grandfather or father. This transition between *exempla* sets up a positive contrast and introduction to Philip's tale. However, as Seneca proceeds to elaborate on Philip, the atmosphere is a little mixed, colouring Philip's initial impression in the text. Seneca's opening comment that, 'if Philip possessed any virtues at all, among them was the ability to endure insults', introduces a Philip who comes with moral question marks. Seneca's words betray some uncertainty over Philip as a good exemplar. As a result, Seneca's praise contains a flaw or *vitium* of subtle invective which emphasises that his approval is here only for Philip's *contumeliarum patientia.* This *patientia* (endurance, forbearance, or patience) to provocation is to be the true focus of the *exemplum.* Philip the king and statesman is to be praised for it – but he is not isolated from whatever baggage Seneca seems to believe he came with as a general moral paradigm.

Seneca concludes his transition between *exempla* by noting that this *patientia* was a great help in the maintenance of a throne (*ingens instrumentum ad tutelam regni*). This observation commends Philip (judged in the following tale as having had this attribute). However, it also highlights (rather ironically) that it is not found in all men in light of the supposed circumstances surrounding Philip's murder (which would be recalled by an educated audience). Philip was murdered by one of his bodyguards, who was unable to let insult and injury go unavenged. The comment highlights the value of this quality for security, and could pass as a veiled warning to the regime of Claudius to look back on Caligula. He had seen insult everywhere, and his murderer Chaerea (one of his bodyguards), had no longer been able endure it. Suetonius also made a connection between Philip's and Caligula's deaths when he noted among the omens to Caligula's that – 'Mnester the pantomime performed the same tragedy which the tragedian Neoptolemus had produced at the games during which King Philip of Macedon was killed' (*Cal.* 57).[669]

In keeping with Seneca's preferences, Philip's *exemplum* proper takes place in a public setting as he performs one of the duties of a statesman – the receiving of envoys. As befits the *comitas* and *humanitas* of a *civilis princeps*,[670] Philip offers the envoys a friendly hearing (*audita benigne*), asking in direct speech what he can do to please the Athenians. For Seneca, Philip's tale highlights the conflict between *realpolitik* and human ideals (a central theme in his work).[671] It also reflects a union in Seneca made between Roman *virtus* and *humanitas* – an evolutionary morality

[669] Cf. Ovid *Metam.* 10.298ff.
[670] It was an emperor's *comitas* which made relations with subjects relaxed and easy; humility replacing arrogance and aloofness (e.g. Suet. *Aug.* 53.2; 74; 98.1 and Plin. *Pan.* 71.6). Moreover, when combined with respect for the Senate, it was held to be *civilitas* – a grand term of praise for an emperor (Griffin 1976: 127; cf. Béranger 1953: 151-52; and Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 32-48).
[671] Sørensen 1984: 9.

for Roman politics.[672] Therefore, Philip's patient and moderate political behaviour is seen to be rich in humane qualities. Certainly, Seneca represented political activity in ethical terms – as was indicative of his stoicism.[673] Indeed, Stoicism offered a discourse on virtue that was difficult to separate from political analysis.[674] Therefore, no matter how orientated towards pure ethics Seneca's writings appear, or how much they humanize stoicism[675] – they have a strong political aspect.

The reply to Philip's *comitas* and *humanitas* from one envoy (Democharesis) is for Philip to hang himself (*Te…suspendere*).[676] What follows is the *indignatio* of bystanders to this reply – described as *tam inhumanum responsum*. This is the opposite of the proffered *humanitas* of Philip, his affability or courtesy towards the delegation.[677] It is this ingratitude to Philip's receptiveness (his *audita benigne*) which damns the man in Seneca's eyes (cf. *De ben.* 1.10.14). It is an insult (*contumelia*), and in his work dedicated to showing how a wise man or *sapiens* was immune to insults and injury (*De Constantia Sapientis*), Seneca defines it as –

> …a slighter offence than injury, something to be complained of rather than avenged, something which even the laws have not deemed worthy of punishment…' (*De Const. sap.* 10.1).

He thought insults were the 'shadows and suggestions of injuries' (*iniuriarum umbras ac suspicions – De Const. sap.* 16.3; cf. 11.1), which were 'serious only to the thin-skinned, for men are not harmed, but angered by it. Yet such is the weakness and vanity of some men's minds, there are those who think that nothing is more bitter' (*De Const. sap.* 5.1; cf. 17.4).

This insult was a moral challenge to Philip, who was surrounded by individuals whose *indignatio* shows that they had already failed it in the face of provocation. This challenge was necessary for the Stoics though. They believed in a 'life in harmony' with reason and with nature, and human nature arose only from the *humanitas* that came from meeting of this challenge.[678] The wise man was to welcome this kind of challenge, for he put himself to the proof and tested his virtue (*per quam experimentum sui capit et virtutem temptat – De Const. sap.* 9.3). In this *exemplum* Philip rises to the challenge like a true *sapiens* and avoids the temporary madness (*brevem insanum – De Ira* 1.1.2) of anger,[679] for a wise man will have no anger towards sinners

[672] On this idea – Sørensen 1984: 52ff.
[673] Habinek 2000: 284.
[674] Habinek 2000: 288-89.
[675] Basore 1963: ix.
[676] His surname *Parrhesiastes* – 'the Outspoken', immediately informs the reader here we are dealing once more with a tale of Philip and *parrhesia*.
[677] Cf. Isoc. *To Dem.* 20, 30-31; *To Nic.* 34.
[678] Sørensen 1984: 53.
[679] Like Plutarch, Seneca links anger to madness – Gill 1997: 215-28; on Plutarch – van der stockt 1999: 517-26. Cf. Harris 2001: 63-64; and van Hoof 2007: 74. The Stoic principal was also that any passion was a mistaken judgement of

(*non irascetur sapiens peccantibus – De Ira* 2.10.6).[680] He is immune to injury and insult (e.g. *De Const. sap.* 2.1, 2.3, 3.2, 3.3), so much so that, 'every wanton, insolent, or haughty act directed against the wise man is essayed in vain' (*De Const. sap*. 4.2). Therefore, Philip's actions are presented as an example of Stoic *apatheia*.[681] Therefore, in reported speech Philip has the man, whom he refers to as Thersites (countering wit with wit), withdraw safe and unharmed (*salvum incolumemque*).[682] By not allowing himself to become mad or emotional (to give over to *pathos* or *orge*), Philip shows proof of his almost Stoic *recta ratio* (upright reason) and greatness, for 'there is no surer proof of greatness than to be in a state where nothing can possibly happen to disturb you' (*De Ira* 3.6.1; cf. Isoc. *To Dem.* 21).

The goodness in Philip does not seek to take any real revenge on the man. This retaliatory behaviour could be worse than that of Democharis, for 'virtue will never be guilty of simulating vice in the act of repressing it; anger in itself she considers reprehensible, for it is in no way better, often even worse, than those shortcomings which provide anger' (*De Ira* 2.6.2). Moreover, any punishment given by Philip whilst angry would have been wrong, for Seneca believed that correction given in anger to the erring and wicked meant only correcting wrong-doing by doing wrong (*peccata corrigere peccantem - De Ira* 1.16.1). Only leniency, kindness and self-control of pride, arrogance and anger should govern our relations with others.[683]

Philip's decision in the end to let the man go unharmed was still an act of revenge in a sense, and one particularly in keeping with Seneca's belief that 'only a great soul can be superior to injury; the most humiliating kind of revenge is to have it appear that the man was not worth taking revenge upon' (*De Ira* 2.32.3).[684] Nor should the public aspect of this action and *exempla* be forgotten. Philip's reaction to the man's provocation was under public scrutiny. However, Philip's actions show that he was cognizant of his position as a king, and of the opprobrium possible if he were seen to lower himself to the level of Democharis – a mere envoy. Seneca believed that, 'the more

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the *hegemonikon* (the 'ruling element'), which would lead to something against reason when seized by impulse (North 1966: 219).

[680] On the psychology of *De Ira* book 2 – Inwood 2005: 41-64.

[681] Stoic *apatheia* ('absence of passion') demanded that the appetites and passions be extirpated (cf. Epicurean *ataraxia* – 'tranquillity'). This was in line with Hellenistic philosophy which believed in the need to protect oneself from the blows of the ever more influential *tyche* (fortune). This differed from Aristotle's and the Peripatetic requirement that they only be moderated (*metriopatheia*) (North 1966: 213-215). *N.b.* Sen. *Ep.* 85.114 – where the shortness of life and the capriciousness of fortune are thought incentives to exercise *temperantia*. Interestingly, Cicero had seen a need to control (*cohibere*) the passions rather than eliminating them (*De Off.* 2.5.18).

[682] As Thersites was known for his impudent tongue and abuse of Agamemnon (*Il.* 2.211-23), Philip implicitly casts himself in the role of the more prudent Odysseus (Molinier 1995: 77). Philip's use of wit here is also indicative of the value Romans placed on wit spoken in defence of abuse – a technique which the rhetoricians called humour *in respondendo* (Corbeill 1996: 194). Elsewhere, Seneca has even higher praise for those who avoid this type of response (*Dial.* 2.17.3).

[683] E.g. *Ep.* 88.30; 81.26; *NQ* 4. *pref.* 18.

[684] Elsewhere, Seneca goes further advocating that the *sapiens* not even acknowledge that the insult has been offered (*De Const. sap.* 13.5), or if need be – return only a smile (*De Const. sap.* 10.4).

honourable a man is by birth, reputation, and patrimony, the more heroically he should bear himself (*De Const. sap.* 19.4)', and that we must –

> '...refrain from anger, whether he be equal or a superior or an inferior who provokes its power. A contest with one's equal is hazardous, with a superior mad, with an inferior degrading (*cum inferior sordidum*). It is a petty and sorry person (*pusilli hominis et miseri*) who will bite back when he is bitten' (*De Ira* 2.34.1).

Therefore, in revenging his insult, Philip risked demeaning himself publically and appearing petty and vindictive. Let his poignant appellation be enough for that man. Instead, Philip acts in accordance with the advice given by Isocrates to the young king Nicocles that –

> ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐργοις μέμνησο τῆς βασιλείας, καὶ φρόντιζε ὅπως μηδὲν ἀνάξιον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης πράξεις (Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 37).[685]

Philip's actions suggest a view towards gaining a positive reputation which Seneca saw as a beneficial by-product of forbearance (*De Ira* 2.34.2). However, it should not be the intended purpose of such action according to Seneca (e.g. 'let us satisfy our conscience; for reputation let us strive not at all' - *De Ira* 3.41.1).[686]

In the climax of the *exemplum*, Philip addresses himself to the other envoys. His use of '*At vos*' (followed by *inquit*) is a rhetorical parody of the '*Te*' (followed by *inquit*) of Democharesʼ address, and it draws in the reader in the expectation of some witty verbal invective of Philip to follow the break in direct speech in response/retaliation to Democharesʼ '*suspendare*'. In a sense, Philip almost feigns the anger that is expected of him by those present.[687] However, instead Philip is measured and respectfully addresses the envoys as '*ceteri legati*'. He merely proceeds to point out for their benefit (and the Athenians back in Athens), that those who spoke such things show more arrogance (*superbiores*) than those who listen without retaliation (*impune*). This aligns with Senecaʼs thoughts elsewhere (e.g. *De Const. sap.* 11.1). Here he believed that insults came from the proud and arrogant (*superbi insolentesque*), but what enabled men like Philip to scorn their puffed up attitude (*affectum inflatum*) with *impune* was what Seneca called, 'the noblest of all the virtues, magnanimity' (*pulcherriman virtutem omnium, magnanimitatem*). Seneca believed that a statesman or a leader was unable to truly rule well without this particular virtue. Philipʼs *impune* (reiterated at *De Ira* 3.24.1), along with the *moderatio* and *lenitas* of this sectionʼs introduction, were

[685] 'In all your actions remember that you are a king, and take care never to do anything which is beneath the dignity of your station.'
[686] Seneca also thought that *severitas* did not discourage crime and bad behaviour; a mild ruler was a more secure ruler (*De Clem.* 1.22-24).
[687] Seneca does note that sometimes feigning anger may be necessary (*De Ira* 2.14.1). Philip seems to use it here to get the envoys' attention and emphasise his next words. In Philip's period, Isocrates had also believed in mild punishment and a king feigning anger during punishment when necessary (Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 23).

manifestations of *magnanimitas*, and Seneca's *exemplum* was a useful illustration and teaching aid for those in search of it.

Philip's address to the other envoys highlighted his actions, and illustrated the moral point of the entire episode for the explicit benefit of others. It is a lesson and an admonishment, and one which Seneca would have appreciated, for the *sapiens* 'will sometimes, just as if they were children, admonish them and inflict suffering and punishment, not because he has received an injury, but because they have committed one' (*De Const. sap.* 12.3). Indeed, it was permissible according to Seneca, 'for he is not avenging himself, but correcting them' (*De Const. sap.* 12.3). The *sapiens* is a physician of a sort, healing the moral ills of those around him.[688] Philip took the arrogance of an individual and turns it into a lesson or benefit for many. It is an action which Seneca seeks to replicate and multiply exponentially in his own use of the *exemplum*.

In conclusion, Seneca's use of this *exemplum* of Philip II is a vivid and memorable illustration of Seneca's argument in *De Ira*. It offers insight into imperial Roman society and culture, revealing something of the preoccupations and challenges facing Seneca and his readers.[689] Like the Greeks and Macedonians, the Romans too lived with anger as a destructive quality. They also now lived under autocrats (some anxiously), whose supreme power dramatically increased general interest in their moral standards. Seneca's historical *exempla* (like Philip's) explored these standards. They also helped to mediate between the abstract discourse of Seneca's specialised work, and the reality of a lived experience in the Roman world under autocrats.[690]

Philip's *exemplum* in *De Ira* was a measure and a guide from the ancient past for individuals (particularly statesmen) to meditate on anger – and on the nature of power and its use. It clearly glances back to the recent past (to Caligula), roots itself in the present (under Claudius and his regime), but looks with one eye to the future – a future which found Seneca still useful to contemplate such things (if his enduring fame is any indication).[691] Seneca's legacy offers insight into those aspects of Roman culture which political narratives easily overlook. It shows a prevailing need by the Romans for a broader range of significant social behaviours and virtues (many tied to *humanitas*) beyond more traditional aristocratic ones like *gloria*.[692] Seneca had believed that some of those qualities and behaviours were embodied in Philip's *exemplum*.

[688] On the physician analogy – *De Const. sap.* 31.1-2; *De Clem.* 1.17.2 and *De Ira* 1.6.3; 2.10.7; cf. *Cons. Polyb.* 13.1.
[689] Griffin 1976: 26; and Habine 2000: 265.
[690] Cf. Habinek 2000: 265.
[691] Cf. Habinek 2000: 265.
[692] Habinek 2000: 284.

Conclusion

The above 'Bosworthian string' of tales in which Philip is criticised or slandered has revealed some remarkable themes. For example, there is the dominating role played by self-control (*sophrosune* or *enkrateia*) and other associated virtues; the difficulty of competing traditions and protagonists; the universality of limiting detail; the general versatility of *apophthegmata* (to speak to a variety of meanings, dedicatees, and audiences); the role of Philip's companions and advisors; Philip's political shrewdness, wit, kindness and personality; the reorientation of the focus of an anecdote; implicit and explicit messages to statesmen and leaders on desirable and undesirable behaviour; and the role of rhetoric and intertextual references. There were also many elements present which appealed to Plutarch (our main author) more specifically, such as the idea of a statesman's immunity to criticism or *parrhesia*, the control of emotions (especially anger) through *logos*, the role of advisors, the disparity between friends and flatterers, and especially the virtues of πραότης and φιλανθρωπία. All of these elements were clearly present during the examination of the 'anecdote cycle' above.

Aside from confirming the difficulty of working with this kind of evidence, these aspects help show that Philip was a famous statesman and autocrat from the past, who became something of a positive symbol or standard for later periods when it came to taking abuse or dealing with free-speech (perhaps in deliberate contrast with his son – whose famous indiscretions cost lives). Philip was what could be explained as a 'large-screen projection of those human possibilities a culture believes are the most fascinating and perhaps useful for its survival' (Braudy 1986: 587-88).[693] He was a behavioural paradigm whose tales were promulgated throughout the Roman Empire by popular authors (like Plutarch and Seneca) to form beneficial currents in the deep cultural reservoir of Graeco-Roman values (particularly regarding leadership). This allowed Philip's examples to help with the transmission of ethics and the morality of leadership, and the replication of *ethos* among the elites of imperial Rome – all of which contributed to the ideological cohesion of the empire under the Principate.[694] Philip's tales of criticism and self-control were small building blocks in a huge ideological edifice which held up and perpetuated monarchy, morality and culture in the Imperial Roman world.

[693] Cf. Habinek 2000: 266.
[694] Habinek 2000: 289, 299. On the construction of autocracy in the Roman world, and the relationship between the aristocracy and emperors – Roller 2001.

5

Philip - Friendship and Politics

The Legacy of the Wisdom, Wit and Generosity of Philip II in the Roman World

> Προτρέπετε τοὺς νεωτέρους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν μὴ μόνον παραινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ὑποδεικνύοντες, αὐτοῖς οἵους εἶναι χρὴ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ἀγαθούς (Isoc. *Nic.* 57).[695]

This chapter examines those tales which concern Philip II as a statesman negotiating the important spheres of friendship and politics. It considers the legacy of Philip's wisdom, wit and generosity as found in those tales and sayings which survived into the Roman period. To analyses this aspect of Philip's memory, a range of themes are discussed. General topics include wisdom (*phronesis*), judging character, trust, praise, rewards and benefactions, greed, bribery, industriousness, wit, and humour. The chapter further reveals the role of Philip's legacy as a moral (monarchic) paradigm with which to consider a range of diverse aspects of leadership, politics and society, particularly in relation to a monarch and his friends. It also grounds these tales in the ideologies of the two most influential writers in monarchic ideology of the fourth century BCE – Isocrates and Xenophon. This demonstrates that tales concerning Philip align generally with the spirit of his age in regard to an (idealized) leader's or king's behaviour. It demonstrates the continuity of many ideas regarding monarchy and statesmanship between Philip's period and that of Roman domination of the Mediterranean world.[696]

There is little doubt that Philip was a supreme statesman and diplomat. Intelligent and charismatic, Philip used his persuasive diplomatic talents on an expansive scale to secure and extend his power in the Balkans and Greece.[697] Indeed, it has been argued that Philip's first objective was always to use diplomacy, and more often than not successfully.[698] This kind of talent was of course a reflection of Philip's personal interactions with individuals. This chapter shows that

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[695] 'Exhort the young to virtue not only by your precepts but by exemplifying in your conduct what good men ought to be.'

[696] There is less effort to dissect and scrutinize each anecdote's minutiae in this chapter. Instead, the focus is on exposing the general themes and ideas outlined above.

[697] Even when Philip controlled Greece after Chaeronea – 'Philip wanted to show himself an amiable person to the Greeks (ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο φιλοφρονεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας - Diod. 16.91.6).'

[698] Ryder 1994: 228-57; cf. Cawkwell 1996: 98-121.

those interactions were based largely on Philip's use of wisdom, wit, courtesy and generosity, which cultivated positive political relationships and personal friendships.[699] Philip may have left something of a different impression on some individuals,[700] but these tales and sayings all demonstrate that Philip was an influential exemplar with whom Roman period authors and readers considered contemporary concerns around these aspects of leadership.

To understand Philip as a Macedonian statesman, diplomat, and friend, a general understanding of Macedonia itself, its political structure, and some of its social and cultural aspects is important. Firstly, Macedonia was a large territorial state, which grew considerably under Philip.[701] Its centralized royal power made it distinct from the self-governing city-states of many of the Greeks.[702] It had more in common with the later Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome under the emperors than any contemporary Greek *poleis*.[703] This is important as it allowed for cultural correlation between the role of the king or *basileus* and the role of later autocrats from different periods by theorists and authors alike.[704]

Power and practical administration was in the hands of the king and his entourage.[705] However, it seems that powerful barons and families could exert influence on more significant state affairs e.g. succession or war and peace.[706] Indeed, the leading families of the state were intimately associated with the royal court through several influential institutions e.g. the *basilikoi paides* and *somatophylakes*.[707] A king would need to make decisions that were in the interests of his most important companions and backers, as well as his own. Therefore, the most powerful of these men must have formed an informal but influential council of state.[708] However, its influence would have

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[699] E.g. 'He [Philip] was courteous in his intercourse with men… sought to win over the multitude by gifts and promises (Diod. 16.3.3)'; and 'Philip showed a kindly face to all in private and in public (φιλοφρονούμενος - Diod. 16.89.2).' On the public use of private relationships in the Greek world – Mitchell 1997: esp. 148-166 (on Philip).

[700] Contrast many of the general remarks of Demosthenes and Theopompus with those of Aeschines e.g. 'Philip showed both memory and eloquence when he spoke (Aesch. 2.48).'

[701] Errington 1990: 7 n. 8. On the prehistory and historical geography of the Macedonia area – *HM* 1 and 2; (*n.b.* Zahrnt 1983: 36f.); Geyer 1930. On the early development of the state – Rosen 1978: 1f.; Borza 1982; 1982b; 1990; 1999; Zahrnt 1984: 325f.; and Thomas 2010: 65-80.

[702] Errington 1990: 4. On the Greeks and the Macedonians – Engels 2010: 81-98 and Worthington 2014: 7-24. For Greek views on the Macedonians and their monarchy – Hammond 1992: 19-21. For Greek (and Roman views) on the Macedonians in general – Asirvatham 2010: 99-124.

[703] The Argead kings in theory enjoyed an absolute power the Greeks would only have recognized in tyrants and non-Greek peoples e.g. the Illyrians, the Thracians, and the Persians. Sparta still had a hereditary monarchy – but its powers were officially restricted (Errington 1990: 4-5; cf. Cartledge 2001: 55-67). For a general overview of Macedonian kingship – Aymard 1967: 100-122; King 2010: 373-391; Greenwalt 2010: 152-54; and Lane Fox 2011: 359-366.

[704] On the use of the term *basileus* – Errington 1974: 20–37.

[705] The social and political structure (including kingship) of the Macedonian state is much discussed. However, scholars fall into two basic camps – 'constitutionalists' (e.g. Granier 1931 and Aymard 1948: 232–63; 1950: 61–97; 1950B: 115–37; and 1955: 215–34; Briant 1973; Goukowsky 1975: 263-77; and Hammond 1980: 455-76) and 'monarchic autocrats' (e.g. de Francisci in 1948; Lock 1977: 91-107; Lévy 1978: 201-25; Anson 1985: 303-16, 1991: 230-47) (King 2010: 374-5 - with bibliography pp. 390-391). The view followed here is essentially the autocratic one as found in Errington 1978: 77-133; 1983: 89-101; and 1990.

[706] Errington 1990: 5, 7. On Philip and Macedonian royal succession – Anson 2009: 276-286.

[707] King 2010: 380-82.

[708] Perhaps called in the Archaic period the *paredroi* (Hdt. 8.138.1), and under Alexander – *ho syllogos ton hetairon* (Arr. 2.25.2), and *consilium amicorum* (Curt. 6.8.1) – Errington 1990: 5 and King 2010: 282-284.

been proportionate and dependant on its own composition and the personality of the reigning monarch. The stronger the king, the less it could have leveraged its weight in matters of state.[709] Indeed, a king like Philip had a dynamic relationship with his entourage which sheds some light on his personality and Macedonian court life if many of his anecdotes are to be even half accepted. Nonetheless, Macedonia's monarchy dominated almost everything. It was the defining characteristic of the Macedonian state as a whole, and like the later principate, was never seriously questioned as an institution.[710] This allowed for meaningful comparative judgements and considerations to be made between Philip's tales and sayings and the behaviour of later autocrats.

Judging Character, Trust and Praise

In chapter three, Philip's ability to judge character was observed (e.g. example 3.3 – the judge who dyed his hair). The initial anecdotes of this chapter return to this idea. Assessing others was an important skill for a king or leader to possess (e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.39; *Anab.* 1.9.28-29). His immediate safety, the welfare of the state, and his popularity among the general populace were intimately linked to those who surrounded him or performed duties in his name. Isocrates was well aware of this during Philip's period.

> Φίλους κτῶ μὴ πάντας τοὺς βουλομένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῆς σῆς φύσεως ἀξίους ὄντας, μη δὲ μεθ' ὧν ἥδιστα συνδιατρίψεις, ἀλλὰ μεθ' ὧν ἄριστα τὴν πόλιν διοικήσεις. ἀκριβεῖς ποιοῦ τὰς δοκιμασίας τῶν συνόντων, εἰδὼς ὅτι πάντες οἱ μή σοι πλησιάσαντες ὅμοιόν σε τοῖς χρωμένοις εἶναι νομιοῦσιν (Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 27).[711]
>
> μηδεμίαν συνουσίαν εἰκῇ προσδέχου μηδ' ἀλογίστως, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείναις ταῖς διατριβαῖς ἔθιζε σαυτὸν χαίρειν, ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τ' ἐπιδώσεις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις βελτίων εἶναι δόξεις (Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 2.29).[712]

However, gauging individuals was not really considered a virtue *per se*. Instead, judging character was associated with a monarch's wisdom (which was a virtue), both in his personal relationships and in the wider political sphere as a good ruler relies on good friends, governors, and generals.

[709] There is no real evidence of any formal assembly of the people. However, it seems that those eligible for military service could express group opinions and exert some kind of pressure (Errington 1990: 5; for succinct discussion of the problem – King 2010: 383-388).
[710] Cf. Errington 1990: 218.
[711] 'Do not give your friendship to everyone who desires it, but only to those who are worthy of you; not to those whose society you will most enjoy, but to those with whose help you will best govern the state. Subject your associates to the most searching tests, knowing that all who are not in close touch with you will think that you are like those with whom you live.'
[712] 'Do not contract any intimacy heedlessly or without reflection, but accustom yourself to take pleasure in that society which will contribute to your advancement and heighten your fame in the eyes of the world.'

This skill was of course part of the monarch's *sophia* (σοφία), and the more practical or prudent *phronesis* (φρόνησις - sometimes γνώμη).[713] It was thought to be especially crucial to rulers who had power over many important affairs (e.g. Isoc. *Evag.* 80).[714] In the Roman world this quality was easily identified with a ruler's *sapientia* or *prudentia*,[715] qualities which were certainly noted when present in emperors (e.g. Dio 68.6 on Trajan). In the fourth century BCE this wisdom, rather than any fortune, could be a true source of admiration, security, and longevity –

> φυλακὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἡγοῦ τοῦ σώματος εἶναι τήν τε τῶν φίλων ἀρετὴν καὶ τῆν τῶν πολιτῶν εὔνοιαν καὶ τῆν σαυτοῦ φρόνησιν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ σώζειν τὰς τυραννίδας μάλιστ' ἄν τις δύναιτο (Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 21; cf. 30).[716]

Therefore, the ability of a king to evaluate the characters' of others, especially those around him, was very important. So too was the way a monarch treated these individuals and behaved around them. Hence, our first anecdote (**example 5.1**) comes unsurprisingly from Plutarch's Trajanic dedicated collection of *apophthegmata*. It involves Philip and his most important general Parmenion.[717]

> **5.1**
>
> Ἀθηναίους μὲν οὖν μακαρίζειν ἔλεγεν, εἰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν αἱρεῖσθαι δέκα στρατηγοὺς εὑρίσκουσιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ἕνα μόνον στρατηγὸν εὑρηκέναι , Παρμενίωνα (*Mor.* 177C = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 2).[718]

This straightforward *apophthegma* contains several ideas aside from the obvious message of Philip's heavy reliance on Parmenion.[719] Philip himself emphasizes this through his willingness to verbally express his trust, praise and honouring of others – admirable attributes themselves for a king and statesman (e.g. Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.4.10).[720] It also reflects Philip's χρηστότης (honesty) in regard to his success for Plutarch (cf. Plin. *Pan.* 36.4). However, most importantly, Philip's trust and high praise demonstrates his ability to judge the character and skills of Parmenion, whose role

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[713] It was a central theme in many early reflections on the good autocrat that power should be wielded by those who were wise enough to use it (e.g. Plato's *Statesman*; cf. Luraghi 2013: 20).

[714] *N.b.* Philip's reported love of knowledge – Isoc. *Ad Phil.* 29; cf. Aeschines' report that Demosthenes called Philip the 'cleverest man under the sun' (2.41). For other acknowledgements and praise of wisdom in a leader or ruler in the fourth century BCE e.g. Isoc. *Evag.* 23, 41, 65, 74; *Ep.* 1. 4; *Ep.* 5.2, 5; *Ep.* 7.1, 3, 8; *Ep.* 9.4, 7; *Ad Dem.* 19, 40; *Ad Nic.* 10, 51; *Ad Phil.* 110; *Bus.* 21; Xen. *Ages.* 6.4; 10.1, 11.9; and *Cyrop.* 1.6.23, 3.1.41. Cf. Gray 2011: 19-20.

[715] Perhaps following Demosthenes' example, Cicero (*De Orat.* 3.35) refers to Philip at one stage as *sapientissimum regem Philippum* (extremely sagacious king Philip). Cf. *De Offic.* 2.14.

[716] 'Believe that your staunchest body lies in the virtue of your friends, the loyalty of your citizens and your own wisdom for it is through these that one can best acquire as well as keep the powers of royalty.'

[717] On Parmenion – Heckel 1992: 13-23; 2009: 190-192; and Berve ii.298-306 no. 606.

[718] 'He said that he must congratulate the Athenians on their happy fortune if they could find ten men every year to elect as generals; for he himself in many years had found only one general, Parmenion.' Cf. Ars. 469 and Fuhrmann 1998: 259 n. 4.

[719] The main point of the boastful words of Philotas in Plutarch's *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute* (*Mor.* 339E).

[720] Cf. Isoc. Hel. 43, 67; Xen. *Hiero* 9.2-3; *Ages.* 7.3; and *Cyrop.* 1.6.20, 2.1.12, 2.1.30, 4.1.3-4, 4.4.3, 5.3.55, 6.2.4, 7.5.85, 8.1.29, 8.7.13. For Demosthenes opposite appraisal of Philip in this regard – Dem. 2.16-18.

as his most senior military leader was crucial.[721] Indeed, a loyal and successful army was the true basis of Philip's power. Philip's judgement of Parmenion, based here largely on the man's usefulness as a general,[722] reflects well that he held the most important position under Philip within the regime. Like those who commanded Rome's legions or held any real power under the emperor, such a position demanded complete trust. Philip only verbalizes what actions have already made apparent.

Philip's trust and praise also goes against the traditional fear and mistrust that bad rulers were meant to have of men of talent and virtue.[723] For example, Xenophon's tyrant ruler Hiero feels he must fear the brave, the wise and the just (*Hiero* 5.1-2).[724] It is an animosity towards a ruler's gifted subjects found in Herodotus' constitutional debate, where tyrants are said to envy the best men while they live, delight in the worst men, and listen happily to slander (Hdt. 3.80.4). Moreover, Plato has the tyrant ruler feel compelled to eliminate such talented men (*Rep.* 566d-568a), thereby becoming a man incapable of trust or true friendship (*Rep.* 576a and 580). These ideas appear to be more *topoi* of tyranny than anything, as a 'king' in the Greek world was always only ever one 'bad' action away from being labelled a tyrant. The solution to the problem of such talented men, according to Simonides' advice to Hiero, is to turn these men into friends and further develop their skills, thereby co-opting their virtues for the good of the ruler and the state (*Hiero* 9.6-10, 9.9-10). In another of Xenophon's images of good rule, the problem of how to incorporate such men of talent into one's administration also faced Cyrus. He rejected the idea of disarmament and banishment from his person, instead intuitively adopting the policy of friend making and sound utilization (*Cyrop.* 8.1.47-8.2).[725] Therefore, Philip's ability to utilize and praise men like Parmenion enabled him to make use of talented men, secure and promote his regime, and provide an example to others of confident and trusting leadership (cf. Isoc. *Ad Dem.* 10).[726] This tale was the embodiment of the first half of a simple lesson regarding leadership – a good monarch has and

[721] It is worth remembering Aristotle's famous remark that the tyrant does not trust his friends, unlike the king (*Pol.* 1313b29-31).

[722] Cf. Isocrates message to king Nicocles that, 'you ought not to judge what things are worthy or what men are wise by the standard of pleasure, but to appraise them in light of conduct that is useful' (Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 50). Philip's comments could also be viewed as a little disparaging towards his other generals. However, such praise and honouring may have had wider benefits for Philip – i.e. 'where the most deserving is seen to receive the most preferment, there all are seen to contend most eagerly for the first place' (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.4; cf. 8.4.5 and 8.3.49 – 'when people are praised by any one they are glad to praise him in turn').

[723] Cf. Gray 2011: 164-65.

[724] The essence of Xenophon's counsel in his *Hiero* is for the tyrant to try and govern like a good king (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1313A). On the *Hiero* as one of Xenophon's chief testimonies on leadership – Gray 1986: 115-23; 2007: 31-3; 2011: 158-62; Gelenczey-Mihalcz 2000: 113-21; Sevieri 2004: 277-287; and Leppin 2010.

[725] Gray 2011: 165

[726] Tales elsewhere show Alexander's faith in his father's ability to judge the characters of others e.g. Ael. *V.H.* 13.7 and Plut. *Phoc.* 17.4-5.

utilizes good men, whereas the bad ruler or tyrant mistrusts and fears such men (e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 68.3 and Cass. Dio 68.6).[727]

The *apophthegma* also implicitly highlights criticisms which were often levelled against the more democratic Athenian system of appointing military leaders. This indicates something of a boast in Philip's words, and suggests that this criticism of Athens was not altogether distasteful to Plutarch, who willingly recorded the tale. As an intelligent man, Plutarch realized that he lived in a world where loyal and strongly centralized military structures were imperative to the stability and defence of the Empire. Therefore, this short *apophthegma* would have its audience contrast the simple and successful appointment of Parmenion with the often messy and sometimes disastrous appointments made by Athens. As mentioned earlier, the unsavoury aspects of monarchy were used to highlight the good aspects of democracy; here that seems to have been reversed – the advantages of authoritarianism are used to underscore the more disorganized features of democracy or democratic institutions. Here that criticism is specific to appointments, but it had broader connotations which took in all aspects of administration and war. Plutarch's willingness to record this *apophthegma* with its implicit criticism aligns his thinking with the explicit statements of the more contemporary Isocrates and Demosthenes.[728]

However, the most important elements of this tale remain its emphasis on the ability to calculate a man's character, and to acknowledge that character and its achievements publicly. Indeed, the tale draws attention to the relationship between rulers and their more talented and powerful friends and supporters (cf. Xen *Cyrop.* 5.3.47). The friends of a ruler were also a reflection on the ruler himself. This meant that a leader's ability to surround himself with good individuals (generals, administrators and friends) and keep them, reflected their type of rule, and was a key attribute of monarchic ideology. Philip's tale shows that it was a quality to aspire to and trait to praise in others under the Roman Empire, particularly in relation to monarchs, whose position almost obliged them to honour few, and to trust even less.

This again seems to be the case in the next Philippic anecdote (**example 5.2**). Here Philip shows trust and good judgement regarding his selection of those whom he advances or adds to his retinue.

5.2

ἔτι δὲ παιδὸς ὄντος αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον παρεπιδημοῦντα καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντα τὰ τῶν Καρδιανῶν θεάσασθαι παγκράτια μειρακίων καὶ παλαίσματα παίδων, ἐν οἷς εὐνμερήσαντα τὸν Εὐμένη καὶ φανέντα συνετὸν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ἀρέσαι τῷ Φιλίππωκαὶ ἀναληφθῆναι. δοκοῦσι δὲ εἰκότα λέγειν μᾶλλον οἱ διὰ ξενίαν καὶ φιλίαν πατρῴαν τὸν

[727] Tacitus does make the point though in regard to Agricola that there could be good men under bad emperors (*Agr.* 42).
[728] E.g. Isoc. *Nic.* 22; Dem. *Or.* 1.4, Cf. 2.23, 27-30; 4.26, 36-37, 44, 47; and 18.235.

> Εὐμένη λέγοντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου προαχθῆναι (Plut. *Eum.*1.1-2 = Duris *FGrH* 76 F53).[729]

Eumenes impresses Philip here whilst exercising with his intelligence and bravery (συνετὸν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον). By doing so, the anecdote establishes two qualities which leaders should value in others (probably to reflect their own similar attributes), and particularly in those of their entourage.[730] Other Roman sources show clearly that Philip developed and utilized the young man's talents during his reign (Nep. *Eum.* 18.1.4-6).[731] Moreover, Plutarch himself details how the talented Eumenes would later also become influential under Alexander and during the wars of the *Diadochoi* in the rest of the man's biography. These facts alone seem to validate Plutarch's initial tale by demonstrating that Philip's assessment of the young man's qualities was proven correct during his lifetime and long after his death.

However, Plutarch is inclined to agree with unnamed sources which assigned Philip's preferential treatment and advancement of Eumenes to ties of guest-friendship with the man's father (Hieronymus). Moreover, one should also be wary of tales of youth in ancient biography which pre-empt qualities shown later in life.[732] Nevertheless, the point of this tale, and its most useful aspect in terms of model behaviour to any perspective audience, is that the talented young man's qualities are noticed by Philip who then takes him into his service to utilize them. Philip's accurate evaluation of another individual's positive qualities for his (and his kingdom's) benefit, reflects positively on him as a king, and as a statesman.[733] His selection of men, whose talents and achievements were known through hindsight to a later audience, reveals Philip's acute judgement of character – and elevates this quality to a *quasi*-virtue of monarchic ideology (cf. Isoc. *Nic.* 16). The tale uses the historical knowledge of Plutarch' auditors to demonstrate Philip's ability and responsibility as a monarch to make correct judgements of character, and to utilize capable individuals (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.2.26 and 8.1.10-12).

Contextually, these two tales of Plutarch tap into contemporary currents of imperial ideology. Indeed, during this period there was some emphasis on Trajan's friendships, his choice in subordinates, and his willingness to reward good administration and behaviour. For example, Dio

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[729] 'While he was still a boy, Duris says further, Philip, who was sojourning in the place and had an hour of leisure, came to see the young men and boys of Cardia exercising in the pancratium and in wrestling, among whom Eumenes had such success and gave such proofs of intelligence and bravery that he pleased Philip and was taken into his following. But in my opinion those historians tell a more probable story who say that a tie of guest-friendship with his father led Philip to give advancement to Eumenes.'

[730] On Eumenes – Berve ii 156-8 no. 317; Bosworth 1992; and Heckel 2009: 120-121. Nepos *Eum.* 1.6, 13.1 for Philip's esteem of the young man's intelligence.

[731] On Cornelius Nepos – Geiger 1985; Dionisotti 1988: 35–49; Millar 1988: 40–55; Tuplin 2000: 124–61; Titchener 2003: 85–99; and Beneker 2009: 109-121.

[732] On childhood and youth in Plutarch – Soares 2014: 373-90.

[733] There are no anecdotes showing Philip actively jealous of individuals of talent and excellence (like a tyrant). Authentic political opponents like his step-brothers or pretenders to the throne such as he faced when he became king are not counted.

Cassius argues that Trajan 'did not envy nor kill anyone, but honoured and exalted all without exception that were men of worth, and hence he neither feared nor hated one of them' (68.6). Pliny notes Trajan's gift for friendship in his *Panegyricus* (85) and that, 'you [Trajan] choose your friends from the best of your subjects' (45.3), and that, 'these then are the men you promote and show as a typical example of the way of life and the kind of man you prefer' (45.4-6).[734] Moreover, 'good deeds win more solid recognition than the mere consciousness of having performed them… it brings them honours, priesthoods, provinces from your hands, and they flourish in your friendship and favour. This payment for application and integrity spurs on others like them' (44.5-6). Plutarch's choice of *apophthegmata* and anecdotes here and elsewhere harmonize well with the spirit of the age of Trajan. They offer up Philip's image as an exemplar, comparative, and endorsement.

In another tale (**example 5.3**) Philip demonstrates his trust in another of his top generals and friends.

5.3

> Κοιμηθεὶς δὲ πλείονα χρόνον ἐπὶ στρατείας εἶτα διαναστάς, "ἀσφαλῶς," εἶπεν, "ἐκάθευδον· Ἀντίπατρος γὰρ ἐγρηγόρει (Plut. *Mor.* 179B = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 27)."[735]

The sentiment is straight forward. Philip sleeps easy because he knows that Antipater, a man he obviously places great trust in, is awake and taking care of business.[736] To be a good leader one had to delegate effectively.[737] To delegate was to trust. Even though his witty remark does deflect focus away from the fact that he has perhaps over slept whilst on campaign, it shows the deep respect Philip held for Antipater as a capable officer – and shows Philip voicing it publicly (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.2.5; 8.1.39). Again, Plutarch could easily relate it to his own period in which those in responsible positions could 'rest assured that incorruptibility and application on their part can expect the highest reward in the Emperor's judgment and support…[as] the field of promotion and fame lies open to all' (Plin. *Pan.* 70.5, 8). Philip's tale of trust and confidence easily fulfils the objective of his collections' introduction. It allows Philip to transcend the confines of his own saying and history – and become a meaningful exemplar of good autocratic government.

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[734] Noreña (2011A: 32) argues that friendship had not been a prominent theme in Greek and Roman literature on monarchy, emerging in the discourse on good kingship only in the early second century CE, and that Pliny is innovating here in his *Panegyricus* (cf. Dio *Or.* 3.86-116; M. Aur. *Med.* 1.16.10, 6.30.13). This timing fits well with Plutarch from whom most of the Philippic material on friendship comes. However, whilst this appears true in terms of explicit praise, these stories of Philip and his friends (and the countless other anecdotes concerning rulers and their friends), had been around for centuries – their very survival linked to their implicit value in monarchic ideology.

[735] Once on campaign he (Philip) slept for an unusually long time, and later, when he arose, he said, 'I slept safely, for Antipater was awake.'

[736] On Antipater – Heckel 2006: 35-38.

[737] Philip's role as supreme military commander would have often forced him appoint deputies to take charge of his other affairs (King 2010: 379; cf. Thuc. 1.62).

Example 5.3 also has close affiliations to two other tales. The first (**example 5.4**) is found in Athenaeus in a small section detailing (unsurprisingly) some of the drinking habits of Philip.

5.4

Καρύστιος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ἱστορικοῖς Ὑπομνήμασιν, ὅτε, φησί, μεθύειν προῃρεῖτο Φίλιππος, τοῦτ' ἔλεγε· "χρὴ πίνειν· Ἀντίπατρος γὰρ ἱκανός ἐστι νήφων" (Athen. *Deip.* 10.435D = fr. 3, *FHG* iv.357).[738]

Philip's amusing remark gives the impression that if Antipater is sober, then there is at least one sober general left in charge of things while the others indulged in merriment. Therefore, all was well and they could all relax. It is high praise for Antipater, whose willingness to disapprove openly with some of Philip's antics might have had something to do with Philip's trust in Antipater's competence (cf. Athen. 10.435D).[739] Either way, Philip publicly acknowledges his faith in, and reliance on Antipater's abilities to handle Philip's business. The broadcasting of such an opinion was one way in which Philip could overtly show respect and reward merit among his top commanders (other than gifts).[740] It was a simple, but powerful gesture which highlighted the man's worth to the king, and his relative position at court. Indeed, the delegation of command and responsibility was powerful praise at Philip's court or any other court, even in jest (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.4.1). Moreover, as the stability of a monarch's power base necessitated such treatment, it is unsurprising that it emerges as a strong theme in Philip's tales. Ultimately, it displays the monarch's political *phronesis* both in the maintenance relationships (with friends and subordinates), and his preservation power through these actions. Together with the other tales above, it shows that the virtue of wisdom (in leadership) was critical in all periods, and was a strong link binding Philip II to the contemporary world of emperors, legates, governors and senators. All these individuals also had to navigate difficult and uneven relationships determined primarily by the dynamics of power. Philip's humour on these occasions offered an amusing model by which this concession to the talents and competence of others could be made more palatable to an autocrat's ego. Praise and respect are forced to share the stage with the leader's wit.

The second related tale (**example 5.5**) is again from Plutarch's *apophthegmata* collection (following example 5.3 in the text), and shows Philip once more oversleeping.

[738] Carystius says in his *Historical Commentaries*: When Philip decided to get drunk, he used to say the following: 'We need to start drinking; because if Antipater's sober, that's enough.'
[739] It is interesting that Isocrates praises outspokenness under a monarchy in a letter to Antipater (*Ep.* 4.4-6; cf. *Ad Dem.* 45; *Ad Nic.* 28). Cf. Xen. *Ages.* 11.5
[740] On leaders rewarding merit – Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.2.20, 2.2.21, 2.2.28, 2.3.16, 2.4.9, 3.1.43, 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 4.1.2, 6.2.6; *Anab.* 5.8.25-6; *Oec.* 13.11-12; Isoc. *Evag.* 42; *Ad Nic.* 16. Cf. Gray 2011: 283-88.

5.5.

Πάλιν δὲ ἡμέρας καθεύδοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἠθροισμένων ἐπὶ θύραις Ἑλλήνων ἀγανακτούντων καὶ ἐγκαλούντων, ὁ Παρμενίων, "μὴ θαυμάσητε," εἶπεν, "εἰ καθεύδει νῦν Φίλιππος· ὅτε γὰρ ἐκαθεύδετε ὑμεῖς, οὗτος ἐγρηγόρει (Plut. *Mor.* 179B = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 28)."[741]

However, this time the witticism comes from Philip's trusted general Parmenion. Though it is not clear where this anecdote takes place, it clearly implies that while these Greeks were sleeping – Philip was awake.[742] In light of Plutarch's inclination for recording positive *apophthegmata* in his collection, it suggests that Philip was up late doing something industrious, that is planning or working.[743] However, there is no clear account of Philip's activities. Therefore, Parmenion's witty (but ambiguous) comment could be interpreted as meaning that Philip was working and planning either on their behalf, or if they were opponents – for their detriment. Either of these options reflects well on Philip's energy and industriousness.[744] Therefore, this *apophthegma* contains a simple lesson of leadership or of monarchic ideology. Leaders must be willing to work hard and long hours, even late into the night - forgoing normal sleep. It highlights Philip's endurance as a statesman – his *karteria*.[745] The ingenuity of this *apophthegma* lies in its ambiguity. This allows the sentiment to be applied by leaders to either life in the field against opponents, or at home on behalf of those being governed. Either way, Philip's night time industry becomes a universal message about a ruler's obligation to work outside the confines of normal parameters which continued to find relevance centuries after his death (e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 13.3).

Friends, Kindness and Generosity

The example above hinted at a Philip whose industry was for the sake of those he ruled and his friends. This work ethic, along with the gift of public acknowledgement (above) would align with other examples of Philip's regard for his friends and supporters. As already seen, a ruler's kindness and generosity towards his friends was critical element in admirable paradigms of

[741] On another occasion when he (Philip) was asleep in the daytime, and the Greeks who had gathered at his doors were indignant and complaining, Parmenion said, 'Do not be astonished that Philip is asleep now; for while you were asleep he was awake.' Cf. the similar tale of Alexander's – Plut. *Al.* 32; Curt. 4.13.17-22; Diod. 17.56.
[742] The disgruntled Greeks could be anyone from hired mercenaries in Philip's employ on campaign or Greek envoys trying to gain audience with him.
[743] Cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.42; *Ages.* 5.3, 11.6.
[744] Elsewhere, Plutarch argues that leaders must realize that it was part of their duty to watch over their people and remain at their post when all others are feasting or sleeping (*Mor.* 781CD). Philip's great enemy Demosthenes was also noted for working hard through the night as part of his traditional portrait e.g. Plut. *Dem.* 8.3; ps. Lucian *Dem.* enc. 11.14-15; Libanius *Progy.* 3.31.
[745] Cf. Xen. *Ages.* 5.2; *Lac. Pol.* 15.4; and *Cyrop*. 8.2.4.

monarchic ideology.[746] It could be thought of in terms of virtues like εὐεργεσία, ἐλευθεριότης, *liberalitas*, and *indulgentia*. In general, these all added up to the cheerful giving of favours, gifts and benefactions to those who deserved them. It seems to have been an essential virtue for Philip as well as for later monarchs.[747] Good examples of this during Plutarch's period are found throughout Pliny's *Panegyricus* and letters to Trajan. They are full of references to the emperor's kindness and generosity towards friends (normally termed *indulgentia, benignitas, bonitatas*, *beneficium* and *liberalitas*).[748] Indeed, just being a friend and having friends was considered extremely important as they were essential to maintaining a ruler's position (e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 85; cf. n.33).

It was a good ruler's responsibility to extend kindness and benefactions towards his friends and those he ruled. **Example 5.6** comes from Diodorus Siculus, and shows Philip as a benefactor to his friends.[749]

5.6.A

Καὶ δήποτ' ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ κατανοήσας Σάτυρον τὸν ὑποκριτὴν σκυθρωπὸν ὄντ' ἤρετο διὰ τί μόνος οὐδὲν ἀξιοῖ μεταλαβεῖν παρ' αὐτοῦ φιλανθρωπίας· τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος ὅτι βούλεται παρ' αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν τινος δωρεᾶς δεδοικέναι δὲ μήποτε δηλώσας τὴν προκεχειρισμένην ἔντευξιν ἀποτύχῃ, ὁ μὲν βασιλεὺς περιχαρ�ὴς γενόμενος διεβεβαιώσατο πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν αἰτήσῃ χαρίσασθαι· ὁ δ' εἶπεν ὅτι ξένου τινὸς ἑαυτοῦ δύο παρθένοι τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχουσαι γάμου τυγχάνουσιν ἐν ταῖς αἰχμαλώτοις οὖσαι· ταύτας οὖν βούλεσθαι λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἵνα λυσιτέλειάν τινα περιποιήσηται τυχὼν τῆς δωρεᾶς, ἀλλ' ἵνα προικίσας ἀμφοτέρας συνοικίσῃ καὶ μὴ περιίδῃ μηδὲν παθούσας ἀνάξιον τῆς ἡλικί ας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦθ' ὁ Φίλιππος ἀσμένως τὴν αἴτησιν προσδεξάμενος παραχρῆμα τὰς παρθένους ἐδωρήσατο τῷ Σατύρῳ (Diod. 16.55.3-4).[750]

It is a lengthier anecdote with no witty *apophthegma* for its climax like the examples above – probably because of its context in a narrative history and not a collection. Instead, it is devoted to highlighting Philip's care and concern for his guests and friends, and his willingness to be generous towards them (Philip's εὐεργεσία and ἐλευθεριότης).[751] Even though Diodorus uses the anecdote to introduce some general comments regarding Philip's use of gifts and benefactions as agents of corruption (16.55.4), the granting of the apparently honourable request of Satyrus still allows Philip

[746] More examples include Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.28-29; 9.24; *Cyrop.* 1.2.1, 3.2.28, 5.3.2, 8.2.2, 8.2.13, 8.4.31.
[747] Some think Philip's bountiful gift giving much like that of Homer's kings (Lane Fox 2011: 358).
[748] *Ep.* 2.3, 4.1, 5.1, 6.2, 8.5, 8.6, 10.2, 11.1, 12.1, 12.2, 13, 26.1, 51, 86, 92, 94.2-3, 104, and 120; *Pan.* 3.4., 21.4, 25.1-5, 27.3, 28.2-3, 32.3, 33.2, 34.3, 38.3-4, 43.4 (Nerva and Trajan), 43.5, 51.5, 58.5, 60.7, 69.5-6, 86.5, and 90.4. *Liberalitas* marked a good emperor also in Suetonius e.g. *Aug.* 41.1; *Vesp.* 17; cf. *Nero* 10.1; *Dom.* 9.1. On *liberalitas* and *indulgentia* and emperors like Hadrian, Trajan, and Caracalla – Noreña 2011B: 258-260, and 276-82.
[749] On the sources of book sixteen – Hammond 1937-8: 79-91; on Diodorus – Sacks 1990, and 1994: 213-32.
[750] 'At one time in the course of the drinking bout, noticing Satyrus, the actor, with a gloomy look on his face, Philip asked him why he alone disdained to partake of the friendly courtesy he offered; and when Satyrus said that he wished to obtain a boon from him but he feared lest, if he disclosed the request he had decided upon, he should be refused, the king, exceedingly pleased, affirmed that he granted forthwith any favour he might ask. He replied that there were two virgin daughters of a friend of his who were of marriageable age among the captive women these girls he wished to obtain, not in order to derive any profit if he was granted the gift, but to give them both a dowry and husbands and not permit them to suffer any indignity unworthy of their years. Thereupon Philip gladly acceded to his request and immediately made a present of the girls to Satyrus.'
[751] For acknowledgment and praise of Philip's benefactions (εὐεργεσίαις) by Isocrates – *Ad Phil.* 20 and 41.

to demonstrate his magnanimity and benevolence towards the captured girls. It also shows his concern for proper Greek social *mores*. Philip does not play the barbarian role of his detractors.[752] Even though it is Satyrus who will ultimately carry out a father's role for the girls regarding their futures – it is only with Philip's blessing that it is possible. Philip is really their true benefactor. Moreover, Philip grants the man's request before it is even made known to him what it will involve. Indeed, Philip does this despite being warned that he might not like the request. Philip's kindness and generosity and will to do right by his friends and supporters appears almost *unconditional*. The ideals and lessons here are easily directed towards those who had the power to bestow benefactions on their friends.[753] Furthermore, unlike a gift of money or riches to an individual friend for their own personal benefit, Philip's example demonstrates an act or gift which had the power to benefit multiple individuals – even society at large. Therefore, Satyrus is to play the father of the two girls, but Philip's generous actions have cast him as a *paternal* figure on a much larger scale.[754] It is his kindness which ultimately dominates any evaluations of the anecdote. This makes it an interesting tale, and perhaps timely message of the fourth century BCE to revive in the last years of the Roman Republic.

These ideas are made even clearer in another more sophisticated version of this anecdote. Found in Demosthenes' *On the False Embassy*, this version is surely one of earliest (if not the first) of the written accounts of this episode.

5.6.B

ἑστιῶν δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ στεφανῶν τοὺς νενικηκότας ἤρετο Σάτυρον τουτονὶ τὸν κωμικὸν ὑποκριτήν, τί δὴ μόνος οὐδὲν ἐπαγγέλλεται; ἤ τιν' ἐν αὐτῷ μικροψυχίαν ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀηδίαν ἐνεορακώς; εἰπεῖν δή φασι τὸν Σάτυρον ὅτι, ὧν μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι δέονται, οὐδενὸς ὢν ἐν χρείᾳ τυγχάνει, ἃ δ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἐπαγγείλαιθ' ἡδέως, ῥᾷστα μέν ἐστιν Φιλίππῳ δοῦναι καὶ χαρίσασθαι πάντων, δέδοικε δὲ μὴ διαμάρτῃ. κελεύσαντος δ' ἐκείνου λέγειν καί τι καὶ νεανιευσαμένου τοιοῦτον, ὡσοὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ ποιήσει, εἰπεῖν φασιν αὐτὸν ὅτι ἦν αὐτῷ Ἀπολλοφάνης ὁ Πυδναῖοςξένος καὶ φίλος, ἐπειδὴ δὲ δολοφονηθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκεῖνος, φοβηθέντες οἱ συγγενεῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπεξέθεντο τὰς θυγατέρας παιδί ' ὄντ' εἰς Ὄλυνθον. αὗται τοίνυν τῆς πόλεως ἁλούσης αἰχμάλωτοι γεγόνασι καὶ εἰσὶν παρὰ σοί, ἡλικίαν ἔχουσαι γάμου.ταύτας, αἰτῶ σε καὶ δέομαι, δός μοι. βούλομαι δέ σ' ἀκοῦσαι καὶ μαθεῖν οἵαν μοι δώσεις δωρειάν, ἄν ἄρα δῷς:ἀφ' ἧς ἐγὼ κερδανῶ μὲν οὐδέν , ἂν λάβω, προῖκα δὲ προσθεὶς ἐκδώσω, καὶ οὐ περιόψομαι παθούσας οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον οὔθ' ἡμῶν οὔτε τοῦ πατρός. ὡς δ' ἀκοῦσαι τοὺς παρόντας ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ, τοσοῦτον κρότον καὶ θόρυβον καὶ ἔπαινον παρὰ πάντων γενέσθαι ὥστε τὸν Φίλιππον παθεῖν τι καὶ

[752] The Greeks often thought of the Macedonians as barbarians – Thuc. 2.80.5; Isoc. *Pan.* 3; Dem. 15.15; and Dinarchus 1.24.

[753] According to Xenophon, Agesilaus was 'very gentle with friends' (πρᾳότης), and 'yielded most readily to a comrade' (*Ages.* 11.10). Moreover, he was 'very compliant to friends' (*Ages.* 11.12), and was, 'best pleased when he could dismiss his suitors quickly with their request granted' (*Ages.* 9.2). Among the countless sections dedicated to Cyrus' benefits to his friends – one sums it up best simply calling him a 'blessing to his friends' (*Cyrop.* 5.3.20). cf. *Mem.* 2.4-10 and *Hiero* 11.13.

[754] Cf. Xen. *Ages.* 8.1; 7.3; *Hiero* 11.14; *Cyrop.* 8.1.1; Hdt. 3.89 and Gray 2011: 325-327.

δοῦναι. καίτοι τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων ἦν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν Φιλίππου οὗτος ὁ Ἀπολλοφάνης (Dem. *De Fal. Leg.* 193-95).[755]

Its proximity in time to the historical events it purports to tell is well represented by the extra details it gives. However, the two main differences from the other account lies in the boisterous public endorsement of Satyrus' request, and Philip's knowledge that the true father of the girls (this time identified) had been one of the assassins of his older brother. Philip's concession to the request is also now an act of forgiveness. Even so, in a seemingly calculated act of misdirection, Demosthenes wishes to focus here on Satyrus and the unselfishness of his request in contrast to those of Philip's other envoys, guests and friends. However, not even the rhetoric of Demosthenes can redirect all the tale's moral approbation away from Philip's decision to grant this extraordinary request. Philip's capacity for kindness and generosity (and forgiveness) is all the more indelible on the auditor in this version with its extra detail. Philip assists the daughters of his brother's killer. In trying to illustrate the altruistic (and brave) behaviour of Satyrus around the powerful autocrat Philip, Demosthenes cannot escape the munificent reciprocity shown by the king. Auditors and readers of Demosthenes' work from all periods, who were accustomed to hearing of the tyrannical failings of Philip, are confronted implicitly by a more generous image of freedom's arch enemy. It was a contradictory image which could have exacerbated the state of negative and positive traditions surrounding Philip. It also shows how the story changed focus from Satyrus to Philip with some editing and reformulating in later versions (e.g. example 5.6.A), and entered the canon of exemplar stories focused on Philip's kingship.

Example 5.7 is again from Plutarch's collection. It once more shows Philip's care for his friends, and his fervent willingness to bestow favours upon them.

5.7

Ἱππάρχου τοῦ Εὐβοέως ἀποθανόντος, δῆλος ἦν βαρέως φέρων· εἰπόντος δέ τινος, "ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡραῖος ὢν ἐκεῖνος ἀποτέθνηκεν," "ἑαυτῷ γε," εἶπεν, "ἐμοὶ δὲ ταχέως· ἔφθη γὰρ τελευτῆσαι πρὶν ἤ παρ' ἐμοῦ χάριν ἀξίαν τῆς φιλίας ἀπολαβεῖν (*Mor.* 178E = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 21)."[756]

[755] 'At the entertainment at which he crowned the successful competitors, he asked Satyrus, the comedian of our city, why he was the only guest who had not asked any favor; had he observed in him any illiberality or discourtesy towards himself? Satyrus, as the story goes, replied that he did not want any such gift as the others were asking; what he would like to ask was a favor which Philip could grant quite easily, and yet he feared that his request would be unsuccessful. Philip bade him speak out, declaring with the easy generosity of youth that there was nothing he would not do for him. Thereupon Satyrus told him that Apollophanes of Pydna had been a friend of his, and that after his death by assassination his kinsmen in alarm had secretly removed his daughters, who were then children, to Olynthus. These girls had been made captive when the town was taken, and were now in Philip's hands, and of marriageable age. "I earnestly beg you," he went on, "to bestow them on me. At the same time I wish you to understand what sort of gift you will be giving me, if you do give it. It will bring me no gain, for I shall provide them with dowries and give them in marriage; and I shall not permit them to suffer any treatment unworthy of myself or of their father." It is said that, when the other guests heard this speech, there was such an outburst of applause and approval that Philip was strongly moved, and granted the boon. And yet Apollophanes was one of the men who had slain Philip's own brother Alexander.'

Philip even goes so far as to mourn the fact that Hipparchus has died too soon for him to bestow upon him the favours or gratitude (ἥ χάριν) that their friendship warranted.[757] Philip's devotion to his friend seems genuine and underscores the value he placed in his friendships. This care and attention accorded well with the values of Plutarch himself, who also placed great importance on friendship (*philia* or *amicitia*).[758] It was a significant topic in Greek and Roman ethics – and could denote a close association or a relationship of duties and obligations.[759] Aside from numerous references to friendships throughout Plutarch's *Lives*,[760] it even prompted works from Plutarch like *How to tell a Friend from a Flatterer* and *On Having Many Friends*.[761] For Plutarch, friendship came from the offering of goodwill and graciousness with virtue (εὔνοια καὶ χάρις μετ' ἀρετῆς - *Mor.* 93F = *De Amic.* 2), and true friendship required three things – virtue, intimacy, and usefulness (ἀρετην, συνήθειαν, χρείαν -*Mor.* 94B = *De Amic.* 3). Moreover, friendship consisted of continual association and mutual acts of kindness (ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ φιλοφροσύναις - *Mor.* 95A = *De Amic.* 4), much like those performed by Philip in tales already discussed, and in keeping with the spirit of Pliny's material in relation to Plutarch's addressee Trajan.

Plutarch thought of friendships also in terms of kindness and harmony between statesmen. Discord could lead to rivalry within a state and with other states (cf. Duff 1999: 89). At the heart of many inter-state relationships were traditions of guest-friendship. **Example 5.8** shows Philip acknowledging this tradition in another overt display of his kindness and generosity towards friends. It is also the first of a group of *apophthegmata* (numbers 18-21 in the Loeb) which deal thematically with Philip and friendship. This of course could be enlarged to include two other tales which introduce the group. They detail Philip's advice to Alexander regarding who he should associate with. This suggests again that the tales are arranged by the author and do not appear randomly.

5.8.

> Πρὸς δὲ Φίλωνα τὸν Θηβαῖον εὐεργέτην αὐτοῦ γενόμενον καὶ ξένον, ὁπηνίκα διῆγεν ἐν Θήβαις ὁμηρεύων, ὕστερον δὲ μηδεμίαν παρ' αὐτοῦ δωρεὰν προσδεχόμενον, "μή με," εἶπεν, "ἀφαιροῦ τὸ ἀνίκητον, εὐεργεσίας καὶ χάριτος ἡττώμενον (*Mor.* 178C = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.*18)."[762]

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[756] When Hipparchus of Euboea died, it was plain that Philip took it much to heart; and when somebody remarked, 'But, as a matter of fact, his death has come in fullness of time,' Philip said, 'Yes, in fullness of time for him, it is true, but swiftly for me, for he came to his end too soon to receive from me, as he ought, favours worthy of our friendship.'
[757] Hipparchus was one of the three men Philip set up to rule Eretria in 343 BCE (Dem. *Or.* 9.58; 18.295).
[758] Beck 2000: 29.
[759] On friendship in the classical world – Konstan 1997 and Fitzgerald 1997 (ed.).
[760] Cf. Duff 1999: 418.
[761] Russell 1973: 93-95; and Gianakaris 1970: 88-89.
[762] Philon the Theban had been his (Philip's) benefactor and host during the time he spent as a hostage in Thebes, but later would not accept any gift from him; whereupon Philip said to him, 'Do not deprive me of my invincibility by letting me be outdone in benefactions and favours.' Cf. Dem. 19.140.

This tale makes reference to Philip's time as a hostage at Thebes (371-368 BCE) and is clearly set sometime afterwards.[763] It does contradict other accounts of this period, one of which is found elsewhere in Plutarch and has Philip staying with the Theban general Pammenes (Plut. *Pel.* 26).[764] However, nothing here (or elsewhere), rules out the possibility that Philip spent time with various households.

What is important here is that Philip's actions speak not only to the idea of a φίλος - ξένος relationship,[765] but clearly demonstrate Philip's willingness to repay a debt of gratitude to a man he considered a former host and benefactor (εὐεργέτην).[766] It also underscores Philip's competitive nature, and Macedon's agonistic culture. Perhaps concerned with reputation here, Philip is reluctant to be defeated at anything – even the giving of benefactions and favours (εὐεργεσίας καὶ χάριτος).[767] Philon's refusal was not unique though. It was also politic or prudent for the Theban statesman in light of accusations levelled against men like Aeschines who apparently accepted Philip's largesse.[768] Indeed, a pragmatic view would see Philip's kindness/largesse as being key to many of the relationships he cultivated - relationships which were crucial to his power and influence at home and abroad.[769] However, any judgements on the matter should also take account of other anecdotes which reveal that Philip's kindness and friendship for men like Aeschines was ostensibly genuine in nature.

5.9

> Παράδοξόν γε, οὐ γάρ, <ἀλλ'> ἀληθές. ἐκπεσόντος Δημοσθένους ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, Αἰσχίνης [δὲ] ὁ Ἀτρομήτου ὁ Κοθωκίδης καὶ ἐνευδοκίμει τοῖς Μακεδόσι καὶ πάμπολυ περιῆν τῶν πρέσβεων τῷ φρονήματι. αἰτία δὲ ἦν ἅπα τούτου τῷ Αἰσχίνῃ ἥ τε πρὸς Φίλιππον Φιλία καὶ τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ δῶρα καὶ ὅτι πράως καὶ ἡδέως ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ ὁ Φίλιππος, μειλιχίῳ τῷ Βλέμματι προσβλέπων καὶ ὑποφαίνων τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ εὔνοιαν. ἅπερ οὖν πάντα ἐφολκὰ ἦν εἰς τὴν παρρησίαν τῷ Αἰσχίνῃ καὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὕροιαν... (*V.H.*8.12).[770]

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[763] On Philip's time as a hostage at Thebes – Diod. 15.61, 15.67.4, 16.2.2-3; Plut. *Pel.* 26.4-5; Justin 6.9.7, 7.5.1-3. For discussion – Aymard 1954: 15-30 and Worthington 2008:17-19.

[764] Justin and Diodorus would have Philip staying with Epaminondas.

[765] Cf. Fuhrmann 1998: 260-61. On reciprocity in ancient Greece – Gill, Postlewaite and Seaford (eds.) 1998.

[766] On just how serious Philip took these kinds of relationships – Sen. *Ben.* 4.37-38. Cf. Xen. *Ages.* 4.2, 3, and 11.3.

[767] Cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.4.32. Philip's slightly arrogant but charming *apophthegma*, which seeks to justify acceptance of his benefactions, is similar to that attributed to Alexander in his dealings with the Indian King Taxiles (Plut. *Mor.* 181C = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Al.* 24; cf. Plut. *Al.* 59).

[768] On Aeschines – Harris 1995. Cf. Phokian's refusal to accept a gift of money from Philip (Nep. *Phok.* 1.3-4; cf. Plut. *Phok.* 18.1-5). According to Duff, it was to demonstrate the 'proper attitude to wealth, and the correct way to be a 'friend' of a king' (1999: 135), and reflects the concerns of Greek political and moral discourse with behaviour around kings and powerful individuals. This may well be the case here and elsewhere when gifts from Philip are refused.

[769] *N.b.* the favours of Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia* are part of his strategy to gain useful friends and to deprive his rivals of support. Moreover, support and defections could be invitations for others to do likewise (Ambler 2001: 14; cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.2.3, 8; 4.6.1-10; 5.2.24-29; 6.1.46-49).

[770] 'Strange, is it not, but true. When Demosthenes lost his voice in Macedonia, Aeschines son of Atrometus, of the deme Cothocidae, was well regarded by the Macedonians and displayed far more confidence than the other members of the delegation. The reason for this was his friendship with Philip, the gifts he received from him, Philip's kind and

This tale (**example 5.9**) is from the *Varia Historia* of the Roman author Aelian. Written in the early third-century CE, the work is a collection of miscellaneous anecdotes and historical material.[771] The account concerns the events of the 'first embassy' (mid-March 346 BCE) of the 'Peace of Philocrates' during which Demosthenes was supposed to have lost his nerve and frozen whilst giving his speech before Philip (Aesch. 2.34; cf. 2.38).[772] Here, the opposite performance of Aeschines and its causes are recorded – all of which relate to the friendship and goodwill of Philip.

Philip's appearance in the *Varia Historia* of Aelian appears at first glance to be of mere capricious antiquarian interest. However, patterns do emerge in the text of the *Varia Historia* as a whole which point to a deeper meaning for most of its material.[773] Indeed, Aelian's choice of subject matter and genre were simultaneously safe and subversive.[774] He exploited a genre, whose programme of collecting large quantities of diverse and non-related material was not known generally for its agenda of overt invective, to fuel reflections regarding contemporary realities and mores. Moreover, the decision to use Classical and Hellenistic history as a resource allowed Aelian a certain semblance of removal from his subject matter which Roman history could not provide. It was easier and less overbearing to be critical of, or instructive to autocracy and elite culture through the use of foreign examples than through indigenous Roman ones.[775]

Aelian's work was never intended to be explicitly seditious either in tone or manner. Instead, it was something more nuanced. Indeed, Aelian's indictment elsewhere of the emperor Elagabalus shows Aelian to have some interest in the political life of Rome and the plight of his fellow Roman elite (despite his withdrawal from this traditionally Roman sphere of competition and fame seeking). It also shows him not to have been foolish. Indeed, his *Varia Historia* seems a rather opaque and subversive attack on certain emperors and aspects of the institution of the principate (all couched in the classicising language of a Philhellene). It critiques and even rebukes contemporary autocracy and elements of elite Roman culture through the medium of an idealised Hellenic past. But it also sought to educate through positive and negative models of behaviour and values.[776]

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patient willingness to listen to him; Philip's glance was sympathetic and displayed his good will. All these facts led Aeschines to speak freely and fluently...'

[771] On Claudius Aelianus and the *Varia Historia* – Wilson 1997: 1-23, Johnson 1997; Campanile 2006: 420-430; Morgan 2007: 156-57; and Smith 2014, esp. chapters 4, 5, and 9.

[772] Worthington 2008: 90-3; 2014: 71.

[773] Johnson's 1997 study of *paideia* in Aelian concludes that, 'Aelian has provided …[his] reader with material that conveys a moral message at the same time that it provides models of the correct way to respond to traditional literature (1997: iii).'

[774] It is a similar situation to Aelian's other major text – *de Natura Animalium*. For example, Smith argues that Aelian had a deep interest in monarchy, but his 'literary stylization of the traditional themes of the discourse is more radically indirect than those of Cassius Dio and Philostratus' (2014: 217).

[775] Despite this approach, Aelian still took pride in being Roman (e.g. *V.H.* – 2.38, 12.25, 14.45). Wilson 1997: 3.

[776] Aelian offers no coherent picture of Philip as being either a good or bad king e.g. Philip's first two anecdotes show that he could be either a slightly negative (3.45) or wholly positive model (4.19). This shows that any assumptions built

Moreover, aside from representing Aelian's interests, and his views on many aspects of life, religion, food, virtues and vices, the *Varia Historia* could also be seen as a manifesto of how to live and not live under autocracy for his fellow nobles.[777] Remember too, that it was from among their number that future leaders and emperors would come. Viewed from this angle, Aelian's work has a clear purpose – cultural, political, and social edification that ultimately sought to influence future elite and imperial behaviour.[778] This particular example's focus on sincere friendship and kindness between monarch and envoy was in itself a part of this process.

In **example 5.10** Philip is himself the recipient of an unexpected favour in the name of friendship. His actions in response are in keeping with the kindness and generosity Philip has so far shown in other examples. Therefore, Philip grants freedom to a prisoner when he performs Philip an unusual 'face saving' service.

5.10

> Ληφθέντων δὲ πολλῶν αἰχμαλώτων, ἐπίπρασκεν αὐτοὺς ἀνεσταλμένῳ τῷ χιτῶνι καθήμενος οὐκ εὐπρεπῶς· εἷς οὖν τῶν πωλουμένων ἀνεβόησε, "φεῖσαί μου, **Φ**ίλιππε, πατρικὸς γάρ εἰμί σου φίλος"· ἐρωτήσαντος δὲ τοῦ **Φ**ιλίππου, "πόθεν, ὦἄνθρωπε, γενόμενος καὶ πῶς;" "ἐγγύς," ἔφη, "φράσαι σοι βούλομαι προσελθών·" ὡς οὖν προσήχθη, "μικρόν," ἔφη, "κατωτέρω τὴν χλαμύδα ποίησον, ἀσχημονεῖς γὰρ οὕτω καθήμενος·" καὶ ὁ **Φ**ίλιππος, "ἄφετε αὐτόν," εἶπεν, "ἀληθῶς γὰρ εὔνους ὢν καὶ φίλος ἐλάνθανεν (*Mor.* 178C-D = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 19)."[779]

Again from Plutarch's collection, it shows Philip's ability to reciprocate an act of discreet kindness from an anonymous man. Philip's dignity as a king overseeing his prisoners is salvaged, and the man receives his freedom from Philip who publically recognizes him as a loyal friend in return. The anecdote speaks to clemency, friendship, benefactions and good will between men of power and those less fortunate. Plutarch's interest in this anecdote surely relates to these overt themes and their relationship to contemporary concerns around power relationships within the governing mechanisms of the empire – from the local provincial magistrate, all the way up to the *princeps* himself. Furthermore, though it was an archaic tale of extraordinary reciprocal favours which

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up about the characters of any individuals in Aelian are only ever one anecdote away from being toppled (not so much the philosophers).

[777] The epilogue of *De Natura Animalian* shows that Aelian chose not to stay at court and live a public life full of opportunities for money making. However, his role as a priest (according to the *Suda*) kept him busy and kept him in circulation outside what might be called strictly 'scholarly circles' (cf. *V.H.* 3.17; Wilson 1997: 5-6).

[778] Aelian might have read his work to his friends (*recitatio* had been common in previous times). There are three places in which Aelian addresses his readers in the plural (*V.H.* 1.28, 2.4, 3.16), which suggests a listening public. *V.H.* 13.4 also suggests that he envisioned a wide public audience (Wilson 1997: 7).

[779] 'On a time when many prisoners had been taken, Philip was overseeing their sale, sitting with his tunic pulled up in an unseemly way. So one of the men who were being sold cried out, 'Spare me, Philip, for I am a friend of your father's' And when Philip asked, 'Where, fellow, and how came you to be such?' the man said, 'I wish to tell you privately, if I may come near you.' And when he was brought forward, he said, 'Put you cloak a little lower, for you are exposing too much of yourself as you are sitting now.' And Philip said, 'Let him go free, for it had escaped me that he is a truly loyal friend.'' Cf. Ars. 469; Zenob. 5, 26. The apophthegm has given birth to the proverb - Ἦλθοι ξένος ὅστις ὀνήσει (Fuhrmann 1998: 261 – with refs.).

Plutarch revived for contemporary consumption, it was deeply grounded in ancient ideals. For example, Philip's actions are reminiscent of Xenophon's king Cyrus who had a policy to 'do large favours in return for small ones' (*Cyrop.* 8.2.12; cf.7.1.42), and proves the statement that 'when any one does [someone] a favour, they try to do him one in return' (*Cyrop.* 8.3.49).

In fact, it is important to show here that Philip's actions regarding friendships, kindness and generosity are in line with ancient monarchic ideology as expressed in his period by authors such as Xenophon and Isocrates. For example, in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, it is the king's kindness and generosity (particularly towards friends) which are front and centre throughout.[780] It is by being the benefactor of his friends that he receives their affection (1.6.24; cf. 3.3.4). Indeed, Cyrus exceeded 'all others in thoughtful attention to his friends and in care for them', and 'it is said to have been no secret that there was nothing wherein he would have been so much ashamed of being outdone as in attention to his friends' (8.2.13). Moreover, (and reminding us of Philip) Cyrus 'far exceeded all other men in the amount of the revenues he received, yet he excelled still more in the quantity of presents he made' (8.2.7). Cyrus even justifies his need for his wealth by stating that he uses it to satisfy his friends, for by 'enriching men and doing them kindness I win with my superfluous wealth their friendship and loyalty, and from that I reap as my reward security and good fame' (8.2.22).[781]

Xenophon believed that the role of a friend was to increase the *eudaimonia* of another through various benefits,[782] this in turn could lead to fame, power, and security.[783] In Xenophon's *Hiero*, the tyrant is advised –'enrich your friends, for so you will enrich yourself (11.13),' and by surpassing them in deeds of kindness, 'it is certain that your enemies will not be able to resist you' (11.14).[784] In his *Agesilaus*, Xenophon's prime paradigm of kingship shrewdly enriched his friends (1.17-19). Indeed, Agesilaus showed 'true comradeship' (φιλεταιρία - 2.21), and 'many acknowledged that they had received many benefits from him' (4.1). Agesilaus 'delighted in giving away his own for the good of others' (4.1), and was an 'unfailing friend' (11.13; cf. *Hell.* 5.5.45), who was in the use of money 'not only just but generous….thinking that the generous man is required also to spend his own in the service of others' (11.8). Finally, Xenophon argues that, 'it is the recipient of unbought, gratuitous benefits who is always glad to oblige his benefactor in return for the kindness he has received' (*Ages.* 4.4; cf. *Symp.* 8.36).

[780] E.g. *Cyrop.* 1.3.7, 1.3.12, 1.4.1, 1.4.4, 1.4.10-11, 1.4.26, 1.5.1, 1.5.13, 1.6.3, 2.3.12, 3.1.37, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.8-12, 5.3.4, 5.5.12, 8.2.1, 8.2.3, 8.4.6-7, 8.4.24, 28, 29, 8.5.21, 8.6.5. 8.7.1.
[781] Cf. 8.1.48, 8.2.10, 8.4.36.
[782] Gray 2011: 233.
[783] *Cyrop.* 8.2.22; Gray 2011: 315-318, 323. On the dynamics of friendship in Xenophon – Gray 2011: 289-329; in the *Cyropaedia* – Due 1989: 221-5.
[784] Cf. *Cyrop.* 8.7.7, 8.7.28; and Gray 2011: 34-35.

Isocrates believed that it was 'disgraceful… to be surpassed by your friends in doing kindness (*Ad Dem.* 26).[785] Moreover, just as Demonicus was 'generous to his friends' (*Ad Dem.* 10), as a leader you must, 'bestow your favours on the good; for a goodly treasury is a store of gratitude laid up in the heart of an honest man' (*Ad Dem.* 29). Indeed, 'display magnificence… in the benefits which you bestow upon your friends; for such expenditures will not be lost to you while you live' (*Ad Nic.* 19). Certainly, king Evagoras made his friends 'subject to himself by his benefactions' (*Evag.* 45). Isocrates goes so far as to write in a letter to Antipater that 'the most agreeable and profitable of all things is to win by one's kind deeds friends who are at the same time both loyal and useful…' (*Ep.* 4.9).[786]

From the examples above it seems certain that Philip's example as a leader and statesman maintaining friends through praise, kindness and generosity corresponded with ancient principles. It was a powerful exemplar in the contemporary Roman world, which was kept very much alive and relevant through these tales and sayings.

Greed and Bribery

Philip's wealth was famous – superseded only by his expenditure of that wealth and tales of extravagance.[787] However, there are divergent interpretations of Philip's expenditure and largesse.[788] We saw the positive above regarding Philip's kindness and generosity, particularly towards his friends.[789] However, more negative tales associate Philip's wealth with greed (*pleonexia*/*avaritia*), and his use of wealth to fund his rise to power by paying mercenaries and providing 'gifts' for goodwill and services.[790] However, even if gifts were a normal part of

[785] Cf. Theognis 869-72; Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.35; *Hiero* 11.14; *Cyrop.* 5.3.32; and *contra* Pl. *Rep.* 335A.

[786] These favours though should not be bestowed ungraciously (*Ad Dem.* 31). For other pronouncements regarding friendship - Isoc. *Ad Dem.* 16; *Ad Nic.* 22; 28; *Nic.* 58 and *Hel.* 37.

[787] E.g. Diod. 16.55.1-2; Just. 9.8; Plut. *Mor.* 327D; and Plin. *N.H.* 33.14.50. The kings of Macedonia owned and disposed of the natural resources of Macedonian territory like timber, royal land, silver and gold as they wished (Borza 1990: 56; and Errington 1990: 7-8, 222-23). Therefore, the king could give large gifts of money and land or offer bribes for domestic and foreign support. Philip was not the first Macedonian king to utilize Macedonian resources this way (e.g. Alexander I – Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.38; Diod. 14.92.3, 15.19.2; Plut. *Pelop.* 27; Hdt. 8.121; Dem. 12.21; King 2010: 379-380). The tale of Philip keeping a gold cup under his pillow in Pliny's *Natural History* (33.14.50) is used as part of an attack on the extravagance of the triumvir Antony.

[788] Being wealthy was part of an ideal king's powers to do good for his friends and subjects, and a means to fund the army (or mercenaries) for security. However, this wealth was also a moral challenge as the king had to overcome the temptations it offered like luxury, sloth, and sensual pleasures (Eckstein 2009: 6). Demosthenes and Theopompus argued that Philip spectacularly failed this test – descending into wantonness (*akolasia*) (e.g. Dem. 2.18-19; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 224 = Athen 4.167a-c and 259f-261a). Isocrates (*Ad Dem.* 27-28) advocated moderate enjoyment of wealth.

[789] Xenophon advocated spending as opposed to hoarding (especially on friends e.g. *Cyrop.* 3.3.3, 8.3.35-50), and using the hope of material gain against people (*Cyrop.* 1.5.8-10; 2.3.4,16; 4.2.10).

[790] The Greek term πλεονεξία ('desire for more'), was often associated with the activities of kings (Gehrke 2013: 91-92). *N.b.* Agesilaus, Xenophon's benchmark king, was said to beyond greed – enriching his army and not himself (*Ages.* 4.5-6; cf. 11.9).

friendships and diplomatic manoeuvring – there was always a fine line between diplomatic gift and shameless bribe (Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 237 = Athen. 77d-e).[791] It was a line which both Philip and Demosthenes were happy to exploit for their own ends.[792] Either way, money attracted individuals to Philip, and like diplomacy, marriage and war, was a valuable instrument with which he increased his power at home and abroad.[793] Philip's wealth was an intoxicating symbol of power – little wonder it divided opinion.

Seneca, who also thought of Philip's success in terms of robbery (*latrocinia* - *Q. Nat.* 2. *Pref.* 5) and bribery (*Ep.* 94.62-63), uses one extraordinary tale of Philip's need for mining revenue (**example 5.11**) to make some blatant comments on greed (*avaritia*).

5.11

> *Asclepiodotus auctor est demissos quam plurimos a Philippo in metallum antiquum olim destitutum, ut explorarent quae ubertas eius esset, quis status, an aliquid futuris reliquisset vetus avaritia; descendisse illos cum multo lumine et multos duraturo dies, deinde longa via fatigatos vidisse flumina ingentia et conceptus aquarum inertium vastos, pares nostris nec compressos quidem terra supereminente sed liberae laxitatis, non sine horrore visos* (*Q. Nat.* 5.15.1-3).[794]

These miners' adventure is used by Seneca not only to highlight the *avaritia* of Philip and those who came before him (cf. *Q. Nat.* 2. *Pref.* 5), but to comment on the *avaritia* of his own age – and more pointedly, that of the Romans' own ancestors.

> *Cum magna hoc legi voluptate. Intellexi enim saeculum nostrum non novis vitiis sed iam inde antiquitus traditis laborare, nec nostra aetate primum avaritiam venas terrarum lapidumque rimatam in tenebris male abstrusa quaesisse: illi maiores nostri, quos celebramus laudibus, quibus dissimiles esse nos querimur, spe ducti montes ceciderunt et supra lucrum sub ruina steterunt* (Sen. *Q. Nat.* 5.15.1-3).[795]

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[791] '…because from these mines he [Philip] had soon amassed a fortune, with the abundance of money he raised the Macedonian kingdom higher and higher to a greatly superior position, for with the gold coins which he struck… he organized a large force of mercenaries, and by using these coins for bribes induced many Greeks to become betrayers of their native lands' (Diod. 16.8.6-7; cf. 16.3.4, 3.5; Strabo 7.7.4; and Just. 9.8). For Philip's use of diplomacy and gift giving/bribery and Demosthenes invective against it – Ryder 1994: 228-257; on bribery in Greek politics – Harvey 1985: 76-117; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1974: 164-65.

[792] E.g. Dem. 18.19, 61, 295-296. Cf. Ryder 1994: 230-32.

[793] Trundle 2006: 71-72.

[794] 'Asclepiodotus is my authority that many men were sent down by Philip into an old mine, long since abandoned, to find out what riches it might have, what its condition was, whether ancient avarice had left anything for future generations. They descended with a large supply of torches, enough to last for many days. After a while, when they were exhausted by the long journey, they saw a sight that made them shudder: huge rivers and vast reservoirs of motionless water, equal to ours above ground and yet not pressed down by the earth stretching above, but with a vast free space overhead.'

[795] 'I read this story with great enjoyment. For I realized that our age suffers not from new vices but from vices that have been handed down all the way from antiquity, and it is not in our age that avarice first pried into the veins of earth and rock searching for treasure poorly hidden in the darkness. Those famous ancestors of ours, whom we are always heaping with praises, whom we complain that we do not resemble, cut down mountains, lured as they were by hope, and stood there over their profit – but under a mass of rubble.'

This tale of the enduring vice of *avaritia* is aimed at men of influence within the Roman state, and goes so far as to criticise those whom others had previously praised as paradigms of good behaviour. The destruction of mountains may even symbolize the final destruction of the Republic itself at the hands of men ruled by this vice. Philip's role is to provide the negative vice of greed as a catalyst to set in motion the tale's events. Any associations between Philip's need for wealth and bribery this brought to mind in an audience conversant with their Demosthenes was not an unwelcomed bonus. As a whole the tale serves Seneca's need to comment on the morality of his own day.[796]

Philip's reputation for bribery seems to have been quite famous in antiquity. There are three accounts of one incident in which Philip uttered what would become a rather notorious statement of the power of gold (**example 5.12**).

5.12.A

διὸ καὶ φασι τὸν Φίλιππον βουλόμενον ἑλεῖν τινα πόλιν ὀχυρότητι διαφέρουσαν, εἰπόντος τινὸς αὐτῷ τῶν ἐγχωρίων ἀνάλωτον αὐτὴν ἐκ βίας ὑπάρχειν, ἐπερωτῆσαι εἰ οὐδ' ὁ χρυσὸς τὸ τεῖχος ὑπερβῆναι δυνατός ἐστιν (Diod. 16.54.3).[797]

5.12.B

Nunc est exspectatio comitiorum; in quae omnibus invitis trudit noster Magnus Auli filium, atque in eo neque auctoritate neque gratia pugnat sed quibus Philippus omnia castella expugnari posse dicebat in quae modo asellus onustus auro posset ascendere (Cic. *Ep. ad. Att.* 16. 12).[798]

5.12.C

Φρούριον δέ τι βουλόμενος λαβεῖν ὀχυρόν, ὡς ἀπήγγειλαν οἱ κατάσκοποι χαλεπὸν εἶναι παντάπασι καὶ ἀνάλωτον, ἠρώτησεν εἰ χαλεπὸν οὕτως ἐστίν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὄνον προσελθεῖν χρυσίον κομίζοντα (*Mor.* 178A-B = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 14).[799]

The two earliest versions are from the first century BCE, and can be complemented with what seems to be another allusion to it in Horace from the same period (Hor. *Ode* 3.16.9-16). There are some obvious differences between these accounts. For example, Diodorus has one of the inhabitants of

[796] This moralizing comes from a man who was no stranger himself to the benefits of wealth though (Tac. *Ann.* 13.42.6; Juv. 10.16; and Dio. 61.10.2).

[797] 'Hence the anecdote that when Philip wished to take a certain city with unusually strong fortifications and one of the inhabitants remarked that it was impregnable, he asked if even gold could not scale its walls.'

[798] 'Now we are waiting for the elections, into which, to everybody's disgust, our Great Man has pushed Aulus' son, using neither prestige nor personal influence to get him in, but those engines with which Philip said any fortress could be stormed provided there was a way up for a donkey with a load of gold on its back.'

[799] 'When he (Philip) was desirous of capturing a certain stronghold, his scouts reported that it was altogether difficult and quite impregnable, whereupon he asked if it were so difficult that not even an ass laden with money could approach it.'

some unnamed city (τινα πόλιν) report the city's impregnability,[800] whereas Plutarch has Philip's scouts report on the impregnability of a certain stronghold (ὀχυρόν). This then leads to Philip's *apophthegma* (in the form of a rhetorical question) in both Diodorus and Plutarch. However, Diodorus mentions only gold scaling its walls (perhaps as a direct offer to the 'inhabitant' from whom Philip received the report), whereas Plutarch has an ass (ὄνον) laden with gold (cf. Cicero's donkey – *asellus*). Cicero has no lead up report, recording only Philip's *apophthegma* to support his comments on election bribes. Moreover, Philip's statement becomes a more universal comment, applicable to any fortress (*omnia castella*) – even those metaphorically protecting the dignity of elections. No matter who had the more correct details, they all show that it was a well know tale for it to be appropriated by such divergent writers.

It is Philip's pragmatism (his *phronesis*), his guile, and his ever-present wit which are on display in these examples. However, whether these examples are seen as negative or positive is completely contextual. The act of outwitting or even deceiving your opponents was a generally positive thing in war (see chap. six), but to do so in a way that involved an act of solicited betrayal within the enemy's camp could be problematic and difficult to praise. Indeed, the glorification of victories in the military sciences generally demanded deeds and achievements that contained rather more 'upright' elements like valour and fortitude (particularly for the Romans). Though the rise in the popularity of stratagems modified this somewhat (chap. six), Philip's prizes of war are tainted by the means in which he gains them when they are intimately associated with acts of paid for disloyalty by collaborators.

Philip certainly had a skill for taking cities by siege, but it is hard to determine for sure how often success was due to 'fifth columnists'. Nonetheless, Diodorus' version comes in a section of his narrative devoted to proving his introductory comments at 16.8.6-7 (see above) by focusing on such acts of treachery. It begins with Mecyberna and Torone being acquired by treasonable surrender (προδοσίας παρέλαβεν), as is Olynthus afterwards when Philip's bribes their infamous chief officials – Euthycrates and Lasthenes (16.53.2 – see below).[801] Afterwards, Diodorus states that Philip,

> 'distributed a sum of money to men of influence in the cities, [and] gained many tools ready to betray their countries. Indeed he was wont to declare that it was far more by the use of gold than of arms that he had enlarged his kingdom' (Diod. 16.53.3).

[800] The positioning of this anecdote near the fall of Olynthus in the text of Diodorus has led some to believe that the city referred to here is Olynthus (e.g. Walsh 2008: 282).
[801] Cf. Juv. *Sat.* 12.46-7.

This leads on to our anecdote. Introduced by reiteration of some of Demosthenes famous comments on traitors in Greece (16.54.2; cf. Dem. 18.61), and concluded by the loaded comments of Diodorus, it clearly indicates his (or his source's) views on the issue.

> 'He [Philip] had learned from experience that what could not be subdued by force of arms could easily be vanquished by gold. So, organizing bands of traitors in the several cities by means of bribes and calling those who accepted his gold ''guests'' and ''friends,'' by his evil communications he corrupted the morals of the people (Diod. 16.54.4; cf. 55.4).'

According to this view, Philip's largesse was negative, self-serving, and ultimately corrupting (διέφθειρε). This stance reflects well the Demosthenic introduction, and casts Philip in this particular instance as a rather negative or underhanded paradigm of conquest. It would seem that bribery was a stratagem too far at this time or a persuasive means by which to belittle Philip's successes. As if to intensify this last point, in Diodorus it is an entire city's fate which hangs in the balance – not merely some military stronghold. The account is intentionally tinted by the potentially gloomy fate of any civilian population if and when the city fell to Philip's gold - and ultimately to Philip's army.

Cicero's use of Philip's *apophthegma* is used to criticise Pompey's use of bribes on behalf of L. Afranius (consul 60 BCE). It is direct negative association between Pompey's deeds and Philip's words. Moreover, Philip's status as the father of Pompey's hero would seem to add another dimension. The association cleverly disparages the exemplar tradition Pompey had invested in publically, and subtly brings to mind Pompey's own paternity. His father Pompeius Strabo had been an unscrupulous individual who had had something of a reputation for avarice and treachery.[802] Cicero's use of Philip is finely chosen for its layers of associative invective. However, this negative and symbolic function of Philip is unlike Cicero's use of him elsewhere.

Examination of **example 5.13** shows that there is a marked difference in Philip's application and character, especially in regard to the role of money. This time Philip appears a statesman not only of intelligence and pragmatism (*phronesis*), but also of some integrity, who criticises *largitio*.[803]

> **5.13**
>
> *Praeclare in epistula quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione benivolentiam Macedonum consectetur: 'Quae te, malum!' inquit, 'ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles putares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses? An tu id agis, ut*

[802] Licin. 22-23; Vell.2.21.3; Plut. *Pomp.* 1. Cf. Plut. *Crass.* 6, *Mor.* 203B, 553C; and Sen. *Contr.* 1.6.4. On Pompeius Strabo – Seager 2002: 20-24.
[803] Cicero foreshadows this particular *exemplum* with his earlier comments on having letters from some of the 'wisest men in history' to their sons (Cic. *De Off.* 2.14). Discussion in Molinier 1995: 69-70.

> *Macedones non te regem suum, sed ministrum et praebitorem sperent fore?* (Cic. *De Off.* 53).[804]

Cicero takes Philip's lesson to his son,[805] and explicitly uses it to provide a positive and more universal lesson for himself and his own audience in statesmanship.[806] This tale is not an off-hand comment in a letter like example 5.12 (suggesting a common proverbial story of wide circulation). This tale is paced within the well thought out argument of the *De Officiis*, and was meant for reflecting on contemporary behaviours among Rome's most elite.[807]

> ''Steward and purveyor' was well said, because it was degrading for a prince; better still, when he called the gift of money 'corruption.' For the recipient goes from bad to worse and is made all the more ready to be constantly looking for one bribe after another. It was to his son that Philip gave this lesson; but let us all take it diligently to heart (Cic. *De Off.* 53-54).'

Plutarch's version of example 5.12.C, devoid of any real context in the collection, is unable to carry quite the same negative connotations as the other two accounts. Indeed, Philip's rhetorical quip is said in response to his own men, and in the pursuit of a military target. No authorial comment leaves the reader free to interpret the text for themselves. It was either a tale of Philip's corrupting wiles and subornment, or of Philip' intelligence and pragmatism (possibly even his determination and wit).[808] Plutarch's comments elsewhere are contradictory and help little.[809] What this account does do is shift the moral burden onto Philip's enemies. It is their moral integrity which

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[804] 'In one of his letters Philip takes his son Alexander sharply to task for trying by gifts of money to secure the good-will of the Macedonians: 'What in the mischief induced you to entertain such a hope,' he says, 'as that those men would be loyal subjects to you whom you had corrupted with money? Or are you trying to do what you can to lead the Macedonians to expect that you will be not their king but their steward and purveyor?'

[805] Philip's advice to Alexander in statesmanship, as well as his concern for his education, seem to have been popular topics in Philip's anecdotes, and no doubt stem from the great success of the two kings. Discussion and speculation on what Alexander learnt from his father is equalled only by that concerning what he learnt from Aristotle. Space does not permit full discussion, though Spencer notes that epistolary advice and Alexander was something of a *topos* (2010: 183; cf. 2006: 79-104). Examples include – Plut. *Mor.* 178B = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 16 (cf. *Mor.* 806B); and *Mor.* 178C = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 17.

[806] That audience ranged from Cicero's son (addressee of the *De Officiis*) to Octavius and the entire Roman aristocracy (cf. Molinier 1995: 65). Valerius Maximus also commends this letter of Philip's under the heading of intelligence. However, he still has a barb at the end of the tale with his own editorial comment, which somewhat denigrates Philip's achievements (Val. Max. 7.2.ext.10). Cf. Spencer 2010: 185-86; and Morgan 2007: 147-48.

[807] Cf. Molinier 1995: 71-73.

[808] This tale appears to be related to two other texts. Isocrates letter to Philip argues that there was more glory in capturing the goodwill of cities than their walls, as winning friendships would mean praise for Philip's wisdom alone as opposed to credit for the entire army (*Ep.* 2.20-21). Whereas, Diodorus states that Philip was prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes which meant credit for him alone – as every member of the army shared in the successes which were won on the field (Diod. 16.95.3-4).

[809] In Plutarch's life *Aemilius Paulus*, both Philip and Alexander are described as 'men who mastered the world through their belief that empire was to be bought with money, not money with empire', and that, 'it was a common saying that the cities of Greece were taken, not by Philip, but Philip's money (12.5-6).' However, in Plutarch's famous criticism of Herodotus, he states that, 'with respect to the way in which a deed is accomplished, a historian's narrative is open to the charge of malice if it asserts that the success was won not by valour but by money, as some say of Philip' (Plut. *De Herod.* 7 = *Mor.* 856B).

is being challenged. Moreover, it is significant that in Plutarch's collection this *apophthegma* is coupled with the following tale of the stigmatism of betrayal (**example 5.14**).

5.14

> Τῶν δὲ περὶ Λασθένην τὸν Ὀλύνθιον ἐγκαλούντων καὶ ἀγανακτούντων, ὅτι προδότας αὐτοὺς ἔνιοι τῶν περὶ τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκαλοῦσι, σκαιοὺς ἔφη φύσει καὶ ἀγροίκους εἶναι Μακεδόνας καὶ τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγοντας (*Mor.* 178B = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 15).[810]

Philip's bribery of Lasthenes is not the focus here. In fact, with no background knowledge of Lasthenes or events surrounding the fall of Olynthus, the reader would be at a loss as to know why these 'associates' of Lasthenes were traitors, and what it had to do with Philip.[811] The real focus here is on Philip's witty *apophthegma* about the Macedonians.[812] Moreover, if one approaches the tale with background knowledge, Philip's comments on these unnamed 'associates' somewhat divorces him from the moral unsavoriness of his actions in regard to Lasthenes and these 'associates'. Philip's witty comment on the Macedonians' candour is clearly meant to align him with his fellow Macedonians. Consequently, the *apophthegma* as a whole comments on the Macedonians' frankness (a trait already encountered). But more importantly, it also gives the reader some insight into Philip's own contempt for those who 'allowed themselves' to be corrupted by his largesse. As it is written, the anecdote does not call for, nor make any moral judgement on the act of bribing, only upon those men and actions associated with the taking (their greed?). Therefore, both of Plutarch's *apophthegmata* involving Philip and bribery do not paint such a dark picture of Philip. They subtly shift the emphasis from Philip's actual bribery (his actions), to his words, so as to showcase the king's sharp wit more than anything. Ultimately, what is being remembered and circulated is the witticism about the Macedonians, which came at the expense of the Philip's enemies (as they often did e.g. Diod. 18.10.1). Plutarch's brevity or ambiguity masks the more unsavoury aspects of both tales - allowing Philip to remain a somewhat worthy exemplar for his auditors.

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[810] 'When the men associated with Lasthenes, the Olynthian, complained with indignation because some of Philip's associates called them traitors, he said that the Macedonians are by nature a rough and rustic people who call a spade a spade.'

[811] Lasthenes along with Euthycrates became synonymous with 'fifth columnists' (e.g. Dem. *Or.* 18. 296, 19.265, 342; esp. 8.40 – where they are described as meeting 'the most ignominious fate of all'). Indeed, elsewhere Plutarch groups these two together with Philocrates, who also took money from Philip - 'Was it the result of chance and because of chance that Philocrates, having received money from Philip, 'proceeded to spend it on trulls and trout,' and was it due to chance that Lasthenes and Euthycrates lost Olynthus, 'measuring happiness by their bellies and the most shameless deeds (Plut. *De fort.* 1 = *Mor.* 97D)?'' The moral burden in these examples squarely falls on the receivers of Philip's money. On Philocrates – Dem. *Or.* 19.229.

[812] This *apophthegma* which became proverbial, is a paraphrase of an unknown comic author (ἄγροιχός εἰμι τὴν σχάφην σχάφην λέγων - Lucian, *J. Tr.* 32; *H. conscr.* 41; Julien *Or.* 7.208A; cf. Fuhrmann 1998: 260).

If Philip truly had contempt for some of those who took his money to betray their own, might there not be instances whereby Philip showed some respect for those who refused his 'bribes'? Surprisingly, this seems to be the case in an anecdote (**example 5.15**) found in Diogenes Laertius (c. early third-century CE).[813]

5.15

λόγος δὲ αὐτὸν μετὰ καὶ ἄλλων πεμφθῆναι πρεσβευτὴν πρὸς **Φ**ίλιππον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν δώροις μαλθασσομένους καὶ εἰς τὰς κλήσεις συνιέναι καὶ τῷ **Φ**ιλίππῳ λαλεῖν· τὸν δὲ μηδέτερον τούτων ποιεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ **Φ**ίλιππος αὐτὸν προσίετο διὰ τοῦτο. ὅθεν ἐλθόντας τοὺς πρέσβεις εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας φάσκειν ὡς μάτην αὐτοῖς Ξενοκράτης συνεληλύθοι· καὶ τοὺς ἑτοίμους εἶναι ζημιοῦν αὐτόν. μαθόντας δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ ὡς νῦν καὶ μᾶλλον φροντιστέον εἴη τῆς πόλεως αὐτοῖς (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ᾔδει δωροδοκήσαντας ὁ **Φ**ίλιππος, ἐμὲ δὲ μηδενὶ λόγῳ ὑπαξόμενος) φασὶ διπλασίως αὐτὸν τιμῆσαι. καὶ τὸν **Φ**ίλιππον δὲ λέγειν ὕστερον ὡς μόνος εἴη Ξενοκράτης τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀφιγμένων ἀδωροδόκητος (4.8-9).[814]

It is given ostensibly by Diogenes to show the incorruptibility of the Platonic philosopher Xenocrates. This it does by highlighting Philip's attempts to corrupt him and the others of his delegation – though the difference between Philip's hospitality and bribes was probably often in the eye of the beholder. Either way, Xenocrates proves himself immune to Philip's 'bribery' even when others fail. This leaves Xenocrates to be honoured at home, and Philip to state with something approaching begrudging respect that Xenocrates was incorruptible (ἀδωροδόκητος). Philip's portrayal is fairly negative. His attempts to bribe Xenocrates represent some ultimate temptation over which Xenocrates' virtue is to triumph. However, Philip's recognition of that virtue in the end does read more in his favour.[815]

This tale represents something of the classic temptation of the philosopher or wise man by the rich and powerful. It also seems to be a manifestation (historical or not) of discussions which reflected on what was thought to be correct behaviour by individuals around autocrats and other powerful men. Though it is difficult to tie Diogenes to any distinct period, let alone events, the messages above were universally relevant to prevailing conditions under the principate in all periods. This clearly demonstrates Philip's ongoing relevance in the Roman world in relation to negotiating relationships with powerful men (particularly within philosophical traditions). It also

[813] On Diogenes Laertius – Jørgen 1978, 1992: 3556–3662, 2007: 431-442; Gaines 2010: 113-125; Warren 2007: 133-149; Kindstrand 1986: 217-243; and Mansfeld 1986: 295-382.

[814] 'There is a story that, when he (Xenocrates) was sent, along with others also, on an embassy to Philip, his colleagues, being bribed, accepted Philip's invitations to feasts and talked with him. Xenocrates did neither the one nor the other. Indeed on this account Philip declined to see him. Hence, when the envoys returned to Athens, they complained that Xenocrates had accompanied them without rendering service. Thereupon the people were ready to fine him. But when he told them that now more than ever they ought to consider the interests of the state – 'for,' said he, 'Philip knew that the others had accepted his bribes, but that he would never win me over' – then the people paid him double honours. And afterwards Philip said that, of all who arrived at his court, Xenocrates was the only man whom he could not bribe.'

[815]

shows (along with other tales already seen) that a number of tales surrounding Philip involved embassies. This probably reflects Philip's inclination for diplomacy and his reputation and fame for this aspect of statesmanship. This also offers clues as to how tales about Philip began to circulate in his own time.

Xenocrates is ultimately successful against Philip's favours, but many were not – particularly when it came to military operations. Though chapter six deals in detail with Philip's military material, one tale in Frontinus suits well the discussion here regarding bribery. Philip was prepared to take cities and strongholds anyway he could, especially through using stratagems involving bribery and treachery (e.g. Olynthus). This often worked out quicker and cheaper in terms of men and money when faced with the possibility of prolonged siege operations (e.g. Perinthus and Byzantium – Diod. 16.74.2-76.4). Frontinus records just such a case in his chapter on siege operations, whereby the town of the Sanians fell to Philip after he bribed one of its generals (**example 5.16**).

5.16

Philippus, oppido Saniorum exclusus, Apollonidi praefecto eorum ad proditionem corrupto persuasit, ut plaustrum lapide quadrato oneratum in ipso aditu portae poneret. Confestim deinde signo dato insecutus oppidanos circa impedita claustra trepidantis oppressit (Front. *Strat.* 3.3.5).[816]

It is located in a section which has unsurprisingly a greater number of foreigners – *On Inducing Treachery*. Philip's tale is one of four foreign examples, and falls between Cyrus the Great and Hannibal (both barbarians and one a bitter enemy of Rome). Lacking any authorial comment, it shows one example of successful inducement of treachery, though exactly what is going on in relation to actual events is somewhat obscrure.[817] Frontinus' interest is almost exclusively on that achievement – which could sit anywhere on the moral spectrum from bad to good depending on interpretations and interests. For Frontinus, it was still a legitimate stratagem in war (and deserving of inclusion in his work). However, it was never going to compete either in terms of approval or even numerically with other more spectacular strategic and tactical schemes (e.g. *Escaping From Difficult Situations* – 28 entries). Ultimately, Philip's example is meant as a simple model for similar actions by contemporaries of Frontinus. It is not meant as a moral benchmark, or a means to colour ethical perceptions of either Philip or his office. Philip was shown to be (successfully)

[816] 'Philip, when prevented from gaining possession of the town of the Sanians, bribed one of their generals, Apollonides, to turn traitor, inducing him to plant a cart laden with dressed stone at the very entrance to the gate. Then straightway giving the signal, he followed after the townspeople, who were huddled in panic around the blocked entrance of the gate, and succeeded in overwhelming them.'

[817] Perhaps Apollonidas was bribed to block the town gate with a disabled cart of dressed stone, so that upon Philip's approach the gate was prevented from being shut.

cunning and ruthless – but war in all periods necessitated these particular traits – often elevating them almost into virtues.

The examination of those tales mainly concerning Philip's greed and his practice of gifts or bribes has shown clearly more areas in which Philip's image and legacy were utilized to engage with more contemporary matters – be they cultural, social, political, or even martial. Whilst in general they raised more negative themes (as was to be expected), they also remind the auditor from any period of Philip's more positive qualities like his ever present pragmatism and wit.

Wit and humour

As already noted, Philip was proud of his diplomacy and persuasive communication skills (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.5.46). Two aspects linked to these (consistently noticeable during the tales of this chapter, and entire thesis) were Philip's humour and wit.[818] Plutarch's collection of Philippic *apophthegmata* has naturally made this particularly clear, and it is unsurprising that elsewhere Plutarch states that Philip 'plumed himself like a sophist on the power of his oratory' (Plut. *Al.* 4.5).[819] It was an important aspect of any statesman's character. However, with power and influence in Macedonia, and later much of Greece, concentrated in Philip's person – it really mattered what he said, and often how he said it (as it did also for leading Romans of the Republic and Roman emperors).[820] Indeed, witticisms and jokes to friends (often in public) were one way for a leader to construct his persona and express his character. The Philip of anecdotes seems to also play this game, and well. They could also express a shared culture and bridge the gap between elite and peasant by the popularization of elite and monarchic principles (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.21.9, 15). Moreover, humour and wit could also cross temporal and cultural boundaries, and demonstrate clearly that the presence or absence of these qualities were important measurements to monarchic ideology (cf. Xen. *Ages.* 8.2).

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[818] On ancient humour and wit – Segal 1968; Laurence and Paterson 1999: 183-197; Speier 1998: 1352-1401; Corbeill 1996; and Haliwell 2008. The two main ancient sources for laughter inducing acts or utterances (*ridicula*) are Cicero's *De Oratore* Book 2 and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* Book 6. *N.b.* the important study of Reekmans which compares the humour of Suetonius and Plutarch using Cicero and Quintilian as guides (1992: 189-232). He concluded that there was little difference between Greek and Roman humour (1992: 232).

[819] Cf. *Dem.* 16.2 and Aul. Gell. *N.A.* 9.3. Appealing to the known *hilaritas* of Trajan (Plin. *Pan.* 4.6)? Isocrates advocated avoiding presumption of speech or being too fond of mirth (*Ad Dem.* 15), thinking it better not to be serious when you should be jovial, and not be jovial when you should be serious (*Ad Dem.* 31; cf. Xen. *Ages.* 8.3). For the humour and good cheer of Cyrus – Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.5.54-5, 5.2.18, 6.1.16, 8.4.12, and 8.4.20-23.

[820] E.g. Pompeius and Caesar (Corbeill 1996: 178-199); Vespasian (Suet. *Vesp.* 13, 23.3, and *Dom.* 1.3; Murphy 1991: 3782-84; and Milns 2010: 117-23); Septimius (Cass. Dio 75.1). Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 86-8; and *Ner.* 33 (Laurence and Paterson 1999: 183-6). On Philip's eloquence both in serious conversation and jesting - Just. 9.8. Cf. Quint. *Inst. Or.* 6.3.1ff.; Suet. *Claud.* 40; and Plut. *Al.* 1.2-3. Philip's *ridicula* (verbal humour) was of both the *cavillatio* and *dicacitas* varieties (cf. Cic. *De or.* 2.218).

Belonging to the 'rich treasury of the instruments of politics' (Speier 1998: 1354), humour, jokes and witticisms are common among Philip's anecdotes, and reveal well this king's connection between his political skill and charisma.[821] Humour 'forged ties between people, binding those who laugh together' (Speier 1998: 1357), and seems to have been an important aspect of Philip's leadership and legacy. Demosthenes noted Philip's great interest in jokes (2.19), and elsewhere it is stated that Philip even sent money away to famous comedians to send him jokes (Athen. 14.614d-e). Philip's humour and jokes sometimes came at the expense of other individuals,[822] or even whole foundations which could be named in jest.

> ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις, ἣν ἐκ τῶν κακίστων καὶ ἀναγωγοτάτων κτίσας ὁ Φίλιππος Πονηρόπολιν προσηγόρευσεν (*Mor.* 520B = *De Cur.* 10).[823]

The Philip of anecdotal tradition certainly took advantage of almost any situation to bring forth some impromptu witticism or joke. Indeed, it seems Philip had a real talent for spontaneous retorts and affirmations. For example, even after a serious defeat in battle Philip was able to retaliate with his wit in some kind of face saving and morale lifting retort (**example 5.17**).

> **5.17**
>
> Ὀνόμαρχος Μακεδόσι παρατασσόμενος ὄρος μηνοειδὲς κατὰ νώτου λαβὼν καὶ ταῖς ἐκ ατέρωθεν κορυφαῖς ἐγκατακρύψας πέτρους καὶ πετροβόλους προῆγε τὴν δύναμιν ἐς τὸ ὑποκείμενον πεδίον. ὡς δὲ οἱ Μακεδόνες ἀντεπιόντες ἠκροβολίσαντο, οἱ Φωκεῖς προσεποιήσαντο φεύγειν ἐς τὰ μέσα τοῦ ὄρους. οἱ μὲν δὴ Μακεδόνες θυμῷ καὶ ῥύμῃ διώκοντες ἐπέκειντο, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κορυφῶν τοὺς πέτρους βάλλοντες συνέτριβον τὴν Μακεδονικὴν φάλαγγα. τότε δὴ Ὀνόμαρχος ἐσήμηνεν τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἐπιστρέφειν καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις εμβάλλειν. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες, τῶν μὲν ὄπισθεν ἐμβαλλόντων, τῶν δὲ ἄνω θεν τοὺς πέτρους βαλλόντων, σὺν πολλῷ πόνῳ φυγόντες ἀνεχώρησαν. ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φυγῇ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Μακεδόνων Φίλιππον φασὶν εἰπεῖν 'οὐκ ἔφυγον, ἀλλ' ἀνεχώρησα ὥσπερ οἱ κριοὶ, ἵν' αὖθις ποιήσωμαι σφοδροτέραν τὴν ἐμβολήν' (*Strat.* 2.38.2; cf. Diod. 16.35.2).[824]

Found in Polyaenus, Philip's *apophthegma* serves the role of a being a positive stratagem for reacting to a serious defeat.[825] Though the focus is on the generalship and stratagems of Onomarchus for the majority of the tale - its ending belongs entirely to Philip. Philip's remark gets

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[821] E.g. Plut. *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 3, cf. *Mor.* 105A, 666A.

[822] E.g. making fun of Cleisophus publically – Athen. 6.248d-f. cf. 6.250c-d.

[823] 'It is like the city populated by the vilest and most intractable of men which Philip founded and called Roguesborough.' cf. Theopompus F.110.

[824] 'When Onomarchus was deploying against the Macedonians, he put a crescent-shaped mountain in his rear, concealed men on the peaks at both ends with rocks and rock-throwing engines, and led his forces forward into the plain below. When the Macedonians came out against them and threw their javelins, the Phocians pretended to flee into the hollow middle of the mountain. As the Macedonians, pursuing with an eager rush, pressed them, the men on the peaks threw rocks and crushed the Macedonians phalanx. Then indeed Onomarchus signalled the Phocians to turn and attack the enemy. The Macedonians, under attack from behind while those up above continued to throw rocks, retreated rapidly in great distress. They say that during this flight the king of Macedonians, Philip, said, 'I do not flee, but retreat like rams do, in order to attack again more violently.''

[825] On Polyaenus, stratagems and Philip's generalship, see chap. six.

the last laugh and instantly forces the auditor's attention forward in time to when Philip also *has* the last laugh. Philip predicts his decisive victory at the Crocus field (Diod. 16.35.4-5; Just. 8.2.1-4), and knowledge of this in the auditor intensifies Philip's comment - validating and magnifying its humour with the reality of truth. Onomarchus' stratagem is a good one, victory here substantiates and justifies its use by both writer and reader. However, inclusion of Philip's comment by Polyaenus also highlights that its success was ultimately limited – Onomarchus never followed it up.[826] Whereas, Philip's confidence in future success after such a demoralizing defeat is exemplary (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.4.5). Philip was true to his word in the end, and this was worth recording for Frontinus.

Example 5.18 is again a clear example of Philip's ability to call forth witty remarks almost at will.

5.18

> ... ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ **Φ**ιλίππου λογιζόμενος· πεσὼν γὰρ ἐν παλαίστρᾳ καὶ μεταστραφείς, ὡς εἶδε τοῦ σώματος τὸν τύπον, "ὦ Ἡράκλεις," εἶπεν, "ὡς μικροῦ μέρους τῆς γῆς φύσει μετέχοντες ὅλης ἐφιέμεθα τῆς οἰκουμένης (Plut. *De exilio* 8 = *Mor.* 602D)."[827]

Like example 5.17, this tale shows Philip saving face and diverting attention away from his defeat and embarrassment. It is a humorous, beneficial, and somewhat moralistic statement from a famous monarch. It is one of a number of anecdotes used to console Plutarch's reader on being exiled. More specifically, the tale counsels on being satisfied with where one ends up, and not to covert more or other places. The slight irony of Philip making the statement is not lost on Plutarch, who uses it specifically for that reason. If Philip, who supposedly wanted all of Greece in his possession (and fathered that world conqueror Alexander), can come to such a humbling conclusion – then surely Plutarch's 'exile' can accept his lot with equal humility. Like a physician of the soul, Plutarch exploits Philip's wisdom, humour and wit as balms for a friend's distress. Philip's tale is an ancient solace for a present-day ill.

In Plutarch's collection, the word-play humour of example 3.4 is followed by yet more Philippic wit (**example 5.19**).

5.19.A

> Μέλλων δὲ καταστρατοπεδεύειν ἐν χωρίῳ καλῷ καὶ πυθόμενος ὅτι χόρτος οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις, "οἷος," εἶπεν, "ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὄνων καιρὸν ὀφείλομεν ζῆν (*Mor.* 178A = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 13);"[828]

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[826] Worthington 2008: 59.

[827] '... but he will rather reason as Philip did, who said, on being thrown in wrestling, as he turned about and saw the imprint of his body: 'Good God! How small a portion of the earth we hold by nature, yet we covert the whole earth!''

[828] 'When he (Philip) was about to pitch his camp in an excellent place, he learned that there was no grass for the pack-animals. 'What a life is ours,' he said, 'if we must live to suit the convenience of the asses!'' (cf. Eunapius Frag. 56).

Another version is found in Plutarch's *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs* (11). It is the less serious of two anecdotes which follow Plutarch's comments that kingship, 'the most perfect and greatest of all political offices, has the most cares, labours and occupations (*Mor.* 790B).'

5.19.B

τὸν δὲ Φίλιππον ἐν καλῷ χωρίῳ μέλλοντα καταστρατοπεδεύειν, ὡς ἤκουσεν ὅτι χόρτος οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις "ὦ Ἡράκλεις," εἰπεῖν, "οἷος ἡμῶν ὁ βίος, εἰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὄνων καιρὸν ὀφείλομεν ζῆν (*Mor.* 790B = *An Seni.* 11)."[829]

It proves Plutarch's point – almost to absurdity. It also gives some insight (like example 5.12) into Philip's quick thinking humour which pokes fun at what may have been quite a frustrating, if not awkward moment (which was obviously well remembered given its popularity). Indeed, it is known that humour could diffuse difficult situations as it does here (Laurence and Paterson 1999: 185, 189). It could also dilute the resentment often directed at a leader who faced difficult decisions almost daily (cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 23). The following examples show Philip using humour to great effect to achieve both of these things.

5.20

Φίλιππος ἐν παλαίστρᾳ καὶ Μηνηγέτης ὁ παγκρατιαστὴς ἐκυλίοντο· οἱ στρατιῶται κύκλῳ περιστάντες κατεβόων τὴν μισθοφορὰν ἀπαιτοῦντες. οὐκ ἔχωνό Φίλιππος προσῆλθεν ἱδρῶτι ῥεόμενος, κεκονιμένος, προσμειδιάσας αὐτοῖς 'δίκαια', ἔφη, 'λέγετε, ὦ συστρατιῶται, ἀλλά τοι κἀγὼ διὰ τοῦτα νῦν ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον ἀλείφομαι, ὅπως ὑμῖν πολλαπλασίως ἀποτίσαιμι τὰς χάριτας'. ταῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ ταῖν χεροῖν κροτῶν, διὰ μέσων δραμὼν, ἐς κολυμβήθραν ἐπέρριψεν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐγέλασαν. ὁ Φίλιππος μέχρι τοσούτου διαβαπτιξόμενος πρὸς τὸν παγκρατιαστὴν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ προσώπου ῥαινόμενος οὐκ ἀνῆκεν, ἔστ' ἂν οἱ στρατιῶται καμόντες ἀπερρύησαν. τοῦ στρατηγήματος τούτου καὶ αὐτὸς Φίλιππος παρὰ τοὺς πότους ἐμέμνητο πολλάκις, ὡς ἀστείως διακρουσάμενος τοὺς ἀπαιτοῦντας
(Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.6).[830]

This humorous stratagem of Philip's (**example 5.20**) is found in the work of Polyaenus, and clearly shows Philip using humour to deflect the legitimate claims of his soldiers for pay.[831] Whilst

[829] 'And Philip, we are told, when he heard, as he was on the point of encamping in a suitable place, that there was no fodder for the beasts of draught, exclaimed: 'O Heracles, what a life is mine, if I must needs live to suit the convenience even of my asses!''

[830] 'Philip and Menegetes the pancratiast were wrestling in the palaestra. The soldiers were standing around in a circle shouting demands for their pay. Not having the money, Philip came forward dripping with sweat and covered with dust, smiled, and said to them, 'You speak the truth, fellow soldiers, but for these very reasons I am rubbing myself with oil now against the barbarian, so I can repay your favours many times over.' After saying this and clapping his hands, he ran through the middle of the soldiers and threw himself into a swimming pool, and the Macedonians laughed. Philip continued to dive in competition with the pankratiast, and did not stop sprinkling his face until the soldiers grew tired and departed. When drinking Philip himself often recalled this stratagem, how he politely evaded the soldiers asking for their pay.'

[831] Though a martial themed stratagem, it is included here for its strong focus on Philip's humour and its lack of a direct relationship to battle. On paying the Macedonian army – Sekunda 2010: 465-66; and Milns 1987: 233-56.

it was probably never meant as an example for direct imitation, it does show what was possible in terms of distraction by a quick witted king or commander when faced by difficult demands from their soldiers or army.[832] Supplying and paying ones' men was a perennial problem for many commanders in the ancient world, and Philip's tale offered something of an unusual and amusing solution. This humour also had the power to create bonds between the men and himself.[833] Certainly, Philip's funny ruse displays an almost endearing roguish quality which pervades many of the other anecdotes about him. It is this particular attribute which may account for some elements of Philip's disputed reputation.[834] Here, this quality underpins Philip's devious humour, and creates a paradigm that must have been of some interest to the ancients.

Plutarch gives three accounts of the next tale (**example 5.21**). It sees Philip use what is described in one instance as a 'polite joke' (τὸ παιχθὲν ἀστείως) to deftly see off a potentially embarrassing situation for his host.

5.21.A

ἵν' οὖν μὴ πῦρ ἐπὶ πυρί, ὥς φασι, πλησμονή τις ἐπὶ πλησμονῇ καὶ ἄκρατος ἐπ' ἀκράτῳ γένηται, τὸ παιχθὲν ἀστείως ὑπὸ **Φ**ιλίππου μετὰ σπουδῆς μιμητέον· ἦν δὲ τοιοῦτον. ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸν ἐπὶ χώρας ὡς σὺν ὀλίγοις ὄντα δειπνῆσαι παρεκάλεσεν, εἶθ' ὁρῶν πολλοὺς ἄγοντα παρεσκευασμένων οὐ πολλῶν ἐταράττετο. συναισθόμενος οὖν ὁ **Φ**ίλιππος ὑπέπεμπε τῶν φίλων ἑκάστῳ κελεύων πλακοῦντι καταλιπεῖν χώραν, οἱ δὲ πειθόμενοι καὶ προσδοκῶντες ἐφείδοντο τῶν παρκειμένων. ἤρκεσεν οὖν ἅπασι τὸ δεῖπνον (*Mor.* 123E-124A = *De Tuenda* 4).[835]

5.21.B

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπό τινος ξένου κληθεὶς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐν ὁδῷ πολλοὺς ἐπήγετο καὶ τὸν ξένον ἑώρα θορυβούμενον, ἦν γὰρ οὐκ ἱκανὰ τὰ παρεσκευασμένα, προπέμπων τῶνφίλων ἑκάστω, πλακοῦντι χώραν ἐκέλευεν ἀπολείπειν· οἱ δὲ πειθόμενοι καὶ προσδοκῶντες οὐκ ἤσθιον πολλά, καὶ πᾶσιν οὕτως ἤρκεσεν (*Mor.* 178D-E = *Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.* 20).[836]

[832] Though is is unclear just exactly what the humour was in this tale. Either way, the Macedonian soldiers clearly found Philip's actions amusing.

[833] A fact well understood by Julius Caesar who often showed off his wit as a general (e.g. Suet. *Iul.* 34.2, 59, 66; Poly. *Strat.* 8.23.15; cf. Front. *Strat.* 1.12.2; Dio 42.58.2-3).

[834] Griffith (1980: 66) labels Philip's action in this tale a 'piece of buffoonery', and notes that Philip's ally here was his great wealth – the soldiers knew that they would eventually be paid.

[835] 'Therefore, to avoid adding fire to fire (as the proverb has it), and gorging to gorging, and strong drink to strong drink, we ought with all seriousness to imitate the polite joke of Philip. It was in this wise: A man had invited Philip to dinner in the country, assuming that he had but a few with him, but when later the host saw Philip bringing a great company, no great preparations having been made, he was much perturbed. Philip, becoming aware of the situation, sent word privately to each of his friends to 'leave room for cake.' They, following the advice, and looking for more to come, ate sparingly of what was before them, and so the dinner was ample for all.' Cf. Pl. *Laws* 666A.

[836] 'Once when he was on the march, and was invited to dinner by a man of the land, he took a good many persons with him; and when he saw that his host was much perturbed, since the preparations that had been made were inadequate, he sent word in advance to each of his friends, and told them to 'leave room for cake.' They took his advice and, expecting more to follow, did not eat much, and thus there was enough for all.'

5.21.C

> ...ἀριθμὸν δ' ὁρίζειν, ὅπως μὴ πάθωσιν ὅ παθεῖν συνέπεσε τῷ δεχομένῳ τὸν βασιλέα Φίλιππον ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας· ἦκε γὰρ ἄγων πολλούς, τὸ δὲ δεῖπνον οὐ πολλοῖς ἦν παρεσκευασμένον· ἰδὼν οὖν θορυβούμενον τὸν ξένον περιέπεμπε πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἀτρέμα, χώραν πλακοῦντι καταλιπεῖν κελεύων· οἱ δὲ προσδοκῶντες ὑπεφείδοντο τῶν παρακειμένων καὶ πᾶσιν οὕτως ἐξήρκεσε τὸ δεῖπνον (*Mor.* 707B = *Quaes. Conv.* 7.6.1).[837]

There is little between these versions of the anecdote in terms of details. What is important is that the tale is a great example of Philip's practical intelligence (*phronesis*) and humour. Showing great awareness Philip discreetly saves a friend and host from embarrassment by playing a small tactful joke upon his fellow guests. Plutarch was obviously fond of the tale and utilized it three times to great effect. One version comes in a section of *Advice About Keeping Well* which advises moderation in eating and drinking. The anecdote, and in particular Philip's advice to his men, melds effortlessly into the narrative as an illustration of good guidance on the subject. Even though the point of the tale is not strictly on controlling appetites for moral or physical benefit,[838] but to avoid a socially awkward situation. It is food for thought that Philip's 'jest advice' becomes the stuff of diet self-help affirmations in the hands of an experienced writer like Plutarch centuries after the events themselves.

Another version comes from Plutarch's *apophthegmata* collection. This version obviously lacks any real context other than being meant as an illustration of those points made above regarding any lessons concerning Philip's talents (especially his *phronesis,* humour, and friendliness) as a leader. However, the setting of the tale may have led to its inclusion in this work for its associations with banquets and the work's dedicatee. Pliny makes much of Trajan's dining habits in contrast to those of Domitian (*Pan.* 49.4-8), particularly as dining habits and banquets were seen as good indicators of status, tastes, and above all – character.[839] Pliny's focus is particularly on Trajan's *suavitas* and *iucunditas* (49.7).[840] Philip's anecdote makes much of the induced restraint of his fellow diners, and its appeal may have been in its validation of Trajan's known hospitality and moderation in banqueting – which may have had the same effect in his period.

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[837] '...the host had to specify a number, however, so as not to get into the position of the man who entertained Philip in the country. He came with a large number, but dinner had not been prepared for so many; so, seeing that his host was embarrassed, he passed the word quietly to his friends to 'save room for cake.' Looking forward to this, they ate sparingly of what lay before them, and in this way there was enough for everyone.'

[838] Cf. Xen. *Ages.* 5.1; *Cyrop.* 1.6.17, 5.2.17.

[839] Noreña 2011A: 31. That extravagant feasting (and partying) was a manifestation of moral decadence had been a stock element of Roman invective since Republican times (Corbeill 1996: 128-135).

[840] Cf. Dio 68.7 and Roche 2011: 52. It was a key commonplace of the *civilis princeps* (cf. Corsen 2003: 237-8).

The final version is found in Plutarch's *Table Talk* (*Quaestiones Convivales*), a work deeply rooted in sympotic texts, *problemata* texts, and miscellany.[841] It is a work which reflects or dramatizes the dinner gatherings at Plutarch's house, with their debates and conversations on myriads of topics.[842] The anecdote itself comes in a section which discusses 'shadows' (σκιὰς), or men who are invited to dinners by other than the host, particularly those who were the associates of great men (τῶν ἡγεμονικῶν). Philip's anecdote is given as a warning of what could happen to a host who did not set a limit on these men. However, like the other versions, the situation is saved by Philip's awareness and quick thinking, rendering the king a witty and perceptive leader. He reveals himself to be a man highly cognizant of the concerns of those around him. Philip plays a guest whose responsibilities both as a king and friend leave him eager to share the worries of his host. The only true victims of Philip's word perfect humour are the unsated appetites of his fellow diners – upon whom the joke was perhaps lost by meal's end.

With these three versions Plutarch manipulates the focus of the tale ever so slightly (mainly through the use of surrounding contextual material) so as to make differing arguments. Despite this, Philip's image does not change in any meaningful way away from that of a sagacious and caring leader who was able to apply his wit to his host's potentially humiliating problem. The messages are different – but Philip remains the same.

Unlike the above tale, Philip's wit or humour could also have its real victims. Indeed, laughter has long been known to have 'an unavowed intention to humiliate' (Bergson 1956: 148), and was a powerful mechanism for public humiliation, political denigration, and social exclusion in the ancient world.[843] Inherent in humour also are beliefs and prejudices that helped to define individuals in relation to their communities. Therefore, jokes could establish and articulate social values and a community's ethical standards, and by exposing transgressors of those norms, humour could act as a disciplinary mechanism, enforcing positive ideals and communal self-definition.[844] As Cicero argues, 'No type of joke is such that stern and serious principles may not be drawn from the same source (*De Orat.* 2.251).' Philip's humour too could operate on all these levels as the following tale clearly demonstrates.

Found in two authors, the story (**example 5.22**) is again set at a banquet. It involves the man Menecrates, who thought himself the god Zeus in some sense.[845]

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[841] Klotz 2011: 12-24; and 2014: 207-222.
[842] On Plutarch's self-presentation in this work – Klotz 2007: 650-667; cf. Klotz (ed.) 2011: 170-179.
[843] Corbeill 1996: 4; Saint-Denis 1965.
[844] Corbeill 1996: 5-6, 9.
[845] Each of the two accounts is introduced by another tale (with some differences) of an exchange of letters between both Philip and Menecrates in which he refers to himself as Zeus. A very similar tale is told by Plutarch on three other occasions about king Agesilaus and Menecrates (Plut. *Ages.* 21.5; *Mor.* 191a = *Reg. et Imp. Apop. Ages. 5*; *Mor.* 213A = *Lac. Apoph.* 59). Athenaeus also mentions similar letters being sent to king Archidamus in his Philippic version (289D).

5.22.A

Εἰστία ποτὲ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ὁ Φίλιππος, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτον ἐπὶ θοίνην ἐκάλεσε, καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλίνην αὐτῷ ἐκέλευσε παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ κατακλιθέντι θυμιατήριον παρέθηκε, καὶ ἐθυμιᾶτο αὐτῷ· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ εἰστιῶντο, καὶ ἦν μεγαλοπρεπὲς τὸ δεῖπνον. ὁ τοίνυν Μενεκράτης τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἐνεκαρτέρει καὶ ἔχαιρε τῇ τιμῇ· ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ μικρὸν ὁ λιμὸς περιῆλθεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἠλέγχετο ὅτι ἦν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ταῦτα εὐήθης, ἐξαναστὰς ἀπιὼν ᾤχετο καὶ ἔλεγεν ὑβρίσθαι, ἐμμελῶς πάνυ τοῦ Φιλίππου τὴν ἄνοιαν αὐτοῦ ἐκκαλύψαντος (Ael. *V.H.*12.51).[846]

5.22.B

καλέσας δ' αὐτόν ποτε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ὁ Φίλιππος μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων θεῶν συγκατέκλινε πάντας ἐπὶ τῆς μέσης κλίνης ὑψηλότατα καὶ ἱεροπρεπέστατα κεκοσμημένης, καὶ τράπεζαν παραθείς, ἐφ' ἧς βωμὸς ἔκειτο καὶ τῶν ἀπο γῆς παντοδαπῶν ἀπαρχαί. καὶ ὁπότε τοῖς ἄλλοις παρεφέρετο τὰ ἐδώδιμα, τοῖς ἀμφὶ Μενεκράτην ἐθυμίων ׀ καὶ ἔσπενδον οἱ παῖδες· καὶ τέλος ὁ καινὸς Ζεὺς μετὰ τῶνὑπηκόων γελώμενος θεῶν ἔφυγεν ἐκ τοῦ συμποσίου, ὡς Ἡγήσανδρος ἱστορεῖ (Athen. 7.289c-f).[847]

There are some minor differences in details, one of the most notable being the so called 'personal deities' (τῶν ἰδίων θεῶν) who attend the banquet with Menecrates in Athenaeus. However, essentially the tale comes down to Philip 'very artfully' (ἐμμελῶς πάνυ) and, for those present, rather humorously bringing the man's arrogance or insanity into the open. Menecrates is denied the treats of the feast because of his diviness. Philip's debunking of Menecrates' pretensions to some kind of divinity is an example of two types of humour.[848] Firstly, for Menecrates it is of the type discussed above, whereby a violator of social norms is exposed and suffers social exclusion and ridicule as a result of Philip's prank. The second type involves the audience, who, by laughing with their superior at Menecrates, engage in what has been called the 'laughter of the mighty' (Speier 1998: 1388). This comes about as Philip suspends his authority and superiority with his subordinates through the equalizing power of laughter – forming a coalition between joker and his laughing audience which dissolves hierarchy.[849] However, though some of Philip's audience must have relished the opportunity to laugh with the king, others must have feared that refusal to laugh

[846] 'Philip was giving a grand banquet, and he invited this man to the feast. He ordered a separate couch for him, and when Menecrates had settled in his place Philip put an incense burner close to him, and lit the incense for him. Everyone else was feasting, and it was a splendid occasion. At first Menecrates was able to hold out and he enjoyed the honour paid to him; but when hunger gradually overcame him and he was shown up to be the mortal he was, and a naive one at that, he got up and walked away, saying he had been insulted. Philip had very artfully brought his insanity into the open.'

[847] 'Once when Philip invited Menecrates to dinner along with his personal deities, he had them all lie down on the central couch, which was very high and elaborately decorated in a style appropriate for gods, and set a table beside them with an altar of first-fruits of all the earth's products on top of it. Whenever food was brought to the other guests, the slaves burned incense and poured libations for Menecrates' group; and in the end the new Zeus fled the party with everyone laughing at him and his subject deities, according to Hegesander.'

[848] This tale is at odds with evidence elsewhere for Philip's own divine pretentions (evidence in Worthington 2008: 228-33).

[849] Cf. Speier 1998: 1355, 1388. Humour could also come from the 'bottom to the top', victimizing prominent individuals of power (Speier 1998: 1353; e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 67F; 179B; 334D; 634D; cf. Ael. *V.H.* 9.36).

was close to insubordination or defiance. Therefore, as this humour could reinforce the supremacy or domination of the joking leader, it has also been label 'paternalistic humour' (Speier 1998: 1388).

Philip's joke also exposes Menecrates' madness without the use of overt confrontation or violence. Philip deescalates and influences what was an anomalous situation, disciplining the man's inappropriate behaviour with the community's full collaboration. The boundaries of normality for the elite are in sense being set from the king down,[850] and being corroborated by those in attendance. Philip's joke establishes his role publically in setting and enforcing some of the values of his retinue and court, and even beyond. Therefore, not only was a king and leader able to set the standard as a paradigm for imitation, but was able to draw attention to those who violated what he and others held to be community agreed values or standards. Here monarchic ideology works from the top down – but does so endorsed and aligned with the community's values and expectations. Philip's humour masks what are more serious aspects. It was these qualities that gave the tale deeper meaning, greater appeal and utility.[851] It spoke to past, current and future concerns around a variety of themes, and suited various purposes from entertainment to implicit didactic moralizing on contemporary politics and *mores*.

In the end, Philip's humour and wit were powerful attributes which he used to great effect as a statesman. They are ubiquitous throughout his tales and sayings, and they help to define Philip's leadership. They were also a means by which the social, political, and cultural values of Philip's period were accessed and utilized to address the more immediate interests and issues of a later author's own society.

Conclusion

Tales concerning Philip's trust and praise; generosity and bribery; greed and wisdom (*phronesis*); and industriousness and humour were all of special significance to later authors when it came to articulating Philip the king, statesman, leader, and exemplar. They were accepted channels by which to ponder Philip, his legacy, and contemporary values and issues in the Roman world (particularly around the role of the *civilis Princeps*). Indeed, though each author and generation dictated the script and lighting, Philip's image never completely left antiquity's stage. Instead, it

[850] Cf. Corbeill 1996: 12.
[851] It was also to Philip's benefit e.g. '…the more vigorously you condemn folly in others, the more diligently will you train your own understanding (Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 14).'

played on to an audience primed to understand all the moral and literary cues – allowing for its easy incorporation into ongoing cultural and political debates.

When it came to friendship and politics, Philip's tales were well grounded in contemporary fourth-century BCE ideologies (exemplified by Xenophon and Isocrates), and the political, social, and cultural structures of Macedonia. In particular, the centrality of its monarchy allowed for meaningful comparative reflections with later autocrats. This was possible because of certain enduring 'truths'. For example, a ruler's popularity and safety (and that of his state), were closely linked to those who surrounded him and acted in his name; good rulers trusted, praised, rewarded and utilized individuals of talent rather than fearing and eliminating them; good leaders were industrious on behalf of their friends and the state; they were also intelligent, witty, kind, generous, affable, and believed in reciprocity and gracious. Moreover, Philip's tales allowed authors like Aelian to make *safe* critiques and commentary on contemporary Roman rulers and elite culture – as they did also for authors like Cicero and Seneca in terms of *latrocinia*, *avaritia* and *largitio*. Finally, these tales of Philip demonstrated the power of humour and wit in a statesmen – its power to neutralize or even resolve difficult situations, its capacity to construct persona and express character, and its ability to share, construct, and enforce cultural and behavioural norms.

The anecdotal Philip's impressive power to make and keep friends, bribe his enemies, and make others laugh, transcended his own life time and engaged the Roman world as much as it does our own. Therefore, when it came to friendship and politics – Philip II offered a popular and powerful exemplar upon which to ruminate.

6

Philip the Warrior and General

Reflecting on War in the Roman World with the Example of Philip II

Ἐνθυμοῦ δ' ὅτι μάλιστα τούτους τιμῶσιν ἅπαντες καὶ θαυμάζουσιν, οἵτινες ἀμφότερα δύνανται, καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ στρατηγειν (Isoc. *Ad Phil.* 140).[852]

'The ability to lead armies was what made Philip a great king' (Billows 1995: 21).

Philip II was a great statesman and politician, but he was also a great military leader.[853] Therefore, unsurprisingly, various tales of Philip's exploits as a warrior and general were recorded, handed down, and widely disseminated. Moreover, for a Macedonian king like Philip, whose position depended on his military authority (internally and often externally), it was inevitable that military anecdotes would form a significant part of his legacy. This chapter examines many of these tales and highlights various recurrent themes and ideas. Therefore, after introducing important topics such as morality and *strategemata*, and Philip's Macedonian martial heritage, this chapter looks at areas such as Philip's stratagems, tactics and cunning – including in battle, sieges, naval matters, diplomacy, truce negotiations and withdrawals, training and discipline; discipline in battle; the battle of Chaeronea and events directly after Philip's victory; Philip and oaths; and Philip on the receiving end of Spartan *apophthegmata* and wit. These tales clearly demonstrate Philip's value as a military paradigm long after his death by showing the versatility and usefulness of this martial aspect of Philip's legacy and image. Through an examination of this kind of anecdotal material, Philip is shown to be a popular and useful exemplar of military achievement and creativity. Moreover, like other famous foreign and domestic generals from the past such as Hannibal,

[852] 'Bear in mind that the men whom the world most admires and honours are those who unite in themselves the abilities of the statesman and the general.'

[853] On Philip as general - Griffith 1980: 48-57; Cawkwell 1996: 108-112, 1978: 150-65; Billows 1990: 30-33, 1995: 11-20; and Moore 2013: 463-64. For an evaluation of Philip - including his generalship - Worthington 2008: 194-203. For a comprehensive study of warfare in the classical world - Campbell and Tritle (eds.) 2013, including a chapter on generalship by Moore (2013: 457-73).

Alexander, Pompey and Julius Caesar – Philip was a functional and *mostly* positive presence with whom interested parties meditated on the practice of war in the Roman world.[854]

There are two distinct ways in which 'Philip the warrior and general' is used in the examples given in this chapter. There is his presentation (particularly in battle) as a talented general of some genius and cunning, whose image and legacy were meant to inspire other military commanders to similar accomplishments. There is also a Philip whose actions before, during and after battle are employed for moral purposes with no real strategic content whatsoever.[855] Many of these types of tales unify the king's role as both general and statesmen for the purpose of making more moral judgements. Certainly, evolving complex attitudes towards the role of the Roman emperor in the field and at home in times of conflict affected the survival and popularity of this kind of material.

Morality and *Strategemata*

Martial proficiency was often subordinated in value to the highly considered moral or ethical facets of a monarch's character (this could change – particularly during periods of instability). However, the majority of those martial anecdotes which show Philip actively engaged in warfare and battle are not given to make individuals who read and digested them into morally better generals or monarchs. Therefore, 'moral monarchic ideology' is not the focal message of these types of tales. Instead, they appear focused on good martial prowess and/or being a good military leader, which were at different times and to varying degrees considered important aspects of any leader's abilities.[856] As this chapter demonstrates, Philip's tales are mostly positive when judged by the criteria of martial practicality and success. However, when morality is drawn into the equation, more negative elements are found (though true of a great many other individuals whose tales were selected for this type of material). In the end, martial considerations normally trump morality in this genre when actual strategy, tactics, or fighting are involved. However, these anecdotes are still easily linked to, and reflective of many other virtues in their application. Like those tales which were more concerned with Philip's moral behaviour, particularly before and after battle, connections could be made with a number of important values, such as the cardinal virtues of

[854] On Philip's comparative status with these and other individuals regarding numbers of stratagems, especially in both Polyaenus and Frontinus – see Introduction. On Roman attitudes towards Greek military achievement – Petrochilos 1974: 93-104.

[855] There are other odd tales e.g. Caracalla's advancement of a Macedonian through all the grades of a military career, eventually appointing him as a senator, because his father's name had been Philip (Cass. Dio 78.8). On Caracalla and Alexander the Great – Baharal 1994 and 2003.

[856] They are present in the classical literature of both Xenophon and Isocrates e.g. Xen. *Ages.* 1.16-17, 20-29; 2.1, 8, 12, 18, 24-27; 3.5; 4.6; 5.3; 6.3, 4; 11.11-12; *Cyrop*. *Passim* and Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 24. They were still present at the height of the Roman Empire e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 6, 10, 12-13, 15-16, 18.

φρόνησις/σοφία (*prudentia/sapientia*), and ἀνδρεία (*virtus*); and others such as πρόνοια (*providentia*), μεγαλοψυχία (*magnanimitas*) and ἐπιείκεια (*clementia*).

The majority of those types of tales which feature Philip actively engaged in warfare come from the collections of Polyaenus and Frontinus, and are classed as στρᾶτὴγηματά or stratagems.[857] Therefore, the focus, rather than being on historical accuracy and virtues, is on technical details, tricks, and traits or abilities. These include resourcefulness, innovation, adaptability, vision, deception, cunning, cleverness, seizing the right moment, astute diplomacy, manipulation, bribery, or more generally – on the invention of stratagems or indirect means to achieve goals or victory (often without battle).[858] This was an ancient doctrine of intelligent or *rusé* generalship whereby brains overcame brawn.[859] It held up wily Odysseus as the ideal commander (cf. *Od.* 9.406 'by trickery or force'), particularly by the Roman period under Stoic influence, whereby its principles argued away the moral reservations about deceit and trickery in war.[860] It was these successful stratagems and military deeds of Philip which were offered to would be commanders, along with their principles and theories, as loose templates for imitation and wellsprings for further martial innovation.[861]

This is exactly what Polyaenus intended with his collection of stratagems, which he dedicated to the emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius when war broke out with the Parthians in 161-166 CE.[862] The latter was of course deeply stoical and highly receptive to this kind of work and any tales of Philip's military exploits within.[863] As for Frontinus, to understand his aims for the *Strategemata*, the programmatic statements of the work's introduction are vital.[864] Frontinus states that he wanted to summarize in convenient sketches the clever operations of

[857] On the author and his work – Lammert 1952: 1432-1436; Phillips 1970; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: vi – xvi; Buraselis 1995: 121-140; Campbell 1996: 1209; Meister 2001: 40-41; and Wheeler 2010: 7-54. On *strategemata* – Lammert 1932: 174-181.
[858] Cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.27, 35-41; 2.4.16ff.; 5.3.12-17; 6.3.30; *Ages.* 1.16-17, 2.18-19.
[859] Moore 2013: 462.
[860] Krentz and Wheeler 1994: vi-vii, xix; Wheeler 2010: 24-29. On Stoic themes in the *Strategika* – Wheeler 2010: 24-27. Polyaenus reflects Stoic doctrine from the very beginning when he uses the authority of Homer (held to be a sage by the Stoics) to start with an excursus on the stratagems of Odysseus (1 *praef.* 4-13; Wheeler 2010: 25; Bolling 1929: 330-334). *N.b* that the *Historia Augusta* advocates the worth of past experience (Roman and foreign) to strategic thinking (*Sev. Alex.* 16.3).
[861] Cf. Wheeler 2010: 38. Roman propaganda sold the 'Romans as the people of *fides* who disdained stratagems' (Wheeler 2010: 26), however, authors like Fontinus and Polyaenus easily compiled stratagems from the Republican era. Cf. Wheeler 1988c: 166-95.
[862] Xenophontov 2002: 212-15. Polyaenus also dedicated it to those sent by the emperors (seemingly for use in further educating the troops under them) – 'to those sent by you, polemarchs, generals, legates of legions, tribunes, prefects of cohorts, and other officers, teaching the merits and skills of ancient victories to their troops' (Poly. *Strat.* 1. *Praef.* 1-2; cf. 5 *praef.*).
[863] On Marcus Aurelius – Birley 1987.
[864] Cf. Campbell 1987: 14-15. On Frontinus and his work – Kappelmacher 1919: 591-606; Duff 1964: 338-342; Perkins 1937: 102-105; Eck 1983: 47-62; Campbell 1987: 13-29; Wheeler 1988a: 7-29; Sallmann 1998: 678; Dahm 1999; Eck and Pangerl 2003: 205-211; Turner 2007: 423-449. On technical writing – Goodyear 1982b: 667-673, and on military manuals more specifically – Campbell 1987: 13-29.

generals.[865] 'For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds... (*Str.* 1. *Pr.*).' Philip's tales were more than just models - but a catalysts for similar actions. Others had narrated the tales Frontinus was to set forth, but his work was to have a more practical purpose as a handbook for Roman commanders.[866] Therefore, Philip's tales had a more acute purpose and audience in Frontinus, who believed that the 'art of generalship was a straightforward, common-sense activity for which a man could prepare himself... by copying previous *exempla* and by using handbooks' (Campbell 1987: 14). Taking material about individuals like Philip from various nationalities and from a variety of sources,[867] Frontinus' work was undertaken directly for the benefit of others. The collecting and exhibiting of Philip's tales was no exercise in antiquarian erudition. Its purpose was to educate and inspire - but always with a focus on clarity, brevity, and arrangement (Frontin. *Str.* 1. *Pr.*).

Philip's Macedonian Martial Heritage

Foregoing the Macedonian heritage of such a writer as Polyaenus, which garnished the author's credibility to offer advice on fighting in the East,[868] it is unsurprising that Philip's martial exploits feature in his collection. Philip rejuvenated an army and kingdom on the verge of dissolution, leading the Macedonians on to victories and unprecedented expansion.[869] Often in the van, Philip fought and suffered the same risks as his men (Diod. 16.4.5; 16.34.5; 16.86.4), and ultimately won their loyalty and respect with this style of kingship and his generous rewards (e.g. Diod. 16.53.2-3).[870] Often Philip's success was seen as the product of both his political guile and military prowess.[871] As Diodorus states early in his account of Philip's period, 'this king excelled in shrewdness in the art of war, courage and brilliance of personality' (16.1.6), and 'won great acclaim among the Macedonians for his successes due to his courage' (16.8.1), 'excellence' (ἀρετή - 16.1.4,

[865] This was in order to complete the task Frontinus had begun with his now lost work on Greek and Roman military science (Frontin. *Str.* 1. *prooem*; cf. Vegetius 1.8; 11.3). It was this work and the *Strategemata* which seem to have led to Trajan's high opinion of Frontinus (*Idem fecerunt alii complures, sed praecipue Frontinus, diuo Traiano ab eiusmodi comprobatus industria* - Veg. 2.3.7).
[866] Turner 2007: 430.
[867] On Frontinus' use of sources – Bendz 1938: 54-100. Frontinus used collections of *exempla*, and literary sources such as Sallust, Livy, and Caesar (Turner 2007: 427 n. 13). His relationship with Valerius Maximus is complicated by their access to the same types of collections of *exempla*.
[868] Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ix and xii.
[869] A quick survey of Diodorus alone confirms Philip's good generalship – 16.3.6; 16.4.2-3; 16.4.4-7; 16.8.2; 16.8.3; 16.8.5; 16.14.2; 16.22.3; 16.31.6; 16.34.4-5; 16.35.1; 16.35.5; 16.52.9; 16.53.2; 16.69.7; 16.71.2; 16.84.2; 16.85.6-7; and 16.86.4. According to Xenophon a good leader's function was to make those he led successful (εὐδαιμονία - *Mem.* 3.2.4 – Gray 2011: 11, 26-27).
[870] Cf. King 2010: 380 and Xen. *Ages.* 5.3.
[871] Polyaenus gives an excellent example (*Strat.* 4.2.19).

6), and 'piety and excellent generalship' (16.60.4; cf. 16.38.2, and 64.3). Moreover, according to Didodorus, Philip's success at Chaeronea was due to his advantage in numbers and good generalship (τὴν στρατηγίαν) – which came from his extensive experience (16.85.6-7). But in keeping with many of the examples of this chapter, it was at strategy that Philip excelled, so much so, that 'Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valour in actual battle' (Diod. 16.95.3-4).[872]

During Philip's lifetime Macedonia had a form of kingship which fostered all these abilities. It was ostensibly heroic or quasi-Homeric in nature.[873] The king was preeminent amongst aristocrats because of his wealth and power, which rested on his own ἀρετή and his ability to lead men in war.[874] Moreover, the Homeric nature of the elite is exemplified by the practice of advancement due to personal merit - and the national pastimes of hunting, feasting, drinking, and war.[875] Being brave in the latter of these was especially esteemed,[876] as the heroes of epic, with their violent warrior principles, were inspirational figures for most Macedonians.[877] Holt writes –

> Macedonia was a tough place that bred a tough population. To survive in the midst of so many enemies… the Macedonians held fast to the heroic warrior code of Homer's Iliad and Odyssey.... In battles, brawls, and drinking bouts, the Macedonians measured a man from king to commoner by the implacable standards of Achilles and Agamemnon (Holt 2003: 7).

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[872] Cf. 16.95.4.1, 8.3, 95.2. It is a sentiment reiterated in Polyaenus – 'Philip achieved no less through conversation than through battle. And, by Zeus, he prided himself more on what he acquired through words than on what he acquired through arms, for the soldiers shared the credit for the latter, while the former were due to him alone' (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.9). Cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.7-8. Philip's diplomacy also included a strategy of marriage alliances. Indeed, Philip was said to gain a new wife with each new campaign (Satyrus in Athenaeus 13.557b-e; Ellis 1976 212-14; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 214-15, 220-30; Tronson 1984: 116-26; Errington 1990: 221; and Worthington 2008:172-74; cf. Ogden 1999: 17-27.

[873] On Macedonian and Homeric kingship – Carlier 2000: 259-268.

[874] Edmunds 1971: 370. On Macedonian background in general – Thomas 2006; Griffith 1965: 125-39; and Worthington 2003: 69-98. Hammond (1979: 164) puts it best arguing that, 'in Macedonian society the male element was dominant to an unusual degree. War, hunting, and administration were respected above all other activities.'

[875] Note Theopompus' criticism of Philip's drinking habits (*FGrH* 115 FF 27, 162, 236, 282). On Macedonian drinking – *FGrH* 126 F 1 = Athenaeus 3.120e; and Demosthenes 2.18-19. On Macedonian symposia and drinking – Tomlinson 1970: 308-15; Borza 1983: 45-55; Carney 2007: 129-180; Worthington 2008b: 9-11; Pownall 2010: 55-65; and Sawada 2010: 393-399. On drinking in the ancient world – Davidson 1997: 36-69. On the important role of hunting among the Macedonian elite – Carney 2002: 59-80; Sawada 2010: 399-403, 408; Briant 1991: 211-55; 1993: 267-77; and on hunting in general – Anderson 1985; and Barringer 2001. It is also of note that when Aristotle gives his list of non-Hellenic nations (or tribal nations – *ethne*) in the *Politics* (1324^{b} 10-23) that are strong enough to expand at the expense of others, where military strength is held in honour, and where there are even laws stimulating military valour, he gives among other examples a law in Macedonia that a man who had never killed an enemy must wear his halter instead of a belt.

[876] Cawkwell 1978: 50. The pebble mosaic images found in the houses of the elite in Pella around the late fourth and early third-century certainly testify to the deep interest in Homeric/heroic values of the Macedonian elite of this time (Robertson 1982: 246; Ginouvès 1994: 117; Cohen 1995: 491-8; Carney 2003: 61; cf. Themeles and Touratsoglou 1997: 223-4. There was also the imitation of Homeric burial habits by the elite (Carney 2003: 62; cf. Themeles and Touratsoglou 1997: 202). On Homeric values being retained or recreated by the Macedonian elite of the fourth-century BCE in archaeology – Ameling 1988: 657-92; and Cohen 1995: 487-91; cf. Carney 2000: 276.

[877] Lendon 2005: 37; and 124 – 'Any Greek soldier recalled Homer when he thought about fighting: Homer was the mirror into which Greek warriors looked to see themselves.'

Philip, like most of his class, regularly adhered to the aristocratic-heroic values of Homer on innumerable occasions.[878] One value in particular was that of *philotimia*, the competitive seeking of honour, fame and glory that motivated figures in the public eye.[879] His son may have consciously emulated Achilles pursuing this public acknowledgement, whereas Philip perhaps subconsciously emulated that other great Homeric figure – Odysseus. Indeed, honour and fame could be gained in this agonistic society by wise words and intelligent schemes and plans as well as by heroic deeds.[880]

This veneration of Homer and the heroes would probably have begun early in any Macedonian prince's life.[881] Therefore, with almost all activities in Homer being a competition for *kleos* and *time* (the most important being combat), the highly agonistic values of the Macedonian elite were confirmed and perpetuated. However, heroes must uphold their reputations by constant displays of merit in battle and planning for battle.[882] They must also continually display virtues (*aretai*) such as strength, skill, courage, cunning, wisdom, and persuasiveness in their pursuit of glory.[883] Macedonian kingship can be thought of in similar terms. It based its power and position upon success in these areas, and the ability to lead armies successfully, providing them with a field of action and a source of booty and wealth.[884] As is attested from Alexander I to Perseus, Macedonian monarchs had to fight in person in battle to command the respect and obedience of their soldiers.[885] It was a public and powerful display of ἀνδρεία,[886] in which military defeats, weakness or incompetence could negatively affect the stability of a king's regime.[887] The number and type of Philip's wounds from battle provide ample testimony for Philip's knowledge of these facts.[888] Indeed, Philip's need to be first into battle had a Homeric flair,[889] and he remained 'the

[878] On the strong 'Homeric resonance' of Philip's Macedon – Lane Fox 2011: 358-59.
[879] Cartledge 2004: 226.
[880] Cf. Diod. 16.95.3-4; Isoc. *Pan.* 49; and Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.26ff., 7.5.15-30. Aelian states that 'Philip of Macedon was said to be not merely a good soldier and powerful speaker, but to have the highest respect for education (*V.H.*4.19).'
[881] Worthington 2008: 18. On the great importance of Homer in Macedonian education – Cohen 1995: 487-8. On Macedonian education – Carney 2003: 47-63; On Homer's important role in Greek education – Marrou 1956: 29-34; Cohen 1995: 487; Robb 1994: esp. pp. 159-82.
[882] Lendon 2005: 24.
[883] Many of the epithets of the poem reflect these virtues (e.g. *Il.*10.109-10 etc.).
[884] Cf. Billows 1995: 19-20.
[885] Errington 1990: 221; and King 2010: 379. Xenophon thought that the best way to get soldiers to obey was to better them in martial accomplishments (e.g. *An.* 7.3.45; *Cyrop.* 5.5.33-34). It was the oldest type of legitimate authority known to the Greeks (cf. *Il.* 12.318-21). Note the defection of Macedonian troops to Pyrrhus from Demetrius because 'their traditions had accustomed them to believe that the man who proved himself the best fighter was also the best ruler' (Plut. *Demetr.* 44.5; cf. 49.4 and Polyb. 10.40.1ff.).
[886] Cf. Xen. *Ages.* 2.12, 6.1-2; and *Cyrop.* 1.4.20.
[887] Gehrke 2013: 79; cf. Diod. 16.35.2-3. Courage (ἀνδρεία, *virtus* and *fortitudo*) was a generic royal quality that required little explanation for most authors of antiquity despite its prominence e.g. Xen. *Ages.* 10.1, 11.9; Isoc. *Evag.* 23, 65; Plin. *Pan.* 3.4 and 16.3 (Noreña 2009: 8). It is seldom explicitly mentioned in Philip's anecdotes and stratagems - but is almost a given in many cases in view of the military contexts. Theopompus put Philip's courage in battle down to being drunk (Athen. 10.435a-d). Cf. Dem. 11.22; 18.67 – seeking glory.
[888] The wounding of Philip II also generated many accounts, stories, and anecdotes e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 177F, 307D, 331B; Dem. *Or.* 18 (*De Cor.*) 67; Aul. Gell. 2.27; Diod. 16.34.5; Stob. 7.67; and Ael. *N.A.* 9.7. Riginos (1994: 103-119) argues that these and other tales of Philip's wounds were embellished or exaggerated by later authors for dramatic and sometimes comic effect. On wounds as proof of a king's fighting qualities and his general character – Xen. *Ages.* 6.2.
[889] Lane Fox 2011: 358.

traditional Macedonian warrior king to the end' (Worthington 2008: 199).[890] Therefore, many tales probably come from the fact that under Philip the king's power was probably far more personal than institutional.[891] Philip was the head of an archaizing heroic monarchy functioning primarily as an efficient military regime.

> Noble birth needed to be buttressed by solid achievement. No rights or constitution protected the king; his government was personal, his authority as absolute as he could make it... success and achievement were the means to authority, and the restless ideal of a Homeric hero was a very real claim to them both (Lane Fox 1973: 64-5).

After Philip, military ability was by far the most critical aspect of his son's reign and that of the Hellenistic monarchs.[892] Evident in other sources and propaganda from the period, this fact is also clearly shown by the oft quoted passage on the nature of kingship in the *Suda* (based on early Hellenistic source).

> *Basileia*: kingship does not derive from nature or legitimacy; it comes from the ability to lead armies and to manage affairs successfully this was the case with Philip and with the Successors of Alexander.

This suggests a strong reason in part for the survival through the Hellenistic period of such a large amount of the tales concerning Philip and military stratagems. Though almost untraceable now – their popularity can hardly be doubted in a world in which military *nous* was paramount.[893]

There was also the role played by the overall status of Philip's achievements and reputation in war, both of which were well known and respected in his own day (Isoc. *Ad Phil.* 105). Moreover, both of these aspects of Philip's legacy endured later into antiquity (e.g. Polyb. 16.60.40 and Just. 9.8) and beyond.[894] Philip's reputation was built on his ability to skilfully co-ordinate

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[890] Philip's hands-on-generalship in battle (along with his son's) was a royal forerunner (and exemplar) to the long list of Hellenistic kings wounded or killed in battle in the following centuries (Moore 2013: 464-5). Cf. Gehrke 2013: 78-79 and Préaux 1978: 196ff. For criticism of Philip's courage in battle as reckless and unnecessary – Isoc. *Ep.* 2. *Ad Phil.* 3, 9.

[891] Cf. Sawada 2010: 406.

[892] Billows 1995: 20-21, 28; cf. Luraghi 2013: 21-22 and Eckstein 2009: 6. Haake (2013: 99-127), who shows how certain *tyrannoi* became *basiloi* by adopting Hellenistic monarchic ideology, including the foundational role of success on the battlefield. On Hellenistic military leadership – Beston 2000: 315-335.

[893] Many of these *exempla* survive in the stratagem collections of Polyaenus, and to a lesser extent Frontinus, both of which stem from the genre of written military theory which emerged in the fourth century BCE. With stratagems as a major theme, it combined historical examples with the sophists' idea that warfare was a teachable art. It found a new expression in the Hellenistic period in the 'stratagem collection' which probably reflected peripatetic fondness for data collection (Krentz and Wheeler 1994: vii; Wheeler 2010: 20-21). For example, the two volume *Strategika* of Demetrius of Phalerum may have contained *exempla* that the author thought of some interest to Ptolemy I. Philip's status and catalogue of military successes would have made him a prime candidate for inclusion in such a work, and others like it. But it is unlikely that Philip's material was invented wholesale during this period because of the conspicuous absence of *tyche* (popular in Hellenistic times) which could diminished the importance of personal qualities (cf. Spencer 2006: 32).

[894] Griffith 1980: 58, 62. There is an epitaph in the *Greek Anthology* which highlights Philip's deeds as a general and king, and also pre-empts pro-Alexander arguments regarding his even greater deeds – 'I, Philip, who first set the steps of Macedonia in the path of war, lie here clothed in the earth of Aegae. No king before me did such deeds, and if any have greater to boast of, it is because he is of my blood' (7.238).

different parts of his forces in operations which he conducted in all terrains and in all seasons. Philip also stressed speed and surprise and the 'vigorous pursuit of the defeated to make victory decisive' (Billows 1995: 15; cf. Diod. 16.22.3).[895] Moreover, though Philip may have been influenced by Theban ways in matters such as harsh training routines, inclined infantry lines, effective speeches to the troops, and personal leadership at the army's front,[896] as a strategist – Philip was patient, could accept a reverse, understood how to prioritise without panicking over the immediate and urgent, preferred political solutions, and often used his army as a threat rather than as a weapon to great effect.[897] All of this is why 'throughout his reign he [Philip] proved to be a master of war and a clever politician' (Müller 2010: 167). These ancient and modern judgements illustrate clearly why Philip never ceased to function under Rome as a creditable and constructive exemplar of a warrior, general, and ruler.[898]

Philip's Stratagems in Battle

Turning to the anecdotes themselves, this section examines collectively a selection of the numerous tales of Philip's stratagems on the field of battle (Appendix A). Mostly found in Polyaenus and Frontinus, these tales show Philip as a shrewd general who had no fear of novelty, innovation, and deception when it came to strategy and tactics.[899] Certainly, the focus of these tales is on Philip's invention of stratagems or some indirect means to achieve his goals or victory. It was these successful military stratagems of Philip which offered principles and theories as templates for imitation and further martial innovation. They also prove that Philip was one of the most dangerous and imaginative generals of all Greek history – and this is why they were chosen by later authors for their collections. These stratagems of Philip allowed him to transcend time and ethnicity to become a 'good non-Roman leader' worthy of emulation by Roman generals in the field.

These stratagems cover a multitude of different situations and conditions. They also could be classified under various subheadings from general warfare and combat, to siege warfare, naval operations, diplomacy, truce negotiations and withdrawals. However, the strong thread running through all these tales is Philip's extraordinary acumen as a strategist and tactician. It is this quality

[895] On the importance of a general's speed – Xen. *Ages.* 2.1; *Cyrop.* 3.1.2-3, 19; 3.2.6, 3.3.9-10, 4.2.22, 6.2.23, 8.5.7; *Hell.* 6.2.27ff. Hammond (1978: 136-140) also emphasises Philip's pursuit of the defeated in warfare (cf. Lane Fox 2011: 343).
[896] Hammond 1997: 355-372.
[897] Griffith 1980: 73.
[898] The parallels between Philip's style of generalship and that of the later Trajan are telling (e.g. Plin. *Pan.* 12.4, 13.1, 15.3, 15.5).
[899] Xenophon thought that all generals should be inventors of stratagems (*Cyrop.* 1.6.38). This quality epitomised by being μηχανικός (cf. *Hell.* 3.1.8 and *Mem.* 3.1.6).

which binds the tales to each other and to the genre of stratagem collections. It is the reason why Polyaenus and Frontinus chose to use Philip as an exemplar for those facing contemporary and future military challenges in the Roman world. Therefore, Philip's tremendous skill in *rusé* generalship is the central theme of all these tales. But it is the various details themselves of each tale which best qualify just how versatile and valuable this skill really was to those Romans hoping to encourage it in themselves through contact and familiarity with examples like Philip's.

Each tale highlights positive aspects of Philip's generalship. For example, Polyaenus *Strat.* 4.2.17 (**example 6.1**) shows that Philip was patient enough to play the long game against the Athenians. Waiting for the right time after having realistically assessed his own circumstances, Philip out manoeuvred the Athenians and defeated their aspirations for Amphipolis through means other than combat (cf. 'bloodless victory' in Xen. *Ages.* 2.26-27). Therefore, Philip succeeds without fighting. Whereas in Frontinus *Strat.* 2.3.2 (**example 6.2**), though Philip must fight – victory is made possible before the actual combat.[900] This successful stratagem of Philip's is recorded under a section entitled *On the Disposition of Troops for Battle*. It is the first of a prestigious collection of ten recorded for foreign leaders (out of twenty-one entries) which included Rome's greatest enemy, three Spartans - famed for their military prowess, and his own son Alexander.[901] Here, Philip's awareness of the enemy's weakness before battle is the true source of his victory. It is his forethought (πρόνοια or *providentia*), which all but guarantees the enemy's defeat.

In Polyaenus *Strat.* 4.2.16 (**example 6.3**), Philip has a novel but natural response to finding the Orbelians hiding from him (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.6.39-40). Hunting was a national pastime in Macedonia, and his use of hunting dogs shows his impressive ability to adapt to the situation. Philip transfers and utilizes skills and assets to successfully achieve his goals. Moreover, he does it so easy that war has become almost a sport – the danger of the Orbelians is replaced by the thrill of the chase. It is Philip's 'instant analysis' (ἀγχίνοια) of the situation which is his superior quality,[902] a quality which constantly emerges throughout Philip's stratagems. However, when an enemy had no place left to run, siege operations normally ensued, and there were few more experienced or successful in this type of warfare than Philip.[903]

Much of Philip's success was the result of both his engineers and his own guile. Polyaenus *Strat.* 4.2.18 (**example 6.4**) demonstrates well the latter with Philip's excellent use of misdirection

[900] Philip's cunning became all too familiar to the Athenians in their dealings with him – Ryder 1994: 251-57.
[901] Philip shares the honour of successful dispositions with Pammenes (the Theban); Artaxerxes (the Persian king who defeated his brother at Cunuxa); Hannibal (x3); three Spartans (Xanthippus, Cleandridas, and Gastron); Alexander, and Pyrrhus (though victory costs him half his army).
[902] Wheeler 2010: 29.
[903] On ancient siege warfare – Marsden 1969; and Campbell 2005. On Philip's siege train – Garlan 1974: 202-44; Marsden 1977: 211-23; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 444-449; Keyser 1994: 27-49; Worthington 2008: 31-32.

to fool the defenders of Pharcedon. However, it is true that Philip was not always successful at siege operations (e.g. Diod. 16.74.2-76.4). Even so, Polyaenus *Strat.* 4.2.20 (**example 6.5**) shows that Philip was able to turn a negative situation into a more positive outcome than was to be expected. Again Philip uses deception to fool his enemy, and because of it manages to withdraw his siege machines safely from operations against Carae. A potential disaster was avoided by Philip as he and his siege engines disappeared. Philip's actions here show him to be pragmatic and cunning (the latter particularly associated with the Roman quality of *vafritia*).

It was a dangerous combination of qualities in an adversary and must have caused some in Byzantium to have serious reservations when Philip began siege operations against their city in 340 BCE.[904] Philip's Machiavellian actions in Polyaenus *Strat.* 4.2.21 (**example 6.7**) show a clever and manipulative general, who tricks the allies of Byzantium so as to effectively take them out of the fight. By using their allies' own interests as leverage, Philip wins a small victory over Byzantium without the cost of having to fight. Moreover, this particular stratagem of seeding the enemy with false information was one which the resourceful Philip seems to have used on several occasions with great success (e.g. Polyaenus *Strat.* 4.2.8 and Frontinus *Strat.* 1.4.13 – **examples 6.8-9**). By deliberately allowing fabricated intelligence too good to pass up fall into enemy hands, Philip allows their own naïveté and hopes to distract and deceive them.[905]

It was again clever misdirection on Philip's part, which he also employed in his siege operations against some unnamed coastal city in Frontinus (3.9.8 - **example 6.10**). Appropriately recorded under the heading *On Attack from an Unexpected Quarter*, it reveals Philip's ability to be imaginative, resourceful and dynamic.[906] It also shows Philip's ability to utilize the surrounding environment – the water in this instance. Indeed, adaptability to the environment or landscape was necessary for any successful general. Philip certainly proved he was just as cunning on the water as he was on the land in **example 6.11** (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.22). Here Philip's genius for subterfuge is clearly demonstrated at the expense of Chares who, like many others, is guilty of taking Philip's bait. Philip again gains his objective without confrontation or loss of any kind. His generalship (or admiralship) has negated the strength of the enemy and decided the issue without the necessity of fighting. These kinds of stratagems of Philip are exceptional in that the enemy must either take the bait entirely (such as on this occasion), or at the very least weaken their forces to account for them.

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[904] On the siege of Byzantium – Diod. 16.76.3-4; Just. 9.1.2-4 and Worthington 2008: 132-33, who argues that Philip had no real intention of taking the city. Instead, it was a means of further provoking the Athenians. Cf. Front. *Strat.* 1.3.4 (example 6.6), where Philip withdraws from the siege because 'he could not endure the delay of a siege.' Recorded under – *On determining the Character of the War*, this tale shows the Byzantines admitting that they were no match for Philip in the field. Their decision to endure a siege was the correct one in the end.

[905] Cf. Themistocles' ruse at Salamis - Hdt. 8.75-76 and Plut. *Them.* 12.

[906] Philip's solution to the problem presented by the coastal element of this siege has similar elements to that employed by Alexander at Tyre (332 BCE). On this operation and Alexander's tactics – Diod. 17.40.2-46.6; Curt. 4.2.1-4.18; Just. 11.10.10-14; Plut. *Al.* 24.2-25.2; and Arr. 2.16-24.

Another naval tale from Frontinus (*Strat.* 1.4.13a = **example 6.12**) shows just how intelligent and crafty Philip could be in the pursuit of his goals.[907] Philip uses diplomacy to distract and manipulate his enemies – engineering circumstances to his favour until the right moment arrives for his decisive action. Philip's combination of negotiation, guile, threat and force enable him to remain the proverbial 'step ahead of his enemies', who appear unable to compete with his talent for deception (cf. Diod. 16.59.2-4). Philip certainly did not let traditional rules of diplomacy or courtesy impede him if he saw any opportunity for achieving a meaningful advantage as **example 6.13** (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.4) well shows. Here Philip uses diplomacy itself to great effect as a misdirection. Philip once more distracts the enemy to bring about the right circumstances and moment for his decisive move or attack, only this time it is not actions or even words – but the promise of words!

This kind of diversion seems to have been something of a favourite ploy of Philip's.[908] Indeed, **example 6.14** (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.12) illustrates another occasion in which Philip performs a similar action, only this time Philip himself is to speak and not ambassadors. Also, going one better than our last example, Philip achieves the capture of ten thousand Sarnusians without fighting – or even weapons apparently.[909] It shows that Philip was willing to use any advantage he could manufacture to his benefit. This fact is no more obvious than in **example 6.15** (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.5) where Philip even violates the unwritten rules of combat regarding the calling of a truce to retrieve the dead.[910] Philip does not stand on ceremony like the generals of old and do battles by half – Philip's war is total war.

Example 6.16 (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.13) is interesting in that it is not an instance of Philip involved in some great piece of attacking trickery. Instead, Philip is engaged in a defensive withdrawal from some Thracians.[911] It is a simple, and not so devious stratagem, which is designed to see his men ultimately to safety. Therefore, with their salvation the crucial goal of the manoeuvre, Philip shows that stratagems were just as good for defensive actions as they were for attacking ones. However, this is completely in contrast to **example 6.17** (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.14). Here destruction and terror are used by Philip to lure the enemy from their strong position. Aware of the folly and danger of attacking such a position, Philip actively weakens the defence of the mountain pass without a single blow against it. Philip successfully facilitates the enemy's taking away of their own advantageous positioning.

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[907] It is paired with example 6.9 (*Strat.* 1.4.13) in a section entitled – *On Leading an Army through Places Infested by the Enemy*.
[908] Cf. Just. 8.3, 8.4-5, and 9.2.
[909] Cf. Ellis 1969: 16.
[910] Vaughn 1993: 46-48.
[911] It echoes elements of Alexander's withdrawal during his campaign against the Thracians (Arr. 1.1-6).

In addition, this stratagem, like many of the preceding tales, puts the focus clearly on Philip. The military successes of the Macedonians remain in the background. Their achievements are Philip's, and clearly reflects the political system, and a (literary) adoration and canonization of their king as a general and warrior. Philip is presented as being a larger than life king – almost a hero in a truly Greek sense.[912] This is not surprising when a strong belief in Philip's personal qualities and military expertise were important factors in the continuance of his regime.[913] As Gehrke argues, 'a ruler by birth was on probation until he had been tested in battle' (2013: 86). Philip was a legitimate king, but in Macedonia it always added some assurance and insurance to clearly emphasise one's agonistic qualities and successes. Therefore, Philip's victories in war legitimized him as a king. His constant successes enhanced his reputation among his subjects, reinforced his power, and strengthened his reign.[914] Through his proven abilities in warfare and his overall ἀρετη, Philip justified the confidence and εὔνοια of the Macedonian people and army – which were amalgamated as few societies have ever been.[915]

Not all of Philip's stratagems were so successful. **Example 6.18** (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.11) shows Philip up to his old tricks - only this time he is unsuccessful when his intended victims are alerted to the deception. However, success was not the crucial factor for a good stratagem for either Polyaenus or Frontinus. What really mattered was the attempt itself, and the devious or innovative thinking and planning behind it. Unsuccessful stratagems could inspire potentially effective stratagems just as well as successful ones (though they are not as commonly recorded). Philip's attempt to seize some of the Aleuadae failed, but his plan meant that he risked nothing in the attempt. Moreover, success would have meant the attainment of his goal without any real danger or confrontation. This was the key objective of any good stratagem, and Philip's stratagems certainly exemplify this kind of approach.

The stratagems of Philip, like those above and those of other great individuals, were collected to form substantial and perpetual pools of creative experience in which Polyaenus and Frontinus expected others to wade for inspiration. From these tales alone it is clear that the anecdotal Philip was not only one of the craftiest generals of the ancient world, but almost certainly one of the more dynamic and creative presences the field of war-craft has ever known. Roman commanders and individuals engaged with war at any level could have done much worse than look to Philip's example when they contemplated their next strategy or tactic. Therefore, Philip commanded respect as an exemplar in war. The survival of all these examples a testament to the level of that regard in later periods.

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[912] On one occasion, Diodorus states explicitly that Philip fought heroically (ἡρωικῶς -16.4.6).
[913] Cf. similar comments about Hieron in Mann 2013: 44-45.
[914] Cf. Gehrke 2013: 85-86, 92.
[915] Cf. Gehrke 2013: 78.

Reform and Discipline

It is true to say that the Macedonian state 'was in large degree the creation of the Macedonian army invented and trained by Philip' (Billows 1995: 17).[916] Philip revitalised and professionalised the Macedonian army by 'reorganizing the troops, reforming training and style of fighting, improving discipline, and introducing new strategies and technological advances' (Müller 2010: 168; cf. Diod. 16.3.1-3).[917] Often these tales highlight the Macedonians' role as (positive) foils for Philip in the use of their discipline as a means to emphasise the expertise of their commander – Philip is a superior general through his superior leadership of them.[918] There are several anecdotes among Philip's tales which reflect some of these elements, all of which would have been of some interest to a Roman audience which regularly saw the effects of stagnation and ill-discipline in the legions.[919] For example, in terms of training and discipline there are these tales recorded in the second-century CE writer Polyaenus (**examples 6.19-21**).[920]

6.19

Φίλιππος ἤσκει τοὺς Μακεδόνας πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων, ἀναλαβόντας τὰ ὅπλα τριακόσια στάδια πολλάκις ὁδεύειν φέροντας ὁμοῦ κράνη, πέλτας, κνημίδας, σαρίσας καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἐπισιτισμὸν καὶ ὅσα σκεύη καθημερινῆς διαίτης (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.10).[921]

6.20

Φίλιππος ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου Δόκιμον Ταραντῖνον λουτρῷ θερμῷ χρησάμενον τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀφείλετο, φήσας 'ἀγνοεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὰ τῶν Μακεδόνων, παρ' οἷς οὐδὲ γυνὴ τεκοῦσα θερμῷ λούεται (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.1).[922]

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[916] On the Macedonian army – Milns 1976: 87-136; Sekunda 1984; 1998; English 2009; and Sekunda 2010: 446-471 (includes bibliographic essay). On the Argeads and the Phalanx – Bosworth 2010: 91-102.

[917] On these reforms – Hammond and Griffith 1979: 405-449; Thomas 2006: 141-158; Gabriel 2010: 62-92; Sekunda 2010: 449-452; and Worthington 2008: 26-32; 2014: 32-38. Lane Fox argues that the hallmarks of this new army of Philip's were 'balance and variety' (2011: 374). For examples of Philip lifting the morale of his troops – Diod. 16.3.1, 4.3, and 35.3. On discipline in the classical world – Chrissanthos 2013: 312-329. On reorganizing, morale, training and discipline in Xenophon e.g. *Hell.* 3.4.16-19, 6.2.27ff.; *Hip.* 1.7, 17, 24, 26; *Anab.* 1.9.13, 5.8.13, 16, 18 (necessarily harsh); *Mem.* 3.3.2, 5; *Cyrop.* 1.6.13, 19, 2.1.9-14, 6.1.24 etc.; Hutchinson 2000: 51-62, 130-136, 189-191, and 227.

[918] Asirvantham 2000: 182.

[919] Note Pliny's lauding of Trajan's reinstitution of discipline in the legions during his reign (*Pan.* 6.2; 18.1; cf. *Ep.* 8.14.7, 10.29.1).

[920] Published in instalments, Polyaenus' work was a universal collection of over nine hundred *exempla* from mythical times to Augustus arranged ethnographically/prosopographically into eight books (in contrast to the topical headings found in Frontinus' *Strategemata*).

[921] 'Philip used to train the Macedonians before battle, making them take their arms and march for 300 stades carrying their helmets, shields, greaves, sarissas, plus – in addition to their arms – a stock of provisions and all the utensils necessary for daily life.'

[922] 'At his camp Philip stripped Docimus the Tarentine in the army because he used warm bath water, saying, 'You seem to me ignorant of the ways of the Macedonians, among whom not even a woman who has given birth bathes with warm water.'

6.21

Φίλιππος ἐπὶ Θηβαίους ἐστράτευεν. Ἀέροπος καὶ Δαμάσιππος ἡγεμόνες ἀπὸ πανδοκείου μισθωσάμενοι ψάλτριαν ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον εἰσήγαγον. οὐ μὴν ἔλαθον Φίλιππον, ἀλλὰ καταμαθὼν ἄμφω τὼ ἡγεμόνε τῶν ὅρων τῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλείας ἐξεχήρυξεν (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.3).[923]

These *exempla* are from the fourth book of Polyaenus, and are given as positive *exempla* regarding Philip's attitude towards training and disciplining his army.[924] They show something of Philip's reforms and his will to turn his army into a well-organized professional and disciplined military force.[925] They highlight the measures Philip took to realize the impressive successes he enjoyed with his army (well known to the collection's audience). They specifically demonstrate Philip's training regime, his belief in the toughness of Macedonian soldiers (and women),[926] his close attention to goings-on within his own army, and his willingness to enforce harsh punishment – including exile. Overall, going by Philip's later triumphs, they are amongst the most successful and efficacious tales of this type in Polyaenus, testimonials to Philip's intelligent and farsighted generalship. Philip's example proves that fit and highly disciplined soldiers, carrying their own equipment and food, make for quick, confident, and ultimately successful armies (cf. Poly. 4.2.7 below). It was a simple lesson for contemporary commanders to understand, process – and perhaps implement on some level.

Aside from fulfilling the overall practical and didactic aim of Polyaenus' universal collection,[927] Polyaenus' interest in these *exempla* of Philip also had a more specific historical importance when read in light of eastern events under Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus (161-166 BCE). Indeed, Polyaenus made much of the motifs of training and discipline in his collection, something which is also emphasised in other contemporary sources.[928] With the setbacks which had happened to Roman interests and forces in the east, which popular opinion and literary *topoi* ascribed to poor discipline, training and morale,[929] it seems that 'exempla on discipline, training, and boosting morale correspond to the order of the day' (Wheeler 2010: 47).[930] This suggests that simple *exempla* showing Philip's great success at reforming, reviving, and sustaining his kingdom's

[923] 'Philip campaigned against the Thebans. Two officers, Aeropus and Damasippus, hired a female harpist from an innkeeper and brought her into camp. They did not, however, escape Philip's notice. When he discovered what they had done, he expelled them both from his kingdom.'
[924] On discipline in Philip's army – Carney 1996: 24-28.
[925] Cf. Xen. *Ages.* 1.24-25, 27; *Cyrop.* 1.6.18; 2.1.20-22, 29, 2.3.13-14, 23-24; 3.3.9, 50, 53, 57; 6.4.13; 7.2.4, 7-8; 8.1.1-4; and Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 17.
[926] This role is similar to that given to Spartans and Spartan women – particularly in the later Roman period. Therefore, in accordance with the argument that from the period of Philip's rise, Macedon was positively associated 'primarily with their military expertise' (Asirvantham 2000: 81), it seems that both Spartans and Macedonians could serve as shorthand for tough warrior societies in Roman thought and literature.
[927] These aims were emphasised in almost all the prefaces (Krentz and Wheeler 1994: viii), and reflect the strong belief in the Second Sophistic that practical matters could be learned from books (Wheeler 2010: 30).
[928] Wheeler 2010: 44-48.
[929] Wheeler 1996: 229-276.
[930] On Rome's eastern frontier and the army – French and Lightfoot (eds.) 1989 and Isaac 1990.

military power, were probably included as useful material to muse over in light of war efforts in the east.[931] Indeed, these tales were well selected for addressing the contemporary concerns of Polyaenus' (imperial) readership, or those connected with Rome's new eastern campaign.[932] Therefore, Polyaenus was not a historian focused on minor details. Instead, his emphasis is on the principles of clever generalship and concise and lively presentations,[933] which could draw in his readers and edify them. This meant that Philip's *exempla* of skilled generalship regarding innovative training and tough discipline were not strictly meant as how-to-manuals. They were instead to be aspirational archetypes – sources of beneficial inspiration for a Roman readership who were seemingly in some need of them.

The next two examples also feature Philip organizing, training and disciplining his army (**examples 6.22-23**).

6.22

Philippus, cum primum exercitum constitueret, vehiculorumusum omnibus interdixit, equitibus non amplius quam singulos calones habere permisit, peditibus autem denis singulos, qui molas et funes ferrent; in aestiva exeuntibus triginta dierum farinam collo portari imperavit (Front. *Strat.* 4.1.6).[934]

6.23

Ὅτι Φιλιππος τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ δοκιμωτάτων τοὺς υἱεῖς παραλαμβάνων περὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θεραπείαν εἶχεν, οὔτι που, φασίν, ἐνυβρίζων αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ διευτελίζων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων καρτερικοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐκπονῶν καὶ ἑτοίμους πρὸς τὸ τὰ δέοντα πράττειν ἀποφαίνων. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τρυφῶντας αὐτῶν καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐπιταττόμενα ῥᾳθύμως ἔχοντας διέκειτο, φασί, πολεμίως. Ἀφθόνητον γοῦν ἐμαστίγωσεν, ὅτι τὴν τάξιν ἐκλιπὼν ἐξετράπετο τῆς ὁδοῦ ὡς διψήσας καὶ παρῆλθεν εἰς πανδοκέως. καὶ Ἀρχέδαμον ἀπέκτεινεν, ὅτι προστάξαντος αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις συνέχειν ἑαυτόν, ὁ δὲ ἀπεδύσατο· ἤλπισε γὰρ διὰ τῆς κολακείας καὶ ὑποδρομῆς χειρώσασθαι τὸν βασιλέα, ἅτε ἀνὴρ ἥττων τοῦ κερδαίνειν ὤν (Ael. *V.H.*14.48).[935]

[931] Though their practical effects were always clearly going to be limited in light of tales concerning Lucius Verus' behaviour in the East (e.g. *HA Verus* 4.4.-6.6).

[932] It seems that the emperors were reading the work of Polyaenus, who makes such a claim in the work itself (*praef.* 5). Some argue that there is evidence that Marcus Aurelius had Polyaenus with him during the Marcomannic wars (Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xiii-xiv; Wheeler 2010: 12).

[933] Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xvi.

[934] 'When Philip was organizing his first army, he forbade anyone to use a carriage. The cavalrymen he permitted to have but one attendant apiece. In the infantry he allowed for every ten men only one servant, who was detailed to carry the mills and ropes. When the troops marched out to summer quarters, he commanded each man to carry on his shoulders flour for thirty days.'

[935] 'Note that Philip took the sons of the leading Macedonian families into his personal service, not intending (so they say) to insult or demean them, but on the contrary training them to be fit and ensuring that they would be ready for action. He took a hostile view (they say) of any who were self-indulgent and slack in obeying orders. So he whipped Aphthonetus for breaking ranks, leaving the road because he was thirsty, and entering an inn. And he executed Archedamus because when he personally ordered the man to stay in his armour, he took it off. Archedamus was unable to resist thoughts of gain and had hoped to win over the king by flattery and wheedling.'

The first comes from a section of Frontinus' *Strategemata* entitled *On Discipline*. Philip is only one of five foreign *exempla* under this title out of the forty-six *exempla* given.[936] It is a significant statistic and goes some way to demonstrating Philip's regard in terms of organizing and disciplining his army in the Roman psyche. The notoriety and ultimate success of Philip's actions at the outset of his extraordinary career as a general allow him to transcend his foreign heritage as progenitor of a conquered nation, and stand as a worthy exemplar for potential commanders of Roman legions. Despite more rhetorical literature which established a parallel tradition that wanted to assign Philip's success to bribery and luck,[937] there were still those who understood the fundamental importance of Philip's military reforms to his prodigious achievements (and those also enjoyed by his son).

> 'Alexander of Macedon conquered the world, in the face of innumerable forces of enemies, by means of forty thousand men long accustomed to discipline under his father Philip' (Front. *Strat.* 4.2.4).[938]

Frontinus gives the details of the *exemplum* hoping that they will be of some practical benefit to his audience (though any advantages gained could only ever be limited because of the multiplicity of complex circumstances). He side steps the hostility of Classical Greek oratorical and narrative views, in favour of Philip's image and legacy as a reforming general and gifted military leader. It is these more functional aspects which should be viewed through Roman interests and concerns. They were attributes of Philip's legend that could be appraised, and wholly appropriated if necessary to further Roman military interests. This was part of ongoing Roman efforts at self-fashioning which could incorporate Macedonian military might and ability ever since Macedonia fell under the dominion of the Roman Empire.[939] In these circumstances, Macedonian martial capacity passed easily to Rome in both literature and spirit, becoming an assimilated touchstone for military prowess in Rome's evolving cultural aspirations. These types of tales also tap into notions of the archetypal Roman soldier, whose incredible self-discipline and physical endurance were proudly entrenched in Roman national consciousness.[940] In the end, Frontinus was in the business of utilitarian military advice and inspiration. Accessing and further disseminating Philip's recognizable military image and legacy (particularly in the areas of discipline and reorganization) naturally flowed from this motivation. Therefore, the contemporary intentions of Frontinus in terms of elevating the Roman military machine were well nourished by the tales of generals of old like Philip.

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[936] All had been generals of some repute – Pyrrhus, Theagenes, Lysander, and Antigonus.
[937] E.g. Demosthenes 1.5; 8.40; 19.265, 342; 18.48, and his derivatives.
[938] Cf. Just. 11.6; and Plut. *Al.* 15.
[939] *N.b.* that when news reached Rome of the defeat of Perseus by Paullus, the Romans celebrated as if they had also defeated Philip and Alexander (Dio. *Zon.* 9.24).
[940] Spencer 2002: 47-8.

Aelian's account also seeks to articulate Philip's legacy in these areas. However, the motivations are quite different, and like Polyaenus, more contextually based in contemporary events. Aelian begins with the introduction of the institution of the *basilikoi paides* (royal pages) by Philip.[941] This is turn leads to Philip's positive reasons for doing so (to train them to be fit and ready for action). However, not before Aelian has rhetorically dismissed some possible negative reasons for its creation (to insult and demean them) – though not overly convincingly with his use of φασίν ('they say'). This suspicious approach of Aelian towards Philip again surfaces when Aelian goes on to detail Philip's hostile attitude towards the self-indulgent and slack in obeying orders. He once more qualifies Philip's laudable attitude with φασί. Finally, Aelian concludes with more anecdotal material by giving the details of instances whereby Philip severely disciplines two *paides* (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 2.2.23, 27).[942]

Despite Aelian's reservations about Philip, he still presents Philip's military discipline as a positive quality.[943] This is particularly true in the second instance where Archedamus incorrectly thinks that flattery and wheedling (κολακείας καὶ ὑποδρομῆς) will excuse him from disobeying the king's personal order. All of these details reflect Aelian's known distrust and withdrawal from Roman politics, and also tie in with contemporary concerns about the corruption of sycophancy and insidious flattery within Rome's imperial court. A general anxiety which was born of the shadowy influence of courtiers, freedmen, and family in Roman imperial politics.[944] However, examining Aelian's material as a whole, the focus is squarely on Philip's innovation and discipline. The latter was particularly topical during Aelian's period when the military was once more playing a decisive role in imperial succession in the third-century CE (note the deaths of Caracalla, Macrinus, Elegabalus, Severus Alexander, and Maximinus 'Thrax' at the hands of their own guards or soldiers). It suggests something of a critique on imperial attitudes or facilities towards military discipline. Though noting Aelian's reservations about Philip, there is something of a slight suggestion that the military might have had some justifications for decisively entering the political sphere when it did. Therefore, Aelian is able to offer implicit commentary in two directions by utilizing Philippic material. This commentary could reflect his discontent, or at least exasperation, with both contemporary leadership and discipline (both within the military and the elite class at Rome as a whole). Aelian's didactic purpose is dictated by his audience who could govern and be governed. Philip as exemplar is able to speak to Roman anxieties across a broad and powerful spectrum.

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[941] On the royal pages – Sawada 2010: 403-406; Hammond 1990: 261-90; Heckel 1992: 237-44; and Carney 2008: 145-64.
[942] They are the only two *paides* known by name from Philip's reign because of this material (Sawada 2010: 404).
[943] This is in contrast to the negative portrayal of his son Alexander, just mentioned at 14.47a as only fearing Atarrius' insubordination and Pithon's revolutionary instinct.
[944] Cf. Spencer 2002: 81.

Philip's military discipline also naturally extended beyond the camp or the march, right onto the field of battle itself (**examples 6.24-25**).

6.24

Philippus veritus, ne impetum Scytharum sui non sustinerent, fidelissimos equitum a tergo posuit praecepitque, ne quem commilitonum ex acie fugere paterentur, perseverantius abeuntes trucidarent. Qua denuntiatione cum effecisset, ut etiam timidissimi malent ab hostibus quam ab suis interfici, victoriam adquisivit (Front. *Strat.* 2.8.14).[945]

6.25

Φίλιππος τοῖς Μεθωναίων τείχεσι κλίμακας προσήγαγεν καὶ δι' αὐτῶν πολλοὺς Μακεδόνας ἀνεβίβασε πολιορκητάς. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνέβησαν ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη, ἀφεῖλε τὰς κλίμακας, ὅπως ἐλπίδα τοῦ καταβῆναι μὴ ἔχοντες προθυμότερον τῶν τειχῶν κρατήσειαν (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.15).[946]

However, these stratagems of Philip were less about instilling discipline, and more about inducing it in battle by cutting off the option of retreat. Philip's Scythian fight is the only foreign *exemplum* Frontinus gives in a section entitled *On Restoring Morale by Firmness*.[947] This again demonstrates Philip's high regard in Frontinus as a general of successful stratagems, but particularly in that most legendary and quintessential quality of a Roman soldier – discipline.[948] It is notable that Philip's stratagem is placed last in this section, which may speak to Philip's heritage, but this is unlikely as Philip seems to function here almost as a Roman example. Placed last, the stratagem instead forms an impressive climax with its harsh strategy. Its message of actively killing one's own men in the pursuit of discipline and courage a measure of final resort in any battle.[949] It was a 'break glass in case of emergency' option which Frontinus included, secure in the belief that it would hardly be needed by any Roman commander of 'brave and disciplined Roman soldiers' – but then again, just in case… Therefore, Philip's extreme stratagem is included to address the needs of Frontinus' Roman audience by encouraging and inspiring other likeminded solutions that corresponded with this section's title.

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[945] 'Philip, on one occasion, fearing that his troops would not withstand the onset of the Scythians, stationed the trustiest of his cavalry in the rear, and commanded them to permit no one of their comrades to quit the battle, but to kill them if they persisted in retreating. This proclamation induced even the most timid to prefer to be killed by the enemy rather than by their own comrades, and enabled Philip to win the day.'

[946] 'Philip brought many ladders up to the walls of Methone and had many Macedonian besiegers climb them. When they reached the top of the wall, he took away the ladders, so that with no hope of descending they would fight more fiercely for control of the wall.'

[947] Cf. Just. 1.6.10-13 for a similar stratagem by Astyages. On Philip's campaign in Scythia – Just. 9.2 and Worthington 2008: 138-140. Philip's dealings with Scythia, and in particular king Atheas, seem to have given rise to a tradition of sayings showing the Scythian king matching wits with Philip (Plut. *Mor.* 174E-F; and Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 162; cf. Just. 9.2.12-13).

[948] On Roman discipline during the late republic and early principate – Phang 2008.

[949] Though it had been done before by the Romans during the Republic e.g. Manlius Torquartus (Livy 8.7.1-22).

This stratagem goes beyond that found in Polyaenus. However, by including Philip's severe approach to the long siege of Methone, Polyaenus sanctions Philip's tough method to coerce discipline and courage out of his men in the face of the enemy.[950] This takes the author's notions on discipline to another level, well beyond the 'training montage' of Philip's previous entries around discipline. It also raises the stakes and the dramatic interest for his Roman world audience. This suggests that Polyaenus (like his audience) also recognized that the true value of discipline and training to an army was always going to be in battle. In fact, turning to those tales surrounding Philip's defeat of the Greeks at Chaeronea in 338 BCE, discipline and training (along with experience) are among the decisive factors for victory.[951]

Chaeronea

Philip's crowning achievement as a general was his victory over the Greeks at Chaeronea. For Polyaenus and Frontinus it was straightforward proof of Philip's remarkable skill as a leader of men in war and combat – and his value as an exemplar. Moreover, the successful army Philip led had been of his own design. This is clearly acknowledged by the stratagems of our authors about the organizing, training and discipline of Philip's army. Philip's successful example at Chaeronea stemmed from the actions of these tales. This fact, along with Philip's generalship, were sure proof of the rewards of stratagems. They testified to the value of each author's work to their respective audience. Each author wrote in the full knowledge of history's assent to their estimations of Philip's talent and paradigmatic worthiness as a general. Therefore, Philip remained a potent model and image of military leadership in the Roman world, one which encouraged comparison, emulation, and competition.

Philip's generalship along with his army's discipline, training, and experience were the critical factors at Chaeronea (cf. Just. 9.3). Both Polyaenus and Frontinus record tales which bear this out (**examples 6.26-28**).

6.26

Φίλιππος ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ παρατασσόμενος Ἀθηναίοις εἴξας ἐνέκλινεν. στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων **Σ**τρατοκλῆς ἐκβοήσας 'οὐ χρὴ ἀποστῆναι προσκειμένους, ἕως ἄν τοὺς πολεμίους κατακλείσωμεν ἐς **Μ**ακεδονίαν' οὐκ ἀνῆκε διώκων. **Φ**ίλιππος εἰπὼν 'οὐκ ἐπίστανται νικᾶν Ἀθηναῖοι' ἐπὶ πόδα ἀνεχώρει συνεσπασμένην ἔχων τὴν φάλαγγα

[950] On the siege of Methone – Diod. 16.31.4, 16.35.5-6; Just. 7.6.13-14; and Worthington 2008: 47-49.
[951] On the battle of Chaeronea – Diod. 16.84-87.2; Just. 9.3-4; Worthington 2008: 147-51 and 2014: 85-90; Griffith and Hammond 1979: 596-603; and Hammond 1989: 115-19. On the fighting capabilities of both sides – Hammond 1994: 149-51. On the importance of the battle in Greek history – Cawkwell 1996: 98-121.

καὶ ἐντὸς ὅπλων πεφυλαγμένος. μετ' ὀλίγον ὑπερδεξίων τόπων λαβόμενος, παραθαρρύνας το πλῆθος, ἀναστρέψας εὐρώστως ἐμβάλλει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος ἐνίκησεν (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.2; cf. 8.40).[952]

6.27

Φίλιππος ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ γιγνώσκων τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὀξεῖς καὶ ἀγυμνάστους, τ οὺς δὲ Μακεδόνας ἠσκηκότας καὶ γεγυμνασμένους, ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν παράταξιν ἐκτείνας ταχέως παρέλυσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ εὐχειρώτους ἐποίησε (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.7).[953]

6.28

Philippus ad Chaeroneam memor, sibi esse militem longo usu duratum, Atheniensibus acrem quidem, sed inexercitatum et in impetu tantum violentum, ex industria proelium traxit, moxque languentibus iam Atheniensibus concitatius intulit signa et ipsos cecidit (Front. *Strat.* 2.1.9).[954]

Experience, discipline, superior training and physical conditioning are the keys to Philip's victory in Polyaenus. They are the clear lessons the author wishes any auditor to recognize. They are also the reasons found in the *exemplum* of Frontinus. Recorded in a section entitled *On Choosing the Time for Battle*, its details are very similar to Polyaenus (*Strat.* 4.2.7) and suggest a common tradition. Frontinus also again highlights Philip for his superior generalship among foreign leaders – he is only one of three foreign leaders mentioned out of eighteen entries. Certainly, Philip's generalship is seen as the foremost cause of Macedonian success at Chaeronea in both authors. Philip's own disparaging comments in Polyaenus on Athenian inability to understand how to win clearly, mark how early on Philip believes that the battle has already been won and lost. It demonstrates Philip's professional martial aptitude having already grasped the situation around him and foreseen victory through his own strategy.

Victory ultimately comes from Philip's intelligence (σοφια or φρόνησις) as a general (cf. Xen. *Ages.* 6.4). It also stems from Philip's ability to predict the outcome of events if a certain strategy was adopted (πρόνοια) (cf. Xen. *Ages.* 8.5), and his courage and personal fighting ability in battle (ἀνδρεία). Having displayed these qualities, all that was needed was some form of ἐπιείκεια on Philip's behalf (which Philip does in fact perform for the Athenians – see below) to round out a collection of attributes that was emerging in the fourth-century BCE. It was a canon of

[952] 'After drawing up his formations against the Athenians at Chaeronea, Philip yielded and gave way. An Athenian general, Stratocles, shouted, 'We must not stop pressing them until we shut the enemy in Macedonia,' and he did not give up the pursuit. Philip, saying, 'The Athenians do not understand how to win,' retreated gradually, keeping his phalanx drawn together and protected by shields. A little later, gaining some high ground, encouraging his troops, and turning around, he attacked the Athenians vigorously and, fighting brilliantly, he conquered.' Cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.2.8; 3.3.69-70.

[953] 'At Chaeronea Philip recognized that the Athenians were passionate and in poor physical condition, while the Macedonians were trained and in top physical condition, so by prolonging the engagement he quickly exhausted the Athenians and made them easy to defeat.'

[954] 'At Chaeronea, Philip purposely prolonged the engagement, mindful that his own soldiers were seasoned by long experience, while the Athenians were ardent but untrained, and impetuous only in the charge. Then, as the Athenians began to grow weary, Philip attacked more furiously and cut them down.'

virtues which advocated perceptive, intelligent, devious, and even ruthless generalship – as long as some measure of moderation or civilised gestures followed victory (i.e. war for the pursuit of peace) (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 4.1.15). It clearly influenced Alexander, and would be influential for centuries to come.[955] It was these qualities which helped to rationalise and explain Philip's success and achievements, and justify his inclusion in these later collections. Furthermore, this type of approach towards generalship also helped to propagate Philip's more positive tradition in these works. Philip the warrior and general in battle was a moral absolute and an unquestionable force of war towards which even Romans, so proud of their own martial prowess and history, could look for encouragement and inspiration. However, this moral certainty in war could change significantly when actual fighting was not occurring.

One such time is directly after Philip's decisive victory at Chaeronea. As already seen in chapter four (e.g. 4.2 and 4.3), it is unsurprising that there were a plethora of tales surrounding this period. It probably reflects not only the enormity of the event itself and the impact it had on Greek history, but also the great interest the Greek world must have had in Philip immediately followed such an astonishing achievement. Who was Philip? What sort of a man or king was he? What did it all mean for Greece? Some of our Roman period sources exploited material that answered these questions in general terms with historical hindsight. Moreover, Philip's victory at Chaeronea mattered for centuries to come, and left many mixed feelings among later generations of Greeks. Some views are accommodating, but others are hostile. Therefore, in some senses the battle never really ended.

This is reflected by one hostile entry found in Aelian (**example 6.29**). Philip forms part of a list of entries concerning Greek peoples (the Athenians – twice, Spartans, and Sicyonianians) who after a victory show some form of excess or lack of restraint. Being the king and sole arbiter of Macedonian policy, Philip is the only named individual mentioned. It seems Aelian will not let Philip hide behind the national descriptor of 'Macedonians'. Philip is equated with the state, his name made interchangeable with 'Macedon'. It is a message that would have resonated during Aelian's period.

6.29

...Ἐπεὶ τὴν ἐν χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην ἐνίκησεν ὁ Φίλιππος, ἐπὶ τῷ πραχθέντι αὐτός τε ἥρτο καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες πάντες. οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες δεινῶς αὐτὸν κατέπτηξαν καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κατὰ πόλεις ἐνεχείρισαν αὐτῷ φέροντες. καὶ τοῦτό γε ἔδρασαν θηβαῖοι καὶ Μεγαρεῖς καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ Εὐβοεῖς <καὶ> οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀκτῇ πάντες. οὐ

[955] Moore 2013: 464-65. *N.b.* 'But nurtured though you were on the glories of war, you have remained a lover of peace, and for this your moderation (*moderatio*) commands our greater praise (Plin. *Pan.* 16.1).'

μὴν ἐφύλαξε τὰς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμολογίας ὁ Φίλιππος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐδουλώσατο πάντας, ἔκδικα καὶ παράνομα δρῶν (*V.H.* 6.1).[956]

This more unfavourable view of Philip condemns his inability to abide by agreements after Chaeronea and his enslavement of the Greeks (*n.b.* the subordinate placement of Philip's name at the end of phrases to emphasise his behaviour and diminish his name). The good work of the general is undone by the perfidy of the statesman.[957] This view taps into a popularised, almost Demosthenic, view of Philip as untrustworthy, deceitful and opportunistic. A view also found in the later author Justin who wrote some time shortly after Aelian. For example, 'conducting his wars with equal perfidy'; 'character for dishonesty, for which he was now deemed remarkable above other men'; and 'as if everything that he meditated was lawful for him to do… to leave no law or right unviolated, proceeded to engage in piracy' (Just. 8.3). Philip is presented as a king willing to break oaths without hesitation for further gain and power (e.g. Just. 9.8; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 74.14).[958] Aelian's judgements here show that Philip's display of faithlessness, dishonesty, and lack of moderation after final victory is to be rejected as a model and discarded. It is an outright moral view which ties in with another saying recorded in Aelian (**example 6.30**).

6.30

Δεῖ τοῦς παῖδας τοῖς ἀστραγάλοις ἐξαπατᾶν, τοὺς δὲ ἄνδρας τοῖς ὅρκοις. οἱ μὲνΛυσάνδρου εἶναι λέγουσι τὸν λόγον, οἱ δὲ Φιλίππου τοῦ Μακεδόνος. ὁποτέρου δ᾽ ἂν ᾖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν κρίσιν. καὶ ἴσως οὐ παράδοξον εἰ μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀρέσκει ἐμοὶ καὶ Λυσάνδρῳ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐτυράννει, ἐγὼ δὲ ὡς φρονῶ δῆλον ἐξ ὧν μὴ τὸ λεχθὲν ἀρέσκει με (*V.H.* 7.12).[959]

Aelian's confusion over attribution (though he favours Lysander) is in stark contrast to his clear distaste for the comment and behaviour.[960] To break oaths was to transgress against the gods (often invoked to guarantee such oaths), which must have greatly offended a man who held priestly office. However, remembering that Philip's image could be used to epitomize a range of political, social and cultural associations, this material of Aelian's might suggest something of the Roman world's

[956] 'When Philip won the battle of Chaeronea he was buoyed up by his achievement, as were all the Macedonians. The Greeks were frightened of him, and their cities surrendered individually; this was the decision of Thebes, Megara, Corinth, the Achaeans, Elis, Euboea, and the whole of Acte. But Philip did not respect the agreements he had made with them, and enslaved them all unjustly and illegally.'

[957] Pausanias explicitly attacks Philip's reputation as a general on account of dishonouring of oaths and treaties (*Arcadia* 7.4-8). He even goes so far as to hold it responsible for the Philip's downfall and the ultimate destruction of his family from the wrath of heaven. 'Philip may be supposed to have accomplished exploits greater than those of any Macedonian king who reigned either before or after. But nobody of sound mind would call him a good general, for no man has sinned by continually trampling on oaths to heaven, and by breaking treaties and dishonouring his word on every occasion. The wrath of heaven was not late in visiting him; never in fact have we known it more speedy.'

[958] It goes somewhat against the model established and praised in Xenophon's *Agesilaus* (1.10-12, 3.2, 3.5; cf. *Cyrop.* 5.1.22-23, 5.2.8-10; and Isoc. *Evag.* 44 and *Ad Dem.* 1.13).

[959] 'Children have to be deceived with knucklebones, men with oaths. Some attribute this saying to Lysander, others to Philip of Macedon. Whoever it belongs to, it is wrong in my opinion. Perhaps it is not surprising if my views differ from Lysander's. He was a tyrant, and as to my views, it is obvious why the remark does not appeal to me.'

[960] Cf. Plut. *Lys.* 8.4 and *Mor.* 177E-F = Example 4.3; and Dio Chrys. *Or.* 74.15, where attribution to Lysander follows comments on Philip. Aelian's distaste reflects rhetorical thinking in which the character of the speaker is judged by their praise or blame of virtue and vice (Arist. *Rhet.* 1.9, 1366a 23-6).

ongoing discourse on political and cultural values. Therefore, it could also reflect more broadly contemporary anxieties among Rome's elite in terms of trusting those actively engaged in Rome's political upheavals of the early third-century CE. Moreover, when example 6.29 is read with its surrounding material, it also strongly suggests general concerns over the illegal and unjust excesses or lack of limits shown by victors, particularly in relation to the vanquished in Rome's power struggles. Philip's image and legend offered a historical avenue with which to symbolically appraise and comment on Rome's contemporary *mores* – especially in regard to power and responsibility (cf. Spencer 2002: 95).

However, in a perfect example of the fluid interpretative possibilities of Philip's image, another tale of Aelian's set after Chaeronea portrays Philip's behaviour as being almost the opposite to that above (**example 6.31**).[961] Philip's name and his image comprised a flexibility and distance which allowed it to swing between negative and positive estimations (again like his son). It also argues that Aelian had no real coherent approach to character portrayals in his work (philosophers fair better than the statesmen though). Instead, lacking the programmatic arguments of a Valerius Maximus, Aelian expected each entry to be read and judged on its own merit or internal message. This anecdote's value to Aelian arises from its ability to play a role in conversations centred on the Roman world's engagement with supreme autocratic power. Philip as model is one way in which the Roman world could think about, explore, and ultimately negotiate the nature and institution of monarchy (cf. Spencer 2002: 83).

6.31

Ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡνίκα ἐνίκησεν <ὁ> **Φ**ίλιππος, επαρθεὶς [δὲ] τῇ εὐπραγίᾳ ὅμως λογισμοῦ ἐκράτησε καὶ οὐκ ὕβρισε· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾤετο δεῖν αὐτὸν ὑπο μιμνήσκεσθαι ὑπό τινος τῶν παίδων ἑωθεν ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ προσέταζε τῷ παιδὶ τοῦτο ἔχειν ἔργον. καὶ οὐ πρότερον, φασίν, οὔτε αὐτὸς προῄει, οὔτε τις τῶν δεομένων αὐτοῦ παρ' αὐτὸν εἰσήει, πρὶν τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸν παῖδα ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἐκβοῆσαι τρίς. ἔλεγε δὲ αὐτῷ· "**Φ**ίλιππε, ἄνθρωπος εἶ" (*V.H.* 8.15).[962]

This anecdote shows Philip after his victory at Chaeronea directly addressing the corrupting influence of absolute power with a rather novel solution. The slave's role does echo protocols found in Roman triumphs, in which a companion or public slave reminded the individual from time to time of their mortality.[963] This may have appealed to Roman elites nostalgic for the reality checks and controls placed on unrestrained arrogance and power offered by such an example. These circumstances suggest that this tale might be better examined with other *civilitas* material.

[961] Aelian has one other mention of Chaeronea at *V.H.* 12.53.

[962] 'Philip had defeated the Athenians at Chaeronea. Encouraged by his success he nevertheless kept control of his faculties and did not become arrogant. So he thought it necessary to be reminded by one of his slaves early in the morning that he was a human being, and he assigned this task to the slave. He would not go out himself, they say, or let any petitioner in to see him, until the slave had called out this daily message to him three times. The slave said, 'Philip, you are a human being.''

[963] Beard 2007: 272-75.

However, it is crucial to remember that it is only as a direct result of Philip's military prowess and victory that he is forced to address these less martial concerns of human limitations. The concerns of Philip the king and statesman are in many ways the result of the successes (or setbacks) of Philip the warrior and general. Therefore, this daily reminder before Philip addressed his more civic responsibilities stemmed directly from Philip's accomplishments in war.

Aelian's willingness to record the anecdote demonstrates Philip's importance as a peripheral figure in the ongoing meditation occurring throughout the empire on supreme power and autocratic government. The nature of Philip's power, success, and personality permitted many meaningful comparisons and associations between him and many of Rome's emperors.[964] In this instance, Philip's anecdote speaks to the idea that only a ruler's ability to check their own behaviour and arrogance (*sophrosune/moderatio*) could be hoped for by his subjects when no external checks were possible.[965] By causing himself to be reminded daily of his true nature and place by a mere slave – Philip appears to succeed where many others failed.

Many of the tales recorded directly after Philip's victory at Chaeronea are found in Plutarch. The two positive examples found in the *apophthegmata* collection have already been discussed (chap. four). The rest below offer striking images of Philip, whose actions at this specific time were particularly important to someone like Plutarch, who felt that real character often revealed itself in times of great success or disaster (**examples 6.32-34**).

6.32

λέγεται δὲ διαμεῖναι μέχρι τῆς ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχης ἀήττητον· ὡς δὲ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐφορῶν τοὺς νεκροὺς ὁ Φίλιππος ἔστη κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ἐν ᾧ συνετύγχανε κεῖσθαι τοὺς τριακοσίους, ἐναντίους ἀπηντηκοτας ταῖς σαρισαις ἅπαντας ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἀναμεμιγμένους, θαυμάσαντα καὶ πυθόμενον ὡς ὁ τῶν ἐραστῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρωμένων οὗτος εἴη λόχος, δακρῦσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν· "'Απόλοιντο κακῶς οἱ τούτους τι ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν αἰσχρὸν ὑπονοοῦντες (Plut. *Pelop.* 18.5)."[966]

6.33

ὥσπερ ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ, πολλὰ ληρῶν ὑπὸ μέθης καὶ καταγέλαστος ὤν, ἅμα τῷ προσπεσεῖν αὐτῷ περὶ σπονδῶν καὶ εἰρήνης λόγον ἔστησε τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ συνήγαγε τὰς ὀφρῦς καὶ τὸ ῥεμβῶδες καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκσοβήσας εὖ μάλα βεβουλευμένην καὶ νήφουσαν ἔδωκε τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις ἀπόκρισιν (Plut. *Quaes. Conv.* 7.10.2 = *Mor.* 715C).[967]

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[964] Cf. Spencer 2002: 100.

[965] Cf. Spencer 2002: 111. Though this is Aelian and not Plutarch, this tale does recall elite aspirations of all periods for the *civilis Princeps* (Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 32-48).

[966] 'It is said, moreover, that the band was never beaten, until the battle of Chaeronea; and when, after the battle, Philip was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the long spears of his phalanx, with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed, and on learning that this was the band of lovers and beloved, burst into tears and said: 'Perish miserably they who think that these men did or suffered aught disgraceful.'

[967] 'Remember Philip at Chaeronea: he talked a lot of nonsense, in his drunkenness, and made a fool of himself, but the moment he was approached with a proposal for an armistice and peace, he set his face firmly, knitted his brows, and, brushing aside his casual and careless air, gave the Athenians a deliberate and sober answer.'

6.34

Παραυτίκα μὲν οὖν ὁ Φίλιππος ἐπὶ τῇ νίκῃ διὰ τὴν χαρὰν ἐξυβρίσας, καὶ κωμάσας ἐπὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς μεθύων, ᾖδε τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ Δημοσθένους ψηφίσματος πρὸς πόδα διαιρῶν καὶ ὑποκρούων· Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους Παιανιεὺς τάδ' εἶπεν· ἐκνήψας δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ περιστάντος αὐτὸν ἀγῶνος ἐν νῷ λαβὼν ἔφριττε τὴν δεινότητα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ῥήτορος, ἐν μέρει μικρῷ μιᾶς ἡμέρας τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναρρῖψαι κίνδυνον ἀναγκασθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (Plut. *Dem.* 20.3).[968]

Plutarch again manipulates his material well to fit both genre and context. This causes Philip's image to once more appear fairly fluid, even within the single author (though in different works). Like Alexander, Philip's image and its manipulative potential are central to his animation in the Roman world. He can be many things. However, his inconsistent portrayal in political and social Roman dialogues informs no completely stable character who can be identified as the true Philip of Roman world reception.[969] That said, the above tales of Plutarch do ultimately present a slightly more positive Philippic image than not – but only after he comes in for some early criticism in two of the tales.

The first anecdote, in which Philip emotionally acknowledges the courage of the dead Theban sacred band after the battle of Chaeronea, comes during an excursus on the sacred band by Plutarch in his *Pelopidas* (18.1-19.4).[970] Philip shows his ability at the moment of his greatest triumph as a general to admire and sympathise with the death and sacrifice of fellow warriors (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 7.1.41).[971] It is respectful behaviour by Philip, but is only used by Plutarch to highlight the extraordinary esteem in which the sacred band were held by even their enemies and conquerors. For Plutarch, Philip's deferential behaviour is commendable, but not really presented in a model way – though it could serve that function easily. Plutarch's concern here is to underscore the Theban 'sacred band' as an elite and distinguished fighting force (once led by the Theban hero of this biography), and to publicise their dramatic and honourable end.

Philip's respectful behaviour is in contrast to that which he is initial said to have shown in Plutarch's *Demosthenes* when going among the dead. This drunken and disrespectful behaviour of Philip's aligns well with the rest of the biography's pan-Hellenic and Demosthenic views of Philip.[972] Philip's mockery of Demosthenes is also juxtaposed with the tale's ending in which Philip regains himself. However, Philip's sobering up and reflection on the battle only serve to

[968] 'Immediately after his victory, then, Philip waxed insolent for joy, and going forth in revel rout to see the bodies of the slain, and being in his cups, recited the beginning of the decree introduced by Demosthenes, dividing it into feet and marking off the time – 'Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, thus move.' But when he got sober and realized the magnitude of the struggle in which he had been involved, he shuddered at the power and the ability of the orator who had forced him to hazard his empire and his life in the brief span of a single day.'

[969] Cf. Spencer 2002: 119.

[970] Worthington argues that the lion Philip had set up to the sacred band's bravery at Chaeronea 'lends credence' to this tale (2014: 89).

[971] On Philip's possible connections with the sacred band – Worthington 2008: 17 and 2014: 28.

[972] On Cyrus and temperance – Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.10-11, 4.5.7-8, 7.5.75.

acknowledge and promote the abilities of the orator Demosthenes, fitting a larger pattern whereby Philip is commonly portrayed negatively in Second Sophistic material deriving from and related to Demosthenes. It was his skills that had forced Philip to risk it all. Philip's generalship may have won the day, but this anecdote highlights that Demosthenes statesmanship had defeated Philip's with having to fight the battle at all (it was also lacking in Philip's initial behaviour after the battle). That Demosthenes' abilities as an orator and statesman are the true focus is also made clear by the section immediate following Philip's anecdote. Here it states that Demosthenes' fame even reached the Persian king, who told others to offer him attention and money because he was able to distract Philip from his Asian plans (*Dem.* 20.4).

For Plutarch, Philip's behaviour and his entire appearance on the stage of Chaeronea is channelled through Philip's reactions to the exploits of the protagonist of his biography as an orator and statesman. Philip is the antagonist, he fights (well), is then drunk and silly, then sober and rational – but ultimately because of Demosthenes. Philip is not really the focus or the hero. However, his anecdote is still part of Plutarch's biography, and as such adheres to Plutarch's overall goals for his biographical work. Therefore, it is still able to be seen as paradigmatic to some extent. However, any potential role for Philip as an exemplar is really on the periphery of the main threads of the work – all of which are intimately linked to Demosthenes.

In Plutarch's other account, Philip appears in a section of his *Quaestiones Convivales* (*Table Talk*), under question 10 – *Whether it was a good custom to deliberate over wine*. Philip's anecdote is used by one interlocutor (Plutarch's brother) as evidence for his argument that considering things such as practical matters (πραγματικὰς σκέψεις) or practical politics (πραγματικὴν πολιτικὴν) under the influence of wine were different from considering things such as the subtleties of philosophy (*Mor.* 715B-C). The inclusion of Philip's anecdote allows Plutarch's brother to also argue that drinking is not the same as being drunk, and that there is no reason to be afraid that men who can take a lot of drink, and are men of some sense otherwise (e.g. *Mor.* 715D). Philip is used as a persuasive exemplar of this type of individual. Though Philip had been drinking and celebrating his victory, he is able to cast aside this behaviour and take up the sobering burden of statesmanship when approached by the Athenians for peace.[973] The jubilation, pride, and relief of the general are quickly forgotten when the practical politics of the situation once more call forth the reasoning of the statesman.[974] Philip's easy transition between the two spheres is of special note, and make him

[973] Elsewhere, Plutarch records that after Chaeronea Hypereides proposed a decree, which granted citizenship to resident aliens, set free the slaves, and suggested moving children, women and sacred objects to the Peiraeus. This apparently frightened Philip who then granted permission to remove the bodies of the dead (*Mor.* 848F-849A). It is unlikely though that Philip had any knowledge of such a decree before making his decision regarding the bodies of the slain.

[974] *N.b.* the difficulty for a king of bearing good fortune and success with moderation as opposed to bearing misfortune well (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.4.14).

an exemplar worthy of arguing even the finer points of philosophical-didactic literature. Plutarch('s brother) has used Philip's anecdote to address an assertion made in relation to a question of some contemporary relevance.[975] Though the extent of that relevance was subjective, Philip's appeal as a known model and image with which to debate was concrete – even if that legacy visibly dances here to the philosopher's tune.

Returning to Philip's reflection on having to risk it all on the outcome of a single day, other tales of Plutarch show that these thoughts were not of Philip's own conception, but seemingly the result of another's address to him before the battle (**example 6.35**). Moreover, like Philip's use of the slave after the battle of Chaeronea (above), these comments are the direct result of Philip's previous military successes. Indeed, despite a strong focus on free speech in the tale (and others like it), these remarks are brought on by Philip's past martial achievements, which have bought him to this critical juncture. But they also question the durability of that success - and Philip's potential for more.

6.35.A

εὖ δὲ καὶ Διογένης, ὅς ἐπεὶ παρελθὼν εἰς τὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου στρατόπεδον, ὅτε τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβάδιζε μαχούμενος, ἀνήχθη πρὸς αὐτόν, ὁ δ' ἀγνοῶν ἠρώτησεν εἰ κατάσκοπος, ἐστι, "πάνυ μὲν οὖν," ἔφη, "κατάσκοπος ὦ Φίλιππε, τῆς ἀβουλίας σου καὶ τῆς ἀνοίας, δι' ἣν οὐδενὸς ἀναγκάζοντος ἔρχῃ περὶ βασιλείας καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὥρᾳ μιᾷ διακυβεύσων. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἴσως σφοδρότερον· (Plut. *Adulator* 30 = *Mor.* 70C-D).[976]

6.35.B

τί δέ; Διογένης οὐκ εἶχε παρρησίαν, ὅς εἰς τὸ Φιλίππου στρατόπεδον παρελθὼν ὁπηνίκα μαχούμενος ἐχώρει τοῖς Ἕλλησι, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναχθεὶς ὡς κατάσκοπος, "ναί," κατάσκοπος ἔφη ἀφῖχθαι τῆς ἁπληστίας αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, ἥκοντος ἐν βραχεῖ καιρῷ διακυβεῦσαι περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἅμα καὶ τοῦ σώματος (Plut. *De Exilio* 16 = *Mor.* 606C; cf. Diog. Laert. 6.43).[977]

Therefore, it was the cynic philosopher Diogenes who seems to have caused Philip to ponder what he risked by his actions.[978] There is little difference in the details of the two accounts, aside from the language used to describe Philip's reasons or motivations for risking his life (σώματος) and

[975] It also aligns with the comment in Cassius Dio that Trajan 'drank all the wine he wanted, yet remained sober' (68.7). It recalls also comments made regarding Alexander (Plut. *Al.* 23.1).

[976] 'Excellent, too, was the retort of Diogenes on the occasion when he had entered Philip's camp and was brought before Philip himself, at the time when Philip was on his way to fight the Greeks. Not knowing who Diogenes was, Philip asked him if he were a spy. ''Yes indeed, Philip,' he replied, 'I am here to spy upon your ill-advised folly, because of which you, without any compelling reason, are on your way to hazard a kingdom and your life on the outcome of a single hour.'' This perhaps was rather severe.'

[977] 'And did Diogenes lack freedom of speech – Diogenes who appeared at the camp of Philip as the king was advancing to join battle with the Greeks, was brought before him as a spy, and answered that he had come to spy indeed – on Philip's insatiable greed and folly in coming to stake on the cast of the dice in a few decisive moments both his empire and his person?'

[978] This is not the only tale linking these two famous individuals. Lucian records an interesting anecdote which was typical of Diogenes (*Hist. conscr.* 3).

kingdom/empire (βασιλείας or ἡγεμονίας). In the first account, Philip's ill-advised folly (ἀβουλίας...τῆς ἀνοίας) leaves him with no real compelling reason (οὐδενὸς ἀναγκάζοντος) for taking the risk. In the second, it is Philip's insatiable greed and folly (ἀπλησίας... ἀφροσύνης) which compel him to take the risk.[979]

The first account is found in Plutarch's *How to tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, in a section which asks when should a friend be severe and emphatic in using frank speech (ἡ παρρησία).[980] Plutarch thinks that it should be used to check pleasure, anger or arrogance, and to 'abate avarice or curb inconsiderate heedlessness' (*Mor.* 69E-F). Moreover, a 'friend who is concerned for his friends must not let slip the occasions which they themselves often present' (*Mor.* 70B). This is followed by two anecdotes of Philip. Firstly, the famous tale of Demaratus speaking candidly to Philip after his falling out with Olympias and Alexander (cf. *Mor.* 179C; and *Al.* 9), and the above tale of Diogenes' equally frank observation.[981] Demaratus was a known friend of Philip's (e.g. *Mor.* 329D), and his frank speech accords well with Plutarch's arguments. However, the relationship between Diogenes and Philip was not the same, and as such the cynic philosopher's παρρησία is of a different magnitude (see below).[982] Indeed, Diogenes comes before Philip as a stranger and an accused spy (κατάσκοπος).[983]

The second version is in Plutarch's *On Exile*, and is used in a list of anecdotes to argue against statements of Euripides, in particular that 'banishment should deprive the exile of free speech' (*Mor.* 606B). Diogenes' tale, along with those about Theodorus and Hannibal, show exiles performing παρρησία before kings. Therefore, the unifying theme for Plutarch between these two accounts of Diogenes and Philip is free-speech. It is Diogenes who is the model and exemplar here of this quality. Philip is here the model of power and folly which the cynic philosopher is to chastise. They are clearly anecdotes of the *chreia* type. Diogenes' clever and perhaps insightful retort is a putdown which has something of a utilitarian objective. Diogenes, the ultimate stateless man of little possessions, chastises Philip - the king who would have it all. The contrast is striking,

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[979] Other evidence from the second and third-century CE Greek Philostratus suggests that Diogenes was there on behalf of the Athenians, and that arriving when he did, Diogenes only succeeded in insulting Philip; '…Diogenes went straight to Chaeronea and reproached Philip on the Athenians' behalf, saying that Philip claimed to be descended from Heracles, and yet his arms were destroying the people who took up arms to defend the children of Heracles (Phil. *Apollonius of Tyana* 7.2.3).' 'If Diogenes had said what he did to Philip before Chaeronea, he might have kept that hero guiltless of taking up arms against Athens, but by arriving only after the event he merely insulted him without any salutary effect (Phil. *Apollonius of Tyana* 7.3.2.).' On Philostratus – Bowie and Elsner (eds.) 2009.

[980] On philosophers, *parrhesia*, and kings – Haake 2013B: 182-84.

[981] Famously, Diogenes also supposedly chastised Alexander – though in a rather less serious manner - Diog. Laert. 6.38; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.32; Plut. *Al.* 14; *Mor.* 331E-F, 605D, 782A; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 4.14; and Val. Max. 4.3 ext. 4a.

[982] On Diogenes and cynic philosophy – Desmond 2008; Navia 1996, 1998, 2005; Cutler 2005; and Shea 2010.

[983] That Diogenes was brought before Philip suspected of being a spy or scout when he spoke his mind is taken up by Epictetus in his teachings to help describe the role of the cynic philosopher in general – '… and partly, in the words of Diogenes, when he was taken off to Philip, after the battle of Chaeronea, as a scout. For the Cynic is truly a scout, to find out what things are friendly to men and what hostile; and he must first do his scouting accurately, and on returning must tell the truth… (*Disc.* 3.22.23-25).' Cf. *Disc.* 2.13.4.

and shows too the courage of Diogenes. He gambles with the only thing he has for the sake of παρρησία – his life.[984]

Plutarch's focus on free speech is unsurprising given its centrality to classical Athenian culture and his second sophistic leanings. However, it was also very Macedonian - perhaps conceptualised as a traditional check on arrogance in monarchic power (cf. *isegoria* - chap. three). Therefore, Diogenes speaks not only as a philosopher before a king, but almost as a Macedonian, and therefore – almost as a friend. This realization allows Plutarch to make the implicit argument that to speak frankly for the betterment of another was to cross boundaries in a higher cause. Philip's reaction to this rebuke is not recorded in Plutarch, and this fact allows Plutarch's idea to stand, whereas anger and punishment from Philip would have undermined it. Diogenes and Philip allow Plutarch to clearly articulate something of his thinking on monarchy, power and free-speech in a time when παρρησία was a quality best cultivated in private. These versions of this Philippic anecdote nurture a central theme which advocates a challenge to unrestrained power and folly, or at least seeks some kind of reconciliation between autocracy and free-speech. Nevertheless, all these tales are the direct consequences of Philip's military skill and successes, and cannot be fully appreciated when detached from them.

Two other accounts of Philip actions after the battle of Chaeronea are of interest here also, as they are based on anecdotal material and again involve *parrhesia*. The first is from Diodorus, who structures this section of his narrative around an anecdote (**example 6.36**).

6.36

Λέγουσι δέ τινες ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τὸν πότον πολὺν ἐμφορησάμενος ἄκρατον καὶ μετὰ τῶν φίλων τὸν ἐπινίκιον ἄγων κῶμον διὰ μέσων τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἐβάδυζεν ὑβρίζων διὰ λόγων τὰς των ἀκληρούντων δυστυχίας. Δημάδην δὲ τὸν ῥήτορα κατ'ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις ὄντα χρήσασθαι παρρησίᾳ καὶ λόγον ἀποφθέγξασθαι δυνάμενον ἀναστεῖλαι τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἀσέλγειαν. φασὶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, Βασιλεῦ, τῆς τύχης σοι περιθείσης πρόσωπον 'Αγαμέμνονος αὐτὸςοὐκ αἰσχύνῃ πραττων ἔργα Θερσίτου; τὸν δὲ Φίλιππον τῇ τῆς ἐπιπλήξεως εὐστοχίᾳ κινηθέντα τοσοῦτο μεταβαλεῖν τὴν ὅλην διάθεσιν ὥστε τοὺς μὲν στεφάνους ἀπορρῖψαι, τὰ δὲ συνακολουθοῦντα κατὰ τὸν κῶμον σύμβολα τῆς ὕβρεως ἀποτρίψασθαι, τὸν δ' ἄνδρα τὸν χρησάμενον τῇ παρρησίᾳ θαυμάσαι καὶ τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας ἀπολύσαντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλαβεῖν ἐντίμως. τέλος δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Δημάδου καθομιληθέντα ταῖς 'Αττικαῖς χάρισι πάντας ἀπολῦσαι τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἄνευ λύτρων, καθόλου δ' ἀποθέμενον τὴν ἐκ τῆς νίκης ὑπερηφανίαν πρέσβεις ἀποστεῖλαι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τῶν 'Αθηναίων καὶ συνθέσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλίαν τε καὶ συμμαχίαν... (Diod. 16.87.1-3).[985]

[984] On Diogenes and the tolerance given to his particularly brusque *parrhesia* in ancient times – Baltussen 2015: pp. 74-93.

[985] 'The story is told that in the drinking after dinner Philip downed a large amount of unmixed wine and forming with his friends a comus in celebration of the victory paraded through the midst of his captives, jeering all the time at the misfortunes of the luckless men. Now Demades, the orator, who was then one of the captives, spoke out boldly and made a remark able to curb the king's disgusting exhibition. He is said to have remarked: 'O King, when Fortune has cast you in the role of Agamemnon, are you not ashamed to act the part of Thersites?' Stung by this well-aimed shaft of the rebuke, Philip altered his whole demeanour completely. He cast off his garland, brushed aside the symbols of pride that marked the comus, expressed admiration for the man who dared to speak so plainly, freed him from captivity and gave him a place in his own company with every mark of honour. Addressed by Demades with Attic charm, he ended

This time Philip is drunk and parading through his captives before having his disgusting behaviour (τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἀσέλγειαν) rebuked by yet another daring act of παρρησία.[986] This causes Philip to cast off his garland (typical symbol of victory) and other symbols of pride (σύμβολα τῆς ὕβρεως), and in an act of *epieikeia* he explicitly expresses his admiration for Demades and his frankness (τὸν δ' ἄνδρα τὸν χρησάμενον τῇ παρρησίᾳ θαυμάσαι) and frees him with full honours. This leads to an abandonment of the arrogance of victory (τὴν ἐκ τῆς νίκης ὑπερηφανίαν) and a more general act of *epieikeia* towards all the Athenian captives as a whole.[987] Encouraged by the Attic charm (ταῖς 'Αττικαῖς χάρισι) of Demades, Philip changes from the drunk and arrogant general celebrating before the defeated – to clearheaded statesman sending envoys and concluding treaties of friendship and alliance.[988]

This tale is similar to other tales already discussed in which Philip's arrogance and the like are chastised by free-speech and leads to some kind of acceptance of responsibility or offering of forgiveness. Philip is again the foil for another's παρρησία. It is the boldness of Demades that is to be admired. Philip is relegated to the model of a drunk autocrat proudly revelling in his own power and victory over enemies.[989] Moreover, the free-speech and later charm of Demades provide the impetus for Philip's later act of *epieikeia* – a sign of his overall φιλανθρωπία.[990] Therefore, these virtues of Demades transform Philip from an unwanted paradigm of autocratic conceit to that of a forgiving statesman, who is himself also able to be redeemed through an act of *epieikeia* from the tale's auditors.[991]

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by releasing all of the Athenian prisoners without ransom and, altogether abandoning the arrogance of victory, sent envoys to the people of Athens and concluded with them a treaty of friendship and alliance...'

[986] Agesilaus though drunkenness to be avoided like madness (Xen. *Ages*. 5.1).

[987] That the actions of Demades were ultimately responsible for the release of his fellow Athenian's might be found in Sextus Empiricus (c. 160 – 210 CE) (Bailey 2002) –'For the art of conversation is not usually gained from grammar but from a general quickness of wit, -unless, indeed, Demades, the orator, was a Grammarian, who (when he was captured along with many Athenians after the defeat at Chaeronea) said to Philip who was forcing him to join in a feast -

> Was there ever a man with a feeling for justice
> Who in his heart could endure to share in eating and drinking
> Ere he had freed his companions and seen them standing before him? (*Against the Professors* 1.294-5).'

[988] On the fate of Greek captives after battle – Pritchett 1991: 203-312.

[989] This behaviour contrasts sharply with that of Agesilaus, who was said to have prided himself on ruling himself and being humble in success (Xen. *Ages.* 10.2, 11.2, and 11.11). However, by the end of the tale Philip can be said to somewhat embody Agesilaus who was the 'bitterest of adversaries, but mildest of conquerors' (Xen. *Ages.* 11.12). *N.b.* Isocrates' advice to Philip in a letter before Chaeronea regarding friendly acts in times of trouble building good will and helping to forget wrongs committed in the past (*To Phil.* 37).

[990] According to Justin, in Philip's first conflict with the Athenians (apparently won when Philip surprised them by a stratagem), 'though he might have put them all to the sword, he yet, from dread of a more formidable war allowed them to depart uninjured and without ransom (Just. 7.6.; cf. Diod. 16.8.5).' It seems that events around Chaeronea were that 'more formidable war', and yet Philip continued to act as he had done in the past. Cf. Philip's forgiveness and courteousness towards Methone despite his wound (Just. 7.6.), the Phocians after their defeat (Diod. 16.60.4), and Amphipolis e.g. '[Philip] exiled those disaffected toward him, but treated the rest considerately' (Diod. 16.8.2). Philip's behaviour is similar to that of Agesilaus towards his defeated enemies (Xen. *Ages.* 1.20 and 1.22; cf. *Cyrop.* 3.2.12-16; 4.4.5-13; 7.1.42-43; 7.2.26, 29).

[991] On *clementia* in warfare – Dowling 2006: 16-18.

O'Sullivan has recently argued that the exchange between the two men, apocryphal or not, works around different 'conceptualizations of *parrhesia*' (2015: 54).[992] On one hand, 'Demades functions as its democratic embodiment' (2015: 54), whilst Philip's *parrhesia* is a frankness bought on by sympotic associations which exhibit a lack of restraint and only helps to demean and disgrace the speaker (2015: 54).[993] This seems true enough, though it is also true that the Greeks rhetorically used Macedonian symposia to reveal 'Greek virtue and Macedonian vice' (Carney 2010: xxi). What is most important here is that the inclusion of this tale allowed Diodorus to unwittingly (or wittingly) emphasise free-speech and forgiveness during the Republic's twilight for those engaged in, or meditating on war, politics and power (his preface does set out something of an exemplary narrative – 1.1.1-5.3).[994] This not only complemented other famous examples which were also available in contemporary events, but enable past and present to bond in collective aspirations for the future. Therefore, as the Roman world turned towards more autocratic governance, following battles that began to echo the political significance of Chaeronea, the example of Philip and Demades was still remembered – and still able to function as an ideal of sorts. Their example was a composite exemplar which was formed from the behaviour of both the conquered and conqueror. Through this tale the actions of Demades and Philip had an importance that resonated well beyond events and Hellenic interests of the fourth-century BCE.

The second story is found in Athenaeus and is unsurprisingly mostly concerned with banqueting and drinking (**example 6.37**).

6.37

> καὶ Φίλιππος δ' ὁ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου πατὴρ φιλοπότης ἦν, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Θεόπομπος ἐν τῇ ἕκτῃ καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν. κἀν ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει τῆς Ἱστορίας | γράφει· Φίλιππος ἦν τὰ μὲν φύσει μανικὸς καὶ προπετὴς ἐπὶ τῶν κινδύνων, τὰ δὲ διὰ μέθην· ἦν γὰρ πολυπό της καὶ πολλάκις μεθύων ἐξεβοήθει. ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῃ καὶ πεντηκοστῇ περὶ τῶν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ γενομένων εἰπὼν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐκάλεσετοῦς παραγενομένους τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις φησίν· ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἀποχωρησάντων ἐκείνων εὐθέως μετεπέμπετό τινας τῶν ἑταίρων, καλεῖν δ' ἐκέλευε τὰς αὐλητρίδας καὶ Ἀριστόνικον τὸν κιθαρῳδὸν καὶ Δωρίωνα τὸν αὐλητὴν | καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς εἰθισμένους αὐτῷ συμπίνειν· περιήγετο γὰρ πανταχοῦ τοὺς τοιούτους ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ κατασκευασάμενος ἦν ὄργανα πολλὰ συμποσίου καὶ συνουσίας. ὧν γὰρ φιλοπότης καὶ τὸν τρόπον ἀκόλαστος καὶ βωμολόχους εἶχε περὶ αὐτὸν συχνοὺς καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν τὰ γέλοια λεγόντων. πιὼν δὲ τὴν νύκτα πᾶσαν καὶ μεθυσθεὶς πολὺ καὶ ἀφεὶς ἅπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἤδη πρὸς ἡμέραν ἐκώμαζεν ὡς τοὺς πρέσβεις | τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Καρύστιος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ἱστορικοῖς Ὑπομνήμασιν, ὅτε, φησί, μεθύειν προῃρεῖτο Φίλιππος, τοῦτ' ἔλεγε· "χρὴ πίνειν· Ἀντίπατρος γὰρ ἱκα νός ἐστι νήφων." κυβεύοντος δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καί τινος ἀγγείλαντος ὡς Ἀντίπατρος πάρεστι, διαπορήσας ὥσεν ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην τὸν ἄβακα (10.435a-d).[995]

[992] Theopompus' critical history may be the source of this tale (Worthington 2014: 89).
[993] Philip's jibe reported in Plutarch (*Dem.* 20.3) accords with iambic witticisms of drinking parties (O'Sullivan 2015: 54 n. 53).
[994] Burton 1972: 16-44.
[995] 'Alexander's father Philip also liked to drink, according to Theopompus in Book XXVI of his *History*. So too in another part of his *History* he writes: Philip was manic and prone to rushing head-long into danger, in part because this

This material is given after a section which details the drinking of Philip's son Alexander. It comes from Theopompus, and there is a good case to be made that it is more quotes than anecdote. Even so, the later material given from book 53 does give some indications of once being anecdotal material. Either way, as a model or exemplar of monarchic behaviour Philip is not presented here in a very positive light.[996] Drinking makes Philip a reckless warrior and a drunk general. Drinking also impairs Philip's statesmanship. This is not helped by Philip's general presentation - almost certainly altered by the selection process of Athenaeus. His interests strongly dictated this kind of undignified material. Furthermore, he has excluded other material for maximum effect. For example, the implication of the tale's ending with Philip left to wander off drunk and unrested to meet with the Athenian ambassadors is that he will discuss matters quite compromised. For those that knew their history, this implied that Philip's meaningful acts of respect and forgiveness towards the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea (well-known from other sources), were little more than the confused apologetic acts of a drunk and tired man. The Philip of Athenaeus exemplifies something of the drunken king/tyrant trope. However, given the themes and motivations of this work – any real serious reflection of Philip's generalship was unlikely.

This presentation of Philip and the use of his legacy is in complete contrast to the reception of these events found elsewhere in the earlier author and historian Polybius (**example 6.38**).[997] Although these are not anecdotes, Polybius does focus on events after Chaeronea to make some positive observations about Philip as a general and a statesman (cf. Asirvatham 2010: 105-6). Gone are any references to drinking, instead, there are only references to Philip's ability to defeat and subjugate his enemies on the field of battle (περιεγένετο καὶ κύριος κατέστη τῶν ἀντιταξαμένων), his gentleness and moderation (εὐγνωμοσύνῃ καὶ μετριότητι), his clemency and goodness (πραότητος καὶ καλοκαγαθίας), his

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was his nature, but in part because of his heavy drinking; for he consumed large amounts of wine and often went into battle drunk. And in Book LIII, after describing what happened at Chaeronea and how Philip invited the Athenian ambassadors who came to see him to dinner, he says: As soon as they were gone, Philip summoned some of the members of his inner circle, and told them to fetch the pipe-girls, Aristonicus the citharode, Dorion the pipe-player, and others who routinely drank with him; for Philip took people like this around with him everywhere, and had plenty of equipment ready for drinking parties and festivities. Because since he liked to drink and was personally undisciplined, he was surrounded by large numbers of smart-asses, musicians, and comedians. After he drank all night and became extremely intoxicated, he let everyone else leave and now, as day was breaking, wandered off drunk to visit the Athenian ambassadors.'

[996] Cf. Worthington 2008: 153-54.

[997] Of note here are the comments of the normally hostile Justin. He praises Philip for his restraint after his victory at Chaeronea – '(Philip)... concealed his joy at this victory. He did not offer the customary sacrifices that day nor did he laugh at dinner; he permitted no games during the feasting, used no garlands or perfume. As far as he could, he conquered without making anyone feel that he was a conqueror. He issued orders that he be addressed not as 'king of Greece' but as 'general'. He showed such restraint, concealing his joy and respecting his enemies' distress, that he avoided the impression of either gloating amongst his own countrymen or of being insulting toward the vanquished' (Just. 9.4.1-3; trans. Worthington 2008: 154).

leniency and humanity of character (ἐπιεικείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας), and his sagacity (τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν).[998] These are all qualities met elsewhere in this thesis in relation to Philip II.

6.38.A

καὶ μὴν ὁ πρῶτος αὐτῶν αὐξήσας τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ γενόμενος ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ προσχήματος τῆς οἰκίας, Φίλιππος νικήσας Ἀθηναίους τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχηνοὐ το σοῦτον ἤνυσε διὰ τῶν ὅπλων ὅσον διὰ τῆς ἐπιεικείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας τῶντρόπων· τῷ μὲν γὰρ πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὅπλοις αὐτῶν μόνων περιεγένετο καὶ κύριοςκατέστη τῶν ἀντιταξαμένων, τῇ δ' εὐγνωμοσύνῃ καὶ μετριότητι πάντας Ἀθηναίους ἅμα καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν ἔσχεν ὑποχείριον, οὐκ ἐπιμετρῶν τῷ θυμῷ τοῖς πραττομένοις, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τούτου πολεμῶν καὶ φιλονεικῶν, ἕως τοῦ λαβεῖν ἀφορμὰς πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς αὐτοῦ πρᾳότητος καὶ καλοκαγαθίας. τοιγαροῦν χωρὶς λύτρων ἀποστείλας τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους καὶ κηδεύσας Ἀθηναίων τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, ἔτι δὲ συνθεὶς Ἀντιπάτρῳ τὰ τούτων ὀστᾶ καὶ τῶν ἀπαλλαττομένων τοὺς πλείστους ἀμφιέσας, μικρᾷ δαπάνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν τὴνμεγίστην πρᾶξιν κατειργάσατο· τὸ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων φρόνημα καταπληξάμενος τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ πρὸς πᾶν ἑτοίμους αὐτοὺς ἔσχε συναγωνιστὰς ἀντὶ πολεμίων... (Polyb. 5.10.1-6).[999]

6.38.B

. . . ς θαυμάζουσι μὲν πάντες Φίλιππον διὰ τὴν ορ . . . ς μεγαλοψυχίαν ὅτι κακῶς οὐ μόνον ἀκούων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσχων ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων, νικήσας αὐτοὺς τὴν περὶ Χαιρώνειαν μάχην τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχε τοῦ χρήσασθαι τῷ καιρῷ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν βλάβην ὥστε τοὺς μὲν τεθνεῶτας τῶν Ἀθηναίων κηδεύσας ἔθαψε, τοὺς δ' αἰχμαλώτους χωρὶς λύτρων προσαμφιέσας ἐξαπέστειλε τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις· μιμοῦνται δ' ἥκιστα τὴν τοιαύτην προαίρεσιν, ἀμιλλῶνται δὲ τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς τιμωρίαις πρὸς τούτους, οἷς πολεμοῦσι τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα. . . .(Polyb. 22.16).[1000]

In the second passage, Polybius mentions Philip's overall greatness of soul, his magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχίαν), in relation to events after Chaeronea. He then uses this image of Philip as a yardstick with which to measure later individuals. Therefore, Philip is used here explicitly as an exemplar against which to evaluate later men of power – particularly Hellenistic kings and generals.[1001] In the end, they not only fall short of Philip's example, but actively seek to supress these types of qualities. Therefore, Polybius links Hellenistic failures, and ultimately that world's

[998] Cf. 'Clemency and perfidy were equally valued by him [Philip]; and no road to victory was, in his opinion, dishonourable (Just. 9.8).'

[999] 'Again Philip, who first raised their kingdom to the rank of a great power and the royal house to a position of splendour, did not, when he conquered the Athenians in the battle of Chaeronea, obtain so much success by his arms as by the leniency and humanity of his character. For by war and arms he only defeated and subjugated those who met him in the field, but by his gentleness and moderation he brought all the Athenians and their city under his domination, not letting passion push him on to further achievement, but pursuing the war and striving for victory only until he found a fair occasion for exhibiting his clemency and goodness. So he dismissed the prisoners without ransom, paid the last honours to the Athenian dead, entrusting their bones to Antipater to convey to their homes, gave clothes to most of those who were released, and thus at a small expense achieved by this sagacious policy a result of the greatest importance. For having daunted the haughty spirit of the Athenians by his magnanimity, he gained their hearty co-operation in all his schemes instead of their hostility.'

[1000] 'All admire King Philip for his magnanimity, in that although the Athenians had injured him both by word and deed, when he overcame them at the battle of Chaeronea, he was so far from availing himself of his success to injure his enemies, that he buried with due rites the Athenian dead, and sent the prisoners back to their relations without ransom and clad in new raiment. But now far from imitating such conduct men vie in anger and thirst for vengeance with those on whom they are making war to suppress these very sentiments....'

[1001] E.g. the massacre at Maronea - Polyb. 22.13.

subjugation to Rome, to the loss of these types of qualities in its men of power. Philip's example provides the critical point of reference for a historian looking for reasons on the Greek side also as to why Rome attained extraordinary success. Hence, Philip was there for the rise and domination of Rome as the Macedonian empire he initially started (now separate kingdoms) faulted and fell. However, Philip's exploitation as an exemplar lived on past these contrasts and comparisons with Hellenistic leadership. His image was reborn in Rome's new world where it continued its paradigmatic role (much like it had after his death) as a touchstone of political and military leadership.

Philip and Sparta

Events directly after Philip's victory at Chaeronea also gave rise to a rich vein of *apophthegmata* from Sparta, the only city-state of note to remain neutral to Philip (Plut. *Mor.* 239F-240B).[1002] There are a multitude of *apophthegmata* which are set either just before or during Philip's move into the Peloponnese (some are impossible to date for certain).[1003] As is to be expected, in most cases the *apophthegmata* use Philip as a foil with which to highlight laconic wit and courage. Philip is not the principal focus and his role is limited in these sayings to representing either authority, foreign other, or dangerous enemy. A fair selection of this material is collected in Appendix B (**examples 6.39-52**), the majority of which come from Plutarch who openly admired laconic speech.[1004]

In general these *apophthegmata* glorify the resistance of the Spartans to Philip, and the large number of them show that this defiance must have made some impression at the time.[1005] However, this stance was not widely supported as Sparta's interests ran counter to that of many of its neighbours who benefited from Philip's policies and support after Chaeronea. Philip's policy towards Sparta after Chaeronea 'demonstrates his appreciation of the complexities of Greek interstate relations' (Hamilton 1982: 82). That said, besides showing the level of antagonism between Philip and Sparta, these particular *apophthegmata* do not reveal much about Philip either as a general or a statesman. They are mostly concerned with venerating and articulating what Spartans were believed to have been (by others and themselves), and as such, are valuable sources for the 'history of the Spartan legend' (Tigerstedt 1974: 18).

[1002] On Laconian *apophthegmata* – Tigerstedt 1974: 16-30 and Beck 1998: 119-127.
[1003] On Philip, Sparta, and the Peloponnesian settlement – Worthington 2008: 159-60; Roebuck 1948: 83-89; Hamilton 1982: 81-83; and Ryder 1994: 241-42. On Philip and Archidamus – Hamilton 1982: 61-83.
[1004] E.g. *De Garr.* 510E-571A; cf. Beck 1998: 126.
[1005] Tigerstedt 1974: 24.

These tales show Laconic wits confronting and matching it with one of the most famous and sagacious statesman of the period. Philip is an enemy of the state against whom the patriotic, law-abiding, moral, austere, and witty Sparta of legend clashes.[1006] They are verbal challenges to Philip's power and propaganda. One example even goes so far as to compare Philip to Dionysius (II), a Sicilian tyrant whose exile in Corinth was well publicised (Plut. *De. Garr.* 17 = *Mor.* 511A). It highlights and equates Philip's foreign presence in Corinth with that of an ineffectual tyrant, and is in complete contrast to the Hellenic leadership role Philip's propaganda actively disseminated for him as head of the new 'League of Corinth'.[1007]

Similar themes are also present in another Spartan *apophthegma* which concerns Philip and the destruction of Olynthus in 348 BCE (**example 6.53**).[1008] Here Spartan wit attacks Philip for his destructive abilities as a general, and his failings as a statesman, not only to preserve Olynthus - but to build again a city comparable to that which he has destroyed.[1009] It suggests also a swipe at any known aspirations Philip may have had to turn Pella into the dominant city of the north in terms of both culture and power with the loss of Olynthus.

6.53.A

ὥσπερ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀκούσας ὅτι Φίλιππος Ὄλυνθον κατεσκαψεν "ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναστῆσαί γε τοιαύτην" ἔφη "πόλιν ἐκεῖνος ἄν δυνηθείη (Plut. *De Recta.* 6 = *Mor.* 40E)."[1010]

6.53.B

Ἀγησίπολις ὁ Κλεομβρότου, εἰπόντος τινὸς ὅτι Φίλιππος ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις Ὄλυνθον κατέσκαψε, "μὰ τοὺς θεούς," εἶπεν, "ἄλλην τοιαύτην ἐν πολλαπλασίονι χρόνῳ οὐκ οἰκοδομήσει (Plut. *Apophth. Lac. Ages. 1* = *Mor.* 215B)."[1011]

6.53.C

Ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ Φιλίππου τις εἶπε κατασκάψαντος Ὄλυνθον, "ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν ἀνοικίσαι γε πόλιν ἐκεῖνος δύναιτο τηλικαύτην," οὕτως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν θυμόν, "ἀνατρέψαι μὲν δύνασαι καὶ διαφθεῖραι καὶ καταβαλεῖν, ἀναστῆσαι δὲ

[1006] Cf. Tigerstedt 1974: 23. Sparta was not the only state to record these kind of patriotic responses towards Philip e.g. the reply of the Athenian Hegesippus to criticism that he was bringing down war with Philip on Athens (Plut. *Reg. et imp. apoph. Heges.* = *Mor.* 187E), and those of Atheas the Scythian king, who seems to have had something of a reputation for being blunt (Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 162; cf. Just. 9.2.12-13; Plut. *Reg. et imp. apoph. Ateas* = *Mor.* 174E-F).

[1007] Cf. Demetrius *On Style* 9 and 108; Lane Fox 2011: 357. Anecdotes survive in Aelian and Plutarch which suggest that the two leaders actually met. The tales are mostly concerned with statesmanship – which was to be expected for a meeting between two famous rulers (Ael. *V.H.*12.60; Plut. *Timol.* 15.4).

[1008] On Philip's campaign in the Chalcidice and the fall of Olynthus – Worthington 2008: 77-82; Ellis 1976: 98-99; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 321-28; and Cawkwell 1962: 122-40.

[1009] This *apophthegma* demonstrates well the way in which attribution can be troublesome. Here we have three different provenances – Agesipolis, the Spartan, and someone.

[1010] 'As the Spartan (Agesipolis) said, on hearing that Philip had razed the city of Olynthus to the ground, 'Yes, but even he could not possibly set up such another.''

[1011] 'Agesipolis, son of Cleombrotus, when somebody said that Philip in a few days had razed Olynthus to the ground, said, 'By Heaven, he will not build another like it in many years!''

καὶ σῶσαι καὶ φείσασθαι καὶ καρτερῆσαι πραότητός ἐστι καὶ συγγνώμης καὶ μετριοπαθείας...(Plut. *De Cohib.* 10 = *Mor.* 458C; cf. Pind. *Pyth. Od.* 4.484)."[1012]

One version comes from Plutarch's *On Listening to Lectures*. It is used as a comparative example for the sentiment that it is easy to offer objections to a discourse, but not so easy to produce a better one without great labour. It is not a positive presentation of Philip, who is aligned in the text with those who are presumptive and full of themselves. However, the most interesting version comes in Plutarch's *On the Control of Anger*. Here the *apophthegma* is used to introduce some of Plutarch's own thoughts which clearly disassociate Philip from the qualities he wishes to emphasise such as 'mildness and forgiveness and moderation in passion' (πραότητός, συγγνώμης, μετριοπαθείας). Philip is implicitly linked to anger which is able to overturn, to destroy, and to throwdown (ἀνατρέψαι, διαφθεῖραι, καταβαλεῖν), and contrasted with a list of individuals Plutarch later mentions. These men, such as Camillus, Metellus, Aristeides, and Socrates, are the exemplars of this particular section. It is their examples which Plutarch wishes to be followed. Whereas Philip's capture of Olynthus clearly made him a good general – but its destruction made him a cautionary model for the absence of moderation and forgiveness. Plutarch is not giving any real strategic advice here, his concern is instead on moral examples. Moreover, this image of Philip is somewhat at odds with previous accounts of Philip's behaviour seen elsewhere in Plutarch's writings. This once more emphasises Philip's flexibility as an exemplar for both positive and negative attributes in the Roman world.

Conclusion

Philip as a warrior and general was one of the great exemplars from the past with whom Greeks and Romans could meditate upon warfare. For those who utilized Philip and his legacy for stratagems and the like, there was a clear understanding that in making war, Philip II of Macedon stood well apart from the buffoon who stumbled drunk and reckless through the pages of Demosthenes or Theopompus. This Philip was a dangerous adversary – a cunning foe who demanded respect and admiration on the battlefield. Indeed, the stratagems recorded by Frontinus and Polyaenus exemplify just how important a figure Philip was in Roman military thinking when it came to innovative generalship that still got the basics right (like discipline, organization, and

[1012] 'Just as, then, someone said of Philip when he had razed Olynthus to the ground, 'But he could not possibly repeople a city so large,' so one may address Anger and say, 'You are able to overturn and destroy and throw down, but to raise up and preserve and spare and forbear is the work of mildness and forgiveness and moderation in passion...''

morale). Philip was a professional general who often made his enemies look like mere amateurs. This never ceased to be worthy of remembrance or emulation through the centuries.

However, away from the actual fighting itself, there seems to have been an ample stock of tales with which to make more moral arguments and judgements. This Philip was a little foolish, proud, and open to chastisement, insults and mockery. Of special significance here was Philip's behaviour after his victory over the Greeks at Chaeronea. This period raised some important themes such as *parrhesia*, forgiveness, respect, moderation, relations with Athens, and Philip's policies regarding an obstinate (and ironically vocal) Sparta. In these tales Philip often found himself on the receiving end of a lesson or witty comment which often transcended martial activity.

It was these two main traditions which together constituted Philip's image and legacy in war in the Roman world. Therefore, Philip the ingenious commander and brave warrior in the field was paired with Philip the general/statesman confronting the realities of victories gained by that acumen and courage. They were the means by which Philip was judged and remembered by posterity. It remains the case today.

Conclusion

The tales of Philip II which survive from the end of the Republic to height of the Roman Empire are used by many authors to present Philip as a largely positive exemplar of words and deeds – particularly regarding monarchy, statesmanship, generalship, and leadership. They reflect a tradition or practice of measured engagement with Philip's legacy and image, whereby each tale was adapted and styled to suit the broader prevailing political, social and cultural conditions of successive generations. Moreover, despite the often ambivalent attitude of Rome toward Greek and Macedonian figures of authority and power, Philip's reception under Rome in these anecdotes is a story of some success. He was a pervasive and persuasive figure and model of a set of values deeply entrenched in the culture of the Mediterranean world (so often epitomised in the cardinal virtues). Indeed, his tales were not only rich in the ideals of his own period (as shown by authors like Isocrates and Xenophon),[1013] but were easily relatable to the values of later epochs. As such, it is impossible to talk of clear distinctions between the principles of Philip's period and those of any period in which his tales were rejuvenated and valued. This shows some continuity of widespread beliefs – especially within elite circles. Prominent in collections and other works which were so often explicitly dedicated to the powerful – Philip's conduct functioned as a potent behavioural regulator and validator. It helped to establish and publicise correct and incorrect ways in which to hold and wield power.

The 'Introduction' to this thesis outlined and rationalised this investigation. It advanced a methodology and approach, and discussed several areas of importance. This included monarchic ideology, Macedonian receptions, kingship in the Greek, Hellenistic and Roman worlds, Philip and Alexander, and Philip as a Macedonian. Chapter one established definitions, the contextual and scholarly background, and a working methodology for the thesis by determining boundaries within which it was to operate. The most important tenets were the decisions to limit the investigation to a selection of the available material, to forego the search for historicity, and to examine the material under the guidance of themes and values in a 'Bosworthian' manner. Chapter two examined two authors who were to be emblematic of all the authors of the thesis. Therefore, Valerius Maximus and Plutarch were critically examined so as to demonstrate the type of approach applied to all authors cited, and illustrate points which had larger more universal relevance. Areas of interest

[1013] It is of note also that the anecdotes of Philip contain virtues which matched the parts of virtue (μέρη ἀρετῆς) as listed by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (1366b I.9.4-6. Cf. *Nic. Eth.* 2.7 and 3.9-4.15) e.g. δικαιοσύνη (just), ἀνδρεία (manliness), σωφροσύνη (self-control or moderation), μεγαλοπρέπεια (magnificence), μεγαλοψυχία (greatness of soul), ἐλευθεριότης (liberality), πραότης (mildness or gentleness), φρόνησις (thoughtfulness or prudence), and σοφία (wisdom).

included monarchic ideology in literature, collections of *exempla*, collections of *apophthegmata*, Roman/Latin authors, Greek authors, the role of rhetoric, the use of anecdotes in treatises, the Second Sophistic, intended audiences, ethics and morals, the selection and reworking of material, agendas, contextual issues, and works dedicated to specific individuals.

Chapter three examined the judicial anecdotes of Philip II. It revealed much regarding Philip's role as a paradigm of monarchy, leadership and 'justice' in the Roman world. It also showed that Philip's character was often tied to the moral of the tale. This was particularly evident in the presentation of example 3.1 by both Valerius Maximus and Plutarch. Valerius portrayed Philip in negative terms to emphasise aspects of free speech, and Plutarch offered a different Philip, whose wise concern for justice and exhibition of other various virtues underscored much of his own values. The chapter also revealed something of the role of the Macedonian king in these tales, the perception of *isegoria* or *parrhesia* within the Macedonian justice system, and suggested that according to tales, Philip's powers regarding fines and judgments were unregulated by anything other than the power of his own personality. Therefore, the judicial tales of Philip in chapter three largely demonstrated positive examples of a monarch performing 'justice'.

Chapter four examined those tales concerning criticism or slander of Philip II. This revealed two very important details. There was the dominating role played by self-control (*sophrosune* or *enkrateia*), and other associated virtues like *praotes* or *philanthropia* (particularly in Plutarch). There was also the fact that Roman period authors used Philip as an exemplar because he was an identifiable figure from the past, who could serve as a positive symbol or standard for later periods in terms of taking abuse or dealing with free-speech. It was a role which put him in direct conflict and competition with the example of Alexander (and almost certainly deliberately so). This chapter also exposed the difficulty of competing traditions and protagonists; the universality of limiting detail; the general versatility of *apophthegmata* (to speak to a variety of meanings, dedicatees, and audiences). It also revealed the role of Philip's companions and advisors; Philip's political shrewdness, wit, kindness and personality; the reorientation of the focus of an anecdote; and the role of rhetoric and intertextual references. Aside from confirming the difficulty of working with this type of evidence – these tales of slandering and criticising Philip II were for the most part recorded and disseminated for their value as positive examples of Philip's formidable self-control and moderation.

Chapter five examined those anecdotes relating to Philip II and friendship and politics. This revealed that there was a perception in the Roman world that Philip had a remarkable capacity to make and keep friends, bribe his enemies, and amuse others. It also showed that they were a means by which to contemplate Philip, his legacy, and contemporary values and issues in the Roman world – particularly around the role of the *civilis Princeps*. The chapter also demonstrated several key

ideas. These included the fact that these tales were grounded in contemporary fourth-century BCE ideologies, and the political, social, and cultural structures of Macedonia. It also showed that a ruler's popularity and safety (and that of the state), were linked to those who surrounded him and acted in his name. Indeed, good rulers trusted, praised, rewarded and utilized individuals of talent rather than fearing and eliminating them. Moreover, worthy leaders were also industrious on behalf of their friends and the state; as well as being intelligent, witty, kind, generous, affable, and believers in reciprocity. Another point shown was that critiques and commentary on contemporary Roman rulers and elite culture were possible – especially in terms of *latrocinia*, *avaritia* and *largitio*. Finally, chapter five demonstrated that humour and wit in a statesmen had the power to neutralize or even resolve difficult situations, construct persona and express character – and share, construct, and enforce cultural and behavioural norms. Therefore, those tales of Philip II that concerned friendship and politics were remembered and exploited for their generally positive contribution to ongoing debates on the nature ideal rule.

Chapter six examined those tales concerning Philip as a warrior and general. It showed that Philip was one of the great models from the past with whom Greeks and Romans could contemplate warfare. This was particularly true in regards to those stratagems recorded by Polyaenus and Frontinus, which clearly detailed just how dangerous and successful Philip was as an opponent on the field of battlefield. Philip exemplified innovative generalship that still focused on areas like discipline, organization, and morale. Chapter six also revealed that away from the actual fighting, there seems to have been an ample stock of tales with which to make more moral judgements – especially relating to Philip's behaviour after victory at Chaeronea. These tales often showed Philip enduring lessons and witty comments which transcended purely martial interest. Together, these two main traditions in Philip's military tales contributed to shaping his generally positive image in war as a general and warrior in the Roman world.

This thesis has shown that in their role as exemplary material, Philip's tales were important parts of a complex whole. Philip, like his son (and like many other leaders from the past), was a critical element in the ceaseless discussions of the Graeco-Roman world around all facets of ruling and command. Even if Philip's image (unlike Alexander's) was not to our knowledge overtly exploited by individual Romans as a role model – it seems assured that Philip was still used as a powerful example of monarchic ideology and leadership qualities by influential Romans of the Republic and Empire. These anecdotes were also entertaining tales of moral edification that promoted Philip (or at least the virtues or vices inherent in his actions) to interested segments of the population beyond the ruling class. This was done particularly through the universally appealing nature of positive virtues and behaviours like justice, self-control, moderation, intelligence, generosity, kindness, approachability, cunningness and innovation in war, humour, and wit.

However, tales of more negative qualities like greediness, faithlessness and bribery were present – but less popular. Nevertheless, they had their role too in establishing and perpetuating behavioural norms.

Philip's tales were an inheritance controlled by the authors of this thesis who approached it for the most part on their own terms.[1014] It was they who dictated Philip's memory and meaning.[1015] They chose the material, they ordered its presentation, they set the boundaries within which it operated, they controlled the context – and they dictated its significance. This left Philip (away from historical narratives) a wrought figure filtered through differing layers of interest, agendas, capabilities, cultural values and needs. Therefore, Philip's reception through anecdotes, *apophthegmata* and *exempla* in the Roman world was always going to be in the 'eye of the beholder' – but only ever after passing through the distortion of the 'pen of the holder'.

[1014] E.g. Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, Seneca, Cicero, Frontinus, and Polyaenus.
[1015] Cf. Spencer 2010: 181.

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Appendix A
Philip's Stratagems in Battle

Ex. 6.1
Φίλιππος Ἀμφίπολιν ἀπαιτούμενος ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ὁμοῦ δὲ καὶ Ἰλλυριοῖς πολεμῶν οὐκ ἀπέδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἀφῆκεν ἐλευθέραν· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἠγάπησαν τὸ ἐλευθέραν ἀφεῖσθαι. Φίλιππος, ὁπότε τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν κρατήσας μείζω δύναμιν ἐκτήσατο, τηνικαῦτα πάλιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατέσχεν Ἀθηναίων καταφρονήσας (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.17).[1016]

Ex. 6.2
Philippus Macedonum rex adversus Hyllios gerens bellum, ut animadvertit frontem hostium stipatam electis de toto exercitu viris, latera autem infirmiora, fortissimis suorum in dextro cornu conlocatis, sinistrum latus hostium invasit turbataque tota acie victoriam profligavit (Front. *Strat.* 2.3.2).[1017]

Ex. 6.3
Φίλιππος ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Ὀρβηλίων χώραν· δέ ἐστι φαραγγώδης καὶ δασεῖα. καταδυομένων τῶν βαρβάρων ἐς τὰ ἄλση καὶ τοὺς θάμνους, θηρευτικὰς κύνας πολλὰς ἐξήγαγεν, αἳ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξιχνεύουσαι τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν ἐθήρευον (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.16).[1018]

Ex. 6.4
Φίλιππος ἐπολιόρκει Φαρκηδόνα πόλιν Θεσσαλικήν· Φαρκηδόνιοι παρέδωκαν τὴνπόλιν. ὡς δὲ εἰσῆλθον οἱ Φιλίππειοι μισθοφόροι, περιπταίουσιν ἐνέδρᾳ· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν στεγῶν καὶ τῶν πύργων ἔβαλλον καὶ ἠκόντιζον. Φίλιππος προς τὴν ἐνέδραν ὀξέως ἀντεστρατήγησεν. Ἦν τὰ ὄπισθεν τῆς πόλεως ἔρημα τῶν πολιτῶνσυνδραμόντων ἐπὶ τὴν ἐνέδραν. κατὰ ταῦτα τοὺς Μακεδόνας προσβάλλειν ἐκέλευσε καὶ προστιθέναι κλίμακας. ἀναβάντων δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ τεῖχος, οἱ Φαρκηδόνιοι τοῦ βάλλειν τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἀποσχόμενοι σπουδῇ ἔθεον ἀμυνούμενοι τοὺς τειχοκρατοῦντας. οἱ δὲ, πρὶν ἥκειν εἰς χεῖρας, ἤδη τῆς πόλεως ἐκράτουν (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.18).[1019]

Ex. 6.5
Φίλιππος πολιορκῶν χρόνῳ μακρῷ Κάρας ἐχυρὸν χωρίον, ἑλεῖν οὐχ οἷός τε ὤν, ἀποχωρῆσαι βουλόμενος ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὰ ὄργανα τῆς πολιορχίας περισώσασθαι, νύκτα σκοτεινὴν παραφυλάξας ἐκέλευσε τοῖς μηχανοποιοῖς διαλύειν μὲν τὰ ὄργανα,

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[1016] 'When the Athenians demanded the return of Amphipolis while Philip was at war with the Illyrians, he did not give it back, but let it be independent. The Athenians were pleased that he let it be independent. When Philip became more powerful by defeating the Illyrians, then he occupied Amphipolis again, disregarding the Athenians.'

[1017] 'When Philip, king of the Macedonians, was waging war against the Hyllians, he noticed that the front of the enemy consisted entirely of men picked from the whole army, while their flanks were weaker. According he placed the stoutest of his own men on the right wing, attacked the enemy's left and by throwing their whole line into confusion won a complete victory.'

[1018] 'Philip invaded the territory of the Orbelians. It is full of ravines and bushy. When the barbarians went down into the groves and shrubs to hide, he brought out numerous hunting dogs, who tracked down and hunted down most of the enemy.'

[1019] 'Philip was besieging Pharcedon, a Thessalian city. The Pharcedonians surrendered the city. As Philip's mercenaries entered, they fell into an ambush, for many men threw stones and javelins from roofs and towers. Philip quickly devised a plan against the ambush. The rear part of the city was deserted, since the citizens assembled for the ambush. He ordered the Macedonians to make an assault there and place ladders against the wall. When they reached the top of the wall, the Pharcedonians stopped throwing at the mercenaries and ran hurriedly to ward off the men who seized the wall. But before they closed to hand-to-hand combat, the Macedonians had already mastered the city.'

μιμεῖσθαι δὲ κτύπον οἷος ἄν γένοιτο συμπηγνύντων. οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς Κάραις ἀκούσαντες τοῦ κτύπου τὰς πύλας ἔνδοθεν ἀσφαλέστερον ἀπέκλειον καὶ τοῖς μηχανήμασιν ἀντιμηχανήματα ἠτρέπιζον. Φίλιππος δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἀσχολουμένων διὰ νυκτὸς αὐτοῖς μηχανήμασιν ἀφανὴς ἦν (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.20).[1020]

Ex. 6.6

Byzantii adversus Philippum omne proeliandi discrimen evitantes, omissa etiam finium tutela, intra munitiones oppidi se receperunt adsecutique sunt, ut Philippus obsidionalis morae impatiens recederet (Front. *Strat.* 1.3.4).[1021]

Ex. 6.7

Φίλιππος ἐπολιόρκει Βυζαντίους ἔχοντας οὐκ ὀλίγην χεῖρα συμμάχων. τούτους ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν συμμαχίαν ἐτεχνάσατο πέμψας αὐτομόλους ἀγγέλλοντας, ὡς αἱ πόλεις αὐτῶν ὑπὸ Φιλίππου πολιορχοῖντο πέμψαντος ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἐκεῖ, καὶ οὐ μακρὰν ἀλώσεως αἱ πόλεις. οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἤγγελλον· Φίλιππος δὲ φανερὸς ἦν διαπέμπων μέρη τῆς στρατιᾶς ἄλλο ἀλλαχοῦ εἰς δόκησιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν. οἱ σύμμαχοι ταῦτα ὁρῶντες καὶ ἀκούοντες ἀπολιπόντες Βυζαντίους ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτῶν πατρίδας ἐστέλλοντο (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.21).[1022]

Ex. 6.8

Φίλιππος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφισσέων ἐστράτευεν· Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Θηβαῖοι τὰ στενὰ προκατελάβοντο, καὶ ἦν ἡ δίοδος ἀμήχανος. ἐξαπατᾷ τοὺς πολεμίους Φίλιππος ἐπιστολὴν πεπλασμένην Ἀντιπάτρῳ πέμψας ἐς Μακεδονίαν, ὡς τὴν μὲν στρατείαν τὴν ἐπ' Ἀμφισσεῖς ἀναβάλοιτο, σπεύδοι δὲ ἐς Θράκην πεπυσμένος τοὺς ἐκεῖ νεωτερίξειν. ὁ γραμματοφόρος [διήει] διὰ τῶν στενῶν. οἱ στρατηγοὶ, Χάρης καὶ Πρόξενος, αἱροῦσιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀναγνόντες πιστεύουσι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν στενῶν ἀπολείπουσι. Φίλιππος δὲ λαβόμενος ἐρημίας ἀφυλάκτως διεξεπαίσατο καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀναστρέψαντας ἐνίκησε καὶ τῆς Ἀμφίσσης ἐκράτησεν (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.8).[1023]

Ex. 6.9

Philippus, cum angustias maris, quae Στενὰ *appellantur, transnavigare propter Atheniensium classem, quae opportunitatem loci custodiebat, non posset, scripsit Antipatro Thraciam rebellare, praesidiis quae ibi reliquerat interceptis; sequeretur omnibus omissis. Quae ut epistulae interciperentur ab hoste, curavit. Athenienses, arcana Macedonum*

[1020] 'When Philip was unable to take Carae, a strong place, after a long siege, he wanted to retreat safely and save his siege machines. Waiting for a dark night, he told the engineers to take the machines apart, but to make noise as if they were constructing new ones. The men in Carae, hearing the noise, strengthened the interior gate defences and got machines ready to oppose Philip's machines. While they were busy all night with these preparations, Philip disappeared with his machines.'

[1021] 'The Byzantines in their war with Philip, avoiding all risks of battle, and abandoning even the defence of their territory, retired within the walls of their city and succeeded in causing Philip to withdraw, since he could not endure the delay of a siege.'

[1022] 'Philip was besieging the Byzantines, who had a large force of allies. He contrived that these abandon the alliance by sending deserters who reported that their own cities were besieged by Philip, who had sent other forces there, and that the cities were not far from being captured. The deserters gave this report. Philip sent parts of his army in different directions in plain sight, for show but not for action. When the allies saw and heard this, they abandoned the Byzantines and set out for their own countries.'

[1023] 'Philip made an expedition against Amphissa. The Athenians and Thebans seized the narrow passes first, and made it impossible for him to get through. Philip tricked the enemy by sending a fake letter to Antipater in Macedonia, saying that he was postponing the campaign against Amphissa but was hurrying to Thrace, since he had learned a revolt had begun there. The letter-carrier went through the narrow passes. The generals, Chares and Proxenus, caught him and, when they read the letter, believed it and abandoned their guard over the passes. Philip found the passes deserted and unguarded, burst through, defeated the generals when they turned around, and captured Amphissa.'

excepisse visi, classem abduxerunt; Philippus nullo prohibente angustias freti liberavit (Front. *Strat.* 1.4.13).[1024]

Ex. 6.10

Philippus in obsidione cuiusdam maritimae urbis binas naves procul a conspectu contabulavit superstruxitque eis turres; aliis deinde turribus adortus a terra, dum urbis propugnatores distringit, turritas naves a mari applicuit et, qua non resistebatur, subiit muros (Front. *Strat.* 3.9.8).[1025]

Ex. 6.11

Φίλιππος τὴν Ἀβδηριτῶν καὶ Μαρωνιτῶν καταδραμὼν ἐπανήει καὶ ναῦς ἔχων πολλὰς καὶ στρατιὰν πεζὴν ἄγων· Χάρης περὶ Νέαν πόλιν ἐναυλόχει τριήρεις ἔχων εἴκοσι. Φίλιππος ἐπιλεξάμενος τῶν νεῶν τέσσαρας τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας ἐπλήρωσεν ἐρετῶν ἀκμῇ καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ῥώμῃ ἀρίστων, καὶ παράγγελμα ἔδωκε, προαναχθῆναι τοῦ στόλου παντὸς καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν Νέαν πόλιν οὐ πολὺ τῆς γῆς ἀπέχοντας. οἱ μὲν παρέπλεον· ὁ δὲ Χάρης ὡς ἀναρπασόμενος τὰς τέσσαρας ναῦς ἐπανήχθη ταῖς εἴκοσιν. αἱ δὲ τέσσαρες, ἐλαφραὶ καὶ ἀρίστους ἐρέτας ἔχουσαι, ταχέως ἐς τὸ πέλαγος μετεωρίζονται. τῶν δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Χάρητα συντεταμένως διωκόντων ἔλαθεν ὁ Φίλιππος Νέαν πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς παραπλεύσας· Χάρης δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς τεσσαρας ναῦς κατέλαβεν (Polyy. *Strat.* 4.2.22).[1026]

Ex. 6.12

Idem, quia Cherronessum, quae iuris Atheniensium erat, occupare prohibebatur, tenentibus transitum non Byzantiorum tantum, sed Rhodiorum quoque et Chiorum navibus, conciliavit animos eorum reddendo naves, quas ceperat, quasi sequestres futuras ordinandae pacis inter se ac Byzantios, qui causa belli erant. Tractaque per magnum tempus postulatione, cum de industria subinde aliquid in condicionibus retexeret, classem per id tempus praeparavit eaque in angustias freti imparato hoste subitus evasit (Front. *Strat.* 1.4.13a).[1027]

Ex. 6.13

Φίλιππος πρέσβεις ἔπεμψεν ἐς πολεμίων Θρᾳκῶν πόλιν. οἱ μὲν ἐκκλησίαν συνήγαγον καὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς ἐκέλευον ἀγορεύειν, καὶ ἦν ἁπάντων σπουδὴ περὶ τὴν ἀκρόασιν

[1024] 'When Philip was unable to sail through the straits called Stena, because the Athenian fleet kept guard at a strategic point, he wrote to Antipater that Thrace was in revolt, and that the garrisons which he had left there had been cut off, directing Antipater to leave all other matters and follow him. This letter Philip arranged to have fall into the hands of the enemy. The Athenians, imagining they had secured secret intelligence of the Macedonians, withdrew their fleet, while Philip now passed through the straits with no one to hinder him.'

[1025] 'Philip, while besieging a certain coast town, secretly lashed ships together in pairs, with a common deck over all, and erected towers on them. Then launching an attack with other towers by land, he distracted the attention of the defenders of the city, till he brought up by sea the ships provided with towers, and advanced against the walls at the point were no resistance was offered.'

[1026] 'After ravaging the territory of the Abderitae and Maronitae, Philip was returning with many ships and a land army. Chares set an ambush with twenty triremes near Neapolis. After selecting the four fastest ships, Philip manned them with his best rowers in terms of age, skill, and strength, and gave orders to put out to sea before the rest of the fleet and to sail past Neapolis, keeping close to the shore. They sailed past. Chares put out to sea with his twenty in order to capture the four ships. Since the four were light and had the best rowers, however, they quickly gained the high sea. While Chares' ships pursued vigorously, Philip sailed safely past Neapolis without being noticed, and Chares did not catch the four ships.'

[1027] 'The Chersonese happened at one time to be controlled by the Athenians, and Philip was prevented from capturing it, owing to the fact that the strait was commanded by vessels not only of the Byzantines but also of the Rhodians and Chians; but Philip won the confidence of these peoples by returning their captured ships, as pledges of the peace to be arranged between himself and the Byzantines, who were the cause of the war. While the negotiations dragged on for some time and Philip purposely kept changing the details of the terms, in the interval he got ready a fleet, and eluding the enemy while they were off their guard, he suddenly sailed into the straits.'

ὧν ἀγγελοῦσι. Φίλιππος ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ μὴ προσδοκῶσιν ἐπιθέμενος τῆς πόλεως ἐκράτησεν (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.4).[1028]

Ex. 6.14
Φίλιππος ἠξίωσε Σαρνουσίοις ἐκκλησιάζουσι διαλεχθῆναι. οἱ μὲν συνῆεσαν· τοῖς δὲ στρατιώταις παρήγγελτο ἱμάντας ὑπὸ μάλης κομίζειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ Φίλιππος ἀνέτεινε τὴν δεξιὰν ὡς δημηγορήσων, τοῦτο ἦν ἄρα σημεῖον τοῖς στρατιώταις τοῦ δῆσαι πάντας τοὺς παρόντας. οὕτω Σαρνούσιοι δεθέντες ἐς Μακεδονίαν ἤχθησαν πλείους μυρίων (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.12).[1029]

Ex. 6.15
Φίλιππος ᾔτησε παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων Ἰλλυριῶν νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους. τῶν δὲ δόντων, ἡνίκα οἱ ἔσχατοι ἐκομίζοντο, σημήνας ἀφυλάκτοις ἐπῆλθεν (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.5).[1030]

Ex. 6.16
Φίλιππος διωκόμενος ὑπὸ Θρᾳκῶν παρήγγειλεν, ἐπειδὰν ὁ σαλπιγκτὴς φεύγειν σημήνη , τοῖς μὲν οὐραγοῦσι προβαλλομένοις μένειν, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις φεύγειν, ὅπως τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους ἐπιστήσειε διώκοντας, τοῖς δὲ οἰκείοις προλαβεῖν τῆς ὁδοῦ παράσχοι (Poly . *Strat.* 4.2.13).[1031]

Ex. 6.17
Φίλιππος τὰς παρόδους τῆς Βοιωτίας Βοιωτῶν φυλαττόντων - ἦν δὲ στενὸς ὄρους αὐχήν - οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ὥρμησεν, ἀλλὰ τήν τε χώραν πυρπολῶν καὶ τὰς πόλεις πορθῶν φανερὸς ἦν. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ οὐχ ὑπομένοντες ὁρᾶν τὰς πόλεις πορθουμένας κατέβησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρους. Φίλιππος ὑποστρέψας διὰ τοῦ ὄρους διεξεπαίσατο
(Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.14).[1032]

Ex. 6.18
Φίλιππος ἀφικόμενος ἐς Λάρισαν, ἵνα τινὰς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἔξω οἰκίας καθέλοι, νοσεῖν ὑπεκρίνατο, ὅπως ἐσιόντας αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐπισκεψομένους συλλάβῃ. Βοΐσκος ἐξήγγειλε τοῖς Ἀλευάδαις τὴν ἐπιθεσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τέλος οὐκ ἔσχεν ἡ πρᾶξις (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.11).[1033]

[1028] 'Philip sent ambassadors to a hostile Thracian city. The Thracians summoned an assembly and told the ambassadors to speak, and everyone was eager to hear what they said. At this moment, when they did not expect it, Philip attacked and conquered the city.'
[1029] 'Philip requested an opportunity to address the Sarnusians in an assembly. They assembled. He ordered the soldiers to bring leather thongs concealed under their arms. When Philip stretched out his right hand as if to begin speaking, this was the signal to the soldiers to bind all those present. Thus more than 10,000 Sarnusians were taken bound to Macedonia.'
[1030] 'Philip asked his Illyrian enemies for a truce to retrieve the corpses. After they granted the truce, while the last bodies were being brought in, he gave the signal and attacked the enemy off guard.'
[1031] 'When Philip was being pursued by the Thracians, he commanded the men in the rear, when the trumpeter signalled to flee, to stand their ground as a cover, and the others to flee, so that he might stop the pursuing enemy and allow his own men to get a head start on the road.'
[1032] 'When the Boeotians were guarding the entrance to Boeotia – it was a narrow mountain pass – Philip did not hurry to the pass, but openly burned the countryside and ravaged the cities. The Boeotians, unable to endure the sight of their cities being ravaged, came down from the mountain. Turning around, Philip broke through the mountain.'
[1033] 'When Philip arrived at Larissa, in order to seize some of the Aleuadae outside of their homes, he pretended to be sick, so that when some of them came to visit him he might arrest them. Boïscus reported the deception to the Aleuadae, and therefore his action was unsuccessful.'

Appendix B
Philip and Sparta

Ex. 39.
Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ἀγησιλάου, Φιλίππου μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην σκληροτέραν αὐτῷ ἐπιστολὴν γράψαντος, ἀντέγραψεν, ‘εἰ μετρήσαις τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιάν, οὐκ ἄν εὕροις αὐτὴν μείζονα γεγενημένην ἢ πρὶν νικᾶν (Plut. *Apoph. Lac. Archid.* 1 = *Mor.* 218E-F).’[1034]

Ex. 40.
Ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὸς Φίλιππον πολέμῳ συμβουλευόντων τινῶν ὅτι πόρρω τῆς οἰκείας τὴν μάχην συνάπτειν δεῖ, “ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτο,” ἔφη, “ὁρᾶν δεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὗ μαχόμενοι κρείττονες τῶν πολεμίων ἐσόμεθα (Plut. *Apoph. Lac. Archid.* 4 = *Mor.* 218F).”[1035]

Ex. 41.
Λέγοντος δέ τινος ὅτι Φίλιππος αὐτοῖς ἀνεπίβατον τὴν Ἑλλάδα ποιήσει, “ἱκανὴήμῖν,” ἔφη, “ὦ ξένε, ἡ ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἀναστροφή (Plut. *Apoph. Lac. Agis* 14= *Mor.* 216A).” [1036]

Ex. 42.
Πρεσβεύων δὲ μόνος ἦκε πρὸς Φίλιππον· εἰπόντος δ’ ἐκείνου, “τί τοῦτο; μόνος ἥκεις;” ἔφη, “καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα (Plut. *Apoph. Lac. Agis* 16 = *Mor.* 216B; cf. *Mor.* 233E, 511A; *Demetr.* 42).”[1037]

Ex. 43.
Ἀντίοχος ἐφορεύων, ὡς ἤκουσεν ὅτι Μεσσηνίοις Φίλιππος τὴν χώραν ἔδωκεν, ἠρώτησεν εἰ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῖς παρέσχετο ὥστε μαχομένους περὶ τῆς χώρας κρατεῖν (Plut. *Apophth. Lac. Antio.* = Mor. 217F; cf. *Mor.* 192B).[1038]

Ex. 44.
Θωρυκίων ἐκ Δελφῶν παραγενόμενος, ἰδὼν τὸ Φιλίππου στρατόπεδον ἐν Ἰσθμῷ τὰ στενὰ κατειληφότος, “κακούς,” ἔφη, “πυλωροὺς ὑμᾶς, ὦ Κορίνθιοι, ἡ Πελοπόννησος ἔχει (Plut. *Apoph. Lac. Thor.* = *Mor.* 221F).”[1039]

Ex. 45.

[1034] ‘Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, when Philip, after the battle of Chaeronea, wrote him a somewhat haughty letter, wrote in reply, ‘If you should measure your own shadow, you would not find that it has become any greater than before you were victorious.’’

[1035] ‘In the war against Philip, when some proffered the advice that they ought to engage him in battle at a good distance from their own land, Archidamus said, ‘No, that is not what we ought to look to, but where, in fighting, we shall be superior to the enemy.’’

[1036] ‘When someone said that Philip would make Greece forbidden ground to them, he (Agis) said, ‘It is quite enough, my friend, for us to go and come within the confines of our own land.’’

[1037] ‘He (Agis) came alone on an embassy to Philip, and when Philip exclaimed, ‘What is this? Have you come all alone?’ He said, ‘Yes, for I came to only one man.’’

[1038] ‘Antiochus, when he was Ephor, hearing that Philip had given the Messenians their land, asked if he had also provided them with the power to prevail in fighting to keep it.’

[1039] ‘Thorycion, arriving from Delphi and seeing in the Isthmus the forces of Philip, who had already gained possession of the narrow entrance, said, ‘The Peloponnesus has poor gate-keepers in you, men of Corinth!’’

Φιλίππου γράφοντος, ὅτε εἰς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν παρεγένετο, πότερον βούλονται φίλιον ἐλθεῖν ἢ πολέμιον αὐτόν, ἀντεφώνησαν, "οὐδέτερον (Plut. *Apoph. Lac. 28 = Mor.* 233E)."[1040]

Ex. 46.
Φιλίππου τοῦ Μακεδόνος προστάττοντός τινα δι' ἐπιστολῆς, ἀντέγραψαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι "περὶ ὧν ἆμιν ἔγραψας, Οὔ (Plut. *Apophth. Lac. 50 = Mor.* 235A-B)."[1041]

Ex. 47.
ἐὰν δὲ Βούληται λακωνίζειν, καὶ τὸ "ἔνδον" ἀφελὼν αὐτὴν μόνην φθέγξεται τὴν ἀπόφασιν· ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, Φιλίππου γράψαντος εἰ δέξονται τῇ πόλει αὐτόν, εἰς τὴν χάρτην ΟΥ̓ μέγα γράψαντες ἀπέστειλαν (Plut. *De. Garr.* 21 = *Mor.* 513A).[1042]

Ex. 48.
Ὅτε δὲ ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ ἐδόκουν ἅπαντες ἀπολεῖσθαι, εἶπε δὲ πρός τινα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, "τί νῦν ποιήσετε, ὦ Λάκωνες;" "τί γάρ," ἔφη, "ἄλλο ἢ ἀνδρείως ἀποθανούμεθα; μόνοι γὰρ ἡμεῖς Ἑλλήνων ἐλεύθεροι εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπακούειν ἄλλοις ἐμάθομεν (Plut. *Apophth. Lac. 53 = Mor.* 235B)."[1043]

Ex. 49.
Atque haec quidem et animi magnifici et prosperi status: illa vero, qua legati Lacedaemoniorum apud patrem eius miseram fortitudinis suae condicionem testati sunt, gloriosior quam optabilior: intolerabilibus enim oneribus civitatem eorum implicanti, si quid morte gravius imperare perseveraret, mortem se praelaturos responderunt (Val. Max. 6.4. ext.4).[1044]

Ex. 50.
An Lacedaemonii, Philippo minitante per litteras se omnia, quae conarentur, prohibiturum, quaesiverunt num se esset etiam mori prohibiturus: vir is, quem quaerimus, non multo facilius tali animo reperietur quam civitas universa (Cic. *Tusc.* 5.14.42).[1045]

Ex. 51.
Lacedaemonius quidam nobilis, Philippo denuntiante multa se prohibiturum, nisi civitas sibi traderetur, 'num,' inquit, 'et pro patria mori nos prohibebit?' (Front. *Strat.* 4.5.12; cf. Plut. *Apophth. Lac. Ignot.* 50).[1046]

[1040] 'Philip wrote at the time when he entered their country, asking whether they wished that he should come as a friend or as a foe; and they made answer, 'Neither.''

[1041] 'When Philip of Macedon sent some orders to the Spartans by letter, they wrote in reply, 'What you wrote about, 'No.''

[1042] 'And if he wishes to adopt the Laconic style, he may omit the 'At home' and only utter the bare negative. So the Spartans, when Philip wrote to ask if they would receive him into their city, wrote a large 'No' on the paper and sent it back.'

[1043] 'When he (Philip) invaded the Spartan's country, and all thought that they should be destroyed, he said to one of the Spartans, 'What shall you do now, men of Sparta? And the other said, 'What else than die like men? For we alone of all the Greeks have learned to be free, and not to be subjects to others.''

[1044] 'That utterance befitted a proud soul and a prosperous state of affairs. But this with which the Lacedaemonian envoys before Alexander's father testified to the sad plight of their bravery was more glorious than enviable. To his terms saddling their community with intolerable burdens they answered that if he persisted in demanding some-thing worse than death, they would prefer death.'

[1045] 'Did the Lacedaemonians in answer to Philip's threat, when he wrote that he would prevent all their efforts, ask him whether he also intended to 'prevent' them from dying: and shall not the true man of whom we are in quest be more readily found with such a spirit than a whole community?'

[1046] 'A certain Spartan noble, when Philip declared he would cut them off from many things, unless the state surrendered to him, asked: 'He won't cut us off from dying in defence of our country, will he?''

Ex. 52.

Καὶ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα μάλιστα τοῖς ἀδολέσχοις προβάλλειν ὅσην χάριν ἔχει καὶ δύναμιν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ "Λακεδαιμόνιοι Φιλίππῳ· Διονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ." καὶ πάλιν γράψαντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ Φιλίππου, "ἄν ἐμβάλω εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἀναστάτους ὑμᾶς ποιήσω," ἀντέγραψαν, "αἴκα." (Plut. *De. Garr.* 17 = *Mor.* 511A; cf. Quint. 7.6.52)."[1047]

[1047] 'And we must be careful to offer to chatterers examples of this terseness, so that they may see how charming and how effective they are. For example: 'The Spartans to Philip: Dionysius in Corinth.' And again, when Philip wrote to them, 'If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out,' they wrote back, 'If.''